Republic of China give a road map
of areas deemed critical. Several
of the provisions strengthen the
stability, continuity and robustness of
governance. Beyond these, I looked for
any deviations from expectations, for
example, on State-owned enterprise
reform or local government financing.
I also looked for any reaction to the
increased push-back against China’s
rising global capabilities from certain
countries.
GT: In recent years, the Chinese government
has made more efforts to make
Two Sessions’ agenda better meet public
expectations. For example, the government
will cooperate with media websites
to conduct surveys
about top policy areas
that the public wants
the Two Sessions to
address. How do you
evaluate such efforts?
Kuhn: Irrespective of the nature of the
political system or ideology, transparency
in governance is the best way for
government to deliver effective, efficient
programs, and enhance credibility.
The Chinese government has been
striving to increase transparency, which
deserves praise.
The Two Sessions are a vehicle for
the government to communicate with
the people and engage them through
media in dealing with all the critical
issues.
TWOSESSIONS
2018
GT: How do you see the political belief
of China that democracy should meet the
real or fundamental needs of the public?
Kuhn: Government performance and
democracy are not the same.
The former is indeed assessed by
alleviating poverty, reducing pollution,
improving healthcare and the like.
Democracy is the public participation of
common people in the complex process
of governance.
Thus, true democracy is much
broader than one-person-one-vote.
It includes, primarily, the capacity to
provide substantive input on complex
Illustration: Liu Rui/GT
issues and to provide oversight in the
management of officials.
GT: China for long has argued that
democracy or any other political mechanism
should be developed on the basis
of a country’s specific condition. How do
you see this belief, as well as its practice?
Kuhn: Certainly, political systems differ,
even between countries that have
the same ideology. Nonetheless, there
are great commonalities in the goals
and objectives shared by all countries
and people. I suspect that over time,
measured in not less than decades and
perhaps even centuries, there will be
a convergence of
systems toward
what I call with a
smile, “Optimizationism”
– leaders,
officials, executives
making myriad decisions every day to
optimize outcomes without thinking of
the ideology.
GT: There’s talk about China’s unique
system of multiparty cooperation and
political consultation led by the Communist
Party of China (CPC) during the
Two Sessions. How do you observe this
system?
Kuhn: The benefits of a one-party-rule
are apparent: the coherence of policies,
rapid decision-making and formulation
of strategies that require long-term
consistency for long-term commitment.
But all systems of governance have
trade-offs, and two challenges of oneparty-rule
are assuring that all rational
points of view, including dissenting
ones, are included in the decision-making
process; and systemic checks and
balances for oversight of officials at all
levels of government.
China’s system of multi-party cooperation
and consultation, led by the
CPC, is a political innovation in including
inputs and ideas from diverse segments
of society, while still maintaining
harmony of spirit and consistency in
policies. But because of its scale and
power, the CPC, which is the ruling
party, has a higher obligation to pay
attention to other parties and voices. A
true democracy is measured by how the
majority treats the minority.
GT: As a decades-long observer of China,
what do you think the constitutional
amendment will bring to the country?
Kuhn: This constitutional amendment
is all about strengthening China’s
system of governance, especially the
Party’s leadership of the country and
President Xi Jinping’s leadership of the
Party and the nation.
Going by the whiplash of Western
reactions, one could be forgiven for assuming
that the amendment is all about
abolishing term limits of the president
and vice president. In fact, there are 21
clauses in the constitutional amendment
and to understand where China
is going, one must gauge the meaning
and intent of all of them.
Xi has been consistent in respecting,
indeed in championing, China’s
Constitution, and by now amending it,
he underscores the congruity between
the realities of how China is governed
and what the Constitution says – thus
bolstering Xi’s commitment to the Rule
of Law.
Establishing the National Supervisory
Law and Commissions, expanding
the anti-corruption campaign to all
public organs and organizations, reaffirms
Xi’s commitment to enhancing
the rule of law.
As for term limits, it is not that Xi
will hold the formal titles of leadership
for life, but that he will hold real
leadership long enough to bring about
China’s national rejuvenation and establish
Chinese type democratic norms.
All factors considered, because of
China’s special conditions and Xi’s special
capabilities, abolishing term limits
may be good for China. It is commonly
said that China’s system of governance
can ensure stability and consistency,
which is a necessary requirement
for advancing reform.
GT: What do you see as the underlying
reason for the institutional
restructuring of the government
passed during the Two Sessions?
Kuhn: The sweeping restructuring
of the Chinese government
streamlines the bureaucracy,
eliminates institutional conflicts
of interest between government
bodies, aligns authority with
responsibility, and, significantly,
enhances the leadership of the
Party in the management as well
as the oversight of the government.
Although the restructuring
has multiple motivations, a
prime driver is to support China’s
continuing development under
complex conditions – a slowing
economy, uncertain financial risk,
unacceptable pollution, the special
demands of innovation.
Given China’s challenges at
home and abroad the government
restructure is timely. Some media
outlets describe it as a “reshuffle,”
as if the random rearrangement of
a deck of cards. I beg to differ.
This restructuring is as deliberate as
it is far-reaching – and planned precisely
to address a host of contradictions.
The outcome is to strengthen CPC’s
leadership throughout the country. In
fact, deepening reform is now defined,
for state as well as for Party institutions,
as strengthening the CPC’s leadership
in every sector. The aim is consistency
and uniformity in implementing policy.
The announcement of the restructuring
followed swiftly after the adoption
by the National People’s Congress
of the constitutional amendment, and
although both were long in the works,
their rapid-fire sequence serves to underscore
the preeminence of President
Xi in setting the new agenda, and the
power of the Party in implementing the
new policies.
GT: Environment has always been a
heated topic at the Two Sessions. How
do you see the prospect of green development
in China?
Kuhn: I have been following China’s
environmental problems for over two
decades, and until recent years under
President Xi. While officials would of
course decry pollution, it only became
progressively worse. Companies flouted
the law. The minuscule fines were a
small price for not worrying about the
cost of controlling pollution. Officials
were loath to risk impeding economic
growth. Today is dramatically different.
President Xi has raised ecology and
environment to the highest category of
national priorities. Ecological progress
is among the five top goals (along with
economic, political, cultural and social
progress). Green is the third of the New
(Five Major) Concepts of Development.
The change in attitudes toward pollution
is stunning. For example, fines for
corporate pollution now hurt.
Page Editor:
yujincui@globaltimes.com.cn
Monday, November 21, 2016
A11
Core strength
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says those who see China’s designation of Xi Jinping as core leader to be a variation
of strongman rule misunderstand its significance for a people navigating their way through huge challenges
When, at a recent
party plenum,
President Xi Jinping
(���) was
designated as
“core” of the Communist Party’s
Central Committee, some Western
media were quick to condemn the
rise of a new “strongman”. While
recognising the significance of Xi as
the core was correct, conjuring up
visions of an emerging dictator was
not.
I recalled my meeting with Xi
years earlier, when he was still party
secretary of Zhejiang (��) province.
Even then he was criticising
“empty talk” and advising, “We
should never overestimate our
accomplishments or indulge ourselves
in our achievements”.
I took note of how Xi stressed,
“We need to assess ourselves objectively”.
Hardly, in retrospect, the
ruminations of a gestating dictator.
To understand why Xi is now the
core, one must appreciate the
complex challenges of our times.
China is now facing multiple challenges:
domestically – slow growth,
industrial overcapacity, endemic
pollution, imbalanced development,
income disparity, social
injustice, social service demands;
and, internationally – wars, regional
conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile
markets, trade protectionism,
ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical
rivalries, and territorial disputes
in the South and East China seas.
Most critically, because China
must deepen its reforms to achieve
its oft-promised goal of a “moderately
prosperous society” by 2020,
the resistance of entrenched interest
groups must be overcome. More
subtly, there is what some call a
pervasive “soft resistance” – local
officials who do not do their job and
economic elites who migrate.
If reform had been progressing
smoothly, then why strengthen
central authority by investing Xi
with the status of core leader? Xi has
encountered obstacles; if there
were no obstacles, there would be
no need for a core leader.
I have been speaking to party
officials and theorists about Xi as
core leader. In fact, the necessity of
having a leadership core to maintain
stability and expedite reform is
the first and foremost of what I
found to be four factors relating to
Xi’s elevation.
A second factor is that not only
does Xi have the responsibility for
China’s transformation, he is also
accountable for it. Moreover, he has
shown courage in confronting and
dismantling a vast, corrupt system
of bribery, patronage and illicit
wealth accretion.
A third factor is that Xi as the core
does not end, and even may not di-
minish, the cardinal principle of
Xi Jinping as
core leader is
more a ratification
of reality than
a shift of
fundamentals
Bring down the curtain on this idiotic political drama
If you’re tired of all the politics, I
feel you. It’s draining, to say the
least, especially when the
melodrama in Hong Kong is
dragging out; it has become
downright dreadful when we know
there is no respite in sight.
We were supposed to have a
brief break after last September’s
Legislative Council polls, before the
next big event. Even though a large
number of people will be unable to
cast a vote in the Election
Committee subsector elections,
less than a month away, and in the
chief executive election, scheduled
for late March next year, the city
should by now be focusing on
what’s ahead.
