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Invisible Forces and Powerful Beliefs:
Gravity, Gods, and Minds
By the
Chicago Social Brain Network
FT Press
Upper Saddle River, NJ
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Invisible Forces and Unseen Powers:
Gravity, Gods, and Minds
Preface
1. Invisible Forces Operating on Human
Bodies
Gravity is an invisible force that holds us
to the surface of the earth, and the fact
that gravity is invisible does not place it
beyond scientific scrutiny. Similarly,
humans are a quintessentially social
species whose need for social connection
produces invisible forces on our brain,
behavior, and biology that are subject to
scientific investigation. Among these are
forces that compel us to seek trusting and
meaningful connections with others and
to seek meaning and connection with
something bigger than ourselves. The
story of these invisible forces speaks to
who we are as a species.
From Selfish Genes to Social Brains
2. The Social Nature of Humankind
The human brain has evolved under the
guidance of selfish genes to produce
more than a brain that is capable of
powerful, isolated information
processing operations. The human brain
also evolved with inherent capacities for
social cognition, compassion, empathy,
bonding, coordination, cooperation,
values, mortality and a need for social
connection that extends beyond kin and
even other individuals.
From Inclusive Fitness to Spiritual
Striving



3. Science, Religion, and a Revised
Religious Humanism
The dialogue between science and
religion, if properly pursued, can usher in
a new era of religious humanism in the
leading world religions. Their central
beliefs and practices largely would
remain intact, but their views of nature
and their concerns with health and wellbeing
would be refined through their
conversations with the sciences. How
this model would work is discussed in
terms of the relation between love and
health in Christian theology – especially
the tension between the agape, caritas,
and eros models of Christian love.


The Status of the Body Politic and the
Status of the Body Itself


4. Health by Connection: From Social
Brains to Resilient Bodies
Most people feel socially connected most
of the time. Felt connectedness is
typically taken for granted, but the
effects of its absence, as experienced in
feelings of isolation, demonstrate that
our evolutionary heritage as a social
species has potent implications for health
and well-being.


From Relationships to People and
Groups to Relationships with God



5. Psychosomatic Relations: From
Superstition to Mortality
It has long been recognized that mental
states can impact health and well being,
but the causal pathways have only
recently begun to be understood.
Thoughts, beliefs and attitudes can have
powerful effects on physiological
functions, health and disease. Examples
range from superstitious beliefs
associated with voodoo, bone pointing,
or other black rituals to the more positive
states associated with spirituality. The
present essay considers these disparate
psychological states and how they might
translate into physiological effects
having real health implications.


The Mind and Body Are One



6. The Suspension of Individual
Consciousness and the Dissolution of
Self and Other Boundaries
A special case of social interaction
concerns two or more individuals
engaging in temporally coordinated
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actions that imply particular timing
patterns such as synchrony or rhythmic
turn taking such as applauding in unison
or the ‘wave’ that is produced by
thousands of individual sports fans in a
stadium. A model to explain such
synchronized behavior is proposed in
terms of the neural processes that are
jointly recruited. One of the main
implications suggested by this model is
that taking part in or being part of a
synchronized social interaction gives rise
to a qualitative shift in subjective
experience due to the difficulty of
applying an individual centered
explanation to collectively produced
spontaneous co-action.
You and I as One
7. Action at a Distance: The Invisible
Force of Language
Language forms the fabric of our social
institutions and makes tangible the nature
of our relationships. Although the
function of language is typically viewed
in terms of the information content that it
provides, some of the social function of
language may depend on the way it
affects us. The idea of language impact
– how language directly affects our
emotions and social connections – may
be fundamental to the way the social
brain functions to connect people.


Systems and Signals for Social
Coordination


8. Hidden Forces in Understanding
Others: Mirror Neurons and
Neurobiological Underpinnings
Specific brain regions in the monkey
contain individual brain cells, or neurons,
that respond to both observation and
execution of identical hand and mouth
actions. Brain imaging in humans has
demonstrated that our brains have
similarly localized regions with similar
properties. These areas respond to
execution of goal-directed actions of the
hand and mouth and during observation
of the same or similar actions.
Interestingly, these brain regions in the
human are also responsive to observation
and imitation of facial movements, and
appear to be sensitive to their emotional
content.


Connecting and Binding Social Brains
and Minds


9. Empathy and Interpersonal Sensitivity
Empathy is thought to play a key role in
motivating prosocial behavior, guiding
our preferences and behavioral
responses, and providing the affective
and motivational base for moral
development. While folk conceptions of
empathy view it as the capacity to share,
understand and respond with care to the
affective states of others, neuroscience
research demonstrates that these
components can be dissociated. Empathy
is not a unique characteristic of human
consciousness, but it is an important
adaptive behavior that evolved with the
mammalian brain. However, humans are
special in the sense that high-level
cognitive abilities (language, theory of
mind, executive functions) are layered on
top of phylogenetically older social and
emotional capacities. These higher level
cognitive and social capacities expand
the range of behaviors that can be driven
by empathy.


Seeing into My Mind and Other Minds


10. Seeing Invisible Minds
Other minds are inherently invisible.
Being able to "see" them requires
learning about other minds, attending to
other minds, and projecting one's own
mind onto others, and seeing minds in
other agents can mean the difference
between treating others as humans versus
as objects.


Inferring Minds When None Can be
Seen


11. Anthropomorphism: Human
Connection to a Universal Society
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The human motivation for social
connection extends beyond the boundary
of the human in the (often
misunderstood) religious language of
anthropomorphism. In this chapter, an
infamous sermon from colonial
America—“Sinners in the Hands of an
Angry God”—is used to illustrate the
way anthropomorphic language works to
incorporate human society in a web of
ethical obligations that connect to the
natural environment and, by imaginative
extension, to the universe as a whole.


Personifications of God


12. How Does God Become Real
Becoming a person of faith is not so
much about acquiring certain beliefs
but about learning to use one’s mind
in particular ways; the often intensely
private experience of God is built
through a profoundly social learning
process.


Belief and Connection


13. Theological Perspectives on God as
an Invisible Force
The beliefs that religious individuals
hold about the way God operates in
human life are potential factors affecting
perceived social isolation. My paper
discusses a specific type of such belief
that is common in the history of
Christian thought: the belief that God is
an invisible force of a rather impersonal
sort working for the good in everything
that happens. The paper argues that this
sort of belief has as great or greater
potential than belief in God as a personal
friend to give one the sense that one is
never alone, but the conception of God
as pervasive can also lead to inattention
and disconnection.


The Elusiveness of Meaningful
Connection


14. Visible Efforts to Change Invisible
Connections
Despite the human need for social
connection, many individuals are lonely
because they are unable to create
meaningful social bonds. Interventions
designed to reduce loneliness have not
been successful, suggesting that a better
understanding of loneliness, social
connection, and the obstacles to forming
meaningful connections with others is
needed.


Reflections on Invisible Connections


15. Social Brain, Spiritual Medicine?
Science and religion are inextricably
intertwined in the practice of medicine.
Science has provided modern medicine
with extraordinary diagnostic and
therapeutic capacities that can be
employed to care for patients. Religions
provide a fuller vision for the worthiness
of caring for the sick, a framework to
guide the application of medical science
in that endeavor, and practices that
strengthen the human capacity for
treating patients as the mindful persons
they are.
Invisible Forces

