Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, international corporate
strategist and investment banker, and a renowned expert on China. He is a
commentator on the BBC, CNN, CGTN, CCTV, CNBC, Fox Business,
Bloomberg, and other media; senior political/economics commentator on China
Global Television Network (CGTN); and a columnist in China Daily and South
China Morning Post.
For 30 years, Dr. Kuhn has worked with China’s state leaders and advised the
Chinese government. He spoke at the launch ceremony of President Xi Jinping’s
book, The Governance of China; he provided live commentary on CNN for Xi’s policy address
during his U.S. state visit (2015); and he introduced to foreign audiences Xi as “core” of the CPC
(2016). He is interviewed extensively on US-China relations, including the trade war (2018).
For the 19 th CPC National Congress (October 2017) and 13 th National People’s Congress (March
2018), Dr. Kuhn was interviewed extensively, including 24 times on CNN and BBC World News /
BBC World Service, and he was quoted in newspapers and websites in U.S., Hong Kong, Italy,
India, etc. His full-page, in-depth analyses of the 19 th CPC National Congress were featured in
China Daily to open the CPC Congress (“Historical Starting Point for New Stage of Development“)
and to close the CPC Congress (“New Era on the Road to 2050”). His essay at the opening of the
Party Congress was published in People’s Daily.
Dr. Kuhn is the author of How China’s Leaders Think (featuring President Xi), and The Man Who
Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (China’s best-selling book of 2005). He wrote
the Introduction for Understanding the CPC, the book series by China’s ruling party, the
Communist Party of China (2015).
Shanghai Media Group and Dr. Kuhn are co-creators and co-producers of the award-winning, fivepart
series China’s Challenges, broadcast internationally (PBS stations in the U.S.) and in China.
Dr. Kuhn is writer and host; Peter Getzels is director. China’s Challenges won first prize in China
News Awards twice (2013, 2018). A second season won an Emmy Award (Los Angeles, 2016). A
third season (on “Xi Jinping Thought” and China 2020 / China 2050) is broadcast in late 2018.
Dr. Kuhn is the creator, co-producer and host of “Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn” on CGTN (China
Global Television Network, co-created by Adam Zhu), the weekly series with unique access that
features China’s thought leaders and decision makers, broadcast globally and in China. Closer To
China focuses on China’s politics and government, CPC/Party, economics and society, reform and
development, and international affairs and relations, with emphasis on Xi’s policies and philosophy.
A special documentary on President Xi’s “targeted poverty alleviation” campaign, co-produced by
CGTN, Dr. Kuhn and Adam Zhu, is in production. Dr. Kuhn is host and writer. Peter Getzels is
director.
Dr. Kuhn was one of only two Americans, with Henry Kissinger, named as the first “China
Visionaries”. He was selected by Oriental Outlook magazine (Xinhua News Agency) as one of the
all-time, top-ten influential supporters of China’s ruling party/CPC (he is the only one living).
An international corporate strategist and investment banker, Dr. Kuhn works with major
multinational corporations, CEOs and C-Suite executives, in formulating and implementing China
strategies by applying his “politico-strategic framework”. He was president/co-owner of the largest
middle-market M&A firm in the U.S. (sold to Citigroup in 2000).
Dr. Kuhn is creator, writer and host of Closer To Truth (produced and directed by Peter Getzels),
the long-running PBS/public television series on science and philosophy (broadcast continually
since 2000, over 275 TV episodes; more are in production). Dr. Kuhn is author or editor of over 30
books on China, corporate strategy, finance, science and philosophy (including, with the
philosopher John Leslie, The Mystery of Existence: Why is there Anything At All).
Dr. Kuhn is chairman of The Kuhn Foundation which supports new knowledge in science and
philosophy, classical music, and informed relations between the United States and China. The
Kuhn Foundation produced the feature documentary “Khachaturian” on the life and music of the
Armenian-Russian composer Aram Khachaturian, which won the Best Documentary award at the
Hollywood Film Festival.
Dr. Kuhn has a B.A. Human Biology (Johns Hopkins); Ph.D. Anatomy/Brain Research (University
of California at Los Angeles, UCLA); MBA (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT).
CNN – Quest Means Business
Future of U.S.-China Trade Relations
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 27, 2018
1
CNBC
Squawk on the Street
US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 22, 2018
1
FOX BUSINESS
Mornings with Maria (Maria Bartiromo)
US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 23, 2018
1

BBC World News
President Xi Jinping-NPC Closing Session
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
March 20, 2018
HOST: Well joining me now
from Beijing is Dr. Robert
Lawrence Kuhn, advisor to
the Chinese government and
author of the book How
Chinese Leaders Think.
Thanks so much for joining us
here on the program. Usually
the NPC is seen as sort of a
choreographed event: we
know what to expect. But
this time it felt very different.
RLK: It certainly was
different. You have to look at
this year’s National People’s
1
Congress - and the so-called
Two Sessions - as part of the
“political season” which
begins with the party
congress in October and goes
now to the government
sessions in March. And
normally there is a
predictability and what
happens at the National
People’s Congress is not very
significant.
RLK: This year is different:
China talks about a “New
Era” – and this is not just
words, it is really the case. If
we look at the vision that Xi
Jinping gave at the party
congress, what we see here
at the National People’s
Congress we see as the
implementation of that vision
across a very broad front.
2
RLK: People have focused on
term limits - understandably
so - but the change is only for
the presidency. Xi Jinping by
having been made “Core” of
the Party in October 2016 -
actually with that designation
undermined “collective
leadership” - and when Xi’s
name was put into the Party
Constitution as the
contemporary arbiter of
Marxism - on which the Party
is based and the Party rules
the country - he then became
the overarching leader, no
matter what position he
would hold.
3
CNN International
President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 12, 2018
HOST: Let’s talk about President Xi Jinping with our
gues,t Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a longtime advisor to the
Chinese government, the author of How China’s Leaders
Think, and the host of Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn on the
China Global Television Network. Thanks for being with
us.
RLK: Hi Natalie. Interesting day we’re having.
HOST: Isn’t it, though? So, I guess the first question
would be to follow up on your book title, how China’s
leaders think. What is Xi Jinping thinking with this move?

RLK: First of all, we have to understand it in context.
There are twenty-one different clauses in this
Constitutional Amendment, and the whole point of it is to
strengthen the governance system of China. Now China is a
party-state system where the party controls the state.
Everyone is focusing on the abolition of term limits, and it
is important, but we need to understand the context within
this party-state system. In October of 2016, Xi Jinping was
made “Core” of the Party, which meant the collective
leadership of the past was no longer operative; that X was,
in essence, for the Party, the decision maker. Then just this
last October at the 19th CPC National Congress, his name
was put into the Party Constitution as “Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era,”… it’s a big phrase.
RLK: But what it means is that Xi is the arbiter of Marxism
and party theory. That means in terms of being the Core ot
the Party and the interpreter of Marxism that gives him
ultimate power. He doesn’t even need a formal position when
has those two and the Party continues to run the country.
HOST: Is that a good thing? How can it be a good thing for
the country when one person has the ultimate power?
RLK: There are two issues. One is how it happened: Now
the abolition of presidential term limits coordinates with the
Party and military, together the three largest positions. So
they’re now coordinated because he already had that power
in the Party and the military.
2
Amanpour on CNN
President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – Minxin Pei
March 5, 2018
HOST: When it comes to trade, one country more
than any other has been the target of Trump’s
rhetorical wrath, and that’s China. But my next
guest tells me that the promised tariffs won’t
bother China much, as we’ve been discussing. In
any way, they in China are dealing with much more
important things, like the proposal for the rubber
stamp Party Congress which starts its new session
today to change the Constitution, and lift all term
limits on President Xi Jinping, effectively making
him president for life. Now, I’ve been talking to
Minxin Pei: he’s a professor of government at
Claremont McKenna College in California, and to
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, who is the author of How
China’s Leaders Think, and he is the host of a show
on the government-run CCTV news channel in
Beijing. Gentlemen welcome to you both. Let me
start by asking you, Robert Lawrence Kuhn there in
Beijing. From the Chinese government perspective,
these tariffs that the president of the United States
has announced, how much does it concern Beijing?

RLK: Well certainly it’s a concern, but I would call it a
minor annoyance as opposed to something extremely
serious. They have a lot on their plate here. The last
thing they want is a trade war with the U.S., but they
have to react. If the U.S. does something, there has to be
something that they will do in retaliation. They will
ratchet it down. They will signal, as you do, that they do
not want to accelerate this, but to save face and to be
appropriate, they’ll have to match it.
HOST: To you Minxin Pei, how do you see this playing
out?
MP: If the investigations find China at fault, or guilty of
some practices, then the US has a wide range of options
to punish China on a trade front. And if these things
happen, then US-China trade war will take place.
Another thing I want to say is that US-China relations
have turned a corner. This is a relationship that has
headed toward a long period of confrontation, and
adversarial relationships. So what is going to happen
on the trade front is part of a much larger picture of
geopolitical rivalry, if not competition.
2
Bloomberg TV Worldwide
President Xi, China, Economy
Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 5, 2018
HOST: You were there at the Great Hall of the People. What was
your main takeaway from what some have described as Li
Keqiang’s impossible challenge: how to deleverage, how to take
away stimulus, and still keep 6.5% growth?
RLK: I don’t take the 6.5% growth as the primary objective here.
I mean you have to look at what these National Peoples
Congresses are. They’re not setting the vision and the strategy.
That was set at the party congress in October. What we’re dealing
here is the implementation of the policies. If you attend these
every year you know they all look and sound the same because
it’s the same structure, same kind of structure of numbers, so
what you do is look for the differences. What are those subtle
differences between one year and another. That’s what I focus on
at these congresses.
HOST: What’s the main difference you saw?
1
BBC World News
Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
October 25, 2017
HOST: We’re going to put a question to Robert Lawrence
Kuhn, who’s a long-time advisor to the Chinese
government. Robert, great to see you again. You were
with us at the very beginning of the Party Congress and
you were at the Congress today when it finished. Did you
have any vision, any inkling that President Xi Jinping
would take on so much authority? Also, what about the
fact that there is no successor candidates among the new
leaders?