But, thanks to the two recently
disqualified lawmakers, who lacked
the necessary knowledge, ability
and respect for oath-taking, our
(albeit dysfunctional) legislature
has basically been shut down for a
month. The ugly politics that
should have been insulated within
“democratic centralism”. The party
bolsters each of the concepts:
encouraging the democratic solicitation
of input and feedback from
members, lower-ranked officials,
and the public; and strengthening
centralism through Xi’s leadership
of the principal levers of power (his
positions as party general secretary,
head of state, chairman of the
Central Military Commission, and
head of the “leading groups” on
reform, national security and internet
security).
A fourth factor is that a core is
required to manage the party more
strictly and thereby give members
and the public more confidence.
Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented
anti-corruption campaign,
which is altering how government
officials and industry managers
work and even think. Let no one
assume that Xi’s battle against
corruption has been risk-free.
Significantly, these four factors
undergirding Xi as the core leader
map onto his overarching political
framework, his strategic blueprint
called “The Four Comprehensives”
– a moderately prosperous society,
reform, rule of law, party discipline.
Xi’s core status arises, we’re told,
through the collective will of the
party and the people. Becoming
party core is not an automatic
consequence of being general secretary;
a core leader must fit the
times and the status must be
earned.
Speaking at a press conference
following the 18th Central Committee’s
sixth plenum last month,
Huang Kunming (���), executive
vice-minister of the committee’s
Publicity Department, said that the
“central and local departments as
well as the military all expressed
their support” for Xi’s position as
party core, adding that this decision
Alice Wu has had enough of the brouhaha over the
oath-taking by two lawmakers. Now that they’ve
been disqualified, HK must focus on battles ahead
the chamber once again spilled out
onto our streets.
And what should have been
decided and concluded on
September 4 is now dragging on
indefinitely, with two or possibly
more by-elections added to the
election overload.
Hell-raising politics is not going
away any time soon, but the sheer
stupidity of the localist pair’s
actions really is one for the books –
Macbeth, in fact:
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and
tomorrow, / Creeps in this petty pace
from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded
time, / And all our yesterdays have
lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out,
was “based on the valuable experience
of the party and we feel keenly
about it”.
Huang explained that “a core is
needed to ensure that the party will
be the governing party”, describing
it as significant for upholding the
Central Committee’s authority and
maintaining the central, unified
leadership of the party and for its
“staying true to its mission”.
Therefore, party theorists
explain, Xi as core leader is more a
ratification of reality than a shift of
fundamentals.
What does Xi as core mean in a
historical context? It was Deng
Xiaoping (���) who introduced
the concept when he designated
Jiang Zemin (���) as “core of the
third generation” of central leaders,
bolstering Jiang’s stature following
his unexpected appointment as
party leader in 1989. At the time,
China was facing the dual impediments
of economic stagnation and
social uncertainty at home, and
economic quarantine and diplomatic
isolation abroad. As Deng
pointed out: “Any leading group
should have a core; a leadership
with no core is unreliable.”
Only then did Deng retrospectively
apply the novel term to Mao
Zedong (���) and to himself, as
core of the first and second generations,
respectively. (Of course,
Mao was so utterly dominant that
calling him core during his lifetime
would have seemed a demotion.
Deng remained core even when he
no longer held any official position.)
Today’s world is more complex.
China faces threats at home and
abroad. Volatility grows and uncertainty
abounds – the Middle East
and Donald Trump are offered as
evidence. The need to secure
China’s stability is more essential
than ever, and thus to strengthen
brief candle! / Life’s but a walking
shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour
upon the stage / And then is heard
no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury, / Signifying nothing.
They were indeed full of sound
and fury, and they did nothing for
the common good.
What they did opened the door
for an invitation to the courts to
intervene. What they did presented
an opportunity for an
interpretation of the Basic Law by
the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee.
What they did, ultimately, may
well become the precedent for
other legislators to be similarly
Xi’s authority is a primary reason,
I’m told, for designating Xi as core
leader. Party theorists say China
“urgently” requires a political nucleus
that is sophisticated and
nuanced, attuned to contemporary
times. Though conditions now
differ from those in 1989, Deng’s
admonition rings timelessly true.
However, that a core leader is
needed now does not mean one will
always be needed. When China
becomes a fully modernised nation,
perhaps by mid-century, condi-
tions may change again.
True loyalty is
telling leadership
in private what
one really
believes is in their
best interests
I hear frequently of the “painful
lessons of China’s century of blood
and tears” and that for China not to
have a tested and authoritative
leadership core would be “unthinkable”.
Party inner talk says “Xi
Jinping has passed the test of the
people” to be China’s political core,
leadership core, and a core of the
times.
Chinese scholars argue that
“core” is a unique characteristic of
Chinese political theory – however
inapplicable (even inexplicable) in
Western political theory. They call
Western concerns that Xi as core
leader means that “a new emperor
is born” wildly unfounded, even
paranoic. In feudal society, the
emperor ruled unconditionally
barred. And that is why the duo’s
pledge to spend every penny – and
lest we forget, this also means the
mounting cost to the public purse –
to “appeal at all costs” is beyond
rich, coming from them.
Clearly, they have yet to wrap
their heads around the concept of
“personal responsibility”. Sixtus
Baggio Leung Chung-hang is
wrong in believing that their
disqualification from Legco
rendered the election meaningless.
They have no one but themselves
to blame for their defenestration. It
is they who made the election
meaningless.
And, to add insult to the grave
injury they brought on the rest of
us, they are asking for donations. At
some point – if we’re not there
already – we must take serious
offence to be taken as fools, again
and again. The curtain must now
be drawn on this overly played-out
second act.
The irony may be lost on the
with arbitrary imperial power, and
in such a “command-obey” system,
goes the argument, there is simply
no need for a core.
Rather, given today’s party political
structure, the concept of a core
both strengthens cohesion and
serves to prevent a personality cult,
not to promote one. Having a core
means acknowledging that the
party system is not the “emperor
system” – absolute power is rejected
– and that the optimum system, at
least for the foreseeable future, is a
combination of concentrated centralism
and democratic collective
leadership.
Corroborating this functional
balance, in the communiqué issued
following the sixth plenum, the
“collective leadership system” is
reconfirmed. It states: “The implementation
of collective leadership
and personal division of labour is an
important component of democratic
centralism and must always
be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any
organisation or individual shall,
under any circumstance, not be
allowed to violate this system for
any reason.” The three “any’s” seem
no accident.
Some analysts see contradictions.
On the one hand, the
communiqué calls for democracy
and constructive criticism internally
within the party. On the other,
disobeying the central leadership is
forbidden, backed by vigilant
supervision and tough discipline.
Yet to read these statements as
contradictory is to misunderstand
what is happening here. Xi appreciates
the complex and arduous tasks
that lie ahead. He told me so a
decade ago, and it is obviously truer
today than it was then. The statements
are harmonised, first, by the
party’s motivation to seek optimum
policies for the country, and second,
by keeping most of the divergent
views internal.
True loyalty is telling leadership
in private what one really believes is
in their best interests, not pandering
and fawning by repeating what one
thinks leadership wants to hear.
Though there are concerns, no one
here worries that Xi will become
Mao.
China is now the world’s largest
trading nation and its second-largest
economy. China’s diplomacy is
expanding and its military is growing.
From its Belt and Road initiative
building infrastructure and facilitating
trade in over 60 developing
countries to its leading role in the
UN peacekeeping forces, China, the
“Middle Kingdom”, is involved in
every meaningful matter of international
affairs.
So, what kind of China do we
want? Certainly not one with weak
central leadership and fragmented
citadels of power. With its huge and
imbalanced population, and its
diverse culture and traditions,
China today requires a leader with
sufficient strength and prestige to
secure social stability, drive economic
reform, and guide it in being
a responsible world power. Xi as
core leader should be good for
China and, thus, for the world.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public
intellectual, political/economics
commentator, and an international
corporate strategist. He spoke at the
launch ceremony of President Xi
Jinping’s book, The Governance of
China, and is the host of Closer to
China with R. L. Kuhn, a weekly show
on CCTV News produced by Adam Zhu
pair but it’s pretty obvious who has
been played for total fools. In case
they haven’t noticed, the
lawmakers who served as the duo’s
chaperones have stopped
babysitting them because there is
no value in being their keepers any
more. Escorting the duo’s Legco
gate-crashing attempts served their
purpose: to usher the two straight
to their political end, and the votes
the two rendered meaningless are
now political spoils.
The two took the toxic brew and
there will be no stay of execution
that could stop those ready to
contest their seats.
We must fight our political
fatigue. We can ill afford to be
distracted by those who
continuously try to foolishly make
their own stupid mistakes our
collective problem.
Alice Wu is a political consultant and
a former associate director of the
Asia Pacific Media Network at UCLA
The basic law
of unintended
consequences
Mike Rowse says the continuing
political tussles in HK illustrate the
pain of being caught in a cycle of
actions and reactions, and we must
address the root cause of the grievances
There has been a considerable focus recently on
the Basic Law and the rule of law, and their
interaction. Perhaps neglected in the process has
been a different but relevant concept: the law of
unintended consequences, whereby an action gives
rise to outcomes unforeseen by the instigator.