16. Epilogue
Invisible forces that connect individuals
to society, or to each other, have effects
at both ends of the connection. As
humans we are fundamentally individual
and fundamentally social. We
encompass both the pursuit of rational
self interest of Homo economicus and the
pursuit of approval, belonging, and
intimacy of Homo socialis, the former
grounded in eros, the latter in agape.
These forces acting together represent a
signature feature of Homo sapiens (the
wise ones) and have contributed a record
of influence and impact– both positive
and negative –that is unmatched in
biology.
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Preface
We view our past through a
reverse telescope, making it seem like
contemporary events are a much larger
part of our history than they are.
Hominids have been estimated to have
evolved about 7 million years ago, with
our species having evolved only within
approximately the last 1% of that period.
The human brain was sculpted by
evolutionary forces over tens of
thousands of years, whereas the human
achievements we take for granted, such
as civilizations, law, and art, have
emerged only during the past few
thousands of years. A mere 300 years
ago, theology and philosophy were the
principal disciplinary lenses through
which the world was viewed, and from
which explanations and instruction were
sought. Advances in science over the
past 300 years have transformed how we
think, act, and live. Nearly every aspect
of human existence, ranging from
agriculture, commerce, and
transportation to technology,
communication, and medicine, has been
transformed by contemporary science.
We have no hesitation to accept
scientific explanations of physical
entities being influenced by invisible
forces such as gravity, magnetism, and
genes. But when human mentation and
behavior are the objects to be explained,
deterministic scientific accounts seem to
many to be less satisfying.
For some, science and modernity
are akin to the apple in the Garden of
Eden, responsible for our fall from
Grace. For others, theology and religion
represent little more than the stuff of
superstition with no place in an educated
society.
About six years ago, we had the
opportunity to create a most unusual
group of scholars to examine questions
about the invisible forces acting on,
within, and between human bodies.
Superb scholars who individually had
made major contributions to their own
disciplinary field – fields as divergent as
neuroscience and medicine to
philosophy and theology – were invited
to form an interdisciplinary network of
scholars to consider such questions. The
development of these discussions even
over the first few meetings truly
astonished us all. We decided to share
what we learned through the present
book, which represents a different
perspective, one in which our
understanding of human nature is
enriched by serious insights and scrutiny
that each perspective has to offer.
Theology and religion have always
relied on unseen forces as the basis for
explanations of human behavior and
experience. Science has been able to
explicate those forces even if along
different lines than originally conceived.
As we start to consider some of the more
complex aspects of human nature,
science and theology may be able to
work together to shed light on some of
these complexities.
We begin this preface and each
chapter with a word cloud produced
using Wordle at http://www.wordle.net.
In the case of this preface, it illustrates
key concepts that are found in this book.
In the case of the chapters, the word
cloud in each provides a visualization of
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the key terms and ideas expressed in that
chapter. Each chapter, in turn,
represents a contribution led by a
particular member to the network but
broadened to reflect the interactions of
the network on that topic. Perusal of the
word clouds across chapters makes the
flow of ideas more visible. Together,
the chapters speak to who we are as a
species and the nature of the invisible
forces that make us such a unique
species. For instance, humans seem to
strive for social connections in a variety
of ways from friendships to
identification with groups to religious
affiliations. A major thesis of this book
is that we are fundamentally a social
species, and that this journey is less a
march toward isolation and autonomy
than it is a march to competence,
interdependence, coordination,
cooperation, and social resilience.
Guiding us through this journey are our
social brains, which have evolved to
create anything but a blank slate at birth.
We owe a debt of thanks to many
for their contributions and support over
the years, but we owe special thanks to
Barnaby Marsh for approaching us with
the idea of forming such a network and
for his many contributions to the
network, and to the John Templeton
Foundation for their support and for their
encouragement to pursue questions,
ideas, and conclusions of our science
regardless of where they led.
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Chapter 1 1
Invisible Forces Operating on Human
Bodies
We may believe we know why
we think, feel, and act as we do, but
various forces influence us in ways that
are largely invisible to our senses.
Gravity is an invisible force that holds us
to the surface of the earth, and
magnetism is an invisible force that we
use in everyday life. The fact that
gravity and magnetism are invisible to us
does not place them beyond scientific
scrutiny. Similarly, there are a host of
forces that, over the course of human
evolution, have emerged to influence our
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.
Because many of these forces are
1 The Chicago Social Brain Network is a group
of more than a dozen scholars from the
neurosciences, behavioral sciences, social
sciences, and humanities who share an interest in
who we are as a species and the role of
biological and social factors in the shaping of
individuals, institutions, and societies across
human history.
The scientists and scholars in the
Network differ in background, epistemologies,
beliefs, and methods. After five years of
working together, we found a common set of
themes to have emerged in our work despite the
differences among us. These themes, which
provide a different perspective on how we might
think about human history, experience, and
spirituality, are examined here and explored in
more detail in subsequent chapters.
elemental, we will be dealing with an
area of human behavior that has also
been addressed for centuries by various
religions. Among these are forces that
compel us to seek trusting and
meaningful connections with others and
to seek meaning and connection with
something larger than ourselves. The
story of these invisible forces speaks to
who we are and what our potential might
be as a species. In short, it is the story
of the human mind.
The mind can be thought of as
the structure and processes responsible
for cognition, emotion, and behavior. It
is now widely recognized that many
structures and processes of the mind
operate outside of awareness, with only
the end products reaching awareness,
and then only sometimes. But clearly we
know a great deal about the mind from
what we experience through our senses.
It is just commonsense that we know the
shape or color of an object from simply
seeing it.
Or do we? It is obvious that the
tops of the tables depicted in the top
panel of Figure 1 differ in size and
shape. You may be surprised to learn
that your mind is fooling you, that the
tops of the table are precisely the same
size and shape. If you don’t believe it,
trace and cut a piece of paper the size of
one table
top and
then place
it over the
other.
Selfevident
truths can sometimes be absolutely false.

