2012 WL 257568 (C.A.2) (Appellate Brief) United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001. Nos. 11-3294-cv(L), 11-3407-cv(CON), 11-3490-cv(CON), 11-3494-cv(CON), 11-3495-cv(CON), 11-3496-cv(CON), 11-3500-cv(CON), 11-3501-cv(CON), 11-3502-cv(CON), 11-3503-cv(CON), 11-3505-cv(CON), 11-3506-cv(CON), 11-3507-cv(CON), 11-3508-cv(CON), 11-3509-cv(CON), 11-3510-cv(CON), 11-3511-cv(CON). January 20, 2012. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Appellants’ Consolidated Brief with Respect to Dismissals for Failure to State a Claim and Foreign Sovereign Immunity Ronald L. Motley, Robert T. Haefele, Motley Rice LLC, 28 Bridgeside Boulevard, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina 29464, (843) 216-9000; Stephen A. Cozen, Elliott R. Feldman, Sean P. Carter, Cozen O’Connor, 1900 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103, (215) 665-2000, and Carter G. Phillips, Richard Klingler, Sidley Austin LLP, 1501 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 736-8000, Attorneys for All Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrea Bierstein, Hanly Conroy Bierstein Sheridan Fisher & Hayes, LLP, 112 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor, New York, New York 10016, (212) 784-6400; Robert M. Kaplan, Ferber Chan Essner & Coller, LLP, 530 Fifth Avenue, 23rd Floor, New York, New York 10036, (212) 944-2200; James P. Kreindler, Justin T. Green, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, 750 Third Avenue, 32nd Floor, New York, New York 10017, (212) 687-8181; Jerry S. Goldman, Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C., 1251 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10020, (212) 278-1000, Chris Leonardo; Adams Holcomb LLP, 1875 Eye Street N.W., Suite 810, Washington, D.C. 20006, (202) 580-8820, Attorneys for All Plaintiffs-Appellants. *i Corporate Disclosure Statement In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, appellants certify as follows: 11-3509 (Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army): Appellants are natural persons. 11-3503, 11-3505, 11-3506, 11-3507 (Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corp.): Appellants are natural persons. 11-3508 (Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. v. Akida Bank Private Limited): Appellants Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.; Cantor Fitzgerald Securities; Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.; C02e.com, LLC (now known as Cantor C02e, LLC); and Cantor Index Limited have no parent corporation and there is no public corporation that holds more than 10% of any of them. Appellant eSpeed, Inc. (now known as BGC Partners, Inc.) has no parent corporation and there is no public corporation that holds more than 10% of it; BCG Partners, Inc. is publicly-held. Appellants Cantor Fitzgerald Associates, L.P. (now known as BGC Capital Markets, L.P.); Cantor Fitzgerald Brokerage, L.P. (now known as BGC Environmental Brokerage Services, L.P.); Cantor Fitzgerald International (now known as BGC International); Cantor Fitzgerald Partners (now known as Seminole Financial); eSpeed Securities, Inc. (now *ii known as Aqua Securities, L.P.); Tradespark, L.P; and eSpeed Government Securities, Inc. (now known as eSpeed Brokerage, L.P.) have no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, owns more than 10% of each of them. The parent company of Appellant Cantor Fitzgerald Europe is Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.; no publicly-traded corporation owns more than 10% of it. 11-3510 (Continental Cas. Co. v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army): Appellants Transcontinental Insurance Company, Transportation Insurance Company, National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford and American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania are wholly-owned subsidiaries of plaintiff-appellant Continental Casualty Company; plaintiff-appellant Valley Forge Insurance Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of plaintiff-appellant American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania; and plaintiff-appellant Continental Casualty Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CNA Financial Corp., which is publicly traded. 11-3294, 11-3407 (Estate of John P. O’Neill v. Republic of Iraq): The Estate is not a corporate entity. *iii 11-3496, 11-3500, 11-3501, 11-3502 (Euro Brokers, Inc. v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp.): Appellant BGC Brokers US, L.P. (successor to Euro Brokers, Inc.) has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. Appellant BGC Financial, L.P. (f/k/a Maxcor Financial, Inc.) has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. BGC Financial Asset Management, Inc. (successor to Maxcor Financial Asset Management, Inc.) dissolved December 23, 2010. Appellant BGC Information, L.P. (successor to Maxcor Information, Inc.) has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. Seminole Financial Limited (successor to Euro Brokers Ltd.) has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. Appellant Tradesoft Technologies, Inc. has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. *iv Appellant Euro Brokers Financial Services Limited dissolved April 23, 2008. Appellant Euro Brokers Mexico, S.A. de C.V. has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. Appellant Euro Brokers (Switzerland) S.A. has no parent corporation; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. 11-3490, 11-3494, 11-3495, 11-3511 (Federal Ins. Co. v. al Qaida): Appellants Federal Insurance Company, Pacific Indemnity Company, Chubb Custom Insurance Company, Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company, Chubb Insurance Company of Canada, Chubb Insurance Company of New Jersey, Great Northern Insurance Company, and Vigilant Insurance Company are members of the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies. Appellants’ parent organization, The Chubb Corporation, a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellants One Beacon Insurance Company, One Beacon America Insurance Company, American Employers’ Insurance Company, The Camden Fire Insurance Association, and Homeland Insurance Company of New York are members of the One Beacon Insurance Group. Appellants’ *v parent organization, White Mountains Insurance Group Ltd., a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellant TIG Insurance Company is a member of the Fairfax Financial Group. Appellant’s parent organization, Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd, a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellants American Alternative Insurance Corporation, Great Lakes Reinsurance U.K. PLC, and The Princeton Excess and Surplus Lines Insurance Company are members of the Munich Re Group. Appellants’ parent organization, Muenchener Rueckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktienqesellschaft, a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellant Allstate Insurance Company is a member of The Allstate Insurance Group. Allstate Insurance Company is wholly owned by The Allstate Corporation, a publicly traded corporation. Appellants Boston Old Colony Insurance Company, The Continental Insurance Company, Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, NJ, CNA Casualty of California, Continental Insurance Company of New Jersey, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, Glens Falls Insurance Company, and National Ben Franklin Insurance Company of Illinois are *vi members of the CNA Insurance Companies. Appellants’ parent organization, the CNA Financial Corporation, a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellant Hiscox Dedicated Corporation Member, Ltd. is a member of Lloyds’ Syndicate 33. Appellants ACE American Insurance Company, ACE Capital V Ltd for itself and as representative of all subscribing underwriters for ACE Global Markets Syndicate 2488, ACE Bermuda Insurance Ltd, ACE INA (Canada), ACE Indemnity Insurance Company, ACE Insurance SA-NV, ACE Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Atlantic Employers Insurance Company, Bankers Standard Insurance Company, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Company of North America, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and Pacific Employers Insurance Company are members of ACE INA Group. Appellants’ parent organization, ACE Limited, a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock. Appellant Woburn Insurance Ltd. is a captive insurance company, wholly owned by Viacom Inc. Appellants AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance, AXA Corporate Solutions Insurance Company, AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance UK *vii Branch, AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance (Canada), AXA RE Asia Pacific Pte. Limited, AXA RE, AXA RE Canadian Branch, AXA RE UK Plc., AXA Corporate Solutions Reinsurance Company, AXA Art Insurance Corporation, SPS Reassurance, AXA Re Madeira Branch, Compagnie Gererale de Reinsurance de Monte Carlo, AXA Versicherung AG, AXA Cessions and AXA Global Risks UK, Ltd. are members of the AXA Group. Appellants’ parent organization, AXA S.A., a publicly traded corporation, owns more than 10% of their stock *i TABLE OF CONTENTS Corporate Disclosure Statement i Table of Authorities v Preliminary Statement 1 Statement Of Subject Matter and Appellate Jurisdiction 4 Statement of Issues Presented for Review 6 Statement of The Case 8 Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 8 Disposition Below 24 Statement Of Facts 24 The Origins of al-Qaeda 24 The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development 28 Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry 42 Al-Qaeda’s Additional Wealthy Financiers 55 Summary of Argument 59 Standard of Review 62 Argument 63 I. The District Court Improperly Dismissed the Anti-Terrorism Act Claims 63 A. The ATA Is Construed Broadly and Readily Encompasses Defendants’ Alleged Conduct 64 B. The District Court Erred In Finding that Plaintiffs Failed to Plead that Defendants Knowingly or Recklessly Provided Support for Terrorism 72 *ii 1. The District Court Applied an Incorrect, Heightened Standard In Evaluating Plaintiffs’ Pleadings 74 2. The District Court Understated and Ignored Plaintiffs’ Extensive Pleadings Addressing Defendants’ Knowing and Reckless Support of Terrorism 77 (a) Al Rajhi Bank 78 (b) Saudi American Bank 81 (c) Saleh Abdullah Kamel and Dallah al Baraka 83 (d) Dar-Al-Maal Al Islami (“DMI”) Trust 86 3. The District Court Failed to Draw Reasonable Inferences From Plaintiffs’ Extensive Additional Pleadings Establishing Defendants’ Knowing and Reckless Support of Terrorism 90 (a) Reasonable inference based on provision of support to al-Qaeda, a notorious terrorist organization 91 (b) Reasonable inference based on provision of support to charities known to be fronts for al-Qaeda 93 (c) Reasonable inference based on defendants’ extensive relationship with the al-Qaeda network 100 4. The District Court Failed to Accept the Truth of the Facts Alleged 112 C. The District Court Incorrectly Disregarded Extensive Allegations of Support to al-Qaeda by Defendants Dallah al Baraka and Saleh Abdullah Kamel in the Early to Mid 1990s 116 II. The District Court Improperly Dismissed The Alien Tort Statute Claims Because The Statute Encompasses Claims Based On Acts Related To International Terrorism 120 *iii A. 0Plaintiffs Alleged That Defendants Violated the ATS By Intentionally Facilitating International Terrorism 123 B. Acts of International