Hong Kong’s tortuous path towards political reform
is a case in point. The first reference to the idea of
universal suffrage for selection of the chief executive
comes in Article 45 of the Basic Law, promulgated back
in 1990. Looking towards 1997, its purpose was to
reassure. Naturally, attention turned to the subject in
the early part of this century. While people understood
that the move towards universal suffrage had to be in
accordance with the “principle of gradual and orderly
progress”, the reform package put forward in 2014 was
widely perceived as disappointing; the plan to stick
with an unrepresentative nominating committee
deciding who could enter the race was unpalatable.
The State Council’s white paper on the governance
of Hong Kong, intended to set things straight, only
stirred things up and led to the Occupy Central
protests. The government let the action linger, hoping
public anger would pay dividends in the 2016
Legislative Council election. While the 79 days of
disruption did bring the protesters momentary
opprobrium, memories quickly faded. In the election,
the pro-government share of the vote actually fell, and
the attack on the idea of independence led directly to a
near 20 per cent share of the vote for a localist faction.
This was surely not the objective.
Now the government is trying to overturn the
election outcome. The practice of banning some
potential candidates from standing, then using all
means at hand to unseat some of those elected, is a
tactic more usually associated with third-world
countries following a military coup.
Has something been lost in
translation here? Perhaps
we need an interpretation
of the interpretation
In the short term, the judicial review sought by the
chief executive against the decision by Legco president
Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen to give Sixtus Baggio Leung
Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching another opportunity
to take the oath has been successful. Mr Justice
Thomas Au Hing-cheung ruled in the High Court that
their oaths were invalid, they should not be given a
second chance and their positions should immediately
be vacated. Many observers thought he might decline
to rule at all, and simply refer the matter back to the
Legco president. The problem with one arm of the
administration delving too deeply into the processes of
another is that it inevitably generates more requests to
do so. And, sure enough, we now have legal challenges
against more legislators, plus a challenge against the
chief executive himself.
Given that, in the past, other Legco members who
had politicised their swearing-in and then done it
properly second time round were permitted to take up
their seats, did Leung and Yau have a “legitimate
expectation” that they would enjoy similar treatment?
The Legco president certainly thought so, hence his
original ruling. Now it is for a higher court to decide.
Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress
Standing Committee has sought to clarify Article 104 of
the Basic Law, which requires all people concerned to
“swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
special administrative region of the People’s Republic
of China and swear allegiance” to it. But the
interpretation is different: it talks of “a legal pledge … to
the People’s Republic of China and its Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region” (emphasis added). Has
something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we
need an interpretation of the interpretation.
If, at the end of the day, there are two (or more)
vacant Legco seats, then we are in by-election territory.
I don’t think the people are fooled for one minute
about what is going on. In each constituency, an
impeccable opposition candidate will stand, win a
majority, and take the oath impeccably. Unfortunately,
this tragedy – or farce – will continue until the
government starts to address the underlying
grievances over the lack of meaningful political reform
instead of just hammering the symptoms, which
generates new grievances in the process.
Mike Rowse is the CEO of Treloar Enterprises and an
adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
mike@rowse.com.hk
> CONTACT US: Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com. If you have an idea for an opinion article, email it to oped@scmp.com
A yellow umbrella, a symbol of the Occupy movement,
is used in a recent protest against Beijing. Photo: Reuters
Wednesday, April 25, 2018
A11
CONTACT US
Agree or disagree with the opinions on this
page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com
If you have an idea for an opinion article,
email it to oped@scmp.com
Looming tech war
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the ZTE showdown points to a misunderstanding over motives
As someone who works for US-
China understanding and
roots for US-China partnerships,
I’ve been concerned, but
not worried, over what others
have called “a looming trade war”. I’ve not
worried because tariffs don’t work; they are
blunt instruments in a globalised economy,
penalising American companies and
consumers as much as Chinese. Most
American experts oppose tariffs, and President
Donald Trump likes to make big deals
after making big threats.
But I am now worried over what I will
call “a looming tech war”, because the
structural imperatives go deeper.
As everyone who follows China knows,
the US Department of Commerce has imposed
a denial of export privileges
against ZTE, China’s second-largest telecommunications
equipment manufacturer,
thus prohibiting US companies from
selling essential electronic components
and software to ZTE, a crippling sanction.
China has responded resolutely, with
actions that seem selected from expert scenario
planning, and with rhetoric, both indignation
and nationalistic bravado.
From China’s perspective, according to
its Ministry of Commerce, “If the United
States attempts to curb China's development
… it miscalculates. The action targets
China; however, it will ultimately undermine
the US itself,” affecting tens of thousands
of jobs and hundreds of related US
enterprises.
“Targeting technology is like throttling
the neck of the Chinese enterprises,”
wrote China Daily. “The ZTE case should
remind China's decision-makers of the
urgency to become self-sufficient in core
technologies.”
President Xi Jinping has been prescient
about domestic control of core technologies,
especially related to the internet and
more recently to artificial intelligence.
Since taking office in 2012, he has stressed
the “hidden risks” that come with core
technologies not being mastered domestically.
He said, “Heavy dependence on imported
core technology is like building our
house on top of someone else's walls: no
matter how big and how beautiful it is, it
won’t remain standing during a storm.”
Innovation is the first of Xi’s “five major
concepts of development”.
Beijing also claims
that the country itself
is a victim of
discriminatory
policies
From the US perspective, according to
its Department of Commerce, the prohibition
against ZTE is punishment for ZTE violating
US sanctions against Iran and North
Korea, making false statements and obstructing
justice, and then after reaching a
settlement agreement, violating it.
The United States claims it is not resisting
China’s rise, but rather the country’s
unfair or illegal means to achieve it. The US
action enumerated four such practices as
rationale for imposing punitive tariffs, all
relating to technology or intellectual property:
foreign firms in China are required to
form joint ventures and transfer knowledge,
as well as license technology with
below-market terms and conditions, while
the state supports Chinese enterprises in
acquiring foreign hi-tech assets, and sanctions
commercial cyber theft.
President Trump is wildly unpopular
among American elites, especially among
policy experts, who do not need much of an
excuse to criticise him – note the fusillade of
attacks on Trump’s tariffs. But these elites
are not criticising Trump on US moves to
counter what they, with unusual consensus,
perceive to be China’s unfair policies,
and in some cases unlawful programmes,
to become a world leader in state-of-the-art
technologies, especially AI, information
technology, robotics, advanced manufacturing,
new energy vehicles, aviation and
biotechnology.
China claims that it is still a developing
country, so different rules apply, a foundational
principle of the World Trade Organisation.
Beijing also claims that the country
itself is a victim of discriminatory policies
restricting its imports of hi-tech products.
Of course, China had to respond with
appropriate actions as well as confident
words, imposing heavy tariffs on US
sorghum and signalling that additional
agricultural tariffs were at the ready, along
with barely veiled threats against US companies
operating in China.
Here’s my fear. While I have argued that
most mainstream American experts are not
motivated to impede China’s rise, as many
in China believe, I can no longer make that
argument persuasive.
In the US, there has been a dark turn
among experts that US policy towards
China, calibrated over four decades to
shepherd China’s rise, has failed: China,
they have come to believe, has become a
competitor and may become an adversary,
and that US relations with China must now
be managed as with an emergent adversary,
not as with a developing partner.
In China, nationalistic voices are on the
rise, castigating the US for its self-serving
motivation to impede China’s rise, and calling
for China to become more self-reliant,
more rapidly, especially in world-class
semiconductors, so that the country would
not be vulnerable to US “blackmail”.
Welcome to the unhappy world of selffulfilling
prophecy, where the actions of
each side in response to a perceived threat
from the other side increases the likelihood
of that threat morphing from theoretical to
actual.
To both sides, I offer two pieces of
advice. First, take a breath and a fresh look,
because the road on which you are travelling
will not lead to a happy place.
Second, contemplate why the other side
is misinterpreting your actions. To my
American friends, what makes China think
the US is resisting its rise? To my Chinese
friends, what makes the US think that
China is a competitor and may become an
adversary?
Projecting malevolent motives and seeing
sinister conspiracies is the easy way out.
It can solicit cheers and plaudits in one’s
domestic media, but it will impede progress
and is likely to be self-defeating.
The US and China must each figure out
how not to confirm the other’s self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual,
international corporate strategist and
investment banker, and China expert and
commentator. He is the author of How China’s
Leaders Think and a co-creator (with Adam Zhu)
and host of CGTN’s “Closer to China with R.L.
Kuhn” and “The Watcher” commentaries
Older people still
have lot to offer
in the workplace
Paul Yip says measures to ensure
Hong Kong retirees remain active
through employment may help
prevent poverty and partially offset
the impact of a declining birth rate
Employment is the most robust method for
keeping people out of poverty. In Hong Kong’s
latest poverty situation report, for those with a
job, the poverty rate is only 12.3 per cent, compared to
77.4 per cent among those not working. Among older
adults with a job, it is 12.9 per cent, compared with 48.2
per cent among those without employment.
Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung Kin-chung has
recently raised the possibility of promoting workforce
participation for those aged 50-64 and helping those
aged 65-74 re-enter the job market. Hong Kong’s
workforce participation rate among older adults is 17.7
per cent, lower than in Japan (22.7 per
cent), Singapore (26.8 per cent) and Seoul (31.5 per
cent).