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The science of the mind is not
unique in this regard. As the historian
Daniel Boorstin (1983, 1) noted:
Nothing could be more obvious
than that the earth is stable and
unmoving, and that we are the
center of the universe. Modern
Western science takes its
beginning from the denial of this
commonsense axiom . . .
Common sense, the foundation
of everyday life, could no longer
serve for the governance of the
world. When “scientific”
knowledge, the sophisticated
product of complicated
instruments and subtle
calculations, provided
unimpeachable truths, things
were no longer as they seemed.”
(p. 294)
And just as the observation that we roam
on stable ground led to the incorrect
inference that we are the center of the
universe, so too is the modern notion
that the human brain is a solitary,
autonomous instrument whose
connections with other brains is a matter
of deliberate choice and of no real
import.
The human brain, the organ of
the mind, is housed deep within the
cranial vault, where it is protected and
isolated from others, so it may seem
obvious that the brain is a solitary
information processing device that has
no special means of connecting with
other brains. But we are fundamentally
a social species. Faces, expressive
displays, and human speech receive
preferential processing in neonate as
well as adult brains. When a person
feels rejected by others, their brain
shows the same pattern of activation as
when they are exposed to a physically
painful stimulus. Permit a person to
cooperate with others, and their brain
shows the same pattern of activation as
when they are given a rich reward such
as delicious food or drink. We may not
be aware of it, but human evolution has
sculpted a human need for social
connection, along with neural circuits
and hormonal processes that enable and
promote communication and connection
across brains. As we shall see in the
chapters to follow, our sociality is an
important part of who we are as a
species and it plays an important though
often invisible role in the operations of
our brain and our biology. Among the
questions we examine is whether our
social brain also contributes to the
ubiquitous human quest for spirituality.
The Chicago Social Brain Network
For hundreds of years, theology
and philosophy were the hub disciplines
of scholarship, and other fields of
inquiry orbited around this dyad and
were tightly constrained by it. Over the
past three centuries, the sciences have
come into their own, displacing theology
and philosophy at the center of the
academic universe. In so doing, they
have produced extraordinary advances in
everyday life. People may reminisce
about the good old days, but thanks to
science and technology the amount of
total income spent on the necessities of
food, clothing, and shelter dropped from
80% in 1901 to 50% in 2002/2003. Yet
there remains an inchoate sense that
something is missing in our lives,
something intangible and elusive.
Science has improved our material lives,
but improvements in material life may
not be enough to optimize human well
being.
Can these two very different
ways of seeing the world be used
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synergistically to shed new light on the
human mind? In the Fall of 2004, we
established an ongoing network of more
than a dozen scholars unbounded by
disciplinary precincts, geographical
borders, or methodological perspectives
to set aside antagonisms that had grown
up between science and humanities in
order to explore this question. These
Network scholars hail from disciplines
as disparate as psychology, neurology,
theology, statistics, philosophy, internal
medicine, anthropology, and sociology.
Each of these scholars was well known
in their own field and were busy with
other obligations, but it was the
opportunity to achieve a deeper, more
comprehensive discussion of the human
mind that made it worth the time and
effort it required to be part of the
Network.
Although various members of the
Network interact on a daily or weekly
basis, the entire Network convenes twice
annually for a four-day retreat to discuss
each other’s research, to critique each
other and to learn from one other.
Scientific analyses characterized by
rigorous experimental designs and data
analytic strategies are interlaced with
rich philosophical, theological, and
historical analyses of the same questions
about invisible forces that act on us all.
The dialogue between the Network
scientists and the scholars from the
humanities and theology is bidirectional.
For instance, the beliefs and behavior
described in the humanities and theology
are rich in hypotheses that can now be
tested empirically, and the measures and
methods of the behavioral sciences and
neurosciences now permit rigorous
investigation of some of these
hypotheses. Each of the Network
members brings a unique perspective to
the study of the human mind, and the
provocative story of the mind that is
emerging from the collective efforts of
the Network is the subject of this book.
The Network is unconventional
in other ways, as well. Traditionally,
scientists and scholars work together to
achieve a common understanding and a
consensus position. We quickly learned
that we did not need to come to a
consensus to benefit tremendously from
the dialogue on the capacity and
motivation for the ubiquitous human
quest for sociality and spirituality. For
instance, there is no consensus within
the Network on whether there is a God,
and we do not seek here to provide the
final word on what science and the
humanities each have to say to the other
about the human mind. Instead, our
purpose is to illustrate the possibility and
importance of engaging others whose
views we may not share in a serious
dialogue on such topics. Among the
lessons we as a Network have learned
are:
1. that some questions about human
nature and our social and
spiritual aspirations have been
asked by humankind for
thousands of years. Accordingly,
there may be more to be gained
from engaging in a collaborative
process of thinking about these
questions than from demanding
simple and immediate answers.
We discuss what we see as
possible answers to questions
about our nature and strivings,
but the value in stating these
positions is to have clear
positions from which to move
thinking and research forward.
Thus, our purpose in writing this
book is to articulate ideas to be
shaped and refined, not to
provide the final word.
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2. that one need not agree with a
position to perform a deep and
thorough analysis of the
arguments for and against the
position. Objectivity in thought
and analysis are keys to reaching
a deep understanding of a topic.
By taking a position, developing
arguments for and against the
position, then taking the opposite
position and doing likewise, we
develop the capacity to be more
dispassionate and powerful
thinkers – and gain deeper
insight into a topic.
3. that one need not reach
agreement with someone to learn
a great deal from discussions
with them or to make significant
advances in addressing a
complex question. The salve of
affirmation can lead us to seek
like-minded others and to
denigrate and avoid those who
disagree with us. Although this
may provide temporary comfort,
it does little to help address deep
divisions or solve problems with
which we must deal in an
increasingly complex and diverse
world. There are inherent
tensions between the sciences
and the humanities, and these
tensions have led to a
polarization of views, an “it’s my
way or the highway” approach
toward those holding divergent
points of view. The contents of
this book illustrate an alternative
possibility. The Network is a
very interdisciplinary group, and
the perspectives captured in the
subsequent chapters reflect some
of the same tensions with which
other books dealing with science
and religion have dealt – and
from which they have not
benefitted. The tensions reflect
deep and enduring differences in
the way in which scholars in the
humanities, the social sciences,
and the sciences think about
theory, methods, and evidence.
These differences can test one’s
mettle but if acknowledged,
respected, embraced, and
pursued, they result in a richer,
more innovative and synergistic
collaborative effort. In the case
of our Network, this was neither
easy nor quick, but it was
achieved through a mutual
respect and exchange of ideas
and a shared conviction
regarding the importance of the
Network’s combination of
approaches from the humanities
and the sciences. In a sense, our
Network is a microcosm of the
structure that exists in our
society. If these tensions are
embraced and used to their full
catapultic effect, one can make
progress on serious problems,
transforming not only how we
think about the problem, but also
how we think about those who
hold different or opposing views.
4. that the insights or advances we
can achieve need not be our or
our opponent’s position, or a
less-than optimal compromise
between the two, but rather they
can be truly innovative, building
on and transcending both initial
positions. The specific forms of
such creative and transcendent
solutions are difficult to
articulate in advance but there is
a thought process – characterized
by clarity, openness, constructive
criticism, and synthesis – that
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Background
increases the likelihood one will
reach such solutions. All of the
perspectives discussed in this
book have been transformed
through this process.
In pursuing the tandem lines of
inquiry of science and the humanities,
the Network itself serves as an example
of the human capacities and emergent
processes that can derive from collective
social structures and actions. In the
chapters to follow, the Network
examines the nature and power of
unseen forces ranging from human coregulation
to physiological effects of
spiritual beliefs. The exchanges across
disciplinary perspectives suggest that the
“dominion of the solitary individual” is
insufficient to understand the human
mind or to optimize human health and
well being. To understand human nature
and the human mind, one may need to
appreciate human needs and capabilities
that have not been given due attention.
Homo sapiens are a social
species, which means there are emergent
organizations beyond individuals that
contribute to the ability of our species to
survive, reproduce, and care for our
offspring sufficiently long that they too
survive to reproduce. As a consequence,
evolutionary forces have sculpted neural,
hormonal, and genetic mechanisms that
support these social structures. Among
the possible consequences explored in
this book are that: 1) people are not the
entirely self-interested, short-term
thinking, rational decision makers
assumed by the mythical creature, Homo
economicus, and 2) some of the
amorphous dissatisfaction and chronic
diseases that characterize contemporary
society may be, in part, the consequence
of the denial of the differences between
the nature of these two beings. Existing
scientific studies of religion have
established the pervasiveness of
religious beliefs and practices and an
association between these beliefs or
practices and physical as well as mental
health. Religious beliefs and practices
have also contributed to failures to heed
life-saving medical advice and to the
horrendous treatment of others. It will
be through the serious investigation of
such beliefs and practices, not through
their denial, that we may ultimately be
able to identify which aspects of these
beliefs and practices are beneficial, for
what individuals and in what contexts,
and through what specific mechanisms.
Recent research has made it
patently clear that William James (1890,
p. 442, 2) underestimated the faculties of
human infants when he suggested that
their first sensory experiences were a
“blooming, buzzing confusion.” But
what James’ sentiment did capture is the
overwhelming complexity and
uncertainty that exists in the child’s
environment, and the inherent difficulty
in making sense of that complexity from
scratch. Our drive to make meaning is
irrepressible---and when we do not
understand the forces that drive our
actions, we invent narratives that make
these invisible forces feel more
predictable and understandable even if
only in hindsight. But we do not do it
alone.
Adults as well as children must
explain the uncertainty and ambiguity of
natural phenomena (calamities of
weather, death and reproduction) as well
as social phenomena (human agents) in
order to operate effectively. But not all
actions are perceived as being
equivalent. Forces operating on objects
to compel action, as when gravity causes
rocks to slide down a mountain, are
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viewed as external causes. Forces
operating on human bodies to produce
action, in contrast, are viewed as