RLK: I was interviewed in early 2012 by a well-known
American television network and the question put to me,
in January of that year, was, “isn’t Xi Jinping going to be a
very weak leader because he was not appointed by Deng
Xiaoping and he has no strong base of support?”
1
CNN International
Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee
Robert Lawrence Kuhn - October 26, 2017
HOST: The author of How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside
Story of Past, Current and Future Leaders, Robert Lawrence
Kuhn is a longtime advisor to the Chinese government. He
comes to us once again from Beijing. We talked this time
yesterday. Good to have you back. And we discussed
yesterday what we would learn about that lineup of the
standing committee. It hadn’t been revealed at that point
that we spoke, but we now know and is it correct to say the
most significant thing is no sign of a leader in waiting?
RLK: I think the most significant sign is who the people are
and how they relate to each other. It’s a group that actually
respects traditional norms.
RLK: There was thought that Wang Qishan, for example,
might violate norms by being on the Standing Committee
after the traditional retirement age and that’s not the case.
There is balance among the member in terms of their
geographies, even their political affiliations within the party
which internally are important. Two are from Shanghai,
two are from the Communist Youth League - one is actually
from Shanghai and the Youth League as well but he’s really
from Shanghai - two have a long relationship with General
Secretary Xi. And then of course General Secretary Xi has
the overarching power as everyone says - and that is correct
and will be correct for a long time to come.


CHINA DAILY Tuesday, January 23, 2018
VISION CHINA
7
Observers offer fresh insight for new era
Intellectual hails progress
made in past while warning
of challenges that lie ahead
By LI YANG
liyang@chinadaily.com.cn
Robert Lawrence Kuhn has many
titles, ranging from investment
banker to anatomy researcher. But
he is better known in China as a specialist
who knows the country
inside out.
Over the past 29 years, he has
visited almost every provincial
region and spoken with people from
all walks of life, including some who
have gone on to become State leaders.
“It’s been a great gift to my life to
be able to learn so much about China’s
rich civilization, political theories
and the whole development,” he
said.
Kuhn, who is from the United
States, learns as an outsider but
communicates as an insider. In his
talk show Closer to China with R.L.
Kuhn on the China Global Television
Network, he presents China’s
complex story to the world through
candid, intimate discussions with
the country’s decision-makers.
In a hotel suite in Wangfujing,
downtown Beijing, one busy lunchtime
last week, Kuhn shared his
thoughts on Chinese politics with
China Daily, between exercising and
a meeting of the Communist Party
of China, which he had been invited
to attend as an observer.
He spoke passionately about the
19th CPC National Congress, which
was held in Beijing in October,
describing it as “a milestone congress
that set the agenda for more
than 30 years”.
The Party proposed two new concepts
at the congress — “a new era
of socialism with Chinese characteristics”
and Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era, which has
been written into the Party Constitution.
“To understand China today, it is
critical to appreciate what the new
era means. … I like to understand
new era in two categories: its characteristics
at home and abroad, and
its timeline,” Kuhn said.
He has obviously developed his
own way of explaining terms with
Chinese characteristics. That is to
break down the characteristics,
domestically and internationally,
rather than delve into the term.
He listed a number of challenges
in China’s new era, from pollution to
medical care, among which he said
the biggest is the rising expectations
of the people at home, because “now
that the people have some, they
want more”.
The complex international environment
is the main characteristic
of the new era, as the world is fragmented
by diverse problems and
challenges, he said.
While explaining what he called
the timeline of the new era (2017,
2021, 2049) and expounding his
understanding of Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era —
which he broke down into three categories:
serve the people, national
rejuvenation, and governance modernization
— Kuhn showcased his
knowledge of the Party’s files, which
he has clearly learned by heart.
He recited almost every key
point of the 68-page report Xi
delivered to the congress in October.
More important, he made connections
between these points,
presenting them in a vivid way, seasoned
with personal experiences
and thinking.
When asked about the effects of
the anti-corruption campaign, he
immediately listed 10 objectives.
That’s his style of approaching Chinese
issues — divergent thinking
and a vigilance not to lose sight of
the connections between different
points.
British journalist tells China’s story to the world
By LIU XUAN
liuxuan@chinadaily.com.cn
Broadcaster sees choice and confidence in rising nation
By YANG WANGLI
yangwangli@chinadaily.com.cn
For 20 years, Liu Xin has had a singular
goal: to build a bridge of understanding
between China and the
outside world.
The television presenter began
working for China Central TV, the
State broadcaster, in 1997, two years
after becoming the first Chinese to
take part in — and win — the International
Public Speaking Competition.
Early last year, her desire to share
China’s story received a major boost
when she was chosen to host The
Point, a prime-time discussion show
that airs weekdays on the China Global
Television Network.
She said that China entering a new
era means three things: opportunities,
challenges and responsibilities.
“My winning speech in that 1995
national competition was about
choice,” she said. “After 15 years of
reform and opening-up, we Chinese
now enjoy an abundance of choice in
our daily lives.”
After listening to General Secretary
Xi Jinping’s report at the opening of
I like to understand
new era in two categories:
its characteristics
at home and abroad,
and its timeline.”
Robert Lawrence Kuhn, investment
banker and anatomy researcher
Q&A | ROBERT
LAWRENCE KUHN
You hold multiple titles now.
How have you managed to
master so many different
fields? Do they have anything
in common?
There’s one word to describe
the commonality, that is “passion”.
Whatever I’ve done I
want to have passion for it. To
expand that a bit, it’s the passion
to learn. I’m not here to
teach, I love to learn. When I
write a new book, it’s something
I want to learn about. I
use that vehicle to learn. So
passion about learning is the
common denominator. China
has given me a hugely rich life
because of everything I’ve
learned here.
the 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China, Liu said
she was impressed with his use of the
word “confidence”.
“It’s the confidence China has developed
through knowing that our system
works. The confidence about who
we are as a people, as a culture. And it’s
the confidence about our future role in
the world,” she said.
“As media workers, we believe we
have a great story to tell. In the past,
people relied on a few correspondents
or experts for information and opinions
on China. But more people are
tuning in to Chinese media for information,
both traditional platforms
such as TV and online.”
As more questions emerge in the
minds of those watching from outside
China, Liu said the opportunities to
tell stories from inside the country are
growing. However, so too are the challenges.
“Because of the ideological differences
between China and the West, China
has always been the subject of
Western media criticism, which is
often downright bashing based on
falsehoods,” she said.
From left: Zhao Jianguo, head of the international communication bureau of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee; Jiang
Qingzhe, Party chief of the University of International Business and Economics; China Daily reporter Andrew Moody; Guo Weimin, vice-minister of the Information
Office of the State Council; speakers Robert Lawrence Kuhn and Liu Xin; Zhou Shuchun, publisher and editor-in-chief of China Daily; and Zhang Jianmin, head of
translation and interpretation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pose for a photo at the inaugural Vision China event on Monday at UIBE. FENG YONGBIN / CHINA DAILY
Now that China has defied all kinds
of predictions of a collapse or economic
hard landing, Western observers are
having a hard time explaining the China
phenomenon, she said, adding that
the result is an ignorance-based superiority
complex mixed with bewilderment
and iced with jealousy.
During her 30-minute program, Liu
conducts live interviews with guests in
the studio or via satellite link to get a
Chinese perspective on two to three topics
that affect people around the world.
“I understand the urgency to be
more assertive, but I believe we always
need to be aware of the danger of putting
feelings before reason, putting
opinions before facts,” she said.
“Nationalism is my biggest enemy.
“President Xi has said we need to
improve the quality and effect of development.
I believe this also applies to
China’s international communication.
The Chinese people will work hard
toward a community of a shared future,
regardless of how others view us.”
Meanwhile, Liu has a job to do. “As a
journalist, our duty is to tell China’s
story as it is, one topic at a time, one
show at a time,” she added.
The real fun of
reporting in China is
the closeness to the
actual story, the big
fascinating story of
China merging into
the 21st century.”
Andrew Moody,
China Daily senior reporter
China has always been
the subject of Western
media criticism,
which is often
downright bashing
based on falsehoods.”
Liu Xin, host of The Point on
China Global Television Network
Q&A
ANDREW MOODY
How do you overcome the
challenges of showing the
real China to the world,
especially to those who have
biases against China?
It’s a long-term thing, and
you cannot change this overnight.
There are negative perceptions
about China. It’s
about engagement. If China
has much more interactions
with the rest of the world, then
people will see China as it
actually is. One of the 2035
objectives is to better increase
China’s soft power. Organizations
like China Daily can actually
play a role in improving
China’s soft power. But I do
think it’s a long-term process,
and China doesn’t need to be
too sensitive toward criticism.
Despite living and working in China
for a decade, Andrew Moody’s ability
to speak Mandarin is still at a basic
level. Yet that has not stopped the
award-winning journalist from interpreting
China’s story for the world.
Moody joined China Daily nine
years ago and is now a senior correspondent.
He has written more than
150 cover stories for the paper’s European
Weekly and African Weekly,
examining a wide range of issues
including the Belt and Road Initiative.
The job has provided him with firsthand
experience of how China is
developing as well as the chance to
record reactions from the outside
world, especially in the West, toward
the nation’s growth and changes.
He was at the Great Hall of the
People to hear General Secretary
Xi Jinping deliver a report to the
19th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China in October,
when the concept of a “new era” was
first mentioned.
“The consensus of the various people
I spoke to in the hours after the
speech was that China’s entering a new
era could be a momentous turning
point in world history,” Moody said.
According to his interviews, he
said, people believe that a more confident
China is striding into a world
that it also is helping to shape.
Moody has his own understanding
of the new era. With 40 years of
reform and opening-up, he said China
has reached a point where it can move
on in many ways, such as in foreign
policy, global governance and domestic
reforms. “China has reached a new
junction and has to move forward.”