The Japanese government has been very active in
promoting workforce participation among its older
citizens, especially since 27 per cent of its
population was aged 65 or over as of 2017. The
population size has decreased, from 128 million in
2010 to 127 million in 2015, and the United
Nations estimates that the number will continue to fall
until 2061. The number of migrants moving to the
country has not offset the population decrease, leaving
no choice but to improve the labour participation and
productivity rate, especially among older adults and
married women with children.
Though Hong Kong’s total fertility rate is only 1.2
per woman – less than the 1.4 in Japan – we have
benefited from migration from the mainland to keep
our population young. Our life expectancy is also very
similar to Japan’s, at 81 for men and 87 for women. It is
time to explore how to make better use of our older
The most important thing is
to provide an option for
older adults to be active in
the job market
Greater effort is required to foster gender diversity
Kevin Sneader and Anu Madgavkar say the Asia-Pacific region needs more women leaders
Women’s representation in highranking
positions in business
and politics is a global issue, but
an even more pressing one in Asia-Pacific.
Across the region, only one in five people in
leading roles is a woman.
This waste of women’s talent comes at
an economic cost. Many economies in the
region are ageing and skills shortages are
on the rise: making more of women’s
potential can help meet such challenges.
Businesses gain a great deal from
supporting women. McKinsey’s 2018
report “The Power of Parity” found that
companies in the top quarter for gender
diversity on their executive teams are 21
per cent more likely to experience aboveaverage
profitability.
Even in developed economies in the
Asia-Pacific, few women are getting to
the top in business – in Japan, there are no
female CEOs in the top 100 public
companies. In Australia and Singapore, the
share of women CEOs in 2016 was only 6
per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The
Philippines, a traditionally matriarchal
society whose government has been
proactive in tackling gender inequality,
does better in senior positions overall, but
only 3 per cent of CEOs and 15 per cent of
board members are women.
The lower share of women in leading
positions within companies isn’t all about
the glass ceiling – the point at which
women’s careers appear to halt. Rather,
women’s under-representation has its
roots as far back as the education system.
In India, only 44 per cent of students in
tertiary education are female and many
graduates don’t take up employment: only
25 per cent of entry-level positions in
Indian companies are taken by women. In
Japan, the share of women enrolled in
college is higher, at 47 per cent, but women
were only 28 per cent of students attending
the top 10 universities.
The share of women erodes sharply
from entry-level to the boardroom, and the
biggest “breakpoint” is motherhood. In a
2015 McKinsey survey, 45 per cent of Asian
executives cited the “anywhere, anytime”
performance model as the largest barrier
to women moving into senior roles. In
Japan, a survey found that three-quarters
of women respondents said they were not
interested in managerial positions, partly
because promotion would mean working
even longer hours.
The second most cited factor behind
women dropping out of work is the
“double burden” of holding down a job
while looking after the family. In China, 33
per cent of female respondents to a 2017
survey said that they had a lower salary
when they returned to work after having a
baby, and 36 per cent said they had to
accept a demotion. Sixty-three per cent
said they did not want a second child
because this would hurt their career.
Many women struggle to return to work
because childcare options are limited or
too expensive. In Australia, net childcare
costs (paid by two-earner families) were 20
per cent of an average family’s income in
2015, compared with the 13 per cent
average in OECD economies.
The attrition of women from the talent
pipeline starts even earlier than
motherhood, as societal attitudes militate
against women pursuing a career and
prioritise looking after families. In India, 70
per cent of respondents to the 2010-2014
World Values Survey agreed with the
statement, “When a mother works for pay,
the children suffer.”
More can be done to
give women the
freedom to choose a
career as well as
motherhood
There has been some progress. The
share of women on company boards has
been rising, reflecting efforts by both
governments and private-sector
organisations. India has made it
mandatory for companies to have at least
one female director, and the Australian
Securities Exchange Corporate
Governance Council tracks gender
diversity in its constituent companies.
Japanese pharmaceutical company
Takeda hit its target of 30 per cent of new
managers being women (from only 6.2 per
cent in 2015) through a range of initiatives
including flexible working hours.
However, there is much more that can
be done to give women the freedom to
choose a career as well as motherhood.
Narrowing the leadership gender gap will
require concerted action by governments
and companies from encouraging and
helping girls to learn the right skills for a
changing labour market and mentoring
women in their careers, to shifting
attitudes towards women’s roles through
public-awareness campaigns to – perhaps
most importantly – making work flexible.
More help with childcare is urgently
needed. Governments can use public
spending to expand childcare provision
and companies can set up nurseries.
Flexible working practices in companies
are vital. In Australia, financial services
company Suncorp enables flexible
working through “work at home hubs” that
combine home work stations and working
spaces in regional shopping centres.
Such efforts are only likely to be
effective with a root-and-branch shift in
attitudes towards women’s roles in society.
Governments can lead from the front,
setting targets for women’s representation
in business as Japan and Singapore have
done, and more companies can push for
true diversity within their ranks. Doing so is
not only in the interests of their bottom line
but the health of the economies in which
they work.
Kevin Sneader is chairman, Asia-Pacific, of
McKinsey & Company. Anu Madgavkar is a
partner at McKinsey Global Institute
adults. We should create the right environment
for raising the retirement age and extending
employment beyond that age. Some issues, like
excessive health and medical insurance costs for the
older workforce, and long working hours, should be
re-examined.
The government can create a fund to protect
against excessive increases in insurance costs, while
introducing a more flexible working arrangement for
the older workforce.
The most important thing is to provide an option
for older adults to be active in the job market, and give
them the choice of whether to continue in a job. Those
who have had enough could perhaps take on volunteer
work in the community. For those who stay on with
paid employment, more flexible time arrangements
would better suit their needs, while their roles could be
redefined so as not to stand in the way of the career
advancement of younger workers. Some tangible
support might be needed for the business sector,
ideally through a tax-deductible arrangement rather
than the proposed cash support.
For some work, such as in teaching and research,
the situation depends on individual ability. As in
overseas countries, participants should be allowed to
work as long as they meet expectations. At present, a
vigorous review process takes place to determine
whether to extend beyond retirement age.
The education levels of Hong Kong’s older adults is
not high and, among those with very low levels, most
can only find work in low-skilled jobs such as cleaning
and security duties. Nevertheless, these areas face a
shortage of labour and can be a good fit. In such cases,
people’s rights and pay should be better protected, to
avoid companies exploiting this group of workers.
Also, sometimes, older adults are not driven by
money when seeking work. For some, finding meaning
in their work can be sufficient. The Japanese
experience shows that some older adults continue to
work to maintain their independence and fitness. Such
workers, whatever they do, display high levels of
professionalism.
Respecting the wishes of older adults and providing
a quality choice in terms of working would be a winwin
situation for the whole community.
Paul Yip is chair professor (Population Health) in the
Department of Social Work and Social Administration at the
University of Hong Kong
For some, finding meaning in work is important, as with
these women who recycle used clothes to make bags.
Comment›Insight & Opinion › United StatesUS-China trade
US-China trade war could end with
a ‘big deal’ through baby steps
towards mutual understanding
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the US must accept China’s
need to support technological development, while China
should work with US policymakers who oppose tariffs but
want the country to further open its markets and protect
intellectual property rights
PUBLISHED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 5:02am - UPDATED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 6:15am
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
President
Xi Jinping
Major Speech
Seattle
September 24, 2015
Robert
Lawrence
Kuhn
Simultaneous
Commentary
Quest
Means
Business
China’s
Xi Jinping
UN Speech
Robert
Lawrence
Kuhn
Interview
September 28, 2015

CNN’S AMANPOUR – May 29, 2013
President Xi Jinping to meet President Barack Obama
Interview with Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn,
long-time adviser to China’s leaders.
http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2013/05/29/exp-­‐race-­‐china-­‐us-­‐amanpour.cnn
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN HOST: Good evening.
I'm Christiane Amanpour. There may officially be only one
superpower today, but another is rapidly advancing. The
United States and China jockey for position at the pinnacle of
the world in what might just be called a race to the top. So
how will the first tete-a-tete go between their leaders, the two
most powerful men on Earth, U.S. President Barack Obama
and China's leader, Xi Jinping, will meet just over a week
from now in an informal setting at the aptly named
Sunnylands Estate just outside Los Angeles. China is
anxious and angry about Obama's much-touted “pivot” to
Asia and about what China perceives to be the U.S. siding
with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea. The
United States, for its part, has a laundry list of concerns,
everything from alleged Chinese hacking of even its most
sensitive military secrets to its influence over North Korea
and Pyongyang's nuclear saber-rattling. President Xi says the
U.S.-China relationship is at a crucial juncture and he says
that he wants to forge, "a new type of great power
relationship." So what exactly will that look like? We need
to know because this may just be the most important
relationship in the world today. And in a moment, I will dig
deeper with Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a long-time adviser to
China's leaders.
AMANPOUR: Robert Lawrence Kuhn has tremendous
insight into China's leaders. He's a long-time adviser to the
Chinese government; he's met President Xi several times and
he's the author of the book, "How China's Leaders Think."
That is a big title. Welcome to the studio.