reflective of purpose, driven not only by
external causes but, more importantly,
by abstract reasons such as goals,
aspirations, and destiny. The meaningmaking
proclivities of humans are so
irrepressible that when external forces
operate on human bodies to produce a
significant impact on humankind, even
the causes of the actions of these human
bodies tend to be regarded in terms of
more abstract purposes and reasons. The
anthropomorphic description of
hurricanes is a case in point.
Actions of objects have causes,
whereas actions of humans have reasons.
Invisible forces that operate on humans
but that appear to operate independent of
human agency have been the subject of
religious speculations for centuries.
These invisible forces include: internal
neural and biological forces (e.g.,
homeostatic processes, autonomic
activity) that exert regulatory forces
which are largely hidden from conscious
experience or control; strong emotions
that seem to arise apart from conscious
human intention (e.g., rage, fear,
empathy); phenomena such as dreams or
hallucinations that seemingly operate
independent from the human will;
motivations, biases, inclinations,
predilections (such as
anthropomorphism, ambiguity
avoidance, preference for simple
explanations, etc.) whose presence is so
universal that, like language, the
capacities for their development or
expression may have an evolutionary
basis; individual beliefs (such as the
belief that there is a reality outside our
head/we are not dreaming; the belief in
human freedom; in values such as
equality, etc), attitudes, preferences,
goals, or intentions; aggregated beliefs
that result in social norms, values,
religion, culture, and social movements;
and codified forces such as decrees,
rules, alliances, and laws.
Before the enlightenment of the
18th century, many scholars believed
that thought was instantaneous and that
action was governed by an indivisible
mind separate from the body. If a
palpable cause for a person’s behavior
could not be identified, the Divine or
some counterpart constituted a more
agreeable explanatory construct than
invisible forces acting through
scientifically specifiable mechanisms.
Unparalleled advances in the sciences
have occurred since the dawn of the
Enlightenment, including the
development of scientific theories about
magnetism, gravity, quantum mechanics,
and dark matter that depict invisible
forces operating with measurable effects
on physical bodies. During this same
period, serious scientific research on
invisible forces acting within, on and
across human bodies was slowed and
underfunded in part because the study of
the human mind and behavior was
regarded by many in the public and in
politics as soft and of dubious validity.
The result is that many still regard the
mind and behavior as best understood in
terms of the actions of non-scientific
agents, such as a god or gods, and the
manifestations of mental illness as the
result of a failure of individual will – a
denial of the possibility that invisible
forces (that is, forces that are tractable
scientifically but of which a person is
not normally aware) can affect mind and
behavior.
One could try to explain away
the gap in scientific knowledge about
invisible forces by referring to the
conception of science and religion as
Page | 13
systems of knowledge that are in
opposition. This approach is common
and evident in a spate of contemporary
books that take the position that science
and religion represent competing ways
of understanding the world and that
science (or religion) is the one and only
valid way of understanding human
behavior and the world around us (3-8).
For instance, in The God Delusion,
Richard Dawkins places specific Judeo-
Christian theological doctrines under the
scrutiny of science only to find that none
passes scientific muster.
The vast majority of people from
all educational backgrounds continue to
harbor strong religious beliefs that affect
their daily decisions and behavior, with
both good and ill effects. These
religious belief systems most commonly
bump into scientific claims around
invisible forces. When science opens up
opportunities to improve the human
condition by providing a more complete
understanding of the causes of events,
their measurable effects, and possible
interventions– ranging from valid
science education to medical
advancements based on stem cell
research – these opportunities are often
threatened by the application of specific
religious beliefs to these endeavors.
Scientific research to understand religion
and religious belief systems may be a
more productive response than broad
denouncements by scientists of any who
hold such beliefs.
Conversely, when religion opens
up opportunities for improving the
human condition by questioning the
emphasis on short-term self-interests at
the expense of the collective, providing a
more complete understanding of the
human need to attribute meaning to
events and their effects, and identifying
possible interventions– ranging from the
provision of tangible support to
individuals in need, to the promotion of
healthy lifestyles and ethical behavior–
scientific research to understand these
influences may again be a more
productive response than broad
denouncements by scientists that such
beliefs are irrational. Indeed, the
question of whether God exists is of
much less scientific interest, and of
much more questionable scientific merit
(how would one scientifically falsify
such a claim?), than the question of the
causes, consequences, and underlying
mechanisms for the observable human
behaviors affected by invisible forces---
whether they be physical (gravity),
social (groups), or perceived spiritual
(gods).
Contemporary science explains
many of these phenomena but also
points to the human capacities and
emergent processes that derive from
collective social structures and actions
and, underlying the emergence of these
structures, the human need for meaningmaking
and connecting to something
beyond oneself. The dominant metaphor
for the scientific study of the human
mind during the latter half of the 20 th
century has been the computer – a
solitary device with massive information
processing capacities. Computers today
are massively interconnected devices
with capacities that extend far beyond
the resident hardware and software of a
solitary computer. The extended
capacities made possible by the internet
can be said to be emergent because they
represent a whole that is greater than the
simple sum of the actions that are
possible by the sum of the individual
(disconnected) computers that constitute
the internet. The telereceptors (e.g.,
eyes, ears) of the human brain have
provided wireless broadband
Page | 14
interconnectivity to humans for
millennia. Just as computers have
capacities and processes that are
transduced through but extend far
beyond the hardware of a single
computer, the human brain has evolved
to promote social and cultural capacities
and processes that are transduced
through but that extend far beyond a
solitary brain. To understand the full
capacity of humans, one needs to
appreciate not only the memory and
computational power of the brain but its
capacity for representing, understanding,
and connecting with other individuals.
That is, one needs to recognize that we
have evolved a powerful, meaning
making social brain.
Social species, by definition,
create structures beyond the individual–
structures ranging from dyads and
families to institutions and cultures.
These emergent structures have evolved
hand in hand with neural and hormonal
mechanisms to support them because the
consequent social behaviors (e.g.,
cooperation, empathy, altruism, etc.)
helped these organisms survive,
reproduce, and care for offspring
sufficiently long that they too
reproduced. From an evolutionary
perspective then, the social context is
fundamental in the evolution and
development of the human brain.
The observable consequences of
these higher organizations have long
been apparent, but we are only now
beginning to understand their genetic,
neural, and biochemical basis and
consequences. To fully delve into these
complex behaviors, science needs to deal
with the invisible forces that shape
human life, whether it is in the form of
physical, biological, or psychological
forces. For instance, anthropomorphism,
the irrepressible proclivity to attribute
human characteristics onto nonhuman
objects to achieve meaning,
predictability, and human connection, is
beginning to be subjected to productive
multi-level scientific analysis.
Experimental studies have shown that
manipulations which increase feelings of
social isolation without the possibility of
resolving these feelings through human
interaction have the compensatory effect
of increasing people’s tendency to
anthropomorphize, including heightened
beliefs in God. This scientific work has
implications for understanding claims
regarding the success of religious
practices such as solitude as paths to
feeling closer God. Research on
anthropomorphism has now identified
developmental, situational, dispositional,
and cultural factors that modulate
people’s tendency to anthropomorphize
nonhuman agents ranging from
technological gadgets to animals to gods,
and the neural mechanisms underlying
this transconfiguration of nonhuman
objects into human-like agents are
beginning to be revealed.
Guided by the insights from
these new scientific theories of
anthropomorphism, historical analyses
may be worthwhile to determine whether
concepts of god have changed across
time and cultures such that god was
created in the image of the believer
rather than vice versa. Xenophanes (6th
century B.C., cited in 9), for instance,
was apparently the first to use the term
“anthropomorphism” when describing
the similarities between religious agents
and their believers, noting that Greek
gods were invariably fair skinned and
blue-eyed whereas African gods were
invariably dark skinned and dark-eyed
(joking that cows would surely worship
gods that looked strikingly cow-like).
Brain imaging research has confirmed
Page | 15
that anthropomorphism is associated
with the activation of the same prefrontal
areas that are active when people think
about themselves or project themselves
onto others.
Conclusion
Just as critically, the study of
invisible forces requires a discussion of
the method that successful teams use to
work together as they cross disciplinary
boundaries. Over the past few decades,
there has been a demonstrable shift from
the individual genius as the source of
scientific and scholarly breakthroughs to
interdisciplinary teams. This shift in the
production of cutting-edge knowledge
has been documented in all fields of
scholarly activity, ranging from
mathematics and theoretical physics to
the humanities. This shift has both made
possible and been necessitated by a need
to understand complex behaviors.
Although this project is primarily about
the ways that scientists seek to study the
impact of invisible forces, it will also
reflect the methodologies that these
researchers use so that their work is not
constrained by common knowledge.
The philosophy of science also
looks different when dealing with simple
causality (one-to-one relations) than with
complex causality. Affirmation of the
consequent, a logical error in which a
given cause for an effect is inferred
based on the observation of the effect,
does not lead to a scientific error when
there is but a single cause for the
observed effect. However, as scientific
inquiry addresses increasingly complex
phenomena, and increasingly complexly
determined phenomena, the philosophy
of science needs to become more
nuanced.
A core challenge is to develop a
“science” of identification and
aggregation of these invisible forces at
different levels. Related research
questions include why they exist, and
measures of robustness. One of our
central goals is to demonstrate not only
that considerations of these forces
matter, but that that they can matter a
lot.
There also are questions of value
and ethics that could be implicated:
descriptive knowledge, models,
awareness of causal relationships, and so
on, might not be enough to answer some
kinds of questions, especially those
related to value and purpose, which are
the very energies that animate and
invigorate real human systems.
Economics comes close with its proxy
measure of value based on the
distribution of scarce resources and
people’s varying need for these
resources. But this theory comes up
short in many instances where other
values are at play that are beyond
markets, such as in assessing the value
of a human life, or whether all lives are
of equal value. It is an especially poor
model for helping us understand
something as simple as the value of
articles of sentimental value, such as
family photographs, which may have
little or no market value at all. Thus,
how do we best understand the
“sentiments” that are important in the
real world?