The British journalist has written
many stories that explain China to the
rest of the world, and these have
brought him many honors, including
being named a State High-End
Project Foreign Expert.
“I like reporting on China because
it’s perhaps the 21st century’s most
fascinating story,” he said. “The real
fun of reporting in China is the closeness
to the actual story, the big fascinating
story of China merging into
the 21st century, the stories that maybe
Western media don’t really have
the chance to interview.”
Moody sees his task as communicating
China to a global audience, and
there are still a number of things that
need to be done, he said.
“I go back to the UK quite a lot, and
I still don’t think that people are
aware of the impact of a much bigger
Chinese economy and China’s being a
more significant player in the world,”
he said. “All I can do is to report and do
stories one by one.”
Q&A | LIU XIN
As a professional journalist,
what do you think China’s
mainstream media could do
to better report China to the
outside world in such a media
transformation age?
It’s challenging. I think we
need to be aware of new technology.
And the content is very
important. If we’re more confident,
we can really be more
sincere, be more at ease with
our problems and our achievements.
So let’s have a sincere
conversation, not shy away
from the problems we’re facing.
That’s why I say let’s tell
the China story as it is. It’s not
100 percent about achievements.
Every day we see mixed
news, we have mixed feelings,
so let’s be factual, let’s be sincere
and let people decide
whether they want to watch us
or not. This is going to take
time, but I think if we follow
the right philosophy, the right
steps, we’re going to make it.
What they say
Vision China
is the
first highend
event
organized
by China
Daily and
UIBE after the two sides
launched a partnership. By
telling China’s stories in an
objective and rational manner,
it aims to help students get to
know a real China and an
objective world, and to understand
China in the new era.
Wang Jiaqiong, president of
the University of International
Business and Economics
I’ve learned
a lot from
Vision China
today.
What
impressed
me most is
how to eliminate bias against
China when telling China’s
stories. The three experts
shared a common opinion,
which is to show a true China
and not care too much about
comments from the outside
world. The sincerest story is
often the most touching one.
Zhu Yue, a senior student
majoring in international politics
from Beijing International
Studies University
It was an
interesting
lecture. It
was good to
understand
certain
aspects
about China. It would be good
to have things like this abroad
because it’s about China. You
don’t have to explain China to
the Chinese people, but you
need to explain it to the outside
world.
Nektarios Palaskas, science
and technology counselor for
the Swiss embassy
This event
was very
interesting.
You invited
distinguished
speakers,
and all of them are of global
thinking and have a vision
about China. China is booming,
and everyone is interested.
I enjoyed hearing the
speakers’ ideas about how
China will be in the future. I
came here with an open mind.
Ratthawoot Nanthaikuakool,
first secretary of Thai embassy

A12 Saturday, March 10, 2018
CONTACT US
Agree or disagree with the opinions on this
page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com
If you have an idea for an opinion article,
email it to oped@scmp.com
Power with purpose
Robert Lawrence Kuhn explains why abolishing presidential term limits may well be good for China
To interview delegates
and officials at the
annual National People’s
Congress in Beijing,
interspersed with
being interviewed in the international
media about China abolishing
term limits for its president,
is to inhabit parallel universes.
Delegates and officials focus
on clusters of issues from controlling
financial risk and reducing
pollution to scientific innovation
and business stimulation, plus
enhancing and institutionalising
China’s anti-corruption campaign
with a powerful National
Supervision Commission. The
international media, no surprise,
focus on the constitutional
amendment ending term limits,
assuming President Xi Jinping will
now serve in a for-life dictatorship,
reminiscent of Mao’s China,
the Soviet Union, the Kim family
in North Korea and some African
countries.
It is no challenge to explain
why abolishing term limits is bad
for China – dependency on one
human being who is not omniscient
but is hostage to fortune,
fewer and weaker checks and
balances, forced conformity in a
complex society with no easy answers,
etc. The system begins
stronger in that hard choices can
be made and consistency maintained,
but it could become brittle
in that officials are more wary and
may say things they do not
believe.
It is a challenge to explain why
abolishing term limits is good for
China, so that’s what I will do.
First, some background. There
are three separate issues being
conflated: the significance of ending
term limits, the intended consequences
and the unintended
consequences. Though terminating
the two-term limit for China’s
presidency captures headlines, it
is more the symbolic, final step
ratifying Xi’s near-absolute power
than the big breakthrough itself.
Many expect this
experiment to
end badly for
China. It is
indeed an
experiment but
its end is not set
Xi’s prior designation as “core” of
the Communist Party in October
2016 and the inscribing of “Xi
Jinping Thought...” into the party
constitution in October 2017 were
more meaningful.
Moreover, the Politburo
Standing Committee, the highest
authoritative body in China,
unambiguously supports Xi.
China watchers see the front page
of People’s Daily – published the
day after the new Standing Committee
marched out on stage –
which featured Xi’s photo on top,
many times larger than the smaller,
subservient photo of all seven
members lined up on the bottom.
All this reconfirms that, in a
system where the party controls
the state – especially where the
party is Marxist and ideology is its
basis for being – Xi, as core of the
party, with his name inscribed in
the constitutions of party and
state as the contemporary arbiter
of Marxism, will be the uncontested,
overarching leader of China
for the rest of his sentient life.
For intended consequences,
the official line is that the purpose
is national cohesion brought
about when the three top leadership
positions – general secretary
of the party, chairman of the Central
Military Commission and
president of the republic – are
aligned temporally and held by a
single person.
This makes sense, but as a
primary, proximal motivation, it is
not entirely persuasive. The
current structure has existed for
decades without outcry or angst
(not to mention that the three positions
could be unified by installing
term limits on the other two).
The “new era”, marked by economic,
social and global complexities,
is said to require firm
and consistent leadership, making
moot inner party struggles
and even mitigating political gossip,
facilitating focus on the tasks
of governance and development.
Specifically, because advancing
reform has become more difficult,
with entrenched interest groups
resisting change, the message
must now go forth that all must
get with the programme, because
you can’t outwit or outwait Xi.
Because, it is said that only Xi
has the vision, experience, competence
and character to bring
about “the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese people”, especially
from 2020 to 2035 and ultimately
to 2050 – bringing China to global
centre stage – Xi’s unimpeded
leadership is deemed essential.
China cannot afford “downtime”
to accommodate a change of
leadership, and after Xi’s success
at the 19th National Party Congress
came the time to make clear
that he will call the shots for the
foreseeable future.
Some argue that doing away
with term limits shows the superiority
of the Chinese system as it
allows flexibility in matching
leadership to requirements
(though what national leader,
when extending his reach, has not
claimed “current requirements”
as justification?).
The party-run Global Times
stated that ending term limits
does not mean China has reverted
to president-for-life tenure. (But
who can deny that however long
Xi holds the top positions seems
largely up to him?)
As for the unintended consequences,
the almost unanimous,
disparaging foreign reaction –
other than US President Donald
Trump’s – did not burnish China’s
international image.
More worrisome would be a
reluctance by officials to offer
constructive opposing views on
central policies.
By stressing term limits, the
international media misses
fundamental changes going on in
China – this year, innovation,
streamlining of government, facilitation
of business (cutting
bureaucracy and reducing taxes),
rural revitalisation and rural land
reform. The 13th National People’s
Congress shows how the
grand vision and mission of the
19th National Party Congress is
translated into specific strategies
and policies. If one sees only term
limits, one cannot visualise the big
picture.
As for Xi maintaining the presidency
perpetually, it doesn’t actually
matter much – this is the deep
insight of how China’s party-state
system works. Xi as core of the
party and “Xi Jinping Thought...”
as the party’s (and now the state’s)
guiding principle means that Xi
can transfer titular party leadership
and/or the presidency to others
and still maintain his
overarching power. It may well be
that, after serving two or even
three more terms, rather than trying
to find and install another
leader like himself, he will move to
bring about true democracy within
the party.
Here’s the best case. Xi will not
be leader-for-life, but leader long
enough to bring about China’s
national rejuvenation and establish
a Chinese kind of democratic
norms. Could Xi continue until
around 2035, when China plans to
have “basically” achieved full modernisation,
heading towards, by
mid-century, 2050, a “great modern
socialist country”?
Many expect this experiment
to end badly for China. It is indeed
an experiment but its end is not
set. It may be a race between
achieving Xi’s grand vision and
some untoward perturbation that
could cause fracture.
All factors considered, I am not
saying abolishing term limits is
absolutely good for China. I am
saying it may be good – because of
China’s special conditions and
Xi’s special capabilities – but if it is
good, it’s just for this once, and it’s
just for so long. That’s the best
case. I’m rooting for Xi.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public
intellectual, international corporate
strategist and investment banker, and
China expert/commentator. He is the
author of How China’s Leaders Think
Private clubs
deserve ‘cushy’
rental deals
Edith Terry says private recreational
clubs are part of Hong Kong’s
heritage and have contributed to
nurturing less popular sports, as
well as a unique hybrid culture
In 1964, a young German, fresh off the plane at his
first job, went in search of a social group. He found a
home away from home in Hong Kong’s oldest
private recreational club, newly relocated from a prime
location on Victoria Harbour, where City Hall is today,
to a modest flagstone boathouse beneath Island Road
on Hong Kong’s south side. Fifty-five years later, Frank
Pfeiffer, a Zen Buddhist and mountain climber, is still
an active member of the Victoria Recreation Club,
established in 1849. He has watched it ring the changes
from Hong Kong’s colonial society in the 1960s, when it
had only two Chinese members and no female
members, to the hybrid institution it is today, under its
first Hong Kong Chinese chairman, Wu Kam Shing.
Its membership is a spectrum of Hong Kong’s
diverse and athletically minded middle class. There is
the Hong Kong Chinese court reporter who visits the
club in Deep Water Bay every morning at 6am on her
way from home in Ap Lei Chau to her workplace in Sha
Tin. There are her fellow swimmers, many elderly, who
swim out to the buoys, rain or shine, hot or cold, every
day. Some 100-150 “paddlers” use the club as a base for
outrigger canoeing, dragon boating and paddle
boarding. Some of the sports were unknown to Hong
Kong before the club nurtured them, others, like
dragon boating, are deeply traditional.