Fareed Zakaria GPS
“Xi Jinping: The Governance of China”
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
October 5, 2014
FZ: What in the world is the leader of the second
largest economy on the planet thinking? That’s a
question many would love to know the answer to,
but in a closed, secretive society, like China, it’s
all but impossible to know. He rarely gives
interviews, and the press in China is far from free.
But now we have something to look at. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has a new book, entitled The
Governance of China, and it’s aiming for
worldwide impact. State media there reports that
the book has been published in nine languages:
Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic,
Spanish, Portuguese, German and Japanese.
My next guest, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, says it is a
milestone. Kuhn has advised the Chinese
government for twenty-­‐five years, and is the
author of How China’s Leaders Think. Welcome.
KUHN: Pleasure to be here.
FZ: First, give us a sense of who this man is for
our viewers. Who is Xi Jinping, and why is he a
little different from China’s ordinary leaders?
KUHN: Xi Jinping has been involved in all aspects
of what makes China today. His father was one of
the founders of the country, truly a great
revolutionary and a great reformer in the early
days. Xi Jinping graduated from Tsinghua
University [‘China’s MIT’], with a degree in
chemical engineering. Then he went through
more than two decades working at the local level.
Starting in a county, and then a city, Xiamen,
working his way up for many years in Fujian
province, becoming the governor. Then for five
years Xi was the Party Secretary of, the number
one official responsible for, Zhejiang province,
which is the center of entrepreneurship in China.
So that gives him a great sense of business. And
that was when I first met Xi Jinping, actually, in
2005, and then again in 2006, seeing him doing
the real work of running a province, a local area.
President Xi is a person, when you see him, who
is unassuming; he’s big, he has a strong presence
in a room, but you feel very comfortable with
him. He doesn’t put on airs, he’s very warm and
BBC World News
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
China’s Economy & Politics
President Xi’s ‘Four Comprehensives’
August 25, 2015
HOST: Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is an advisor to the
Chinese government and author of How China’s
Leaders Think and he joins me now from Beijing. A
cut in interest rates today - but in China any economic
decision is always colored with politics.
RLK: Certainly people are concerned here, but you
have to realize a 43% drop in the Shanghai stock
market is still 25% above its 52-week lows, so what
the economists, government, tries to do is to
distinguish between the so-called real economy and
the stock market. Most people realize China’s stock
market was overvalued, but perception is reality, and
if people have less money on paper, they’ll spend less,
and so the fall will affect the real economy.
And you’re right, the way to look at such situations in
China is not just economically - you can’t look at
China without looking at politics, and here there are
two major areas. One is President Xi Jinping’s state
visit to Washington. This has been a very tense time
in Sino-US relations: South China Sea, cybersecurity,
human rights, lots of issues. But what this economic
uncertainty and volatility will do - I hope - is to make
both presidents focus on what really affects human
beings and human lives, focus on economic areas,
because this is where there can be some commonality
between China and the US. The contentious issues are
real, but economics is more real for people.
Domestically in China, it’s really interesting, because
in recent days, there have been editorials in People’s
Daily talking about extreme resistance to reform and
older leaders who are still involved and maybe
shouldn’t be, and so you have to look at domestic
politics in terms of what Xi Jinping, who is China’s
dominant leader, the president of the country, head
of the party, head of the military, and other titles as
well, and what his overarching policy is.
It’s called the “Four Comprehensives.” We learn from
each one. The first says that China wants to build a
‘moderately prosperous society’. That’s their shortterm
goal. It’s not different than others have said in

⽇报周报杂志
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往期回顾
分类检索
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“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 将成本世纪伟⼤故事
—— 专访美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩
本报驻美国记者张朋辉
《⼈民⽇报海外版》 ( 2017 年 05 ⽉ 08 ⽇第 01 版 )
第 01 版 : 要闻
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罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩
“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛开幕前⼣ , 本报记者专访了美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩。作为此次⾼峰论坛的嘉宾之⼀ , 库恩博⼠密切关注中国倡议的 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设 , 对 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设及 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛抱有很⾼期待。他认为 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议正当其时 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设将成为 21 世纪最伟⼤的故事之⼀。
中国找到了同世界的契合点库恩分析说 , “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 在世界这么受欢迎 , 是因为中国找到了⾃⾝发展经验同世界需要的契合点。他说 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议在全球许多国家受到热烈欢迎 , 主要有 3
个原因 : ⼀是基础设施是很多发展中国家的迫切需要 , 基础设施建设是 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 的重要关注点。⼆是世界上很多国家经济增长缓慢 , 他们希望通过参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬刺激经济增长。三是对于许多发展中国家来说 , 中国既是⼀个榜样 , 也是能够带来专长、经验和资本的国家 , 参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬是与中国加强合作的理想⽅式。
“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议提出 3 年多来 , 成果超出预期 , 得到国际社会积极评价。库恩说 :“ 习近平主席关于合作共赢的全球化观念 , 从蓝图变成了路线图 , 从计划到付诸实践 , 从纸⾯的概念变成了地⾯的项⽬。过去 3 年 ,‘ ⼀带⼀路 ’ 建设项⽬遍地开花 , 我亲⾃见证了这⼀设想从愿景变成现实。 ” 库恩说 , 他更看重的成就是将正在进⾏的 “ 最
Interview: Xi's engaging, creative diplomatic
approach to benefit China-U.S. ties: U.S. expert
| 2015-09-10 21:06:53 | Editor: Tian Shaohui
by Xinhua writer Luo Jun
BEIJING, Sept. 10 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping, with an engaging and creative diplomatic
approach, is likely to secure "a big success" in his visit to the United States later this month, said U.S.
expert Robert Kuhn.
In an exclusive interview with Xinhua, Kuhn, author of "The Man Who Changed China: The Life and
Legacy of Jiang Zemin" and "How China's Leaders Think," recalled Xi's previous trip to California as
president and to Iowa as vice president as "one of the best images as for China."
(The photo shows Robert Lawrence Kuhn introducing "Xi Jinping: The Governance of China" at
BookExpoAmerica in New York on May 29, 2015)
"He went to sporting events and I was at one of the luncheons. You really had a wonderful, enriched
feeling about China at that point," Kuhn said.
Now with the United States entering a political season of presidential election, issues of contention
with China and the lack of overall understanding of China's policy has been increasing, but Kuhn
believes that low expectations can become an advantage as people may "get surprised on the positive
8 C H I N A D A I L Y . C O M . C N / O P I N I O N M O N D A Y, O C T O B E R 2 0 , 2 0 1 4 C H I N A D A I L Y
Comment
editorial • opinion
THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE 18TH
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China opens on
Monday and will last for four days. The designated theme —
governing through the rule of law — indicates how important
this meeting will be for the future of both the Party and the
country.
That this is the first time in 17 years the Party has designated
such a theme for a plenary session speaks volumes about the
importance the new leadership attaches to it. It is high on the
agenda.
Yet, the more the concept of rule of law has been discussed,
the more obvious it becomes that there is, today, much to be
desired.
More than 50 minister­level or higher officials have either
been indicted or placed under investigation for abuse of power
in the past year or so, underlining the fact that the rule of law is
sorely needed. It is perhaps the only way to eliminate, once
and for all, the most serious threat to good governance and to
secure the blessings of prosperity and justice to the people.
The fact that power today can effectively nullify the law, and
that those in power can circumvent it, not only deprives the
Party of its capacity to govern the country in a consistently fair
and just manner but also disrupts the reasonable running of
the marketplace. Abuse of power makes it impossible for fairness
to prevail in the socialist market economy.
Despite the great achievements China has made over more
than three decades, it will be very difficult for its economy to
grow in a sound manner — and neither will society progress in
a healthy way — unless fair competition and mutual trust can
be secured and ordinary people’s rights and interests can be
guaranteed through the rule of law.
If the country is to achieve further reforms in various fields
and establish and maintain a fair and just society, the powerworshipping
mentality among government and Party officials
must be eliminated. This is a core goal of the leadership.
Unless the overwhelming majority of Party and government
officials not only respect the law, but follow it when making
decisions, governing the country by the rule of law will
amount to little but lip service.
It will be no easy job, and it will take time for the power­oriented
way of doing things to be transformed. But the new Party
leadership has shown it has the courage to face the
challenge. We therefore have reason to expect much from the
current plenary session as they work to put the country on the
right track.
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E D I T O R I A L
he convocation of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Com­
Party of China Central Committee, whose theme is
Tmunist
promoting the rule of law, embodies the CPC’s deepening perception
on governance and the law.
www.people.com.cn October 15.
t is the first time that the CPC, as the ruling Party, will make a
Icomprehensive plan on the rule of law in the form of a Party document.
The session, which marks the ruling Party’s significant
strategic layout on how to govern the nation in accordance with
laws and the Constitution, illustrates its new exploration of socialism
with Chinese characteristics. The CPC Central Committee will
focus on discussions on how to promote rule of law in at a plenary
session. ...
It has only six years to 2020, the deadline set for the realization
of a well­off society for China, and 35 years to 2049, the promised
year for China to be a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious
socialist modern nation. All these mean China has
entered a crucial stage of deepened reforms. Only by sticking to
“governance of the nation according to laws” will China realize its
historic mission.
www.xinhuanet.com.cn October 19.
he National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, should
Tplay a bigger role in the country’s efforts to promote the rule of
law. For example, the NPC can push for deepened reforms within
the framework of the Constitution and laws through legislation to
realize a benign interaction between reforms and the rule of law.