Terrorism are a Violation of Customary International Law 123 1. United Nations Security Council resolutions 125 2. International conventions 126 3. Domestic laws of nations 128 4. Congress and federal courts 129 C. International Terrorism Is Sufficiently Definite and of Mutual Concern to States 132 III. The District Court Improperly Dismissed the Torture Victim Protection Act Claims 135 IV. The District Court Improperly Dismissed the Negligence And Intentional Tort Claims 139 A. The District Court Wrongly Dismissed the Negligence Claims 140 B. The District Court Wrongly Dismissed the Intentional Tort Claims 145 1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Time-Barred 145 1. Plaintiffs Pleaded That Defendants Materially Supported al-Qaeda 148 2. Defendants Who Supported al-Qaeda Through Its Network Are Liable 149 V. The Court Should Reverse The Dismissals Of NCB and the Sovereign Defendants Based Upon Doe v. Bin Laden 151 A. The Sovereign Defendants And NCB Were Dismissed Under Terrorist Attacks III 152 B. Doe Overruled Terrorist Attacks III 154 *iv C. The Court Should Reverse the Dismissals of the Sovereign Defendants and NCB and Remand For Jurisdictional Discovery 155 Conclusion 156 Certificate Of Compliance Pursuant to FRAP 32(a)(7)(A) 160 *v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010) 124 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) 124, 136, 137 Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614 (S.D. Tex. 2011) 68, 71, 101, 118 Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996) 66 Ahern v. Cnty. of Nassau, 118 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1997) 158 Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 111, 112 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011) 103 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010) passim Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) 111 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 111, 112 Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 100, 131, 132, 136 Amaker v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 435 F. App’x 52 (2d Cir. 2011) 65 Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 138 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) passim Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) 103, 0109, 116, 140 Balt. & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883) 140 Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) passim Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) 67, 71, 78 Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) 149 Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219 (1984) 147 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) 140 *vi Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) 141 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) 15 Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 2010) 16 Carter v. Barry, 468 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1972) 158 Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) 65 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 94, 141 Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22516 (2d Cir. 2011) passim Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 126 Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) 16 Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2009 WL 1539068 (2009) iii, 15 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) 126 Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005) 148 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003) 126, 137 Foster v. Auburn Univ., No. 11-CV-503, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141056 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2011) 100 Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Rep., 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009) 23, 156 Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 101, 153 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222 (2001) 143, 146 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) 68, 71, 72 Holmes v. Lorch, 329 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 148 In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2010) 99 In re Issuer Plaintiff Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 00 CTV 7804 (LMM), 2004 WL 487222 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004) 150 *vii In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y 2005) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y 2005) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 462 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 464 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) passim In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) passim Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1996) 150 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996) 125 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank. Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) 139 Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 71, 81 Luddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 387 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1990) 149 Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2011) 92, 115, 116, 147 Mohamad v. Rajoub, 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011) 98, 139, 140, 141 Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2010) 141 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 118, 153 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972) 148 Redding v. Edwards, 569 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2008) 100 Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998) 158 Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 103, 111, 113, 114 Samantar v. Yousuf, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) 16 *viii Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1988) 100 Sickles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) 145 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) 139 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) 124, 133, 136 Splawnik v. DiCaprio, 540 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 144 Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72649 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) 101 Sys. v. Masterson Mktg., No. 11-CV-695, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135216 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2011) 100 Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969) 158 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 10-CV-1842, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106657 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2011) 100 Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005) 141 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011) 100 United States v. Bahlul, No. 09-001, 2011 U.S. CMCR LEXIS 3 (CMCR Sept. 9, 2011) passim United States v. Bin Laden, et al., 397 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 47 United States v. El-Mezain, No. 09-1560, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24216 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) 100 United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (CMCR 2011) 131, 132, 137 United States v. Kassir, No. 09-CR-356, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83075 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) 101 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820) 136 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) passim United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 125 Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 111, 113, 114 Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) passim *ix Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) passim Yeadon v. New York Transit Auth., 719 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 150 Statutes, Rules, and Regulations 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(24) 133 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25)(A) 133 18 U.S.C. § 2332B 70 18 U.S.C. § 2333 65 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 69 18 U.S.C § 2339A 70, 100, 134 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 68, 70, 78, 100 18 U.S.C. § 2339C 70, 134 28 U.S.C. § 1350 5, 7, 123, 138 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5524(1) 149 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5524(7) 149 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) 68 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) 76 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3) 148 Other Authorities Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charges, 50 I.L.M. 513, 536 (Spec. Trib. For Leb. July 2011) 130, 131 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999) 130 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), § 390 144 S. Rep. No. 102-249 (1991) 142 S.C. Res. (Oct. 8, 2004) 129 *x S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998) 127 S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998) 128 S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) 128 S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) 128 *1 Preliminary Statement Plaintiffs-Appellants are family members of the nearly 3,000 people killed in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; thousands of individuals who were severely injured as a result of the attacks; and commercial entities that incurred billions of dollars of property damage and other losses as a result of the attacks (collectively “the September 11th plaintiffs” and/or “plaintiffs”). Consistent with the rights conferred upon them by the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and long-standing principles of common law concerted action liability, plaintiffs brought these lawsuits, which were consolidated below by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, to hold accountable the charities, financial institutions, individuals and other parties that knowingly provided material support or resources to al-Qaeda for more than a decade before September 11, 2001, and thereby provided al-Qaeda with the means to successfully conceive, plan, coordinate, and carry out the September 11th Attacks. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against five defendants-appellees (“Defendants”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), holding that, despite the existence of remedies specifically designed for victims of terrorist attacks, plaintiffs *2 were entitled to seek no relief against those who had supported, conspired with, and/or aided and abetted al-Qaeda in carrying out the worst terrorist attack ever to take place on American soil.1 This Court should reverse the district court’s rulings with respect to these Defendants -- Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. (“Al Rajhi Bank”), Saudi American Bank, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Dallah al Baraka, and Dar-Al-Maal Al Islami (“DMI”) Trust -- because the pleadings sufficiently allege that each of these Defendants knowingly provided material support and resources to al Qaeda in the years leading up to the September 11th Attacks, so that each of them is properly held accountable under the ATA, the TVPA, RICO, the ATS, and/or the common law. Taken collectively, the facts and allegations contained in the plaintiffs’ complaints, RICO and More Definite Statements, and extrinsic materials formed a vast record, spanning literally tens of thousands of *3 pages. Evaluated in a manner consistent with the standards of review for motions addressed to the adequacy of pleadings, the vast record presented by plaintiffs to the district court established that plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to state claims against the Defendants under the ATA and other relevant causes of action. In the face of these extraordinarily detailed and supported pleadings, which more than satisfied the requirements of Rule 8, the district court nonetheless held plaintiffs to an improper heightened pleading standard, specially applicable to cases involving allegations of terrorism. Nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and no precedent of this Court or any other of which plaintiffs are aware, authorized this heightened standard, nor is such a heightened standard appropriate for plaintiffs who have suffered such grievous injuries or for defendants who are alleged to have committed such heinous acts. The district court also ignored the wealth of details provided by plaintiffs in their supplemental filings, failed to credit the allegations in the pleadings, and failed to draw inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. The court also misconstrued the scope of the Alien Tort Statute, under the erroneous belief that acts of international terrorism do not, in and of themselves, *4 violate the “laws of nations” unless they involve the hijacking of an airplane. The court also applied the wrong statute of limitations to certain of plaintiffs’ claims and misconstrued the scope of the TVPA. The combination of these errors resulted in the dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ claims against some of the most significant financial institutions that provided knowing support to al-Qaeda, enabling it to train the September 11 hijackers and plan and carry out the attacks. And, in dismissing three Defendants on the basis of sovereign immunity, the district court applied a decision of this Court that has since been overruled. This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and hold that plaintiffs may pursue their claims against these financial sponsors of terrorism. Statement Of Subject Matter and Appellate Jurisdiction The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had subject matter jurisdiction over these actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1331, 1332, 1350, 1367, 1407, and 1605, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964 and 2338, and 49 U.S.C. §40101. Plaintiffs assert claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq., and under the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute, *5 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 et seq., which conferred jurisdiction on the district court through the specific grants of jurisdiction applicable to each statute and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In some of the underlying cases, plaintiffs and defendants were diverse, in that defendants were citizens of foreign states or of states different from the states in which plaintiffs were citizens. Plaintiffs who are not U.S. persons assert claims for violations of international law, over which the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The district court further had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ common law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Where defendants claimed immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and plaintiffs asserted the application of one or more exceptions to immunity, the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 & 1605. In addition, actions originally filed in other jurisdictions were transferred to the Southern District of New York by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court dismissed defendants in this case in six orders dated January 18, 2005 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (“Terrorist Attacks”) (S.D.N.Y 2005)); September *6 21, 2005 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (“Terrorist Attacks II”) (S.D.N.Y 2005)); November 20, 2006 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 462 F. Supp. 2d 561 (“SAMBA I”) (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); December 14, 2006 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 464 F. Supp. 2d 335 (“DMI-Kamel”) (S.D.N.Y. 2006)); June 17, 2010 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456 (“Terrorist Attacks IV”) (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); and September 13, 2010 (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494 (“Terrorist Attacks V”) (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).2 Additional defendants remain in the case, which is still pending below. On July 14, 2011, the district court entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in favor of 75 defendants dismissed in those four orders, including each of the appellees. Plaintiffs timely filed their notices of appeal on August 9, 2011, August 10, 2011, and August 11, 2011. Statement of Issues Presented for Review 1. Whether plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true and with all reasonable inferences drawn from them in plaintiffs’ favor, constitute a *7 prima facie showing that each of five defendants, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2333, knew that or recklessly disregarded whether al-Qaeda was the recipient of the financial and other support each defendant was providing to al-Qaeda. 2. Whether, for purposes of claims asserting violations of “the law of nations” under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, such violations include acts of international terrorism or are limited to the hijacking of commercial airplanes. 3. Whether claims arising under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, can be asserted against defendants who are not natural persons, including corporations and other legal entities. 4. Whether plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true and with all reasonable inferences drawn from them in plaintiffs’ favor, constitute a prima facie showing that defendants who provided material support to al-Qaeda owed a duty of care, in relation to negligence claims, to victims of an al-Qaeda attack in the United States. 5. Whether plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims related to the September 11, 2001 attacks in Virginia and Pennsylvania are subject to New York’s one-year statute of limitations. *8 6. Whether plaintiffs’ intentional tort claims related to the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania are subject to equitable tolling even if subject to New York’s one-year statute of limitations. 7. Whether the dismissals of three defendants, based on a decision of this Court construing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), should be vacated because this Court has overruled that earlier decision since the filing of notices of appeals. Statement of The Case Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings On September 11, 2001, members of the al-Qaeda3 terrorist organization hijacked four commercial airliners and used those planes as weapons in a coordinated attack on the United States (“the September 11th Attacks”). The September 11th Attacks were the culmination of a campaign to wage jihad against the United States, set in motion with the formation of al-Qaeda in 1988 and made possible by the massive financial, logistic, and material support provided to al-Qaeda by its collaborators and *9 sympathizers over a period of many years. That support allowed al-Qaeda to build the global infrastructure necessary to plan and conduct the September 11th Attacks. Through their suits, plaintiffs seek to hold accountable the states, purported charities, banks, organizations and individuals who knowingly provided material support or resources to al-Qaeda, thereby making the September 11th Attacks possible. Plaintiffs’ complaints assert claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, Alien Tort Statute, Torture Victim Protection Act, and common law theories of concerted action liability. Plaintiffs initiated their respective actions between August 15, 2002 and September 2, 2004. In presenting their substantive claims and theories of jurisdiction against the defendants, and in responding to the various motions to dismiss, plaintiffs offered detailed factual allegations in their respective complaints concerning the origins of al-Qaeda, the vast infrastructure that fueled that organization’s growth and development, and al-Qaeda’s systematic and public targeting of the United States and its citizens beginning in 1988. JA3775-78.4 Within this broader framework, the *10 pleadings described the particular character of the defendants’ collaboration with al-Qaeda, and the nature of the material support and resources they provided to al-Qaeda in furtherance of its jihad against the United States. JA3602-3728, 3778-3876. Plaintiffs in virtually all cases later filed one or more amended complaints, and numerous RICO Statements and/or More Definite Statements as to individual defendants, which served to amend their respective complaints.5 Those supplemental pleadings offered additional details concerning the individual defendants’ roles in supporting al-Qaeda, based largely on the flow of new evidence and information uncovered as a result of the intensive investigations initiated following the September 11th Attacks concerning the sources of al-Qaeda’s vast financial and logistical support. On December 9, 2003, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued an order transferring the Burnett action from the District of Columbia to the Southern District of New York and consolidating all then-indicated, citations to the record refer to the docket numbers on the MDL 1570 docket sheet. *11 pending cases against al-Qaeda’s material sponsors and supporters arising from the September 11th Attacks. The September 11th MDL was assigned to Judge Richard Casey, who presided over the consolidated proceedings until his death on March 22, 2007. On April 20, 2007, the September 11th MDL was re-assigned to Judge George Daniels, who has since presided over the trial court proceedings. Between 2002 and 2005, approximately 100 defendants entered appearances in the cases comprising the September 11th MDL and, with one exception, moved to dismiss the claims against them. In general terms, the defendants’ motions sought dismissal principally under one or more of the following theories: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA); (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; and/or (3) failure to state a claim. In response to defendants’ motions seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and/or subject matter jurisdiction and under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), plaintiffs supplemented their already detailed allegations record relevant to those jurisdictional disputes through extrinsic information and evidence filed in support of their oppositions to the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. These materials *12 included, inter alia, governmental and intelligence reports, documents released in response to Defendants’ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, U.S. filings in criminal trials, Congressional testimony, analyses authored by counterterrorism experts and think tanks, Treasury Department statements concerning designations of terror sponsors and supporters pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as well as relevant public reporting. On January 18, 2005, Judge Casey issued his decision in Terrorist Attacks I, dismissing claims against, inter alia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and several Saudi Princes on sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction grounds. Judge Casey held that the FSIA protected the Princes from claims arising from actions undertaken in their official capacities. SPA25. The decision also dismissed claims against Al Rajhi Bank in the Burnett action for failure to state a claim, a ruling that was then extended to the remaining MDL cases by Order dated May 5, 2005. SPA57, 2548-51. On September 21, 2005, Judge Casey issued a second opinion, Terrorist Attacks II, dismissing claims in certain of the MDL cases against two additional Saudi Princes, again on FSIA and personal jurisdiction grounds, as well as claims against the Saudi High Commission for Relief of *13 Bosnia & Herzegovina (SHC), a purported charity operating as an alter-ego of the Saudi government, also under the FSIA. SPA76-77, 81, 98. On December 16, 2005, the district court certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) its orders of January 18, 2005, May 5, 2005, and September 21, 2005 with respect to the Kingdom, Princes, SHC, and several other defendants, but not as to Al Rajhi Bank. Docket # 1554. Plaintiffs filed appeals as to the dismissals of the Kingdom, five Princes and SHC, and a panel of this Court issued a decision concerning those appeals on August 14, 2008. Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d 71. Affirming the dismissals of the Kingdom and SHC, the Panel held that tort claims against foreign states for injuries resulting from a terrorist attack on U.S. soil may not be brought under the FSIA’s non-commercial torts exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5), but must instead be brought exclusively under the FSIA’s so-called State Sponsor of Terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605A. Id. at 80-86. Because Saudi Arabia is not a designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Panel deemed the Kingdom and SHC immune from the September 11th plaintiffs’ tort claims. Id. In also affirming dismissals of four of the Princes for conduct undertaken in their official capacities, the Panel ruled that individual foreign officials are entitled to *14 the protections of the FSIA. Id. at 90-92. Finally, the Panel affirmed the dismissals of all five Princes for claims arising from their personal, nongovernmental activities, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them for the claims as pled would not comport with due process. Id. at 93-95. Plaintiffs thereafter sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court of each of these three principal holdings. In response to a request from the Supreme Court, the United States filed an amicus brief on May 29, 2009, expressing its views that this Court’s reasoning was flawed with respect to each of the holdings. Br. for the United States, Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2009 WL 1539068 (2009). With regard to the decision’s due process analysis, the United States stated “[i]t is unclear precisely what legal standard the court of appeals applied in affirming the district court’s holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Princes for their personal actions .... To the extent the court of appeals’ language suggests that a defendant must specifically intend to cause injury to residents in the forum before a court there may exercise jurisdiction over him, that is incorrect. It is sufficient that the defendant took ‘intentional * * * tortious, actions’ and ‘knew that the brunt of th[e] injury would be felt’ in the *15 foreign forum.” Id. at *19, (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984)). Even so, the United States argued that the questions presented by the Petition did not warrant review by the Court. Id. at *22. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). A few months later, the Supreme Court accepted review of another case raising the applicability of the FSIA to claims against individual foreign officials and unanimously held that the FSIA does not apply to individual officials of foreign states. Samantar v. Yousuf, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). This Court subsequently acknowledged that Samantar “abrogated [Terrorist Attacks III] insofar as it held FSIA applied to individual officials.” Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 2010). Throughout the course of the prior appeals to this Court and related proceedings before the Supreme Court, approximately 90 initial Rule 12 motions remained pending before the district court. Following Terrorist Attacks III, the district court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning the import of that decision to the remaining motions to *16 dismiss, as well as lists identifying those defendants’ motions as to which the holdings in Terrorist Attacks III were dispositive. In their submissions, plaintiffs conceded that Terrorist Attacks III was dispositive as to the immunity defenses asserted by the Saudi Red Crescent Society (SRC) and Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), two purported charity alter-egos of the Kingdom. As Terrorist Attacks III purported to resolve the entitlement of only senior foreign officials to FSIA immunity, plaintiffs asserted that the import of that holding as to the immunity defenses asserted by several remaining defendants, who allegedly held more junior positions in foreign governments, was unclear. Struggling to interpret the precise meaning of Terrorist Attacks III’s personal jurisdiction holding, plaintiffs submitted that the decision could be interpreted as drawing a distinction between direct and indirect support of terrorism for due process purposes, and that Terrorist Attacks III should not be read to allow defendants with direct ties to al-Qaeda to evade jurisdiction. Plaintiffs expressly reserved their right to argue on appeal that, among other things, a rule immunizing indirect sponsors of terrorism from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for injuries *17 suffered in the United States on due process grounds is incorrect and inconsistent with controlling precedent. For their part, the defendants asserted that Terrorist Attacks III should be read to require, for purposes of due process, a showing that the defendant “intentionally provided funding to support the September 11 attacks against the United States.” R.2140, 1-2, 13. On February 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority bringing to the district court’s attention the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2008 (en banc) (Boim III). R. 2156. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit comprehensively discussed the substantive liability standards governing civil claims under the ATA, and the findings and policies that prompted the Legislative and Executive Branches to establish a civil cause of action for the benefit of terror victims against material sponsors and supporters of terrorism. The Boim III court held that liability under the ATA extends to any person who knowingly or recklessly provided material support or resources to the terrorist organization responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, whether directly or indirectly, and that a plaintiff in an ATA case need not allege any specific or temporal link *18 between the defendant’s support and the attack producing the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 688-702. On June 17, 2010, Judge Daniels issued an opinion, Terrorist Attacks IV, resolving the motions to dismiss of thirty-seven defendants, and holding that thirty-six of those defendants were entitled to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. SPA152-211. The defendants dismissed through that decision included Appellees Abdullah bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, Tariq bin Laden, Yeslam bin Laden, Dallah Avco Trans-Arabia Co. Ltd. (Dallah Avco), DMI Administrative Services, Faisal Islamic Bank, Saleh al Hussayen, Yousef Jameel, Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz, National Commercial Bank (NCB), Abdullah al Obeid (Obeid), Abdullah al Rajhi, Saleh al Rajhi, Suleiman al Rajhi, Schreiber & Zindel Treuhand Anstalt, Frank Zindel, Engelbert Schreiber, Sr., Engelbert Schreiber, Jr., Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Shamal), Abdul Rahman al Swailem (Swailem), Tadamon Islamic Bank (Tadamon), Abdullah Muhsen al Turki (Turki), Martin Wachter, Erwin Wachter, Sercor Treuhand Anstalt, and Asat Trust (Asat). Generally, the district court predicated the dismissals of those Appellees on its conclusions that: (1) a defendant’s indirect funding of al- *19 Qaeda through a charitable intermediary “is, under controlling Second Circuit law, of no jurisdictional import,” see SPA196; or (2) plaintiffs were required, but failed, to present allegations and facts sufficient to demonstrate the defendant’s “specific intent that [his support for al-Qaeda] be used to aid al-Qaeda in the commission of a terrorist attack against the United States, see SPA197. In certain cases, the district court went further, appearing to require allegations or facts (or even evidence) directly linking the defendant to the September 11th Attacks. See SPA194. On September 13, 2010, Judge Daniels issued another decision concerning the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of an additional seven defendants, and thirty-three defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. SPA214-253 (Terrorist Attacks V, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494). The district court granted the motions of all seven defendants seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, thereby dismissing Appellees Abdullah Naseef (Naseef), Sulaiman al-Ali (Ali), Adnan Basha (Basha), Jamal Khalifa (Khalifa), Aqeel Al-Aqeel (Aqeel), Yassin al Kadi (al Kadi), and Soliman al-Buthe (al-Buthe). SPA217-227. The reasoning in support of those dismissals generally followed that offered by the district court relative to the dismissals in Terrorist Attacks *20 TV. As a component of its rulings dismissing two of the defendants-Appellees, the district court specifically held that a defendant’s “terrorist designation” by the U.S. government for sponsoring al-Qaeda is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, Terrorist Attacks V, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 508, and that a defendant’s status as “a key al Qeda operative” and direct participation in several al-Qaeda plots and attacks other than 9/11 was insufficient to establish jurisdiction absent an allegation that he “played any role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks” or “had authority to steward the direction of al-Qaeda’s terrorist operation.” SPA223. Terrorist Attacks Valso granted motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, of Appellees Dar al-Maal-al Islami Trust (DMI Trust), Saleh Abdullah Kamel (Kamel), and al Baraka Investment and Development Corp (al Baraka). The dismissal was primarily based on the conclusion that plaintiffs did not adequately allege that those defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, that the recipients of their support advanced al-Qaeda’s activities -- despite plaintiffs’ detailed pleading of defendants’ extensive dealings with al-Qaeda and its network of supporting entities. The Court also granted particular defendants’ motions *21 to dismiss claims predicated on the Torture Victims’ Protection Act, the Alien