In the current debate over the future of the 67
private recreational clubs that pay minimal rents to the
government, history has been swept aside. True, they
were designed on a colonial template, in which the
diverse ethnic groups were given separate retreats.
Membership at the pinnacle clubs was reserved
primarily for the British. For other ethnic groups, there
was a Chinese Recreation Club, a Club de Recreio, a
Filipino Club, an Indian Recreation Club, and so on.
Hong Kong’s colonial rulers reviewed the lease
system for the private clubs in 1968 and 1979, and in
the run-up to the handover in 1997 when leases were
restricted to 15-year terms. At the handover, a number
of leases were extended to ensure a so-called smooth
transition. The sceptic would argue that this was a
dodge, and indeed, in 2011, during the first post-1997
review of private recreational leases by the Legislative
Council, most of the clubs seemed oblivious to public
concerns as well as new requirements for “opening up”
The government argued
that subsidies were
needed because use of land
for sports and recreation
would never trump
commercial utilisation
What the Western belt and road sceptics are missing
Wenshan Jia says there are opportunities for the whole world to benefit from China’s initiative
China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”is
an original plan to carry out a new
type of “collaborative globalisation”
above and beyond US-led type. It was
proposed five years ago by President Xi
Jinping after the tapering off of US-led
globalisation in 2008.
Xi offered three principles: mutual
consultation, joint construction and
shared benefits. China has since then fully
executed 101 agreements with 86
countries, and total investment in the 24
countries along the belt and road regions
has amounted to US$50 billion, resulting
in 75 industrial and trade zones, and
200,000 jobs.
With its focus on infrastructure, the
initiative is a model not only for developing
countries, but also industrialised ones in
Europe and North America, where ageing
infrastructure needs replacing. It also
adapts to each local, national or regional
condition, situation and need. It is proving
very democratic, more so than the
lopsided US-led globalisation that spurred
a populist, isolationist backlash across the
Western world.
China has done a proper job of
explaining to the West what the initiative is
and extended a sincere invitation to each
country to join. Many think tank scholars
and major media outlets in the West have
found it potentially lucrative and
expressed relatively strong support.
Yet, instead of appreciating China’s
efforts to both inherit the liberal agenda of
globalisation and forge a new path for
global development, many Western
political elite, led by the US, have started a
campaign to resist the initiative. From
Australia to the US , and the UK to
Germany, there are calls for the West to cut
interactions with China to minimise or
resist its so-called “sharp power”. The
labels typically applied to China include
“authoritarian” and “predatory”, citing
Beijing for not upholding “freedom,
democracy and individual rights”, the core
values of the West.
This attitude towards the initiative
reveals not only a contradiction in the
Western mind, but also the narrowing or
even closing of minds.
Isn’t it beneficial to meet the goals of
forging connectivity and cooperation, as
articulated in Xi’s effort to enrich and
expand the meaning of the “free world” by
liberating humankind from geographical,
financial, political and cultural barriers?
The world is no longer the West versus the
rest, as we already live in a world
connected by the internet. The initiative
seeks to make the world more
interconnected for both the West and the
rest, contributing to the construction of a
human community with a shared future.
Recently, the initiative has inspired and
spawned a push for localisation,
particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy led by
the so-called “Quad” of the US, India,
Japan and Australia. Some Western media
view it as a rival or alternative to China’s
belt and road.
But I would argue that it can be part of
China’s initiative as long as the three
Chinese principles (mutual consultation,
The anti-China smear
campaign must be
replaced by a
discourse involving
consultation and
communication
joint construction and shared benefits) are
observed in the Quad strategy. The belt
and road was created to be an all-inclusive
platform, so Beijing has no need to fear
localisation as long as such strategies do
not seek to contain China or disrupt its
plan. It would be wise for the Quad and
China to look for ways to collaborate.
Quad countries need not take an
antagonistic stance towards China; the
anti-China smear campaign must be
replaced by a discourse involving
consultation and communication. The
world has experienced more than enough
damaging talk, not to mention wars.
The core principles of Xi’s belt and road
strategy must be always applied in China’s
interactions with local strategies. If China
is, as German Foreign Minister Sigmar
Gabriel told the Munich Security
Conference in February, “the only country
in the world with any sort of genuinely
global, geostrategic concept”, then
Western leaders should cultivate a
genuinely global strategy in line with
China’s vision, for the betterment of all
humankind.
Wenshan Jia, PhD, is a professor in the
School of Communication, at Chapman
University (California) and a research fellow
at the National Academy of Development
and Strategy, Renmin University of China
to schools and community organisations. Following
the last well-publicised review in 2013 and the current
investigation seeking new venues for public housing,
they are no longer complacent.
Should the private clubs have got their cushy rental
deals in the first place? At the time of the reviews 50
years ago, the government argued that subsidies were
needed because use of land for sports and recreation
would never trump commercial utilisation. What was
true then is even more so today. The high cost of land in
Hong Kong is a drag on innovation and creativity. The
existence of the private recreational clubs means it has
been less of a drag on sports.
Most of the clubs with government leases are
framed around core sports – golf, tennis, horse racing,
swimming, sailing and rowing, to name a few. Hong
Kong athletes whose development was supported by
these clubs have gone to the Olympics and other
international competitions. In the 1940s, the Victoria
Recreation Club was the driving force behind Hong
Kong’s participation in the International Olympic
Committee and the Hong Kong Sports Federation.
Public pressure on the clubs to forge community
ties and contribute to Hong Kong through “opening
up” schemes is appropriate – but not the pressure to
convert their land to high-rise estates. The loss is not
only to the core sports they represent but also to their
unique DNA, which is the foundation of Hong Kong –
diverse, cosmopolitan and adventurous. If you want to
look for a Hong Kong that is not just about money, one
place to look is here.
Edith Terry is the honorary secretary of the Victoria
Recreation Club. She writes in a personal capacity
Stand-up paddlers participate in an event held at the
Victoria Recreation Club. Photo: Jonathan Wong
CHINA DAILY Wednesday, December 27, 2017 VIEWS 9
2017 YEAR-END: Politics
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Watching China’s year for history
When future historians reconstruct
the long history of China,
they will likely circle 2017
as a year of significance. I’ve
seen it all this year, and attended or even
participated in the major events. I’ve conversed
with Chinese leaders and experts,
and searched for meaning.
I didn’t appreciate the opportunity I’ve
had until I began reviewing the year from
China’s domestic perspective, seeking
themes and trends, discerning from what
we know about the recent past to what we
might forecast about the near-term future.
It takes no flash of insight to see the leadership
and vision of President Xi Jinping
headlining almost every event.
Following is the review of the meaningful
events of 2017.
January: Xi began
the year with a memorable
speech at the
World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland,
mounting a roaring
defense of globalization,
free trade, and
Robert Lawrence
Kuhn
economic openness and
liberalization. It was the
first-ever speech by China’s
head of state at
Davos and, as commentators the world over
noted with amazement and irony, as the
United States under President Donald
Trump was apparently retreating from the
world and abrogating global leadership,
China under President Xi was apparently
defending the international order and promoting
global governance.
March: The annual “two sessions” of the
National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature,
and the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference National Committee,
the top political advisory body, seemed
to radiate more energy than usual, perhaps
in anticipation of the 19th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in
the fall. A highlight was the adoption of the
draft general provisions of civil law, a step
closer to a long-needed unified civil code.
I sensed delegates’ growing confidence
and assertiveness to represent their particular
sectors in the competitive marketplace
of public ideas and government funding, a
competition that is vital for the development
of China’s kind of consultative democracy.
This was especially true of the CPPCC
National Committee, whose members are
often leading experts in their fields, such
that even though they do not have legal
authority to pass laws, they have moral
authority to exert pressure and affect
change. It did not escape notice that,
throughout the “two sessions”, Xi was recognized
repeatedly as “core” of the CPC Central
Committee and of the whole Party.
Belt and Road to the fore
May: The first “Belt and Road Summit”
(the Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation), held in Beijing, was the diplomatic
highlight of the year in China. Some
130 countries participated, including 29
heads of state and government. The goal
was no less than the transformation of the
economic structure of the developing
world: building infrastructure and connectivity,
stimulating development, alleviating
poverty, reducing severe imbalances, promoting
South-South cooperation, and revitalizing
globalization.
Xi called the Belt and Road Initiative “the
project of the century”.
July: China celebrated the 20th anniversary
of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland.
It was a time of reflection for the
cosmopolitan city, long a global leader in
economic freedom and competitiveness.
Hong Kong had flourished: its way of life
preserved, its economy dynamic. But times
change. With Shanghai and Shenzhen on
the rise, and with some claiming the “one
country, two systems” principle is in
decline, Hong Kong faces new challenges.
August: The People’s Liberation Army
celebrated its 90th anniversary. In a move
both practical and symbolic, the PLA established
its first overseas logistics base in Djibouti,
situated strategically on the Horn of
Africa.
Xi Jinping, who is also chairman of the
Central Military Commission, said the PLA
is becoming “strong” informationized
armed forces. “The Chinese people love
peace,” Xi said. “We will never seek aggression
or expansion, but … No one should
expect us to swallow the bitter fruit that is
harmful to our sovereignty, security or
development interests”.
Foreigners are wondering: what is the
PLA’s long-term plan for operating overseas?
What will be the impact of the PLA’s
modernization and reform, especially its
burgeoning blue-water navy with multiple
aircraft carriers?
August: China hosted the BRICS Summit
in Xiamen, East China’s Fujian province.
The five BRICS countries — Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa —
have increasing influence on global economy
and politics, but does BRICS as an organization
make sense? China certainly thinks
so, and promoted the BRICS Summit as
representing a new kind of multilateral
global governance. There are complexities:
political instabilities in Brazil and South
Africa; the growing, comprehensive cooperation
between Russia and China; the sensitive,
multifaceted relationship
between India and China.