The deeper the water China’s reforms will enter, the more legal
guidance and guarantees these reforms will need. The NPC enjoys
a broad space for maneuvering in this regard.
Beijing News October 17
I
n the last three months, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central
Committee has held two conferences studying major issues
related to comprehensively pushing for the rule of law. As the
theme “Chinaruledbylaw” issetfortheFourthPlenarySessionof
the 18th CPC Central Committee, the overall planning and
prospect of a China governed by law will become increasingly
explicit.
Lianhe zaobao October 14
China Daily UK
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R O B E RT L AW R E N C E KU H N
Decoding Xi’s future vision
President Xi’s new book reveals his thinking about the country’s
governance and maps out a path for achieving the Chinese Dream
The Governance of China, President
Xi Jinping’s new book, is
unprecedented. Can analyzing
the book elucidate Xi’s thinking
and illuminate China’s future?
Consider seven frameworks or
perspectives: publishing purposes,
overarching themes, content analysis, chain of
developmental causation, domestic goals, domestic
means and global principles.
Publishing Purposes: substance,
symbol, signal. Substance means Xi’s political philosophy
and wide­ranging policies — organizing 79
speeches and commentaries in 18 chapters — to
discern how Xi intends to realize the Chinese
Dream, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation”. Symbol means recognizing Xi’s emergence
as China’s leader, with greater authority, confidence
and support than observers had expected
when he first took office two years ago. Signal
means communicating Xi’s way of thinking to
global audiences in nine languages, an original
and explicit outreach to engage the world on multiple
levels.
Overarching Themes: pride, stability, responsibility,
vision. Pride expresses the yearning of the
Chinese people for the “great rejuvenation”. Stability
means maintaining the current political system
(Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the
Party’s leadership). Responsibility means “realizing
a moderately prosperous society by the centenary
of the Party in 2021”. Vision means “turning
China into a prosperous, democratic, culturally
advanced and harmonious modern socialist country
by the centenary of the People’s Republic of
China in 2049”.
Content Analysis. How does Xi impute importance
to topics? By examining what’s in Xi’s book,
can we explore what’s on Xi’s mind? Of the book’s
18 chapters, 11 relate to domestic affairs, seven to
foreign affairs; six have political relevance; six concern
standards of living; and four standards of
L I M I N
behavior. Categorizing the content, about a third is
politics and people; another third on international
relations; about 15 percent each on reform and
development, and society and culture; and about 8
percent on national security and defense. Pervasive
throughout is reform.
Chain of Developmental Causation. The
Chinese Dream is founded on political stability,
which enables far­reaching reform, which in turn
promotes economic development, and which,
when combined with rule of law and Chinese values,
strengthens China’s society, culture, ecology
and even defense. Where is this “chain of causation”
in Xi’s book?
The first and last chapters affirm political stability:
“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and
“The CPC Leadership”, both of which assert the
Party’s political primacy and thus assure social stability.
“The Chinese Dream” is the second chapter,
proclaiming the grand mission of national resurgence
and personal well­being. Then, chapters on
deepening reform and economic development,
which lead to chapters on rule of law, advanced culture,
social undertakings and ecological progress.
Domestic Goals: values, morality, prosperity,
fairness, happiness. Values: Xi’s vision is to inculcate
China’s traditional values — “the thoughts of
the ancient sages”, exemplified by Confucianism —
into socialist core values. (“We must take traditional
Chinese culture as the base.”) Morality: Derived
from values, morality is described as “conscious
law”, and “civic morality” is characterized as needing
improvement, while “paragons of morality are
important banners for building public ethics”. (“A
gentleman takes morality as his bedrock” — a traditional
virtue that Xi quotes.) Prosperity: “Common
prosperity is the fundamental principle of
Chinese socialism … We will accelerate China’s
overall prosperity”. Fairness: Because the Chinese
people have always had a perception that “inequality
rather than want is the cause of trouble”, Xi
says, China “should do a better job of promoting
Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng
arrived in the lobby of the European
Commission’s headquarters at 9
o’clock on Saturday morning. He was
led to the office of outgoing Trade Commissioner
Karel De Gucht, who has been a thorn in the side
of Chinese businesses because of his protectionist
attitude ever since he took over the job in 2010.
De Gucht, 60, will be replaced in a few days by
Swedish politician Cecilia Malmstrom, 46, when
a newly constituted commission gets underway.
In the afternoon, the Chinese side announced a
long­awaited agreement in principle: Brussels
will not launch an investigation into subsidies of
China’s telecommunication imports into the
European market. The EU side still needs to go
through internal procedures for formal approval.
The threat was mainly targeted at Chinese telecommunications
equipment makers Huawei
Technologies Co and ZTE Corp.
While the big picture of relations has been a
positive one, the Europeans have annoyed Beijing
from time to time — for example, by allowing the
Dalai Lama to visit, by attacking China on human
rights and by imposing high trade barriers.
Despite such irritants, Beijing has sent constructive
signals. In the first half of this year, President
Xi Jinping paid the first­ever visit of a
Chinese president to the European Union’s headquarters.
And last week, at the summit of Asian
and European leaders in Milan, Italy, Premier Li
Keqiang hosted a special dinner for Barroso and
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy,
thanking them for their contributions to positive
relations. At the dinner, the leaders were
thought to have touched on the telecommunication
trade dispute, which involves about 1 billion
euros ($1.26 billion) annually.
The path to Saturday’s solution was similar to a
pattern set earlier, in mid­2013, after both sides
worked through an anti­dumping and anti­subsidy
investigation involving China’s multi­billiondollar
solar panel exports to the EU. Brussels
began that investigation in 2012.
Beijing was unhappy that there had been no
high­level invitation to visit Brussels a year after
the launch of the investigation.
In May last year, Li made his first trip to Germany
after taking office and won the support of
the German government, which vetoed Brussels’
decision, following dozens of EU member states.
Li made a last­minute call on Barroso the following
month, as Brussels was about to vote on
whether to end the solar panel dispute through
amicable consultation.
Li’s decisive role was crucial in preventing the
escalation of a trade war. If Beijing had opted to
deal with such disputes in an eye­for­eye, toothfor­tooth
manner, both sides would have been
losers, with the EU taking the brunt. It has
already suffered two economic recessions, and
its jobless rate has been in double digits for a
few years now.
Of course, with the trade volume between China
and Europe expanding, and with investment
pouring into Europe, China’s government, its
businesses and its media must work to make the
most of the rising economic tide.
fairness and justice”. Happiness: The Chinese
Dream, Xi says, is to “bring happiness to the Chinese
people”, to “ensure the people greater happiness”
— but, he cautions, “happiness does not fall
from the sky, nor do dreams come true automatically.”
(In Xi’s book, “values” occurs about 120
times, “morality” 24, “prosperity” 67, “fairness” 44
and “happiness’’ 16.)
Domestic Means: close to the people, realism,
stability, reform, rule of law, combating corruption.
“Close to the people” is an all­encompassing
way of thinking that shapes all decisions. Realism:
“I have repeatedly said that the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation can in no way be realized
easily,” Xi says. “While fully affirming our achievements,
we should also be aware of our shortcomings.”
Stability: The precondition for all else,
stability is a recurrent and foundational theme
(“stability” occurs 125 times). Reform: Those who
wonder whether Xi is a “real reformer” should
read “Explanatory Notes … Concerning Comprehensively
Continuing Reform” (page 76). Examples:
the market plays a “decisive role”; farmers
given transactional property rights; the judicial
system separate from the administrative system.
Rule of Law: “A fundamental principle” and “the
basic way to run the country” — the Fourth Plenary
of the 18th CPC Central Committee, focusing on
rule of law, is Xi’s call to action. Combating corruption
is a hallmark of Xi’s administration, enhancing
each of the five other domestic means. It is no
accident that the chapter on combating corruption
is positioned, significantly, between “Close Ties
with the People” and “The CPC Leadership”.
I bear witness to Xi’s consistency. In 2006, Adam
Zhu (my long­term partner) and I met privately
with then­Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi. He stressed
that while China should be properly proud of its
successes, “achievements should not engender
complacency”. Xi said: “We need to assess ourselves
objectively.”
Global Principles. Consider five. Independence
(China remains unaligned). Multi­polar
world (no country dominates). One country, two
systems (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan). Peaceful
development (“We have made a solemn pledge to
the whole world that we will never seek hegemony”).
Multilateral affairs (cooperation with the
global community). These five global principles
drive China’s “new model of major country relations”
(primarily with the US), “neighborhood
diplomacy” (Japan, Vietnam, Koreas, etc.), and
“cooperation with developing countries” (such as
in Africa). The Silk Road economic belt (land route
and maritime) is President Xi’s new initiative for
multinational development.
Here’s my blurb for Xi’s book: “This book is a
milestone, both in substance and symbol, offering
openly the political philosophy of President Xi Jinping
and recognizing his emergence as China’s
senior leader. While misunderstandings about
China and its leadership abound, there is now no
need to speculate about President Xi. Here is how
he thinks, candidly and comprehensively.” It is the
pride of a patriot.