The members of the Network
have worked beyond the boundaries of
disciplinary borders, geographical
precincts, and epistemological comfort
zones to develop a rigorous but
innovative approach to the study of the
human mind, sociality, spirituality,
health, and well being. The Network
members represented in this book are
Gary Berntson from Ohio State
University, Don Browning from the
Page | 16
University of Chicago, John Cacioppo
(Network Director) from the University
of Chicago, Farr Curlin from the
University of Chicago Medical Center,
Jean Decety from the University of
Chicago, Nick Epley from the University
of Chicago Booth School, Clark Gilpin
from the University of Chicago, Louise
Hawkley from the University of
Chicago, Tanya Luhrmann from
Stanford University, Chris Masi from the
University of Chicago Medical Center,
Howard Nusbaum from the University
of Chicago, Gün Semin from the
University of Utrecht, Steve Small from
the University of Chicago Medical
Center, Kathryn Tanner from the
University of Chicago, and Ron Thisted
from the University of Chicago Medical
Center. The biography of each along
with an explanation for the essay each
presents is provided at the beginning of
each of their essays on invisible forces.
References
1. D. J. Boorstin, The Discoverers.
(Random House., New York,
1983).
2. W. James, The principles of
psychology. (Holt, New York,
1890).
3. R. Dawkins, The God delusion.
(Bantam, London, 2006).
4. D. C. Dennett, Breaking the
spell: Religion as a natural
phenomenon. (Penguin, New
York, 2006).
5. S. Harris, The end of faith:
Religion, terror, and the future of
reason. (W. W. Norton, New
York, 2004).
6. S. Harris, Letter to a Christian
nation. (Vintage Books, New
York, 2006).
7. C. Hitchens, God is not great:
How religion poisons everything.
(Hachette Book Group, New
York, 2007).
8. D. Mills, Atheist universe: The
thinking person’s answer to
Christian fundamentalism.
(Ulysses Press, Berkeley, CA,
2004).
9. J. H. Lesher, Xenophanes:
Fragments. (University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1992).
Page | 17
From Selfish Genes to Social Brains
The Chicago Social Brain
Network was established to examine
how science might inform us about our
fundamental human nature, including the
apparently irrepressible quest for
connection with a higher understanding
and organization. Science can describe
what religion does in rigorous ways that
benefit religion, and religion can serve a
meaning-making function that science
itself disclaims. This is not to say that
science can address the existence of
God. Our Network instead focuses on
the consequences of believing in such a
mind and of seeing into that mind.
In the next chapter, John
Cacioppo, a social neuroscientist, draws
on work on evolutionary theory,
sociobiology, and evolutionary
psychology to examine the implications
of the selfish gene hypothesis for Homo
sapiens. He shows how the notion of the
selfish gene has been joined with
political theory, consumerism, and
economics to produce a dominant
modern image of humans summarized
by the phrase “what is best for me is best
for the society.” Without rejecting the
selfish gene view, Cacioppo shows how
it evolves in humans into what he calls
the “social brain”– a large cerebral
cortex and an interconnected limbic
lobule that together are sensitive to the
complexities of physical and social
environments. Central to this
complexity is the long period of
dependency of the human infant and the
interdependencies of adult humans for
survival especially in hostile
environments (e.g., warfare). For the
selfish gene to contribute its DNA to the
ongoing gene pool, the individual must
not only reproduce but also cooperate
with others to assure that his or her
offspring also grow to maturity and
reproduce. This leads to natural
selection choosing those genes and
capacities that contribute to cooperation,
reciprocity, attachments, and generosity.
Over the millennia of human evolution,
this process has created the social brain
and made humans a unique social
animal.
Page | 18
Chapter 2 2
2 The lead author is John T. Cacioppo, Ph.D., the
Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished
Service Professor in the Departments of
Psychology and Psychiatry and the Director of
the Center for Cognitive and Social
Neuroscience at the University of Chicago. He
is a co-founder (with Gary Berntson) of the field
of social neuroscience, a past president of the
Association for Psychological Science and a
recipient of numerous awards including the
National Academy of Sciences Troland Research
Award and the American Psychological
Association Distinguished Scientific
Contribution Award. Cacioppo’s research
concerns the neural, hormonal, genetic, and
behavioral mechanisms underlying the operation
and maintenance of the emergent structures that
characterize social species generally and humans
in particular. He has published more than 400
scientific articles and 16 books, including
Loneliness: Human nature and the need for
social connection (2008, Norton Books) and
Handbook of neuroscience for the behavioral
sciences (2009, John Wiley & Sons). Cacioppo
is also the Director of the Chicago Social Brain
Network.
Cacioppo has been interested both in
the similarities and the differences between
humans and other species. Human social
cognition, emotion, behavior, and executive
functioning – that is, our social brain – are
especially sophisticated compared to those found
in other species. Research in the neurosciences
sometimes focuses so much on mechanisms
divorced from the social settings and functions
they may have evolved to serve in social species
such as our own that the generalizations to
humans are inaccurate. Animal models permit
experimental control and interventions that
cannot be carried out in humans, but
understanding the implications of this work for
the human brain and biology depends on explicit
The Social Nature of Humankind
Social species, by definition, are
characterized by the formation of structures
(e.g., dyads, families, tribes, cultures) that
extend beyond an individual. Although we
may revere the rugged individualist, we are
fundamentally a social species. I begin by
discussing some of the invisible evolutionary
forces that led members of our species to band
together to form such structures. I then
consider how selfish genes (e.g., through
anthropomorphism, 1) might have led to social
brains and why the social connections and
structures created by humans are especially
powerful and flexible. Finally, I describe a
nonintuitive way of thinking about the
absence of satisfactory social connections
(i.e., loneliness), mention how and why
chronic loneliness can be so harmful, and
discuss how our need for social connection
motivates us to search for meaning and
connections beyond ourselves and other
individuals. One implication that is explored
here, and in more detail in the essays to
follow, is that genetic and cultural adaptations,
not human ignorance, may be fueling the
search for meaning and connection with a
transcendent entity or being.
Mythic Individualism
For at least the past century, we
have celebrated the power and
intellectual might of the solitary genius.
This includes individuals such as
Thomas Edison who brought electrical
power to individual households,
transforming night into day; Henry Ford
who introduced the mass production of
comparison to and knowledge of the rich
benefits of human social interaction and feelings
of connection. This essay addresses this gap in
our thinking about the genetic, neural, and
hormonal processes that constitute our brain and
body and in doing so provides a different
perspective on who we are as a unique biological
species.
Page | 19
automobiles, changing how we
transported and consequently how and
where we worked and lived; Charles
Darwin who argued that the difference in
mind between humans and other species,
great as it is, is one of degree and not of
kind; and Albert Einstein who surmised
a relationship between energy and
matter, opening a universe of
possibilities that previously was virtually
unimaginable. As a result, the cultural
focus moved from a focus on the social
group – the family, neighborhood, or
society – toward the autonomous
individual.
Forty years ago, the dominant
metaphor for the human mind was the
digital computer, complete with inputs,
filing and memory systems, limited
processing resources, and outputs.
Evolutionary theory focused on the
selfish gene and, by extension, on the
individual whose purpose for living was
to survive long enough to reproduce.
Milton Friedman influenced economic
theory and government policies for
decades by positing that people, being
fundamentally rational, are motivated
first and foremost by self interests, and
the adage of “united we stand, divided
we fall” was supplanted by the notion
that what is best for the me is best for the
society. Moving from an economy
based on manufacturing for the masses
to one based on catering to idiosyncratic
consumer interests further fueled a focus
on the preferences of the autonomous
individual.
One can certainly find evidence
in humans and other species for the view
of life being best understood in terms of
self-interest. Sardines, for example,
swim in what appears to be synchronized
schools until approached by a predator,
at which time they dart about so
chaotically that they create what appears
to be a large, tumultuous ball with a
mind of its own. The rule governing the
behavior of this dynamic and adaptive
collective action can be explained
entirely in terms of self-interests. Each
fish is driven to swim to the middle,
where it is less likely to be eaten by the
hungry predator. Sardines are born with
the capacity to swim, find food, and
avoid predators. If they survive long
enough to reproduce, their genes will be
part of the gene pool for future
generations. That is, if those who are
genetically predisposed to swim to the
middle are more likely to survive
predation, then the genetic
predisposition to swim to the middle will
become a characteristic of a larger
percentage of sardines in future
generations.
The sardine ball is an example of
a more general phenomenon, in which
the choices made by members of a group
endow the collective with properties that
are consistent, predictable, and
purposive enough that we can speak of
them as “behaviors” of the group, even
though the collective actions of the
group are not directed by any of the
individual members. This phenomenon
can be called “emergent,” because the
properties or behavior of the group are
not determined by any individual but
arises from the collective behaviors of
the individuals who constitute the group.
Social structures like the sardine ball
have evolved because the sardines
whose genes compelled them to swim to
the middle in the presence of predators
were more likely to survive to
reproduce, thereby contributing these
genes to this species’ gene pool.
According to the National
Science Foundation’s Tree of Life
project, there are anywhere between 5
million and 100 million species on
Page | 20
Earth, only 2 million of which have been
identified thus far. Most of the species
identified are either born with the
capacity to find sustenance and avoid
predation sufficiently well that some
survive long enough to reproduce, or
they are born in such large numbers that
some survive long enough to reproduce.
It is the ability of such organisms to
reproduce that determines what genes
constitute the gene pool for the future
generations of that species. These genes,
in turn, shape the structure and function
of the organisms that constitute a
species. This reasoning led George
Williams (2) to suggest a half century
ago that traits (i.e., behavioral
tendencies) which benefit the group at
the expense of the individual would
evolve only if the process of groupselection
was great enough to overcome
selection within groups. He further
suggested that group selection is nearly
always weak, so that group-related
adaptations do not exist (3). Richard
Dawkins (1) popularized the notion that
traits which evolve are adaptive at the
gene level through his use of the
metaphor of the selfish gene. Genes
serve their own selfish interests in the
sense that whatever the contributions
made by a gene, or set of genes, to an
organism’s structure and function would
be passed on to the next generation if
and only if the gene made its way to the
gene pool. Survival of the fittest now
had a biological basis.
United We Stand, Divided We Fall
Charles Darwin did not know
that genes were the mechanism through
which structures and behaviors evolved,
but an important component of his
original theory was the notion of
survival of the fittest. Darwin was also
puzzled by the observation that many
individual organisms made themselves
less fit so that the group might survive.
Subsequent generations of evolutionary
biologists realized that even though