Throughout the year, events on the
Korean Peninsula continued to
intrude. While China continued to
call for denuclearization and dialogue,
just hours before Xi gave
the opening speech at the BRICS
Summit, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea detonated its
most powerful nuclear bomb
ever.
19th Party Congress
and the New Era
October: The highlight of the
year was, as expected, the 19th
CPC National Congress. Not quite
expected were the far-reaching
proclamations and, taken together,
the magnitude of their significance. I
witnessed history and see six highlights.
First, Xi’s name and thought were written
into the CPC Constitution — “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era”. Xi is now, officially,
the overarching creator and arbiter of political
thought, and combined with his designation
as “core” of the CPC, he is now the
undisputed, unimpeded leader with singular
authority. Xi Jinping “thought” is built
on the twin pillars of people orientation and
national rejuvenation, with the new concept
of development (innovation, coordination,
green, open, sharing) driving a new
kind of economic growth.
Second, the “New Era”, which is intended
as a policy-energizing game changer, is a
conceptual lens with which to view the
range of goals, strategies and concepts that
compose Xi’s way of thinking and the Party’s
new direction.
The “New Era” is envisioned in three temporal
segments: (i) from now until the fulfillment
of China’s first centenary goal of a
“moderately prosperous society” in 2020
(2021 being the 100th anniversary of the
CPC); (ii) from 2020 to 2035, when the CPC
states it will build on the foundation of the
moderately prosperous society so that, after
“15 years of hard work”, the country will
“basically” realize “socialist modernization”;
and (iii) from 2035 to 2050, when the CPC
states it will “work hard for a further 15
years” and “develop China into a country
that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced, harmonious, and beautiful”.
Realizing this vision at mid-century,
around 2050, with China being respected as
a great, modern, socialist country, is the second
centenary goal (2049 being the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China).
Third, the new “principal contradiction”
in China’s “New Era” is between “unbalanced
and inadequate development” and
“the people’s ever-growing needs for a better
life”, which includes increasingly broad
demands for “democracy, rule of law, fairness
and justice, security, and a better environment”.
From now on, this new-era
principal contradiction, replacing quantitative
GDP growth with qualitative improvement
of life, is what will guide China’s
domestic affairs and policies.
Fourth, the Party’s leadership role in governing
the country is expanding and the
Party’s stringent approach to governing
itself is intensifying. The Party will be more
deeply embedded within agencies of government
and sectors of society (including
private companies, foreign businesses and
educational institutions), and by reforming
and purifying itself, the Party’s governance
will be stricter and more comprehensive.
The anti-corruption campaign, not only
continues, it has been enhanced.
Fifth, the “New Era” has China moving
closer to center stage of the world and making
greater contributions to humanity,
offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese
solutions” for world problems. China’s
diplomacy will be proactive, championing
the development of a community with a
shared future for humanity and encouraging
the evolution of the global governance
system.
Sixth, I watched the new senior leaders of
China, the seven members of the new
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau
of the CPC Central Committee, walk out on
stage, ending months, really years, of speculation
and rumor. Because everything in
China reports to a Political Bureau Standing
Committee member, and because of the
Party’s principle of collective leadership,
their personalities, composition and balance
determine the vision, strategies and
policies that shape China.
The importance of the Political Bureau
Standing Committee remains true today,
but its importance frankly is also less true
today. It is hard to overstate the consequences
of Xi’s name written into the Party
Constitution, thus inscribing into perpetuity
his predominant status and assuring
his continuing pre-eminence in the coun-
try’s political life.
Following the 19th Party Congress, some
might have expected a respite, a slower
November and December. They were anything
but.
Form is substance
November: The “state visit-plus” of US
President Donald Trump came at a delicate
moment. Amid pomp and pageantry,
including a personal tour of the Palace
Museum (Forbidden City), $253 billion in
business deals were signed, a world record,
though critics complained it was all transactional,
nothing structural. The number,
some said, was more form than substance,
but here, perhaps, form was substance.
Both Xi and Trump hailed the visit as “successful
and historic”.
Yet, on sensitive topics, one could be forgiven
for seeing sunlight between their
positions. On trade, Xi lauded the business
deals and market access, “which will deliver
great benefits for the two peoples”. Trump
sought improved trade with China based on
“a level playing field for our workers” and
solving the “massive trade distortion” —
which, characteristically, Trump blamed on
past US administrations, not on China.
On the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, Xi reiterated China’s firm commitment
for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula
and direct communications, while Trump
said that they “agreed not to replicate failed
approaches of the past” and he called for
“increased economic pressure until North
Korea abandons its reckless and dangerous
path”.
Subsequent to Trump’s visit, China
announced revised regulations that were
indeed structural. China will reduce or
eliminate (over time) limits on foreign
ownership of financial services sectors,
including insurance, commercial banking,
securities, futures, and asset management.
Significantly, the State Council, China’s
Cabinet, established a Financial Stability
and Development Committee to oversee
financial stability and boost risk prevention
(including close monitoring of “shadow
banking” and corporate debt). This new
supra-ministry commission will be empowered
to make decisions related to reform
and development, coordinate issues concerning
monetary policy, and establish
financial policies and related fiscal and
industrial policies, thus improving the
financial regulatory system.
At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam, Xi strengthened
his themes of making economic globalization
more open, balanced and
inclusive; lauded regional multilateralism
for promoting common interests; and
stressed the Belt and Road Initiative for
advancing global connectivity.
What struck me in Xi’s speech was what
he inserted about poverty: “To lift all the
remaining poor people out of poverty is a
solemn commitment made by the Chinese
government to the people. It is uppermost
in my mind, and I have spent more energy
on poverty alleviation than on anything
else.”
“Upper most in my mind?” “More energy
on poverty alleviation than on anything
else?” An extraordinary statement from the
president! Although Xi has been making
high-profile visits to numerous poor counties
and villages, relentlessly championing
“targeted poverty alleviation” for realizing
the “moderately prosperous society”, this
was his clearest statement that poverty alleviation
is his highest priority.
Main contradiction reinforced
Two unpleasant events in Beijing reinforced
the new “principal contradiction”,
highlighting “the people’s ever-growing
needs for a better life” as that surprisingly
powerful lens for viewing Chinese society.
The first was alleged child abuse at a kindergarten.
The second was a fire in which
19 migrant workers died. In both cases, netizens
reacted with anger: in the alleged
child abuse, anger about a perceived coverup;
in the fire, anger for the disorderly and
inconsiderate way of evacuating migrant
workers.
When Xi first announced the new principal
contradiction at the 19th Party Congress,
some dismissed it as arcane Partyspeak.
Public reaction to the alleged child
abuse and to the fire revealed its prescient
and perspicacious wisdom.
The second volume of Xi Jinping: The
Governance of China, a collection of 99 of
Xi’s speeches, conversations, instructions
and letters, was published. The book offers
a resource to follow the development of Xi’s
ways of thinking and ideas and to understand
China’s new guiding philosophy and
the specific elements that compose it.
The month ended with what may seem a
light touch when Xi called for China to
upgrade its toilets. Toilets among the year’s
highlights? Xi was serious and his point is
probative. For China to become a more civilized
society, the hygiene of the people must
be improved (especially in rural areas), and
for China’s tourism industry to blossom,
better bathrooms are needed. Although
China’s leader talking toilets elicits smiles,
and some say it downgrades his dignity, it
demonstrates, above all, Xi’s intrinsic commitment
to improve the quality of life for
the Chinese people.
December: In the first nine days of the
month, Xi engaged with four international
events, stressing common commitment to
build a community of a shared future for all
humanity.
The four engagements
SHI YU / CHINA DAILY
To the “CPC in Dialogue with World Political
Parties High-Level Meeting”, Xi
described four views of the future: a world
that is safe and free of fear; prosperous and
free of poverty; open, inclusive and free of
isolation; and environmentally clean and
beautiful.
At the “Fourth World Internet Conference”,
Xi asserted how the internet posed
new challenges for sovereignty, security and
development.
At the “2017 Fortune Global Forum”, Xi
called for openness and innovation to
enhance global economic growth, pledging
to liberalize and facilitate trade and foreign
investment in China.
And at the “South-South Human Rights
Forum”, Xi emphasized that “human rights
must and can only be promoted in light of
specific national conditions and people’s
needs”.
The CPC’s Dialogue with World Political
Parties was path-setting in that it put the
world on notice that a transformed CPC
under Xi is reaching out globally with pride
and confidence — explaining, especially to
developing countries, the developmental
benefits of party leadership and party building.
The point of debate, as it were, has
shifted from whether the China model of a
perpetually ruling party (with all that
entails) is good for China to how the China
model is good for other countries.
At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee, Xi directed authorities
to improve digital infrastructure, promote
the integration and sharing of digital
resources, and protect data security, in
order to better serve the nation’s economic
and social development as well as to
improve people’s lives. The big vision is to
turn China into a world leader in big data
and a global innovation hub for artificial
intelligence by 2030.
The last major event of the year was the
annual Central Economic Work Conference,
which identified “three tough battles” for
the next three years: preventing and defusing
risks (especially financial risks), eliminating
absolute poverty (China’s 2020 goal),
and curbing pollution (for instance, encouraging
investment in environmental projects).
Setting three-year targets was itself
an innovation (over the traditional one-year
targets), thereby strengthening long-term
thinking, reducing pressures to make hasty
decisions, and giving markets stable expectations.
The priority of reducing absolute debt
was modified to controlling a rise in borrowing,
such that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio
does not further deteriorate. This signaled
that growth would not be jeopardized and
(to the disappointment of some) debt-driven
growth would continue.
To contain financial risk, China will
crackdown on irregular and illegal activities
in its chaotic financial industry and intensify
regulatory scrutiny; continue supply-side
structural reform (reducing overcapacities);
and maintain a proactive fiscal policy, a
prudent and neutral monetary policy, and a
basically stable yuan exchange rate.