The author is an international corporate strategist
and political/economics commentator. He is
theauthorof How China’s Leaders Thinkanda
biography of former president Jiang Zemin. He
gave one of the speeches at the launching ceremonyfor
Xi Jinping: The Governance of China,at
theFrankfurtBookFaironOct8.
F U J I N G
Courtesy, not confrontation, best for Europe
So far, there is no unified Chinese business
council in Brussels to represent and lobby for
Chinese investors in Europe. By contrast, a major
US business organization reportedly has 300 staff
members focusing on Brussels’ policymaking.
A lack of communication and influence can
easily lead to misunderstandings. Bureaucrats in
Brussels usually follow Washington’s lead when
making policies that affect China.
Trade commission leaders need to make more
field trips to member states to learn how Chinese
businesses matter.
Take China’s solar panel exports for example.
The industry, which involves about 400,000
workers in China, has offered competitive products
to thousands of European upstream companies
and helped Europe achieve its status as a
green energy leader.
In telecom, Huawei and ZTE are deeply integrated
with European partners. And, incidentally,
Huawei is a steady job creator in Europe, where
young people, in particular, have faced huge
employment challenges.
If De Gucht had kept the big picture in mind,
he would not have made confrontational moves
against China and its businesses.
Overall, the EU recognizes China as strong strategic
partner. This is the starting point for dispute
control. Amicability helps both sides win. With
confrontation, everyone loses.
The author is China Daily chief
correspondent in Brussels.
fujing@chinadaily.com.cn

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P A G E 3 2
Last word
C H I N A D A I L Y E U R O P E A N W E E K L Y J U L Y 1 3 - 1 9 , 2 0 1 2
The insider with an outside view
strategist, Banker and author has intimate knowledge of China — and its leaders
By Andrew Moody
andrewmoody@chinadaily.com.cn
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says
the West often doesn’t
understand the Chinese
leadership’s key priorities
for China. The 67-year-old American
is seen by many as one of the few
figures outside the world’s secondlargest
economy who actually does.
He is regarded as a knowledgeable
insider, having been an adviser to
a number of leading Chinese bodies
since the late-1980s and knowing
many of the country’s top political
figures personally.
“There is rarely alignment between
what topics China’s leaders think are
important about China and what
the world thinks,” says Kuhn, also
an international corporate strategist
and investment banker. “Understanding
China requires knowing the
difference.”
He was speaking recently in the
five-star Grand Hyatt hotel in central
Beijing, which is his home for 90 days
a year. The rest of the time he divides
between his three homes in the United
States and traveling elsewhere.
“They treat me very well here.
Even when I travel around China, I
keep a room here,” he says.
The hotel is well placed near to
China’s seat of government around
Tian’anmen Square where he has an
extensive network of contacts.
His latest book, How China’s Leaders
Think: The Inside Story of China’s
Past, Current and Future Leaders,
which is now out in paperback and
more than 500 pages, goes into
extensive detail about those who
have the responsibility for shaping
modern China.
Kuhn, who cuts a dapper figure,
says many in the West often have an
outdated view about modern Chinese
leaders.
“The reality is that China’s leaders
are meritocratic,” he says.
“Many have strong academic backgrounds
from top universities and
all have significant experience, often
having run two or more provinces or
major municipalities as Party secretary,
governor or mayor.”
Kuhn, who is also a new China
Daily columnist, is much in demand
from major news organizations
around the world, including TV
appearances on BBC, CNBC, Euronews
and Bloomberg TV, and says he
has had complete freedom to express
his opinions.
“I have written three books about
China, dozens of articles and columns;
I’ve produced two major TV
documentaries about China and
given scores of media interviews —
and never has anyone in China even
requested to censor anything I’ve
published or broadcast outside of
China,” he says.
Some in the West, however, have
accused him of being too much of an
insider and not giving the full picture
about China because he was too close
to the leadership.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn says China’s growth is good for the world, but it cannot save the world.
“I deem it vital, considering China’s
importance in the world, that
China’s leaders become more known
to the world, and known not just via
sound-bites and photo ops, but by
seeing them up-close as real people
— hearing their own words, listening
to their stories, getting their ways
of thinking. I’m pleased to facilitate
some of this,” he says.
“I also offer my own analysis. As
for my accuracy and understanding,
readers or viewers can judge for
themselves.”
Kuhn, who was born in New York,
began his career as a scientist. After
studying biology at John Hopkins
University, he did a doctorate in
anatomy and brain research at the
University of California at Los Angeles
in the 1960s. Brain science and
consciousness remain major interests
of his.
His first involvement in China was
through the scientific community in
the late-1980s when he worked with
scientists reforming China’s research
and technology base. He received an
invitation from Song Jian, then a
State councilor and chairman of the
State Science and Technology Commission.
At the time he was developing a
parallel business career and became
president of The Geneva Companies,
a leading US mergers and acquisitions
company, which he eventually
sold to Citigroup in 2000.
At the same time he was cementing
links with leading business and
political figures in China.
His organization, The Kuhn Foundation,
with CCTV (China Central
Television), produced the documentary
In Search of China for PBS in the
US, which was broadcast in 2000.
He is now working on a new fivepart
series China’s Challenges, which
will be broadcast in China in the
autumn and syndicated to PBS stations
in the US next year.
Perhaps Kuhn’s most significant
project was writing a biography of
former president Jiang Zemin, which
was the best-selling book in China
in 2005.
How China’s Leaders Think was
based on interviews with more than
100 leading Chinese political figures,
some of whom he has known for
more than a decade.
“I know many personally and have
worked with several for a number of
years. When you hear them speak
over a period of time, it gives you
a sense of their personalities and
character as well as their intellectual
capabilities, leadership style and
political progress,” he says.
Kuhn sometimes likes to invoke
humor to explain why there is sometimes
friction between Chinese and
American leaders.
“Some people think it is because
feng yongbin / China Daily
of ideological, historical or cultural
reasons that we have communication
problems. As I once pointed out,
perhaps it’s because China’s leaders,
the members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, were trained as engineers,
and most American politicians
were trained as lawyers. Maybe the
problem is that lawyers and engineers
can’t talk to one another!”
Kuhn says the main focus in the
West is often the Chinese economy
and whether it will continue to
motor ahead.
“China should have 10 to 20 more
years of what we should still call relatively
high growth, driven by continuing
the country’s unprecedented
urbanization and modernization.
“Growth rates will naturally ease
from reform’s historic averages —
probably to 6 to 8 percent per annum
— which is less than we are used to,
but which may be optimal because
China can more effectively deal with
its most severe problems, particularly
economic and social imbalances
and sustainable development.
“However, China’s economy is fragile,
vulnerable to exogenous shock.
China’s growth is good for the world,
but it cannot ‘save the world’,” he
says.
Kuhn says there is often a danger
of China being misrepresented
because it is seen through a narrow
perspective.
BIO
Robert Lawrence
Kuhn
International corporate strategist,
investment banker, senior adviser
to multinational corporations and
author
Age: 67
Education:
• Bachelor’s degree in human biology,
Johns Hopkins University, 1964
• PhD in anatomy and brain research,
University of California at Los Angeles,
1968
• Master of sciences in management,
MIT Sloan School of Management,
1980
Career:
• President and co-owner of The Geneva
Companies, a US leading mergers
and acquisitions company (sold to
Citigroup in 2001)
• Chairman, The Kuhn Foundation,
which produces documentaries on
scientific and philosophical questions
as well as on China issues
• Author of The Man Who Changed
China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin
and How China’s Leaders Think, as
well as 25 books on business strategy,
finance and investment banking
Books: The Inflationary Universe: The
Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic
Origins by Alan H. Guth, Lake Views:
This World and the Universe by Steven
L. Weinberg, The Coherence of Theism
by Richard Swinburne, and Infinite
Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology by
John Leslie. Books on consciousness
by John R. Searle, David J. Chalmers
and Colin McGinn.
Film: Khachaturian (2003, directed by
Peter Rosen; Dora Serviarian-Kuhn,
executive producer)
Music: Piano Concerto in D-flat Major
by Aram Khachaturian (1903-78) played
by Kuhn’s wife Dora Serviarian-Kuhn
Food: “I eat tofu all the time. I appreciate
the unbelievably different textures.”
“Western media takes China’s very
real problems and reports them as if
they were, say, 80 percent of China’s
story. I take the same problems —
which are genuine and often intractable
— and they consist of, say, 35
percent of my work,” he says.
“It is not that Western media is
conspiratorially biased or always
anti-China, it is that they often do
not provide proper and sufficient
context,” he says.
Huang Tiantian, Dong Fangyu and
Zheng Yibing contributed to this story.

B6 COVER STORY
Sunday 25 November 2012 Shanghai Daily
On a mission to
explain ‘real’ China
Above: “How
China’s Leaders
Think”
Right: “The Man
Who Changed
China: The Life
and Legacy of
Jiang Zemin”
“
I don’t try to make anybody
happy, but I just want
to tell the truth. I can be
wrong, and maybe my
truth is not balanced.
Lu Feiran
China expert and American public intellectual,
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is best known in
China for two books about Chinese leaders
and their views, including a biography of
former President Jiang Zemin in 2005 and one about
other leaders and their thinking in 2009.