genes might act as if selfish, the vehicle
responsible for the transport of these
genes to the gene pool occasionally
extended beyond the individual or parent
to kin and even to unrelated members of
groups. More specifically, in some cases
the superorganismal structures formed
by social organisms represent naturally
selected levels of organization above
individual organisms (4).
Consider the example of the
Emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri).
Emperor penguins typically reside near
their food source of squid, shoaling fish,
and small crustaceans but in early winter
they gather into breeding colonies
(rookeries) up to 60 miles inland in April
and May during the Antarctic winter.
They search for their mate from the
previous year, and go through a
courtship ritual before mating. The
female lays only one egg in May or
June, which coincides with the start of
the bitter Antarctica winter. The
Emperor penguins are thought to have
developed this unusual winter breeding
behavior to permit the chick to grow to
independence the following summer,
when food is plentiful. Ensuring the
chick survives that long is a collective
enterprise, with the vehicle responsible
for the chick surviving long enough such
that it too can reproduce not being solely
the mother or the father but also the
huddle.
The birthing of the egg leaves the
mother depleted, so she must return to
the seaside to feed while the father
assumes responsibility for the incubation
of the egg during the winter. An egg
from an Emperor penguin will quickly
freeze if left exposed to harsh winter
conditions of the Antarctica, so the
Page | 21
transition of the egg from beneath the
warmth and safety of the mother to atop
the feet and under a fold of feathered
abdominal skin of the father requires a
bit of coordination on the part of the
two. Even this is not sufficient for the
genes of this pair to find their way into
the gene pool. The conditions of the
Antarctic winters are among the least
hospitable on earth, with winter
temperatures dipping below -60 degrees
Celsius and winds reaching 120 mph.
To protect themselves from the wind and
cold, the male penguins huddle together,
spending much of their time sleeping to
conserve energy. In this harsh
environment, survival of the chicks
depends on the shared warmth and
protection of the huddle, not the
individual. The group as a whole is
more likely to survive if each penguin
and chick shares in the warmth and
protection of the collective structure,
which means selective pressures exist to
promote cooperation to maintain the
integrity of the huddle. More generally,
for species born to a period of utter
dependency, the genes that find their
way into the gene pool are not defined
solely or even mostly by likelihood that
an organism will reproduce but by the
likelihood that the offspring of the parent
will live long enough to reproduce. As
in the case of the Emperor penguins, one
consequence is that selfish genes
evolved through individual-level
selection processes to promote social
preferences and group processes,
including reciprocal social behaviors,
that can extend beyond kin relationships
(e.g., 5). Examples of such selection
processes in humans exist, as well (e.g.,
6, 7).
The environmental challenges
facing Emperor penguins, as daunting as
they are, pale by comparison to the
complexities facing the human species.
Indeed, the social brain hypothesis posits
that the social complexities and demands
of primate species contributed to the
rapid increase in neocortical (i.e., the
outer layer of the brain) connectivity and
intelligence (8). Warfare among
ancestral hunter-gatherers appears to
have contributed to group selection for
human social behaviors, especially
altruistic behaviors (5). As Darwin
(1871) noted:
A tribe including many members
who, from possessing a high
degree of the spirit of patriotism,
fidelity, obedience, courage, and
sympathy, were always ready to
aid one another, and to sacrifice
themselves for the common good
would be victorious over most
other tribes; and this would be
natural selection. (p. 166)
Moreover, deducing better ways
to find food, avoid perils, and navigate
territories has adaptive value for large
mammals, but the complexities of these
ecological demands are no match for the
complexities of social living (especially
in hostile between-group social
environments), which include:
recognizing ingroup and outgroup
members; learning by social observation;
recognizing the shifting status of friends
and foes; anticipating and coordinating
efforts between two or more individuals;
using language to communicate, reason,
teach, and deceive others; orchestrating
relationships, ranging from pair bonds
and families to friends, bands, and
coalitions; navigating complex social
hierarchies, social norms and cultural
developments; subjugating self-interests
to the interests of the pair bond or social
group in exchange for the possibility of
long term benefits for oneself or one’s
group; recruiting support to sanction
Page | 22
individuals who violate group norms;
and doing all this across time frames that
stretch from the distant past to multiple
possible futures (9). Consistent with
this hypothesis, measures of sociality in
troops of baboons have been found to be
highly correlated with infant survival,
and cross-species comparisons have
shown that the evolution of large and
metabolically expensive brains is more
closely associated with social than
ecological complexity (9).
Our survival depends on our
connection with others. Born to the
most prolonged period of utter
dependency of any animal, human
infants must instantly engage their
parents in protective behavior, and the
parents must care enough about their
offspring to nurture and protect them. If
infants do not elicit nurturance and
protection from caregivers, or if
caregivers are not motivated to provide
such care over an extended period of
time, then the infants will perish along
with the genetic legacy of the parents
(10). Our developmental dependency
mirrors our evolutionary heritage.
Hunter/gatherers did not have the benefit
of natural weaponry, armor, strength,
flight, stealth, or speed relative to many
other species. Human survival depended
on collective abilities, not on individual
might.
Selfish Genes, Social Brains
It is the gene that is obligatorily
selfish, not the human brain. Genes that
promote behaviors that increase the odds
of the genes surviving are perpetuated.
One implication of this simple insight is
that evolution can be viewed as the
competition between genes using
individuals and social structures as their
temporary vehicles. The genetic
constitution of Homo Sapiens in the long
run derives not solely from the
reproductive success of individuals, but
also from the success of their children to
reproduce. Hunter/gatherers who did not
form social connections and who did not
feel a compulsion to return to share their
food or defense with their offspring may
have been more likely to survive to
procreate again, but given the long
period of dependency of human infants
their offspring may have been less likely
to survive to procreate. The result is
selection that strongly favors the ability
to process information that could
contribute to the formation and
maintenance of social capacities and
connections – that is, a social brain.
These social capacities evolved hand in
hand with genetic, neural, and hormonal
mechanisms to support them because the
resulting social behaviors helped humans
survive, reproduce, and care for
offspring sufficiently long that they too
survived to reproduce (11-13). Relative
to other animals, the striking
development of and increased
connectivity within the human cerebral
cortex, especially the frontal and
temporal regions, are among the key
evolutionary developments in this
regard. The cerebral cortex is a mantle
of between 2.6 to 16 billion neurons with
each neuron receiving 10,000 to 100,000
synapses in their dendritic trees (e.g.,
14). The expansion of the frontal
regions in the human brain contributes to
the human capacities for reasoning,
planning, performing mental
simulations, theory of mind, and
thinking about self and others. The
temporal regions of the brain, in turn, are
involved with aspects of social
perception, memory, and
communication. The means for guiding
behavior through the environment
emerged prior to neocortical expansion.
Page | 23
The evolutionarily older systems also
play a role in human information
processing and behavior, albeit in a more
rigid and stereotyped fashion. The
intricately interconnected neocortical
regions of the frontal lobes are involved
in self control, which permits the
modulation of these older systems and
the overriding of organismal hedonistic
impulses for the benefit of others (15).
Evidence across human history
provides overwhelming support for the
supposition that humans are
fundamentally social creatures (13).
Even in contemporary times in which
autonomy is revered, the average person
has been estimated to spend nearly 80%
of waking hours in the company of
others, most of which is spent in small
talk with known individuals (16). These
estimates have been supported in more
detailed assessment using the dayreconstruction
method to determine how
people spend their time and how they
experienced events in their lives on a
daily basis (17). The results of these
daily assessments indicate people spend
only 3.4 hrs alone, or approximately
20% of their waking hours. The time
spent with friends, relatives, spouse,
children, clients, and coworkers is rated
on average as more inherently rewarding
than the time spent alone (17).
Respondents indicate that their
most enjoyable activities are intimate
relations and socializing – activities that
promote bonding and high quality
relationships, whereas their least
enjoyable activities are commuting and
working. These results are consistent
with survey data. When asked “what is
necessary for happiness?” the majority
of respondents rate “relationships with
family and friends” as most important
(18), although we certainly do not
always act like this is most important. It
is surprisingly easy to overlook the
evident.
Noticing the Unusual, Overlooking the
Obvious
On January 15, 2009, US
Airways Flight 1549 departed from New
York’s LaGuardia Airport for Charlotte,
North Carolina when it struck a flock of
geese during takeoff. Both engines were
disabled, and the heavy aircraft quickly
lost the power it needed to stay aloft, but
Capt. Chesley Sullenberger somehow
managed a controlled descent into the
Hudson River. The media dubbed the
ditching of the plane and the survival of
all 155 passengers and crew the miracle
on the Hudson, and Sullenberger was
duly heralded as a hero. The ability to
control the descent of an 84-ton plane
without engine thrust is not something
with which humans are naturally
endowed. Sullenberger was not a
novice, of course. He is a U.S. Air
Force Academy graduate who flew F-4
fighter planes while in the Air Force, has
40 years of flight experience, and holds a
commercial glider license and glider
instructor rating. As remarkable as was
his achievement relative to what one
might normally expect in this situation,
however, Sullenberger’s efforts were not
sufficient for the miracle on the Hudson
to be achieved.
When Flight 1549 came to a stop
in the frigid Hudson River, the
passengers and crew scrambled to the
wings and inflatable slides of their
slowly sinking aircraft. Local
commercial vessels from the New York
Waterway and Circle Line fleets
responded almost immediately, with the
first of the vessels reaching the plane
within four minutes. The crews of the
various vessels worked together to
rescue the passengers and crew of Flight
Page | 24
1549, and various volunteers and
agencies offered medical assistance.
These rescue efforts were not motivated
by personal or commercial self-interests,
and none of the commercial vessel
captains was lauded as a hero. Their
efforts received less attention because
their actions were precisely what we
expect of one another.
It is the unusual, not the
commonplace, that is noticed. On
March 13, 1964, Kitty Genovese parked
near her home in Kew Gardens, New
York, and proceeded to her residence in
a small apartment complex. Winston
Moseley, a business machine operator
who later confessed that his motive was
simply to kill a woman, overtook
Genovese and stabbed her twice in the
back. Genovese screamed, “Oh my
God, he stabbed me! Help me!”, a call
that was heard by neighbors. When one
neighbor shouted at the attacker, “Leave
that girl alone,” Moseley ran away.
Genovese, who was wounded and
bleeding, moved toward the apartment
building slowly and alone. Moseley
returned approximately 10 minutes later
and searched for Genovese. Finding her
nearly unconscious in a hallway of the
building, he continued his knife attack
on her and sexually assaulted her. The
entire attack unfolded over about half an