Resisting arguments for shrinking Stateowned
enterprises, China will make SOEs
“stronger, better and bigger”; and the government
will seek efficiencies by becoming
more of an investor and less of an operator.
China pledged to open up its markets further
and to balance trade by boosting
imports (US pressures, expressed vividly by
Trump, were not mentioned).
Theoretical foundation
After five years of “practice”, the theoretical
foundation of China’s economic development
is now labeled, “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era”, paralleling
the phrase added to the Party
Constitution two months earlier. The
“thought” is based mainly on Xi’s new concept
of development — innovative, coordinated,
green, open and shared development
— which has been the core of his economic
philosophy.
For the first time at this annual conference,
topics other than economics were on
the agenda. Diverse public concerns were
addressed, such as burdensome homework
for schoolchildren, sex discrimination in
the workplace, and online scams. This was a
clear consequence of how China’s new
“principal contradiction” in the “New Era”
now drives domestic policy; as Chinese citizens
seek a “better life”, the government
must respond.
To pick one message to characterize the
year, it is this. In 2017, under the leadership
of Xi, China set the trajectory, in all vital
areas, of the country’s domestic development
and international engagement for the
next 30-plus years, to mid-century, to 2050.
Every year brings challenges. For China,
no doubt, big ones lie ahead. In 2018, China
will celebrate the 40th anniversary of
reform and opening-up. The world is
watching.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist and investment
banker, and China expert/commentator. He
is co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and host of
CGTN’s Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn and
“The Watcher” commentaries.

October 28-29, 2017 5
COMMENT
OPINION
ChinaDaily
chinadaily.com.cn/opinion
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
New era on the road to 2050
Iwitnessed history sitting in the Great
Hall of the People during the 19th
National Congress of the Communist
Party of China. I listened raptly to
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC
Central Committee, when he delivered his
new-era-defining report. I heard the
amendment to the Party Constitution that
enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era”. I watched members of the new Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee walk out on stage. I
was awed by the presence of the leadership,
past and present. And I was overawed by
Xi’s grand vision for China and the country’s
increasing, radiating confidence. Most of all,
I marveled at the remarkable and historic
transformation of China, which means so
much to the Chinese people and which in
this new era will mean so much to the rest
of the world.
Having departed the Great Hall of the
People, I reflected how I, an American,
found myself caught up in the welling Chinese
patriotism of the 19th CPC National
Congress. Certainly, I was experiencing firsthand
this inflection point in Chinese history,
when China envisions itself becoming a
fully modernized country and taking proactive
part in international affairs, and
regaining its leading seat at the high table of
great nations.
What have I just witnessed? Following are
some personal observations.
A general consensus describes four primary
outcomes of the 19th Party Congress:
Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era; a new
“contradiction” that defines China’s principal
social challenge; a China that takes “center
stage in the world”; and the Party
enhancing its leadership of society, including
maintaining, indeed intensifying, its
anti-corruption campaign.
To me, however, a highlight was the specificity
of Xi’s vision of China, not only establishing
policies for the next five years, but also
framing the agenda and setting the strategies
for the next 30 years. This congress, Xi said, is
the “confluence” of the “Two Centenary
Goals”: a moderately prosperous society by
2020 (2021 being the 100th anniversary of
the CPC), which will likely be fulfilled within
the term of the 19th Party Congress, and a
great, modern, socialist country by 2050
(2049 being the 100th anniversary of the People’s
Republic of China), which is being
planned by the 19th Party Congress.
In a multi-meaning refinement, the path
to mid-century is now designed in two stages.
In the first stage, from 2020 to 2035, the
Party states it will build on the foundation of
the moderately prosperous society such that,
after “15 years of hard work”, the country will
basically realize “socialist modernization”.
In the second stage, from 2035 to 2050, the
CPC states it will build on a basically achieved
modernization, “work hard for a further 15
years” and “develop China into a great modern
socialist country that is prosperous,
strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious,
and beautiful”. China portrays its
mid-century self as a global leader in every
area of human consequence: economics and
trade, science and technology, military and
defense, culture and governance.
But Chinese leaders, and officials in general,
seem to have a different highlight. While
the “Two Centenary Goals” are certainly vital,
especially with new stages and specificity, they
focus on the amendment to the Party Constitution:
“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”.
“The (Xi’s) thought is the biggest highlight
of the 19th National Congress of the
CPC and a historic contribution to the Party’s
development,” said Zhang Dejiang, the
third-ranking member of the Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the
18th CPC Central Committee. Liu Yunshan,
the fifth-ranking member, said the elevation
of Xi’s thought to the Party’s guiding principle
is of great political, theoretical and practical
significance.
I take a closer look at Xi’s thought: first by
examining each of its elements, then by considering
its unified significance.
“Xi Jinping” is the “core” of the CPC Central
Committee and of the whole Party, and
he thereby at the top level provides the “centralism”
of the Party’s cardinal principle of
democratic centralism.
The “Thought” is the totality of Xi’s fundamental
principles. I see four broad categories:
people orientation, national
rejuvenation, comprehensive development,
and Party leadership.
In his report, Xi listed 14 categories: Party
leadership over all aspects of society; people-centered
policies; deepening reform
comprehensively; new concept of development
(innovation, coordination, green,
open, and sharing); people as masters of the
country; adherence to rule of law, comprehensively
governing the country by law;
socialist value system and cultural confidence;
protecting and improving people’s
livelihoods; harmonious coexistence of man
and nature (ecological civilization); national
security; the Party’s absolute leadership
over the military; “one country, two systems”
and promoting reunification with Taiwan;
international community of a shared
future for all humanity; and comprehensive
and strict Party governance.
The term “thought” in Chinese has special
meaning because before this it had been
associated only with Mao Zedong — “Mao
Zedong Thought”.
“Socialism” is a set of political ideas with a
complex history, unified by public or common
ownership of the means of production
and concern for the masses.
“Chinese characteristics” is the phrase,
originating with Deng Xiaoping, that adapts
Marxism to China’s special conditions — the
Sinicization of Marxism in modern China —
which includes the market playing a decisive
role in the allocation of resources and the
encouragement of non-public, for-profit businesses,
while at the same time State-owned
enterprises still playing a dominant role.
“New Era” is a new idea in the constitutional
amendment, and it is designed to
profoundly transform the essence of socialism
with Chinese characteristics into the
vision, concepts and strategies that compose
Xi’s way of thinking.
The more I reflect, the more I see “New
Era” as a conceptual lens with which to view
the 19th Party Congress. Semi-official Party
analysts say the new era answers five questions.
Robert
Lawrence Kuhn
What “road” to take? Socialism with Chinese
characteristics under new historical
conditions.
What kind of country to build? First, a
moderately prosperous society and then a
modernized socialist country.
What development to realize? Better life
and common prosperity for all.
What goal to achieve? The great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation.
What contribution to make? Facilitate
world peace and prosperity (exemplified by
the Belt and Road Initiative of building
infrastructure in developing countries).
Thus, Xi Jinping joins only Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping in having his name
affixed to a political philosophy in the Party
Constitution, a blazing sign lost on no one.
It then would follow that the “New Era” into
which China is now entering is the third era
of the CPC and by extension of the People’s
Republic of China.
A seemingly subtle but significant
change is the Party’s judgment of what constitutes
the fundamental “contradiction” in
Chinese society. (“Contradiction” is a Marxist
term expressing a particular way of
political thinking — dialectical materialism
— which identifies “dynamic opposing forces”
in society and seeks to resolve the
resulting tensions).
The principal contradiction has evolved
from one between the ever-growing material
and cultural needs of the people and
backward social production to that between
“unbalanced and inadequate development
and the people’s ever-growing needs for a
better life,” Xi said. The needs for the people
to live a better life are increasingly broad
and have to be met. Not only have their
material and cultural needs grown; their
demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness
and justice, security, and a better environment
are increasing.
This “New-Era” contradiction, replacing
quantitative GDP growth with qualitative
improvement of life, is what will drive China’s
policy.
The mission of a CPC congress is to review
and assess achievements of the previous five
years, and to forecast challenges and set targets
for the subsequent five years (and
beyond). Overall, for the 19th Party Congress,
the ambition of the goals and the comprehensiveness
of the categories
were clear,
amplified by the commitment
to deepen reform.
Here, by category, are
what stood out.
The Party and the
fight against corruption.
Confidence in
socialism and the
increasing role of the
Party in managing all
aspects of the country is unequivocal, and
the increasingly strict governance of the
Party, by reforming and purifying itself, is
unambiguous. Moreover, the anti-corruption
campaign not only continues but also
will be enhanced.
Economy. After more than three decades
of rapid growth, China’s economy has been
transitioning to slower but higher-quality
growth. Supply-side structural reform has
been written into the Constitution. No GDP
growth targets are set. The country focuses
on the real economy (as opposed to speculation,
such as in the real estate sector). China
is not backing away from State-owned
enterprises, rather it will support State capital
in “becoming stronger, doing better, and
growing bigger, thereby turning Chinese
enterprises into world-class, globally competitive
firms”.
Consumption is fundamental in driving
economic growth. The framework of regulations
must be improved, prudent macroeconomic
and monetary policy maintained,
and interest and exchange rates made more
market-based. For economic development,
innovation leads, especially in science and
technology.
Poverty alleviation. Xi has made the
elimination of extreme poverty in China by
2020 a cornerstone of his domestic policy.
After all, how could China claim to have
achieved a moderately prosperous society
by 2020 if millions of its citizens would be
still living in extreme poverty?
Opening-up. China reasserts its commitment
to become more open, including
easing market access and protecting the
rights and interests of foreign investors.
China’s economists see foreign competition
as upgrading the quality and cost efficiency
of Chinese companies, thus better serving
Chinese consumers.
Rule of Law. Strengthening and institutionalizing
the rule of law, and weakening
arbitrary rule of officials, is a priority.