Kuhn, also an investment banker, business consultant,
brain scientist and philosopher, has been
granted unprecedented access to Chinese leaders,
though he does not speak Chinese.
His biography “The Man Who Changed China:
The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin” published in
both Chinese and English, was a best-seller in China
where readers are not accustomed to humanized
biographies of leaders.
It was probably the first biography written by a
foreigner about a living Chinese leader that was
published in China.
Kuhn has also produced documentaries on China,
written extensively for Chinese media and is often
quoted by western media. He is a contributor and
consultant to CCTV, some Chinese newspapers and
the Xinhua News Agency.
Kuhn sees his mission as telling the world about
the real China.
He was in Shanghai late last month for an International
Channel Shanghai (ICS) program he
co-produced and wrote about China’s challenges, in
conjunction with the 18th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China. He held a press conference
and also spoke with Shanghai Daily.
Chinese media sometimes accuse some Westerners
and Western media of China bashing, saying they
misunderstand or are even malevolent.
But 68-year-old Kuhn, a New Yorker, is believed
to have a more neutral view for China. He received
a bachelor’s degree in human biology from Johns
Hopkins University, a master’s of science in management
from the MIT Sloan School of Management,
and a PhD in anatomy and brain research from
UCLA.
His books were published by the Shanghai Translation
Publishing House and Shanghai Century
Publishing Group.
Kuhn said he “never tried to please the Chinese
government, though Western media thought I did.”
“I like feedback, including negative feedback,
because I know that people are engaged,” he told
Shanghai Daily.
“I don’t try to make anybody happy, but I just want
to tell the truth. I can be wrong, and maybe my truth
is not balanced.”
Kuhn’s experience with China started in 1989,
when he was invited by former State Councilor Song
Jian, director of the State Science and Technology
Commission.
The two became friends and Kuhn began traveling
between the US and China, getting to know government
officials and ordinary people.
Kuhn said he felt frustrated because his experience
in China differed from the description in much of
the Western media. “Then they only focused on the
negative side and ignored the rest,” he said.
That disparity inspired him to write Jiang’s biography,
he said. Jiang himself said that Kuhn didn’t
“beautify” him and got his wedding date wrong.
Kuhn spent four years writing “The Man Who
Changed China.” Though he had only met Jiang three
times and did not interview him for the book, he
talked to many people close to Jiang, including relatives,
friends and colleagues, gathering stories and
perceptions. He became close to many of them.
“I thought I had been rather familiar with China
before I started working on the book,” said Kuhn.
“But after I started collecting the information, I
found that my knowledge was very limited.”
Humanized leader
Kuhn said he was determined to depict a real, animated
Jiang, different from the seemingly impassive
figure appearing on state occasions, on Chinese TV
and in newspapers.
“For a very long time, Chinese leaders were either
described as God or the Devil, but never in-between,”
he said. “So I expected to display a Chinese leader
who is a human being.”
Soon after publication, it became a best-seller in
China. After Kuhn held a book-signing in Guangzhou,
Guangdong Province, more than 300 books
were sold in an hour. In Shanghai, more than a
million copies were sold in 2005, the highest in the
social science category.
Chinese readers called the book refreshing because
it told daily life stories and described Jiang’s
youth.
One Internet user called “Burn the scarecrow” said
before reading the biography, he thought Jiang was
“a quiet man standing high above the masses.”
“But after reading the book, my first feeling was
that he was once young like us and he is also an
ordinary man.”
The English version, however, received some criticism,
primarily that Kuhn was “fawning” over Jiang
and the government. Kuhn denied that.
“In fact, the book had a disclaimer, saying all
Wisdom comes with Global People
读环球人物获人生智慧
第 32 期总第 201 期
2012 年 12 月 6 日
美国将军腐化生活
罗阳 , 没喝上最后的庆功酒何亮亮 :“ 廉政公署不可复制 ”
苹果设计团队的秘密领袖有种气质叫 “ 桂纶镁 ”
www.globalpeople.com.cn 售价人民币 10 元港币 20 元邮发代号 :82-667
COVER PEOPLE
封面人物
情地与他们聊天 , 再从庞杂的素材中挑选自己需要的故事 ……
库恩坦言 , 在写这本书的过程中 , 自己与江泽民仅仅在公开场合见过 3 次面。
“1993 年 , 江泽民对古巴进行国事访问 ,
住在古巴国宾馆 , 当时 , 我也在那里。我站在走廊上 , 而他正好也走了出来。那是我们的第一次见面。 ”2000 年 9 月 , 江泽民赴纽约参加联合国千禧年首脑峰会 , 他在一次招待会上第二次见到江泽民。 3 年后 , 库恩又在北京听了江泽民关于几个重要问题的讲话。尽管没采访到江泽民本人 ,
库恩却并不觉得有什么遗憾。在他看来 ,
这本书只是传记而非自传 , 没必要非采访到本人。为了完成这本书 , 库恩总是随身带着手提电脑 , 一有空就开始写作 , 从周一到周五 , 他常常工作至凌晨。每当他在吃完饭后一头钻进书房 , 妻子总会调侃他 “ 又去见江泽民了 ”。整整 4 年 ,3 次重写 ,5
次编辑 , 库恩光资料就搜集了 3000 万字 ,
第一稿 70 万字 ……
2005 年 , 一本 47 万字的《他改变了中国 —— 江泽民传》出版。首批印刷的 20
2006 年 3 月 , 库恩在浙江与习近平会谈。万册 , 仅 10 多天就销售一空。为新书做巡回推广时 , 由于签名数量太多 , 库恩的手肘甚至有些劳损 ,“ 影响了打网球 ”。走访中国 40 多个城市《他改变了中国—— 江泽民传》的成功 , 让库恩有了进一步探寻中国整体形象的想法。他于是带着助手 , 开始走访中国
40 多个城市 , 进行深入的、大规模的调查研究。就是在这次调研过程中 ,2005 年 2 月
26 日 , 库恩在浙江西子宾馆见到了时任浙江省委书记习近平。习近平向库恩介绍了浙江的经济、历史和文化等方面的情况 ,
并感谢库恩多年来从自己独到的角度研究中国、向世界介绍中国 , 在中美两国之间搭起了文化的桥梁。次年 3 月 , 库恩再次来到浙江 , 这一次 , 他的目的是了解 “ 浙江模式 ”。虽然是不期而至 , 但习近平仍挤出时间与他见面。习近平说 , 自己之所以要这么做 , 是要 “ 表示我们对库恩先生关注中国、客观介绍中国的感激之意 ”。库恩回忆说 , 习近平在那次谈话中强
调了中国自改革开放以来发生的翻天覆地的变化。 “‘ 有句老话 , 士别三日当刮目相看。你一个月不来 , 半年不来 , 中国就会有很大的变化。 ’ 他又补充说 ,‘ 但如果结合中国悠久的历史来分析 , 又不会惊讶于它变化之快 , 因为我们经历了几千年才走到这一步。无论我们怎么看待这一速度 ,
中国的发展变化 , 至少在一定程度上 , 是由爱国热情和民族自豪感推动的。 ’”
让库恩印象最深的是 , 在谈及如何以最好的方式向世界介绍中国时 , 习近平提出 , 中国的情况无法用简单的一句话来描述 , 或用单一的方法来概括 , 并借用中国古代寓言 “ 盲人摸象 ” 来说明这个问题。 “ 他把中国富裕的东部沿海比作大象的腿 , 而将中国广袤的西部比作大象宽阔的后背 ,
认为 ‘ 象是一个完整的概念 , 必须全面地了解 , 要避免犯盲人摸象的错误 ’。 ” 对库恩来说 , 这样的比喻是新颖而有用的 , 这个说法 , 他到现在还记得。接连的调研 , 让库恩对中国有了更深入的认识。
2007 年 12 月 9 日 , 时任中宣部部长刘云山在与库恩的一次会谈中提议 , 如果由他来写一部关于中国改革 30 年的书 ,
一定很有意义。库恩知道 , 这次又说到他心坎上了。库恩列出了一份庞大的采访名单 , 每次采访前 , 他会向被采访对象提供三四十个问题的采访提纲 , 后者通常会选择其中的二三十个作答。采访结束后 , 库恩再根据采访录音进行整理 , 并对其中提及的年份、数字和事实进行核实。在与 100 余位省部级官员、企业领袖和专家学者沟通交流 , 并采访了诸多改革开放的亲历者后 , 库恩用 5 个月时间完成了 80 万字的初稿。 “ 我的家人说 , 整整一年 ,
他们只能看到我的后脑勺。 ”
2008 年 12 月 ,《中国 30 年 : 人类社会的一次伟大变迁》中文版在中国发行。第二年 , 为纪念新中国成立 60 周年 , 该书英文版在全球出版发行。截至目前 , 这本书是唯一由外国人详细描述中国改革开放 30 年进程的书籍。
编辑 | 张建魁肖莹美编 | 苑立荣图编 | 傅聪编审 | 刘爱成丁子
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库恩十年十人政治□ 本刊记者凌云
讲述中国政坛
10 年变迁
. 16 .
2016 年 1 月 11 日 , 库恩在北京接受本刊记者专访。 ( 本刊记者傅聪摄 )