hour, and yet no one responded. The
first clear call for help to the police did
not occur until minutes following the
final attack, and Genovese died in an
ambulance en route to the hospital. The
number of people who were aware of
some aspect of the attack was estimated
to be from a dozen to more than three
dozen. One unidentified neighbor who
saw part of the attack was quoted in a
New York Times article as saying “I
didn’t want to get involved.” (19). The
notion that people might not go to the
aid of another, even a stranger, in dire
need led to public outrage. Decades of
research led to the conclusion that the
ambiguity of the situation and the
diffusion of responsibility were
contributing factors.
These two news stories illustrate,
in very different ways, how invisible
forces sculpted by evolution and
cultivated by the environment act on our
species. When commercial boat captains
act against their own financial interests
to rescue others on a sinking aircraft, we
think nothing of it because we believe it
is what any individual in the same
situation would naturally do. When
observers of a brutal attack do nothing to
aid the victim, we are horrified because
we believe it goes against who we are as
a species. Humans are not motivated
solely by self interests but rather we
work together and help one another
when in need. We survive and prosper
in the long term through collective
concerns and actions, not by solely
selfish pursuits (20).
Danger Signals
The stories of the sardine ball
and the penguin huddle suggest that it is
dangerous to be on the social perimeter.
Living on the perimeter threatens the
lives and genetic legacy of humans, as
well. Epidemiological studies have
found that social isolation is not only
associated with lower levels of
happiness and well being but with broad
based morbidity and mortality (21).
Moreover, humans are such meaningmaking
creatures that perceived social
isolation is at least as important a
predictor of adverse outcomes on human
health and well being as is objective
social isolation (22). Writers may spend
long periods by themselves, but the
envisioned readers make this time feel
Page | 25
anything but isolated. High school
graduates who leave family and friends
for the first time to attend college, on the
other hand, typically experience intense
feelings of social isolation even though
they are physically around more people
than before they left home. Caspi and
colleagues (23) found that perceived
social isolation in adolescence and
young adulthood predicted how many
cardiovascular risk factors (e.g., body
mass index, waist circumference, blood
pressure, cholesterol) were elevated in
young adulthood, and that the number of
developmental occasions (i.e.,
childhood, adolescence, young
adulthood) at which participants felt
socially isolated predicted the number of
elevated risk factors in young adulthood.
Perceived social isolation is
known more colloquially as loneliness,
which in early scientific investigations
was depicted as “a chronic distress
without redeeming features” (24, p. 15).
Loneliness may feel like a painfully
miserable, hopeless, and worthless state,
but we have found it has a specific
structure and a valuable adaptive
function.
Research on the ways in which
people describe themselves when asked
the question, “Who are you?”, reveals
three basic dimensions (25): (1) a
personal, or intimate, self, the “you” of
your individual characteristics; (2) a
social or relational self, which is who
you are in relation to the people closest
to you—your spouse, kids, friends, and
neighbors; and (3) a collective self, the
you that is the member of a certain
ethnic group, has a certain national
identity, belongs to certain professional
or other associations, and a member of
the fan club for certain sports teams.
Similar to the relational self, this part of
the self is social but what makes this self
distinct is that these are broader social
identities, linked to larger social groups
rather than individual members of the
groups. When we examined the
dimensions underlying loneliness/social
connectedness, we found the same three
basic dimensions (26): (1) intimate
connection/isolation refers to the
perceived presence/absence of anyone in
your life who affirms you as a valued
person; (2) relational
connection/isolation refers to the
perceived presence/absence of quality
friendships or family connections; and
(3) collective connection/isolation refers
to the perceived presence/absence of a
meaningful connection with a group or
social stimulus (e.g., school, team)
beyond other individuals. When you
perceive you are part of a valued group
(collective connection), for instance, you
may be more inclined to agree with other
group members, even on beliefs that
may seem irrational, than when you are
thinking of yourself as a unique
individual.
Given that human survival and
prosperity depends on inclusion in and
participation with a social group,
especially in evolutionary time when
food was scarce and dangers were
common, there is an adaptive benefit to
having the strong and aversive response
of loneliness when an individual feels
his or her social connections might be
weakening or broken, just as there is a
benefit to having aversive signals for
other conditions critical for survival.
Hunger, thirst, and pain have evolved as
aversive signals to prompt an organism
to change their behavior in a way that
protects the individual and promotes the
likelihood their genes will make their
way into the gene pool. The social pain
of loneliness has evolved similarly – to
serve as a signal that one’s connections
Page | 26
to others are weakening and to motivate
the repair and maintenance of the
connections to others that are needed for
our health and well being as for the
survival of our genes (27). Physical pain
is an aversive signal that evolved to
motivate one to take action that
minimizes damage to one’s body.
Loneliness is an aversive signal that
evolved to motivate one to take action
that minimizes damage to one’s social
body.
People differ dispositionally in
their sensitivity to the pain of social
disconnection (i.e., feelings of
loneliness; 28) just as people differ in
sensitivity to physical pain. Ostracism
or objective isolation in most species is
associated with an early death (29). In
humans, the chronic feeling of social
isolation, even when the person remains
among the protective embrace of others,
is associated with significant mental and
physical disorders (30). Chronic hunger,
thirst, and pain can also have deleterious
effects for, like loneliness, their adaptive
value lies in their effects as acute
signals, not as chronic conditions. The
opposite of feeling hunger, thirst, pain,
or loneliness is feeling normal, and this
is the state in which most people exist
most of the time.
The social connections formed
by humans need not be based on genetic
similarities. The human species has
evolved the capacity for and motivation
to form relationships not only with other
individuals but also with groups (e.g., a
Chicago Cubs or Boston Red Sox fan)
and nonhuman entities (e.g., through
anthropomorphism, 31). Team spirit and
school spirit are familiar notions, and
although team or school spirit refers to
an invisible influence, it is an invisible
influence that is no less open to rigorous
scientific inquiry than are the invisible
influences of gravity or magnetic flux.
In the cases of team and school spirit,
this influence represents a specific form
of social connection between an
individual and an emergent structure.
Perceived social connections are
abstractions that can transcend time and
space. People may feel a connection
with their ancestors or family heritage
even if they are the only remaining
descendant, just as people can perceive
personal connections with pets, cars,
television characters, celebrities, and
unseen spiritual entities with whom they
do not actually interact. A potent
component of spirituality (that does not
depend on a specific religion) is the
feeling of connection and purpose that
come from forming a relationship with a
higher being. A simple byproduct of our
selfish genes and social brains may be
our search for meaning in and
connection with broader organizations or
beings.
Conclusion
In 1939, the astrophysicist Sir Arthur
Eddington published a book entitled The
philosophy of physical science (32). In it he
describes a hypothetical scientist who sought
to determine the size of the various fish in the
sea. The scientist began by weaving a 2-inch
mesh net and setting sail across the seas,
repeatedly sampling catches and carefully
measuring, recording, and analyzing the
results of each catch. After extensive
sampling, the scientist concluded that there
were no fish smaller than two inches in the
sea. The moral of Sir Eddington's analogy is
twofold. First, scientific instruments are
shaped by people’s intuitive theories of the
phenomena to be investigated. Second, once
developed, scientific expectations and
instruments shape data and theory in ways
more powerfully and fundamentally than are
often appreciated.
Page | 27
What is the relevance of this to the
story of the social nature of humankind? Our
research findings have led me to believe that
we all have made Eddington’s error in the way
we have thought about, studied, and tried to
deal with an invisible force that motivates us
to seek and maintain our connection with
others – including the loneliness one feels
when we feel important social connections are
threatened or absent. Historically, the
scientific perspective on loneliness was not
only that it was a painful and miserable state,
but that it was an aversive state with no
redeeming features. All one needs to do is to
reflect on the last time one felt terribly lonely,
and one can appreciate the seemingly selfevident
truth of this characterization. But as
Sir Arthur Eddington’s story shows us, the
obvious and intuitive can sometimes be very
misleading. It is now widely recognized that
many structures and processes of the mind
operate outside of awareness, with only the
end products sometimes reaching awareness.
Humans have evolved to seek
connections with and validation from
other minds, and these social
connections represent an important set of
invisible forces operating on our brain
and biology. The need for social
connection extends beyond kin relations
and beyond face to face relations to
include felt connections with
superorganismal entities such as teams,
political parties, nations, and God. The
unseen forces compelling these
connections can be quantified and
investigated objectively independent of
one’s spiritual beliefs. Underlying these
aspirations are selfish genes that have
produced a social brain which activates
reward regions of the brain when we
cooperate effectively with others (33) or
punish the perpetrators of social
exploitations (34), and which activates
the pain matrix in the brain when we feel
rejected by others (35). When people
feel socially isolated (i.e., lonely)
compared to when they do not feel
lonely, they are more likely not only to
perceive nonhuman objects as humanlike
but to believe in the existence of
God (31, 36). To understand the full
capacity of and forces operating on
humans, we need to appreciate not only
the memory and computational power of
the brain but its capacity for
representing, understanding, and
connecting with other individuals and
with the emergent structures, fictional
and real, that the brain can represent.
That is, we need to recognize that we
have evolved a powerful, meaningmaking
social brain and a need for social
connection.
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Page | 30
From Inclusive Fitness to Spiritual
Striving
The notion of “selfish genes”
(and, by extension, selfish organisms)
was popularized in Richard Dawkins’
1976 book by that title. Not long
afterwards, an article appeared in
Science that presented evidence that the
most vicious members of a warlike tribe
in South America had the most wives
and children. The underlying notion was
one of (genetic) survival of the fittest:
Those warriors who were particularly
vicious were more likely to contribute
their genes to the gene pool.
Methodological objections have left this
an open question, however, and new
evidence now exists that calls this
interpretation into question (1): the most
aggressive warriors may have more
children but they have lower indices of
reproductive success than their milder
brethren in part perhaps because the
most aggressive warriors and their
offspring are also more likely to be the
targets of revenge killings. These new
data are entirely consistent with John
Cacioppo’s argument that the content of
the human gene pool has more to do
with the reproductive success of one’s
offspring than one’s own reproductive
success. Cacioppo argued further that
this genetic selection resulted in a social
brain that seeks meaning and connection