Reflecting Xi’s commitment, the Party is setting
up a central leading group for advancing
law-based governance in all areas,
coordinating the activities of judicial
organs. The goal is to complete the transformation
of China’s legal system by 2035 with
theoretical foundations and practical
enforcement.
Ecology. Beautiful China is one of the
country’s main descriptions for its second
centenary goal by the middle of the century.
This modernization is characterized by harmonious
coexistence between humanity
and nature (such as nature parks) and it
requires substantial bolstering of regulatory
agencies and their enforcement powers.
Armed forces. China’s goal is to transform
the People’s Liberation Army into a
world-class military by mid-century, basically
completing military reform and modernization
by 2035, with information
technology/cyber applications and strategic
capabilities prioritized.
Especially significant for Xi’s mission are
the two “anti’s” — anti-corruption and antipoverty
— the former to support the Party’s
continuing leadership, the latter as a prime
example of what the Party has delivered.
Xi does not downplay a realistic appraisal
of problems, including social imbalances,
industrial overcapacities, financial system
risks, endemic pollution. “Achieving national
rejuvenation will be no walk in the park,”
Xi said, an example of his plainspoken candor.
“It will take more than drum-beating
and gong-clanging to get there.”
The speculations of China watchers, and
the focus of the international media, have
been on the new Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Because everything in China reports to
a standing committee member, composition
and balance determine the vision, strategies
and policies that will shape China.
This remains true today, but less true
today. It is hard to overstate the significance
of Xi Jinping’s name written into the
Party Constitution. Xi is now, officially, the
originating designator and overarching
arbiter of “Thought” as it relates to “Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era”, which is the guiding political theory of
China and encompasses, essentially, everything
in China. For Xi to be named in the
CPC Constitution is the ultimate in authority,
surpassing even “core” (which already
had superseded all other leaders), thus setting
into perpetuity Xi’s predominant status
and assuring his preeminence in the
country’s political life.
That said, to know China is to know the
members of the Standing Committee. They
are a highly competent, highly experienced
group: six of the seven have run provinces
or province-level municipalities, many of
which, in terms of population and GDP, are
the equivalent of major nations.
Traditional norms of balance and age are
respected. It’s a diverse group — by geography,
education and political career. They
ZHAI HAIJUN / FOR CHINA DAILY
have worked together, in various combinations,
for years. With much now being written
about each member, I’ll just offer some
personal reflections.
First, of course, is Xi Jinping, general secretary
of the CPC Central Committee, whose
prior experience included governor of Fujian
province and Party secretary of Zhejiang
province and Shanghai.
In 2005, I was advised to study the “Zhejiang
model”, which promotes entrepreneurship
to generate economic development. I
met Xi, who was then Zhejiang provincial
Party secretary, and he recommended that I
study China both “horizontally” across
diverse regions and “vertically” through the
history of its development.
“To understand our dedication to revitalize
the country, one has to appreciate the pride
that Chinese people take in our glorious
ancient civilization,” Xi said. “This is the historical
driving force inspiring people today to
build the nation. The Chinese people made
great contributions to world civilization and
enjoyed long-term prosperity,” he said. “Then
we suffered over a century of national weakness,
oppression and humiliation. So, we
have a deep self-motivation to build our
country. Our commitment and determination
is rooted in our patriotism and pride.”
But he cautioned that pride in China’s
recent achievements should not engender
complacency.
Second, premier of the State Council, is
Li Keqiang, who was Party secretary of Henan
and Liaoning provinces. When I visited
Li in Liaoning, he explained the complex
challenges of revitalizing State-owned
enterprises while creating a fertile environment
for private businesses. Li shared the
same experience of Xi as educated youths in
the countryside in the 1970s. The experience
gave them the chance to know better rural
China and the lives of rural people and thus
fostered their people-orientation.
The following members are new:
Li Zhanshu, who was governor of Heilongjiang
province and Party secretary of
Guizhou province, has been director of the
general office of the CPC Central Committee
since 2012.
Wang Yang, vice-premier, is former Party
secretary of Chongqing municipality and
Guangdong province. At the height of the
global financial crisis in early 2009, he
argued it was imperative to restructure
Guangdong’s economy, so that it can move
up the ladder of industrialization and promote
more knowledge-based, high-tech, lowpolluting
businesses.
Wang Huning, secretariat, is director of
the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central
Committee. Wang is well known for providing
intellectual vision and sophistication in
support of practical strategies and policies,
ranging from political philosophy to international
relations.
Zhao Leji, new chairman of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, has
served as head of the CPC Organization
Department, and before that, as Party secretary
of Qinghai and Shaanxi provinces. In
addition to his responsibilities for Party and
government officials, Zhao provided strong
support for the poverty-alleviation mission.
Han Zheng is Party secretary of Shanghai.
Under his leadership, Shanghai has become
a recognized leader in trade, logistics and
finance.
What is the impact of all this on China’s
international relations?
There is no need to speculate. Xi himself,
in his report, openly and boldly tells all who
will listen. China, he says, “has become a
great power in the world”. China’s global
engagement is proactive, confident and
growing. Economics and trade drive China’s
power, exemplified by the much-needed Belt
and Road Initiative, but diplomacy, the soft
power of culture and media, and the hard
power of a blue-water navy projecting power,
are developing rapidly.
As Xi said, the new era sees “China moving
closer to center stage and making greater
contributions to mankind”. The country is
now offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese
solutions” to the international community —
the experiences and lessons of China’s
remarkable development, especially to developing
countries.
Regarding Taiwan, which exemplifies Chinese
sovereignty, Xi painted a bright red line.
“We will resolutely uphold national sovereignty
and territorial integrity and will never
tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a
divided country,” Xi emphasized. “We have
firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability
to defeat any form of Taiwan independence
secession plot.”
China has asserted again that it is no
threat to any country. No matter how powerful
China becomes, China’s leaders say it will
never seek hegemony or pursue expansionism.
Nonetheless, some foreigners remain
suspicious, wary of China’s long-term ambitions.
Who knows future circumstances, they
worry? Who knows how China may change?
Although I fear self-fulfilling prophecy, I am
encouraged that China appreciates such sensitivities
and works to build confidence.
The 19th Party Congress, especially Xi’s
report, is an epic narrative of what China has
accomplished, what China has yet to achieve,
and what China envisages as necessary to be
a great nation. Xi, now, carries the authority;
he also bears the burden.
Setting that new target date of 2035 for
China to achieve basic modernization, Xi
sees China as standing at a new historic
starting point and socialism with Chinese
characteristics as exploring new horizons.
China has entered a new era and the road
ahead leads, apparently, to great nation status
by 2050.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist, and China expert/
commentator. He is co-creator (with Adam
Zhu) and the host of China Global Television
Network’s Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn.
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CHINA DAILY Wednesday, October 18, 2017 VIEWS 11
Five years on
Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Historical starting point for new stage of development
The 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China,
which begins on October 18, will
set the leadership and establish
the policies for the next five years, at least.
While Party national congresses are
always seminal events in the political life
of the country, there is reason to expect
that this congress will have even greater
and longer-reaching impact.
The context of the 19th
CPC National Congress is
the grand vision for China
presented by CPC
Central Committee General
Secretary Xi Jinping,
who is now the “core” of
Robert
Lawrence Kuhn
“the CPC Central Committee
and of the whole
Party”. It is an epic narrative
of what China has
remarkably achieved, what China has yet to
do, and what China envisages as necessary
to become a great nation.
Xi’s grand vision is famously expressed as
“the Chinese Dream”, described as “the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,
which has personal and national implications.
It is specified by two overarching
goals: the two centenary goals of establishing
a moderately prosperous society by
2020 — the 100th anniversary of the CPC is
2021 — and establishing China as a “fully
modernized, socialist nation” by the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China
in 2049.
The first goal, which includes the total
elimination of extreme poverty in the country,
will likely be achieved within the fiveyear
term of the 19th CPC National
Congress. It is the second goal that is of special
interest at this time, because in drawing
the roadmap and formulating the policies
to achieve China’s mid-century goal, this
Congress may set the agenda for the next
30-plus years.
The CPC national congresses are the
highest authority of CPC governance and
decision-making. The CPC constitutional
provision of holding congresses every five
years was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in
the early days of reform (in part to establish
order and collective responsibility after a
period of chaos and political vicissitudes),
and since 1982, Party congresses have been
held scrupulously on schedule.
The congresses establish the senior leadership
of the Party and hence the nation by
electing the CPC Central Committee, which
in turn elects all top Party positions, and
also the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection; review and assess the achievements
and challenges over the five years
since the previous Party Congress; set the
vision, goals and objectives, agenda and priorities
for the subsequent five years; revise
the Party constitution (to keep up with the
times); and project an image of unified purpose
and direction to engender national
confidence and commitment.
The review and assessment of the previous
five years and setting the agenda and
priorities for the subsequent five years are
formally presented in the Report, delivered
by the general secretary representing the
outgoing Central Committee and thus
reflecting the consensus view of the Party
leadership. Ratified by the congress (after
minor modifications), it becomes the guiding
document that drives policy for the
incoming Central Committee.
On the day following a congress, the first
plenum of the new 19th Central Committee
is convened to elect the Party’s new senior
leadership, including the Political Bureau,
the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau (to which, in essence, everything in
China reports), and the general secretary of
the Central Committee. Also approved are
the Central Military Commission (which
oversees the People’s Liberation Army), the
Secretariat (which runs Party daily operations),
and the head of the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection.
The planning for the national Party Congress
follows similar patterns. Beginning
more than a year in advance, it involves
both formal and informal processes. The
formal process includes the election or
appointment of about 2,300 delegates
(2,280 delegates at the 19th National Congress)
from among the Party’s over 89 million
members, at all levels and in all sectors,
and the preparation of the Report via an
elaborate system of extensive research in
targeted areas (involving thousands of
experts), solicitation of broad input, drafts
(or sections) circulated to numerous Party
experts and officials for comments, and iterative
intense reviews by higher bodies and
senior leaders. In addition, smaller groups
are assigned the more sensitive tasks of
amending the Party constitution and recommending
candidates for the new Central
Committee and senior leadership positions.