Tort Statute, RICO, and common law causes of action. On October 7, 2010, the parties jointly requested that the district court enter Rule 54(b) final judgments in favor of all defendants dismissed through Terrorist Attacks IV and Terrorist Attacks V, as well as with respect to dismissals effectuated through the Terrorist Attacks I and Terrorist Attacks II decisions, to the extent not within the scope of the January 10, 2006 Rule 54(b) judgment. Seventy-five defendants fell within the scope of that joint request. The district court granted the parties’ joint request for entry of Rule 54(b) judgments on July 13, 2011, and the clerk of court entered final judgment in favor of the seventy-five defendants pursuant to Rule 54(b) on July 14, 2011. Plaintiffs in all actions filed timely Notices of Appeal as to all Rule 54(b) defendants within the scope of their respective actions. Following the filing of plaintiffs’ Notices of Appeal, this Court issued its decision in Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22516 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), another of the cases comprising the September 11th MDL. In Doe, the Court held that the FSIA’s “terrorism exception, rather than limiting the jurisdiction conferred by the noncommercial tort *22 exception, provides an additional basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at *19 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court concluded, “the noncommercial tort exception [§ 1605(a)(5)] can be a basis for a suit arising from the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001.” Id. The Court remanded the case against Afghanistan for jurisdictional discovery. Id. at *20-21. The Court recognized that its holding conflicted with and abrogated the prior panel’s decision in Terrorist Attacks III, and noted that the Circuit had employed its mini-en banc procedure, whereby the new decision had been circulated to all active judges and had received no objections, including from members of the panel that decided Terrorist Attacks III. Id. at *19-20 n.10. Doe, therefore, is now the law of this Circuit, and Terrorist Attacks Ill’s holding regarding § 1605(a)(5) has been overruled. See Frontera, 582 F.3d at 400 (applying the mini-en banc process and holding that “to the extent that” an earlier opinion “conflicts with our holding today ... it is overruled”). In light of Doe, plaintiffs moved this Court to summarily vacate the dismissals in favor of defendants’ SRC, SJRC and NCB, and remand those claims for discovery, on the grounds that Doe abrogates and overrules the legal basis for those dismissals. Appellants’ Motion to Summarily Vacate *23 and Remand, Case No. 11-3294, Docket # 243, at p. 7. Those defendants sought and received an extension of time until January 23, 2012 to respond to that Motion, which remains pending as of the date of the filing of this brief. In an effort to narrow the scope of these appeals, plaintiffs in all cases agreed voluntarily to withdrew the appeals as to twenty-two defendants.6 Several additional non-dispositive stipulations of dismissal were filed in individual cases as to other Appellees. As a result, these appeals now focus on the dismissals for failure to state a claim of defendants Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank (SAMBA), DMI Trust, Kamel, and Dallah al Baraka, and the dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction of defendants Abdullah bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, Tariq bin Laden, Yeslam bin Laden, Dallah Avco, DMI Administrative Services, Faisal Islamic Bank, Saleh al Hussayen, Yousef Jameel, Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz, NCB, Obeid, Abdullah al Rajhi, Saleh al Rajhi, Suleiman al Rajhi, Schreiber & Zindel Treuhand Anstalt, Frank Zindel, Engelbert Schreiber, Sr., Engelbert Schreiber, Jr., Shamal, Swailem, Tadamon, Turki, Martin *24 Wachter, Erwin Wachter, Sercor Treuhand Anstalt, Asat, Naseef, Ali, Basha, Khalifa, Aqeel, al Kadi, and al-Buthe. Disposition Below As noted above, in Terrorist Attacks I, Terrorist Attacks II, SAMBA I, DMI-Kamel, Terrorist Attacks IV, and Terrorist Attacks V, the district court dismissed all claims against the defendant-appellees. Thereafter, the court entered partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). This brief addresses the district court’s dismissals of plaintiffs’ ATA, ATS, TVPA, and torts claims against Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, DMI Trust, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, and Dallah al Baraka for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and dismissals of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, Saudi Red Crescent Society, and National Commercial Bank for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Statement Of Facts The Origins of al-Qaeda As alleged in plaintiffs’ pleadings and confirmed by countless governmental investigations, al-Qaeda has its origins in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which served as a rallying point for *25 Islamic extremists in the Middle East.7 In 1980, Osama bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the jihad, and gained prominence for his role in establishing the financial and logistical infrastructure that sustained the mujahedeen fighters. Bin Ladin understood better than most of the volunteers the extent to which the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization. This organization included a financial support network that came to be known as the “Golden Chain,” put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Donations flowed through charities or other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).8 Together with Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden founded the Maktab al Khidmat (“Office of Services”) to facilitate the provision of financial and logistic support to the mujahedeen.9 Throughout the Afghan jihad, Maktab al Khidmat worked in concert with a network of purported charities and relief organizations, including the Muslim World League (“MWL”), International Islamic Relief Organization (“IIRO”), Rabita Trust, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (“Al Haramain”), Muwafaq Foundation *26 (“Muwafaq”), and the Saudi Red Crescent Society, to provide travel documents, funds, transportation, training facilities, arms, physical assets and other support to the mujahedeen.10 Fueled by donations from wealthy supporters in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, this network of ostensible charities established a vast infrastructure to support the mujahedeen opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.11 At the conclusion of the Afghan jihad, bin Laden determined that the network that supported the mujahedeen in Afghanistan should not be abandoned, but rather adapted to serve as a foundation for waging a global jihad against all of the perceived enemies of Islam, and in particular, the United States.12 As the 9-11 Commission explained: *27 April 1988 brought victory for the Afghan jihad. Moscow declared it would pull its military forces out of Afghanistan within the next nine months. As the Soviets began their withdrawal, the jihad’s leaders debated what to do next. Bin Ladin and [Abdullah] Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan should not be allowed to dissolve. They established what they called a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad.13 Once al-Qaeda was established, bin Laden turned its focus towards the United States. This was not done secretly, but rather publicly, in a series of fatwas. “Bin Ladin began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia [in 1991]. He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. In early 1992, the Al Qaeda leadership issued a jihad against the Western ‘occupation’ of Islamic lands...[s]pecifically singling out U.S. forces for attack.”14 In a 1996 fatwa, tellingly entitled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” bin Laden asserted that “the occupying American enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation. Therefore efforts should be *28 concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy until, by the Grace of Allah, it is completely defeated.” In 1998, bin Laden proclaimed to the world: The ruling to kill Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do.15 These fatwas ensured that those who provided support to al-Qaeda knew and understood that al-Qaeda was directing its conduct at the United States. The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development Consistent with bin Laden’s plan to adapt the infrastructure developed during the Afghan jihad to build a global terrorist movement, al-Qaeda relied on the network of charities and wealthy individual donors established for the Afghan jihad to sustain its growth and development.16 According to the United Nations Security Council Committee Concerning al-Qaeda and the Taliban: From its inception al-Qaida has relied heavily on charities and donations from its sympathizers to finance its activities. Charities provide al-Qaida with a very useful international channel for soliciting, collecting, transferring and distributing the funds it needs for indoctrination, recruitment, training, and *29 logistical and operational support. These funds are often merged with and hidden among funds used for other legitimate humanitarian or social programs. Al-Qaida supporters and financiers have also established front charity networks whose main purpose is to raise and deliver funds to al-Qaida. The roots of these charity networks stem from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan during the late 1980s. During that time, al-Qaida could draw on a number of state-assisted charities and other deep pocket donors that supported the anti-Soviet cause.17 As confirmed by internal al-Qaeda historical records seized during a 2002 raid of an al-Qaeda front charity, the partnerships forged during the Afghan jihad with the Muslim World League, International Islamic Relief Organization, and Saudi Red Crescent Society were among those seamlessly adapted to build and sustain the global infrastructure needed to support the planned jihad against the United States.18 Additional “charities,” such as al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Muwafaq Foundation, and the Saudi Joint Relief Committee, would emerge as important al-Qaeda partners as bin Laden’s organization grew and expanded its global terrorist and military operations to regions as diverse *30 as the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kashmir, Somalia, Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia.19 Plaintiffs’ pleadings and other record materials describe in detail the pervasive involvement of these purported charities in knowingly and directly supporting al-Qaeda in the years preceding the September 11th Attacks.20 As detailed in the record, the nature of the support provided by these organizations to al-Qaeda has taken many forms, and viewed collectively reflects their intimate, systematic, and longstanding ties to al-Qaeda. In this regard, plaintiffs’ pleadings and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that these purported charities have: (1) raised and laundered funds on behalf of al-Qaeda; (2) channeled donated funds to al-Qaeda; (3) provided financial and logistical support and physical assets to al- *31 Qaeda; (4) permitted al-Qaeda members to use ostensible employment with their organizations as a vehicle for covertly traveling in furtherance of al-Qaeda’s operations; (5) performed reconnaissance within conflict regions on behalf of al-Qaeda; (6) served as liaisons to localized terrorist organizations on behalf of al-Qaeda, thereby assisting al-Qaeda in expanding its operational base and sphere of influence; (7) funded and facilitated shipments of arms and supplies to al-Qaeda; (8) funded camps used by al-Qaeda to train soldiers and terrorists; (9) actively recruited Muslim youths on behalf of al-Qaeda; (10) served as channels for distributing information and documentation within al Qaeda, and from al-Qaeda to the media; (11) disseminated publications designed to advance al-Qaeda’s radical Islamist ideology throughout the Muslim world and legitimize violent jihad against Christians and Jews on the grounds that they are “infidels” who do not deserve to live; and (12) openly advocated for young Muslims to take up arms against Western and democratic societies.21 Contrary to the defendants’ tireless efforts to cast plaintiffs’ pleadings as conclusory, this Court commented in relation to a prior appeal in this *32 proceeding that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the terrorist activities of the purported charities “include a wealth of detail (conscientiously cited to published and unpublished sources) that, if true, reflect close working arrangements between ostensible charities and terrorist networks, including al Qaeda.” Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d at 76. Defendants Aqeel al Aqeel, Soliman al Buthe, Abdullah Naseef, Abdullah bin Saleh al Obaid, Abdullah Muhsen al Turki, Adnan Basha, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Abdulrhaman al Swailem, Suleiman al Ali (the “Charity Official Defendants”), Yassin al Kadi, and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz served as senior officials of one or more of al-Qaeda’s front charities, and are alleged to have used their authority over those organizations to orchestrate their material support and sponsorship of al-Qaeda.22 Each of these defendants is specifically alleged to have acted with knowledge that the organizations under their control were channeling *33 material support and resources to al-Qaeda, and that the support flowing to al-Qaeda from the organizations under their control would be used to support al-Qaeda’s jihad against the United States.23 These allegations are corroborated by the very nature and scope of the support flowing from the charities under defendants’ control to al-Qaeda, which extended to separate branch offices throughout the world over a period of many years.24 In many cases, these partnerships grew out of the charities’ well publicized sponsorship of bin Laden and the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, a legacy which was well known to the heads of those organizations.25 In the ensuing years, each of these purported charities was repeatedly and publicly implicated in terrorist activities, and yet their support for al-Qaeda continued unabated while under the leadership of defendants.26 In several instances, the Charity Official defendants were directly responsible for appointing senior al-Qaeda members to positions of authority within the purported charities, a pattern that further reflects the intimacy of the partnership between those organizations and al-Qaeda. For *34 instance, while serving as the head of both the Saudi Red Crescent Society and Saudi Joint Relief Committee (“SJRC”), Defendant Dr. Abdul Rahman al Swailem appointed Wa’el Jelaidan to serve as Director of the SJRC’s office in Pristina, Kosovo.27 Jelaidan is a founding al-Qaeda member, whose ties to bin Laden date to the Afghan jihad when Jelaidan served as Director of the MWL’s office in Peshawar, Pakistan and orchestrated that purported charity’s support for the mujahedeen.28 According to U.S. authorities, Jelaidan proceeded to use the SJRC as a front to “move money and men into and from the Balkans” for Osama bin Laden.29 On September 6, 2002, the United States listed Jelaidan as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to Executive Order 13224, explaining that “the United States has credible information that Wa’el Julaidan is an associate of Osama bin Laden and several of bin Laden’s top lieutenants. Julaidan has directed organizations that have provided financial and logistical support to al-Qa’ida.”30 *35 The leaders of the MWL and IIRO similarly ensconced well known bin Laden associates as senior officials of those organizations, thereby providing al-Qaeda with an efficient mechanism to support its global expansion. Defendant Abdullah Naseef met personally with Osama bin Laden around the time of Al-Qaeda’s formation, and reached agreement with bin Laden at that meeting that al-Qaeda would use MWL offices to launch attacks.31 This meeting and agreement are documented in the historical records of al-Qaeda’s formation seized during the 2002 raid in Bosnia.32 Naseef proceeded to leave Wa’el Jelaidan, who to Naseef’s knowledge was responsible for directing the MWL’s assistance for the Afghan mujahedeen and a founding al-Qaeda member, in his position as Director of the MWL, thus ensuring a direct channel for coordinating MWL’s collaboration with al-Qaeda.33 *36 Around this same time, Naseef formed Rabita Trust, appointing Jelaidan to a senior position within that organization as well, as reflected by the Treasury Department’s own press release concerning Rabita Trust’s designation under Executive Order 13224 indicating that “Rabita Trust is headed by Wa’el Hamza Julaidan, one of the founders of al-Qaida with bin Laden. He is the logistics chief of bin Laden’s organization and fought on bin Laden’s side in Afghanistan.”34 In this regard, the MWL-headed Nassef retained Jelaidan as a director of its operations for several years following the establishment of al-Qaeda, despite his close ties to bin Laden and primary role in supporting the jihad in Afghanistan.35 Jelaidan’s role in the MWL allowed the nascent al-Qaeda organization to use the MWL as an “umbrella” under which the terror group’s members could operate, including using MWL offices for launching terrorist attacks.36 Similarly, as head of the MWL, Naseef approved the appointment of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, also a founding al-Qaeda member and bin Laden’s brother-in-law, to head the Philippine office of MWL subsidiary *37 IIRO.37 Through that position, Khalifa used the IIRO as a platform for al-Qaeda’s expansion into Southeast Asia, providing funds and other support through the IIRO for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 “Bojinka” plot to simultaneously bomb multiple airplanes while in transit to the United States.38 The Bojinka plot was conceived by September 11th mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and was a precursor to the September 11th Attacks.39 Khalifa also used IIRO funds and resources to establish Abu Sayyef Group, a Philippine terrorist organization that has served as an al-Qaeda proxy in the Far East since its establishment.40 Appellee Adnan Basha assumed control over the IIRO, after serving as a senior officer of its parent the MWL, in the immediate aftermath of the *38 disclosure of IIRO’s involvement in the aforementioned plots and terrorist activities, and proceeded to expand IIRO’s support for al Qaeda by providing $60 million to fund al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, as confirmed by a 1996 CIA Report.41 The direct involvement of Appellee Aqeel and al-Buthe in orchestrating al Haramain’s terrorist activities was also well documented. As defendant Aqeel himself stated, “[t]he [al Haramain branch] offices’ directors are employees who follow directions of the main office with regards to hiring workers at the offices and making any decisions on cooperation with any party.”42 In designating Aqeel as a terrorist in 2005, the United States asserted that “[t]hese entities and this individual [defendant Aqeel] have provided financial, material and logistical support to the al-Qaida network, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, fueling and facilitating their efforts to carry out vile acts against innocent individuals and the civilized world.”43 The Treasury Department further stated that *39 Defendant Aqeel “controlled [al Haramain] and was responsible for all [al Haramain] activities, including its support for terrorism.”44 On September 9, 2004, the United States Department of Treasury designated defendant Soliman al Buthe as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for his role with al Haramain in the United States, which the Treasury Department stated had “direct links” with bin Laden.45 Defendant al Buthe was also indicted on allegations that he diverted charitable donations from al Haramain to al-Qaeda fighters in Chechnya.46 Al Buthe’s role in directing al Haramain’s activities are also revealed in the record which states that a “document obtained by the U.S. government shows that in October, 1997, [al Haramain] in Saudi Arabia appointed Al-Buthe its true and lawful attorney in its name, place, and stead” and “appears to give Al-Buthe broad legal authority to act on [al Haramain’s] behalf within the United States.”47 *40 Plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant Yassin al Kadi co-founded Muwafaq Foundation with defendant Khalid bin Mahfouz for the specific purpose of serving as a front for al-Qaeda operations likewise enjoys support in the facts and allegations concerning al Kadi’s appointment of known terrorists to head various Muwafaq offices.48 For instance, al Kadi, himself a close associate of Jelaidan, appointed Chafiq Ayadi to head the Muwafaq operations in Europe and Bosnia.49 On October 12, 2001, the United States listed Ayadi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.50 Other Muwafaq offices throughout the world were similarly populated with al-Qaeda operatives, and al Kadi acknowledges having personally selected the managers responsible for running Muwafaq’s various offices.51 As a result of al Kadi’s deep involvement in sponsoring al-Qaeda, through Muwafaq as well as various businesses under his control or influence, the *41 United States listed him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on October 12, 2001.52 Read in context and collectively, the allegations concerning the charities’ sponsorship of al-Qaeda while under the direction and control of the Charity Official defendants provide ample support for plaintiffs’ specific contention that each of the these defendants played a direct role in facilitating the respective charities’ sponsorship of al-Qaeda. In particular, the pleadings make clear that the charities embraced al-Qaeda’s Islamist vision and used their global infrastructures to support al-Qaeda’s jihad against the United States as an institutional matter.53 The institutional character of the collaboration between al-Qaeda and the purported charities is reflected by the pervasiveness of their support, which followed a common pattern at separate branch offices throughout the world. In several cases, the Charity Official defendants enhanced their organizations’ collaboration with al-Qaeda by appointing senior al-Qaeda officials to *42 positions of authority within their organizations. Further, although the charities were repeatedly implicated in terrorist activities in the years following the formation of al-Qaeda, the pattern of sponsorship continued unabated under the direction and leadership of the Charity Official defendants for a period of many years, and in many cases even after the September 11th Attacks. These allegations, and the logical inferences arising therefrom, established for purposes of the jurisdictional disputes that the Charity Official defendants engaged in tortious conduct directed at the United States. Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry Beyond the charity sector, al-Qaeda also benefited immensely from close working relationships with a number of financial institutions, many of which worked in concert with al-Qaeda’s charity sponsors and supporters to facilitate the transfer of resources to al-Qaeda operations and affiliates through the international banking system.54 By virtue of its own Islamist agenda, as well as for pragmatic reasons, al-Qaeda sought in particular partnerships with financial institutions operating under principles of Sharia compliant finance, and was successful in finding *43 willing collaborators within that industry.55 As the Council on Foreign Relations observed in its report on terrorist financing, “[m]any prominent Islamic banks operate under loose regulatory oversight, in part because they are based in jurisdictions without proper controls, but also because their religious nature often allows them a greater degree of autonomy owing to obvious domestic considerations. Islamic banks regularly co-mingle funds from depositors to place them within group investments by fund managers, creating ready opportunities for anonymous money transfers and settlements. Moreover, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that use Islam to justify their actions are also more likely to find willing collaborators within the Islamic banking system.”56 Al-Qaeda’s willing collaborators within the financial industry included Defendants National Commercial Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp. (“Al Rajhi Bank”), Al Shamal Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank-Sudan, Tadamon Islamic *44 Bank, DMI Trust, DMI Administrative Services S.A., Saudi American Bank, and Al Baraka Investment.57 The character of support provided by al-Qaeda’s sponsors in the financial industry also took several forms, but in every instance involved the knowing provision of financial services and other forms of material support to al-Qaeda. In certain cases, al-Qaeda officials were directly embedded in the infrastructures of those financial institutions, and al-Qaeda openly maintained accounts and carried out transactions with the knowledge and consent of senior officials of the financial institution in question. For example, during the period that al-Qaeda was headquartered in the Sudan under the protection of the ruling National Islamic Front regime, it openly used Defendants Al Shamal Islamic Bank (“Al Shamal”) and Faisal Islamic Bank-Sudan (“FIBS”) to support its operations and terrorist agenda.58 (Together with Defendants DMI Administrative Services S.A. (“DMI”) and Tadamon Islamic Bank (“Tadamon”), Al Shamal *45 and FIBS are referred to herein as the “Sudanese Defendants”). According to the testimony of former al-Qaeda finance chief Jamal al Fadl, previously deemed credible by this Court,59 Al Shamal maintained accounts for Osama bin Laden and several other al-Qaeda officials, and carried out large cash and wire transactions in furtherance of al-Qaeda operations.60 Al Fadl similarly testified that FIBS, which in turn is the founder of Al Shamal, partnered with al-Qaeda by mamtaining accounts for al-Qaeda and by embedding al-Qaeda officials in the infrastructure of Al Shamal.61 Tadamon also maintained accounts for al Qaeda members according to al Fadl, including an account for bin Laden’s personal bodyguard, who handled money for bin Laden and used the account for bin Laden’s activities on behalf of al Qaeda.62 More frequently, al-Qaeda’s partners in the financial sector operated covertly within its global infrastructure, by providing financial services to al-Qaeda’s charity fronts with full knowledge that those accounts were being used to support al-Qaeda, and by themselves providing funds to al- *46 Qaeda, typically through their own zakat charitable contributions to al-Qaeda’s charity fronts. The allegations and record evidence relating to Al Rajhi Bank and National Commercial Bank (“NCB”) are illustrative of this pattern of support.63 Testifying before Congress just three weeks after the September 11th Attacks, former Central Intelligence Agency Chief of Counterterrorism Operations Vincent Cannistraro affirmed that “[t]here is little doubt that a financial conduit to bin Laden was handled through the National Commercial Bank, until the Saudi government finally arrested a number of persons and closed down the channel. It was evident that several wealthy Saudis were funneling contributions to bin Laden through this mechanism.”64 The “mechanism” through which “wealthy Saudis” channeled support to bin Laden via NCB involved large transfers to IIRO, Muwafaq Foundation, Saudi Red Crescent, SJRC and other al-Qaeda charity fronts.65 Conveniently, NCB maintained accounts for many of these ostensible charities, including in particular IIRO and SJRC, and promoted *47 contributions to those accounts via advertisements, with specific awareness that those entities were supporting al-Qaeda.66 At all times, NCB was aware of the terrorist activities of those purported charities, by virtue of the extensive public reporting concerning those activities in the Muslim world prior to 9/11, and by virtue of the longstanding ties between senior executives of NCB (including its Chairman Appellee Khaled bin Mahfouz and Appellee Yassin al Kadi, who was the architect of NCB’s Islamic Banking Division), and bin Laden, as described in further detail below.67 (Together with NCB and Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz and Yassin al Kadi are referred to here is ahe “NCB Defendants.”) Al Rajhi Bank played an analogous and equally important role in al-Qaeda’s financial infrastructure, by also providing financial services to al-Qaeda charity fronts including the MWL, IIRO, al Haramain, and Benevolence International Foundation.68 In addition, Al Rajhi Bank funneled its own zakat contributions to al-Qaeda, via contributions to al- *48 Qaeda’s charity fronts.69 Like NCB, Al Rajhi Bank was aware at all relevant times that MWL, IIRO, al Haramain and Benevolence International Foundation were fronts for al-Qaeda, again by virtue of the public reporting concerning the terrorist activities of those organizations, and because senior Al Rajhi Bank officials, including in particular the bank’s founder Suleiman al Rajhi,70 were themselves important al-Qaeda benefactors with direct ties to bin Laden dating from the Afghan jihad.71 Appellees DMI Trust and DMI S.A., in turn, sat at the apex of a deliberately decentralized financial network, which included Appellees Al Shamal, FIBS and Tadamon, established for purposes of “pursuing financial jihad.” Functioning as the operational arm of DMI Trust and implementing the Trust’s strategies and objectives, including its material sponsorship of al Qaeda, DMI S.A. handled accounts for al Qaeda members and primary financiers, including Wa’el Jelaidan and Yassin al Kadi, *49 siphoned off charitable donations to support al Qaeda, and used its own zakat contributions to support al Qaeda.72 As referenced above, plaintiffs’ pleadings and supplemental materials allege that support for al-Qaeda’s agenda emanated from the founders and most senior officials of al-Qaeda’s partners in the financial industry, many of whom had longstanding direct ties to bin Laden, and several of whom also held positions within al-Qaeda’s charity fronts, thus placing them in a unique position to facilitate the provision of resources to al-Qaeda via the network of financial institutions and charitable organizations under their influence. In the case of Al Shamal, bin Laden was himself one of its major shareholders, having contributed $50 million in capital to the bank around the time he relocated al-Qaeda to the Sudan.73 The Sudanese regime that invited bin Laden and al-Qaeda to Sudan also held a direct ownership in Al Shamal, as did Saleh Kamel, a wealthy patron of al-Qaeda’s endeavors.74 Al Shamal’s Chairman was Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee, a close bin Laden associate who also headed al-Qaeda charity *50 fronts Benevolence International Foundation and its Saudi parent, Lajnat al Bir.75 Batterjee’s primary role in al-Qaeda’s support infrastructure prompted the United States to list him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist after the September 11th Attacks.76 Faisal Islamic Bank’s leadership is similarly intertwined with the al-Qaeda organization. As is true of Al Shamal, the Sudanese regime that provided safehaven and support to bin Laden and al-Qaeda held a direct interest in Faisal Islamic Bank.77 Its founders included Yousef Nada, another al-Qaeda financial patron designated by the United States pursuant to Executive Order 13224, and two of its Directors, Abdullah Omar Naseef and Amin Aqeel Attas, in turn were founders of Rabita Trust, an entity also designated by the United States under Executive Order 13224 based on its role in sponsoring al-Qaeda.78 *51 Tadamon and the DMI entities were similarly intertwined with al Qaeda’s leadership and other members of al Qaeda’s inner support circle. Osama bin Laden was himself a shareholder in Tadamon, and Tadamon’s other shareholders included al Qaeda material sponsors FIBS, Saleh Kamel, Al Baraka Investment, Mohammed Hussein al Amoudi, and Dubai Islamic Bank.79 DMI Trust appointed Hassan al Turabi, the noted Islamist leader of the National Islamic Front who invited bin Laden to the Sudan to build al Qaeda, to serve on its Board of Supervisors, and also held direct or indirect stakes in Al Shamal, FIBS and Tadamon.80 The pleadings similarly allege that al Qaeda’s collaborations with NCB and Al Rajhi Bank were implemented by NCB Chairman Khaled bin Mahfouz and Al Rajhi Bank Managing Director Suleiman al Rajhi,81 both of *52 whom have direct ties to bin Laden.82 Both bin Mahfouz and al Rajhi are identified as primary al-Qaeda sponsors on the “Golden Chain,” a document discovered during a 2002 raid of the Bosnian offices of Benevolence International Foundation that uncovered a trove of internal documents on a computer hard drive.83 After careful review of the materials, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that they were internal al-Qaeda documents, chronicling the formation of al-Qaeda and details of its financial and organizational structure.84 The Golden Chain document was found within this broader collection, and U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have concluded that it is an authentic al-Qaeda document identifying al-Qaeda’s most important financial benefactors, and the individuals responsible for coordinating their contributions to al-Qaeda.85 The Golden Chain has been authenticated by former al-Qaeda *53 finance chief Jamal al Fadl, and the Treasury Department has used inclusion on the list as a basis for designating individuals pursuant to Executive Order 13224.86 The authenticity of the Golden Chain as a list of al-Qaeda’s most important financiers has been widely accepted. The 9/11 Commission Monograph on Terrorism Financing cites to “a group of wealthy donors from the Persian Gulf region known as the ‘Golden Chain,’ which provided support to ... Usama Bin Ladin.”87 The 9/11 Monograph continues: The material seized [in Bosnia] included many documents never before seen