Final decisions for this year’s congress, as
well as final edits of the Report, were made
at the Seventh Plenum of the 18th CPC Central
Committee, held on Oct 11 to 14, days
prior to the opening ceremony of the 19th
CPC National Congress.
To understand the position and role of
CPC Central Committee General Secretary
Xi at the 19th Party National Congress, we
should appreciate what it means for Xi to
be the core. It was in October 2016, at the
Sixth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee,
that Xi was designated the “core” of
the CPC Central Committee and of the
entire Party. The appellation was an unambiguous
assertion that China requires
strong leadership to maintain stability and
ensure development given China’s unprecedented,
complex challenges: domestically,
slower growth, industrial overcapacity,
endemic pollution, unbalanced development,
income disparity, social injustice,
social service demands; and internationally,
regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile
markets, trade protectionism, ethnic
clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and
territorial disputes.
Moreover, because China must deepen
reform to achieve the goal of being a moderately
prosperous society, the resistance of
entrenched interest groups must be overcome.
In fact, the necessity of having a leadership
core to maintain stability and
expedite reform was a primary factor relating
to Xi’s elevation to be the core.
In addition, not only does Xi have the
responsibility for China’s transformation;
he is also accountable for it. He has shown
courage in combating rampant practice of
graft, bribery and illicit patronage. Xi’s
relentless anti-corruption campaign is
altering how officials in government and
managers in industry work, and even how
they think. And let no one assume that Xi’s
battle against corruption has been risk-free.
Xi as the core does not change the Party’s
cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”.
The Party says it is encouraging the
democratic solicitation of input and feedback
from Party members, lower-ranked
officials, and the general public; and
strengthening centralism through Xi’s core
leadership.
In a complex world, given the diverse
interests and forces in Chinese society, the
Party asserts that the Chinese Dream cannot
be realized without unity. Strong leadership
is required to build and maintain unity
for China to continue its development.
When Xi received the core appellation, he
was already general secretary of the Party,
chairman of the Central Military Commission,
and president of the country — the
three highest leadership positions in China
— so how does being the “core” augment his
perceived stature or actual power?
The 2016 Party plenum communique
confirmed that “the collective leadership
system … must always be adhered to”.
Nonetheless, there must have been shifts in
terms of both the setting of the agenda and
making final decisions — or else making Xi
the core would have little meaning.
When foreigners dismiss the political
aphorisms of China’s leaders as simplistic
sloganeering, they miss an opportunity to
enrich their understanding. Chinese officials
certainly hold Xi’s frameworks in high
esteem.
Xi’s thought for the Party, the inner-Party
directives, include the “eight regulations”
(against waste and perks); “four self-confidences”
(in the country’s development path,
The China model, Xi
said, successful at home,
also broadens the way
for developing countries
to modernize, thus
providing Chinese
wisdom and Chinese
solutions for problems
facing mankind.
theories, systems, culture of socialism with
Chinese characteristics); opposing the “four
evil winds” (formalism, bureaucracy,
hedonism, decadence); the “four greats”
(struggles, projects, enterprises, dreams).
The combined intent is to make Party
members, especially Party and government
officials, more dedicated, committed, competent
and loyal, with exemplary moral
standards of probity and rectitude. It is no
small order.
The Party’s unremitting anti-corruption
campaign, unprecedented under Xi, has
won strong public support and will certainly
continue. But some foreign analysts mistakenly
see Xi’s anti-corruption campaign
as largely a tool of political power, thus
reflecting a superficial and one-dimensional
understanding of China. Befitting the size
and complexity of the country, for almost
every decision of importance, China’s leaders
have multiple motivations.
For the anti-corruption campaign, these
motivations include respect for the rule of
law and judicial impartiality; effective functioning
of the Party devoid of personal
interests; public trust in the Party; efficient
economic resource allocations (corruption
distorts markets); expediting reform (by
breaking up “interest groups” that resist
reform); maintaining national unity (by
removing officials with non-standard political
ambitions); elevating morality of Chinese
society; restoring ethical standards of
Chinese civilization; and facilitating China’s
emergence as a world-business center and
global role model.
Xi’s thought for the country — his new
ideas, new strategies, new initiatives set
forth over the past five years — can be
encapsulated as the overall vision of the
“Five in One” construction (economic, political,
cultural, social, ecological); governance
of the country via his “Four Comprehensives”
(a moderately prosperous society;
deepening reform, strengthening the rule of
law, strictly governing the Party); and
renewed economic development via the
Five Major Development Concepts (innovation,
coordination, green, open, sharing),
plus “supply-side structural reform”.
SHI YU / CHINA DAILY
Xi’s thought for national rejuvenation
includes a grand vision for global governance,
consisting of eight big diplomatic concepts:
a global community of shared destiny
and future; win-win cooperation; economic
globalization; fairer global governance; a
new kind of major power relationship;
expanding cooperation while managing differences;
multilateralism; and people-topeople
exchanges. Moreover, Xi’s Belt and
Road Initiative — facilitating economic
development in developing countries, especially
by building much-needed infrastructure
— is China’s “project of the century”.
China recognizes it has international
responsibilities and seeks to uphold a common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable
security strategy. China’s own
requirement is to protect the country’s
three sacrosanct “core interests” — its political
system, economic development, and
national sovereignty (territorial integrity).
China appreciates that to be a major
country, with its political influence reflecting
its economic strength, and also to protect
its own core interests, its diplomacy
must be pro-active. China does not claim
that its “China model” can be adopted by
other countries, but the world should
understand Xi’s principles of governance as
optimally suited for China’s domestic conditions.
Party congresses have similar styles and
to casual observers, they can all seem much
the same. But they do have differences,
which are usually subtle and often meaningful.
For the 19th National Congress, some of
the things to look out for are:
Are political frameworks and policies
stated in their expected forms? If so, confidence
in political and economic stability is
reinforced.
How is General Secretary Xi Jinping’s status
as “core” further stressed, as expected?
Who are the members of the new Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau and
what are their portfolios?
Assuming the Party Constitution is
amended to include Xi’s new ideas, new
strategies, new initiatives, will they be given
an overarching label?
What is the composition of the new Central
Committee?
In listing the essential economic, political,
cultural, social and ecological policies,
are there shifts of emphasis that, however
nuanced, suggest changing priorities?
For deepening reform, surely stressed,
what targets are specified? For example,
what will be stated explicitly about Stateowned
enterprise reform?
Environmental protection is a high priority,
but what specific regulations and
enhanced enforcements distinguish the
fight against pollution under Xi from those
of previous congresses?
Many social areas will be highlighted —
for example, education, healthcare, rural
land reform, migrant worker residencies —
but do any stand out?
As already affirmed, the anti-corruption
campaign will continue, but will its intensity
or direction change in any manner, will it
be institutionalized? How will the forthcoming
National Supervisory Commission
work?
What is the relative prominence of military
reform and modernization?
What is the relative prominence of international
affairs, given the high-profile Belt
and Road Initiative and China’s intense,
pro-active diplomacy?
Forecasting the 19th CPC National Congress
is not all guesswork and triangulating
rumors. Following tradition, Xi offered to
Party leaders a preview of his Report.
Speaking on July 26, he outlined China’s
achievements since the previous national
congress: new concepts of development,
deepened reform, enhanced rule of law,
strengthened environmental protection,
and a more capable military.
China, Xi said, has, after suffering century-long
hardships and tribulations, taken
three historic leaps, from standing-up to
becoming better-off to becoming stronger.
Xi called for a comprehensive, strategic and
forward-looking action program, highlighting
the success and vitality of socialism with
Chinese characteristics, the increasing
strength of the Party, and China’s expanding
circle of friends in the international community.
In China, he stressed, political legitimacy
is founded on competence and
accomplishment.
Significantly, Xi asserted that China’s
development stands at a new historic starting
point and that socialism with Chinese
characteristics is entering a new development
stage. The CPC cannot rest on its laurels,
he stressed. The country faces daunting
challenges. He warned the Party against
self-satisfaction and blind optimism.
Xi’s comments resonated with his core
values and bear witness to his consistency.
In 2006, then Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi
told me that China should be proud of its
successes, but its “achievements should not
engender complacency”, adding “we need to
assess ourselves objectively”.
Preparing for the upcoming congress, Xi
recognizes that the people’s desire for a happier
life is stronger than ever. They want
better education, higher incomes, stable
jobs, reliable social insurance, higher quality
healthcare, more comfortable living conditions,
a more beautiful environment and
a richer cultural life.
And there has been an inflection point in
China’s international perspective, reflecting
the nation’s consequential global engagement.
The China model, Xi said, successful
at home, also broadens the way for developing
countries to modernize, thus providing
Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for
problems facing mankind.
The influence of the 19th CPC National
Congress and the impact of Xi Jinping’s
thought seem for decades to come.
The author is a public intellectual, international
corporate strategist, and China
expert/commentator. He is co-creator (with
Adam Zhu) and host of CGTN’s Closer to
China with R.L. Kuhn.

16 Wednesday March 21, 2018
FORUM
CPC-led system a political innovation
Editor’s Note:
The Two Sessions, the annual meetings
of China’s top legislative and
advisory bodies, have been under
global spotlight for the past few
weeks. This year’s Two Sessions
are of extraordinary importance as
they have adopted the constitutional
amendments, restructured government
institutions and elected the new
national leadership. To understand
what the institutional changes mean
for China’s future, as well as the
policy agenda for the coming year,
Global Times (GT) Washingtonbased
correspondent Hu Zexi talked
to Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn (Kuhn)
who is a long-time China observer,
and author and editor of over 25
books. Kuhn has been invited to Beijing
to take a closer look at this year’s
Two Sessions.
GT: What kind of policy issues are
you following during the Two Sessions?
Kuhn: The proposed amendments
to the Constitution of the People’s