by U.S. officials, such as the actual minutes of al Qaeda meetings, the al Qaeda oath, al Qaeda organizational charges, and the “Golden Chain” list of wealthy donors to the Afghan mujahideen....88 The Council on Foreign Relations Studies (“CRS”) produced a report in October 2002 that also made use of the Golden Chain. Relying on the 9/11 Commission report, the CRS report described the Golden Chain as: *54 an informal financial network of prominent Saudi and gulf individuals originally established to support the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance movement in the 1980s. U.S. officials state that this network collected funds and tunneled it to Arab fighters in Afghanistan, and later to Al Qaeda, using charities and other non-governmental organizations .... Saudi individuals and other financiers associated with the Golden Chain enabled bin Laden and Al Qaeda to replace lost financial assets and establish a base in Afghanistan following their abrupt departure from Sudan in 1996.89 The Golden Chain thus provides a list of the most significant donors to al-Qaeda. These donors, moreover, did not give money to al-Qaeda unwittingly, through an al Qaeda front masquerading as a legitimate charity; they were, rather, bin Ladin’s original list of financial backers for his al-Qaeda enterprise. The appearance on this list of Khalid bin Mahfouz and Sulaiman al Rajhi is strong evidence of their knowing and active financial support of al-Qaeda. In addition to the positions within their respective financial institutions, Khalid bin Mahfouz, Suleiman al Rajhi, and Abdullah al Rajhi also played significant roles in al-Qaeda charity fronts. As mentioned above, bin Mahfouz founded Muwafaq Foundation along with Defendant al Kadi, with the intent that it would serve as a front for al-Qaeda *55 operations.90 Al Rajhi served as a Board Member of the IIRO, and also founded the SAAR Foundation, a U.S. based charity established by al Rajhi to support Islamic extremists.91 These allegations and facts concerning their longstanding ties to bin Laden, and positions within financial institutions and charities with documented links to al-Qaeda, place bin Mahfouz and al Rajhi at the center of the al-Qaeda financial and logistic network. Al-Qaeda’s Additional Wealthy Financiers A number of other wealthy financiers and sponsors played critical roles in the advancement of the al-Qaeda enterprise, by providing much of the funding al-Qaeda needed to sustain its global operations, estimated by the U.S. government at more than $30 million per year in the period immediately preceding the September 11th Attacks.92 These wealthy individual sponsors included defendants Bakr bin Laden, Tariq bin Laden, Yeslam bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, Abdullah bin Laden (collectively the “Bin Laden Brothers”), Yousef Jameel, and Saleh Kamel--Bakr bin Laden, *56 Jameel, and Kamel, along with Khalid bin Mahfouiz and Suleiman al Rajhi, are identified as primary al-Qaeda financiers in the Golden Chain.93 Bakr, Tariq, Omar, and Yeslam bin Laden are Osama’s half-brothers. Bakr, Tariq, and Omar are alleged to have used their positions within the Saudi Binladin Group, the bin Laden family construction empire, to channel support to their sibling Osama after he formed al-Qaeda and made clear his intent to conduct jihad against the United States.94 Consistent with those allegations, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks’ Staff Monograph on terrorist financing confirms that Osama bin Laden continued to receive disbursements from SBG following the establishment of al-Qaeda in 1988 through 1993 or 1994, to a tune of approximately $1 million per year, until the Saudi government allegedly “forced the Bin Ladin family to find a buyer for Usama’s share of the family company.”95 Bin Laden used those funds to provide economic support to the National Islamic Front regime, a central component of the bargain under which the *57 NIF provided safehaven, training camps and other support for al-Qaeda.96 In addition, Bakr is a member of the Golden Chain, and a primary contributor to al-Qaeda front charity IIRO.97 Abdullah bin Laden sponsored al-Qaeda through his roles in establishing two US branches of al-Qaeda front charities, Taibah International and WAMY USA, both of which have extensive ties to al-Qaeda.98 Yeslam bin Laden supported al-Qaeda through the management of Swiss bank accounts for Osama’s benefit.99 Defendants Kamel and Jameel also are members of the Golden Chain.100 Both are alleged to have longstanding ties to al-Qaeda, and to have supported al-Qaeda through a variety of channels.101 Jameel’s sponsorship of al-Qaeda flowed largely through purported charities, known to Jameel to be al-Qaeda fronts.102 Kamel also contributed generously to al-Qaeda through its known charity fronts, and also *58 supported al-Qaeda through various businesses and financial institutions under his control, including Defendant-Appellee Dalian al Baraka.103 *59 Summary of Argument The district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim against certain defendants under the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), and common law claims including negligence and various intentional torts. In each instance, the court mistakenly narrowed the scope of legal relief afforded by statute or the common law. In certain instances, it compounded that error by failing to give effect to plaintiffs’ pleadings. And throughout, the court understated and failed to acknowledge the direct nexus between the persons who facilitate an act of international terror through the provision of funding or other support, the persons who personally plan and execute a particular terrorist attack, and the persons harmed by that attack. All these errors were evident in the court’s treatment of the ATA claims. Congress intended the ATA to provide relief broadly for U.S. citizens injured by an act of international terrorism, and the district court acknowledged that recovery could be predicated on the provision of material support to a terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda when the supporter knows the nature of the recipient. The court concluded, *60 however, that plaintiffs had insufficiently pled facts establishing that defendants knew that it was al-Qaeda they were supporting. The court could reach this conclusion only by applying a clearly incorrect legal standard (requiring “extra-careful scrutiny” of terrorism allegations) and failing to acknowledge plaintiffs’ extensive allegations of defendants’ knowledge and facts making those allegations plausible. The court also failed to draw obvious, much less reasonable, inferences from plaintiffs’ allegations that placed each defendant at the center of a web of dealings with al-Qaeda members and their closest associates, and it even weighed evidence at the motion to dismiss stage, discounting important documents that had been credited by the U.S. government and independent experts. And further, the court misconstrued and arbitrarily limited the ATA, and ignored plaintiffs’ pleadings, in disregarding -- as “too remote” -- allegations that two defendants had provided extensive support to al-Qaeda in the mid-1990s. The district court adopted different, but no less improper, narrowing constructions of the Alien Tort Statute and the TVPA. The Alien Tort Statute provides a cause of action for certain violations of international law, and the court concluded that the only relevant international law norm *61 related to the hijacking of commercial airplanes. Plaintiffs had, however, pled that the relevant international law norm proscribes acts of international terrorism, which basic principles of customary international law, a considerable range of judicial decisions, and the determinations of Congress and the Executive Branch all establish as acts that violate international law for purposes of establishing an ATS claim. While plaintiffs perhaps did not adequately allege a nexus between defendants’ acts and hijacking, their allegations were clearly adequate in relation to acts of international terrorism. Similarly, the TVPA permits terrorism-related claims to be brought against “individuals,” which the district court construed as limited to natural persons and thus excluding commercial and other entities. That conclusion was incorrect, as this Court has already indicated, and in any event the U.S. Supreme Court is expected soon to offer definitive guidance on this point. As to plaintiffs’ common law claims, the district court declined to apply hornbook tort principles in concluding that defendants owed no “duty of care” to plaintiffs, who thus could not recover for claims predicated on Defendants’ negligence. It also misapplied the statute of limitation to bar recovery on tort claims by certain plaintiffs. Although *62 acknowledging that an adequately pled claim under the ATA (an intentional tort) would also suffice to establish the predicate for the common law intentional torts, the court failed as noted above to recognize that plaintiffs’ ATA claims were more than amply pled. Its dismissal of those claims, too, was thus erroneous. Finally, a change of law since the filing of notices of appeal requires vacatur of the district court’s decision dismissing three defendants. The district court applied an aspect of this Court’s decision in Terrorist Attacks III that has since been overruled by a subsequent decision as a result of this Circuit’s “mini-en band” process. Because those dismissals were based on the overruled portion of the opinion, and because the Court must apply current law to a pending appeal, the orders dismissing those defendants should be vacated so that the district court can apply current law to defendants’ motions. Standard of Review The Second Circuit “review[s] de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Amaker v. N.Y. State Dep’t of *63 Corr. Servs., 435 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)). Argument I. The District Court Improperly Dismissed the Anti-Terrorism Act Claims The Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333 et seq., provides a cause of action for treble damages for those injured in their person, property, or business by acts of international terrorism, and it was designed especially for claims against material supporters of terrorist organizations. Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly provided just such material support to al-Qaeda, rendering them liable for injuries that plaintiffs suffered as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The district court erroneously dismissed plaintiffs’ ATA claims against Al Rajhi Bank,104 Saudi American Bank,105 Dar Al-Maal-Al-Islami Trust (“DMI *64 Trust”),106 Saleh Abdullah Kamel,107 and Dallah al Baraka Group L.L.C. (“Dallah al Baraka”).108 It did so primarily on the ground that plaintiffs did not adequately allege that Defendants knew that the recipients of their support advanced al-Qaeda’s activities -- despite plaintiffs’ detailed pleading of Defendants’ extensive dealings with al-Qaeda and its network of supporting entities. As shown below, the district court’s rulings are based on fundamental legal errors regarding the standard of review and appropriate treatment of plaintiffs’ allegations, misconstrue the ATA, and ignore plaintiffs’ detailed pleadings that squarely place defendants at the heart of the network of persons and organizations that supported al-Qaeda. A. The ATA Is Construed Broadly and Readily Encompasses Defendants’ Alleged Conduct