with individuals and with social entities
(e.g., groups) that extend beyond other
individuals.
In the next chapter, theologian
Don Browning also embraces the
concept of inclusive fitness and, through
the writings of Thomas Aquinas, shows
how religion serves the human need for
meaning and connection through the
ethics they advocate, the congregations
they form, the institutions they represent,
and the God they serve. In his view,
religion serves to extend love and
connection beyond kin. He further
argues that new developments in the
sciences and long-standing traditions in
theology constitute fertile ground on
which to build new and testable
hypotheses regarding our fundamental
human nature.
1. S. Beckerman et al., Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 8134
(May 19, 2009).
Page | 31
Chapter 3 3
Science, Religion, and a Revived
Religious Humanism
For over 150 years there has been
a vital, and often contentious, dialogue
between science and religion. In recent
3
The lead author is Don Browning, Ph.D., the
Alexander Campbell Professor of Religious
Ethics and the Social Sciences, Emeritus,
Divinity School, University of Chicago. He has
interests in the relation of the social sciences to
religious ethics for the purpose of addressing
various challenges facing modern life. His books
include Generative Man (1973, 1975; National
Book Award Finalist, 1974), Religious Thought
and the Modern Psychologies (1987, 2004), the
co-authored From Culture Wars to Common
Ground: Religion and the American Family
Debate (1997, 2000), Christian Ethics and the
Moral Psychologies (2006), and Equality and the
Family (2007). He co-edited Sex, Marriage, and
Family in the World Religions (2006), American
Religions and the Family (2006), Children and
Childhood in American Religions (2009), and
Children and Childhood in World Religions
(2009). He is the co-principal investigator with
Jean Bethke Elshtain of a Templeton Foundation
funded $4,000,000 New Science of Virtue
project.
In this essay, Browning acknowledges
the antagonistic relationship that can be found
between science and religion, but he proposes
that the dialogue between science and religion
can now be conducted on philosophical grounds
that promote a new religious humanism that will
honor the core ideas of the great religions, refine
their view of nature, and increase the values of
health, wealth, education, and general wellbeing.
years, new energy and fresh public
interest have been injected into this
conversation. This largely has come
about due to the new insights into
religion and ethics achieved by
collaboration between evolutionary
psychology and cognitive and social
neuroscience.
What are the likely social
consequences of this new interest in the
relation of science and religion? There
are at least three possible answers. One
might be the new atheism exemplified
by the writings of Richard Dawkins,
Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and
Christopher Hitchens. 1 In this approach,
the alleged defective thinking of the
world religions is exposed, and a
worldview and way of life based strictly
on science are offered as replacement. A
second option might be the return of a
hegemonic dominance of religion over
science. However, polarizing rhetoric
from advocates for the exclusive
interpretive priority of either science or
religion has long since ceased to be
culturally or academically productive.
Instead, through dialogue about common
issues, scientific and theological thinkers
may pose questions that lead to more
sophisticated inquiry in both fields.
Confidence in the productive
possibilities of reciprocal questioning is
a hallmark of the long tradition known
as religious humanism. Here I illustrate
the potential contribution of religious
humanism by bringing recent
psychological research into dialogue
with the religious concept of love.
What would this religious
humanism be like? The major world
religions would remain visible and
viable as religious movements. But the
contributions of science would help
these religions refine their interests in
improving the health, education, wealth,
Page | 32
and overall well-being of their adherents.
In addition, the sciences would help
them refine their grasp of the empirical
world about which they are, like humans
in general, constantly making judgments,
predictions, and characterizations. In
my vision, the attitude of scientists
toward religion would be first of all
phenomenological; they would first
attempt to describe and understand
religious beliefs, ethics, and rituals in
their full historical context. But their
interest in explaining some of the
conditions that give rise to religious
phenomena would not be inhibited by
either religion or the wider society.
There are several different approaches to
phenomenology. The perspective that I
recommend follows the “critical
hermeneutic phenomenology” of Paul
Ricoeur. Ricoeur advocates beginning
the study of religion with a
phenomenology – a careful description –
of the person’s or community’s words,
symbols, metaphors, and narratives used
to communicate the meaning of a
religious experience or practice. This
view assumes that we cannot describe
experience directly but rather that
experience is always mediated by
symbols and metaphors. But Ricoeur’s
phenomenology does not stop with a
description of these meanings. It builds
in a secondary place for science and
explanation. It seeks through science to
give explanatory accounts of the affects
and motivations that humans bring to
these words, symbols, and metaphors. If
scientists followed Ricoeur’s model,
they would understand the importance of
beginning with description, be hesitant
to skip lightly over initial
phenomenological meanings, appreciate
yet grasp the limits of explanation, and
be reluctant to plunge into speculations,
such as those of the new scientific
atheism, about the ultimate truth or
falsity of religious phenomena. 2
On the other hand, the religions
themselves can contribute to the
sciences. They can do this by offering
hypotheses about how social and
religious ideas, behaviors, and rituals
can shape experience, even neural
processes, often for the good but
sometimes not. The religions can offer a
more generous epistemology and
ontology than science is inclined to find
useful for the tight explanatory interests
of the laboratory or scientific survey.
This too might generate new hypotheses
for scientific investigation. These would
be some of the ground rules for how a
dialogue between science and religion
might stimulate a revived religious
humanism.
Religious Humanisms of the Past
To speak of a revival suggests
that there have been many expressions of
religious humanism in the past when
some form of science, philosophy, and
religion creatively interacted. I will
limit myself to speaking primarily about
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. A
synthesis between Greek philosophical
psychology and Christianity can be
found in the use of Stoic theories of
desire by the apostle Paul, 3 the presence
of Aristotle’s family ethic – with its
implicit psycho-biology - in the
household codes of Ephesians and I
Colossians, 4 and the gospel of John’s
identification of Jesus with the Platonic
and Stoic idea of the pre-existent
“Word.” 5 A more intentional religious
humanism can be found in Augustine’s
use of the neo-Platonic Plotinus,
especially in the philosophical
psychology of remembrance developed
in his Confessions. 6 But the most
dramatic example of a religious
Page | 33
humanism that spread simultaneously
into Judaism, Christianity, and Islam can
be found when the lost texts of Aristotle
were discovered, translated, and
appropriated by scholars from these
three religions who worked at the same
tables in Islamic libraries in Spain and
Sicily during the ninth and tenth
centuries. Richard Rubinstein in his
timely book titled Aristotle’s Children
(2003) tells the story well. 7 This gave
rise to forms of Aristotelian religious
humanism in the works of Thomas
Aquinas in Christianity, Maimonides in
Judaism, and Averroës in Islam. On the
American scene, one sees another form
of Christian humanism in the synthesis
of philosophical pragmatism, with all its
influence from Darwin, and expressions
of liberal Christianity and the social
gospel movement. 8
Religious humanisms have not
always flourished and are subject to
attacks from both fundamentalists and
scientific secularists. They need
constant updating and vigorous
intellectual development. But at their
best, they make it possible for societies
to maintain strong religious communities
as well as integrating symbolic
umbrellas that protect the productive
interaction of the scientific disciplines
with the wider cultural and religious life.
An Example: The Agape, Caritas, and
Eros Debate
Few words in the English
language have such a range of everyday
meanings and of serious philosophical
and theological consideration as the
word love. For this reason, it is an
excellent candidate for scientific
investigation that has potential benefits
for religious practice and everyday life.
Although some theologians have sought
to create a sharp division between
"Christian love" and all other forms of
love, the tradition of religious humanism
proposes that science clarifies the
workings of love in human societies and
religion extends the scope of love
beyond its most immediate domain of
kinship.
There are three major tensions in
theological discussions of Christian love.
They center around the two Greek words
agape and eros and the Latin word
caritas. A famous book titled Agape
and Eros (1953) written by the Swedish
theologian Anders Nygren traced the
debate through Christian history. 9
Nygren believed that the truly normative
and authentic understanding of Christian
love is found in the word agape, the
Greek word used for Christian love in
the New Testament. It refers to a kind of
self-giving, even self-sacrificial, love
that is only possible by the grace of God.
10 Nygren was particularly interested in
arguing that Christian love did not build
on what the Greek philosophers called
eros. He claimed eros refers to the
natural desires of humans to have and
unite with the goods of life. This
includes the goods of health, wealth,
affiliation, and pleasure but it also
includes the higher goods of beauty and
truth. Nygren’s point, however, was
that Christian love does not build on or
incorporate eros – the natural
aspirational strivings of humans. He
believed he found this view of Christian
love in the New Testament (especially
the writing of the apostle Paul) and
Martin Luther, the giant of the Protestant
Reformation.
Nygren was particularly
interested in dismantling the classical
medieval Roman Catholic view of
Christian love that was often
summarized with the English word
charity or the Latin word caritas. Why
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did Nygren oppose the caritas view of
Christian love? The answer is that the
meaning of love as caritas did exactly
what Nygren thought Paul and Luther,
his theological heroes, did not do. In the
classic Roman Catholic view, love as
caritas builds on eros. Caritas was seen
to include natural desires for health and
affiliation. But the caritas view of love
also held that religious education and
God’s grace built on and expanded these
natural inclinations to entail a self-giving
benevolence to others, even strangers
and enemies – an idea so central to the
concept of Christian love.
All of this seemed too
naturalistic for Nygren. It seemed to
play down the importance of God’s
transforming grace. He joined other
European neo-orthodox theologians of
his day such as Karl Barth and Rudolph
Bultmann in cutting off Christian love
from eros, 11 which in effect was to cut
Christian love from nature and desire –
the very things scientists tend to study.
Beginning with Nygren’s strong view of
agape and the strong supernaturalism of
both Nygren and Barth, there was little
room in these mid-twentieth century
Protestant trends for a productive
dialogue between Christian ethics and
the new scientific advances in moral
psychology, evolutionary psychology,
and neuroscience.
At the same time, however,
breakthroughs in these very disciplines
have led to a new reassessment of the
Catholic caritas model of Christian love.
But before I review in more detail how
this model worked, especially in the
thought of the great medieval Roman
Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas, let
me turn to review some of the moral
implications of insights into kin altruism
and inclusive fitness emerging today
from evolutionary psychology and social
neuroscience.
Moral Implications of Kin Altruism
and Inclusive Fitness
As is well known, the idea of
inclusive fitness was first put forth in
1964 by William Hamilton. 12
Hamilton’s view of inclusive fitness
holds that living beings not only struggle
for their individual survival but for the
survival of offspring and kin who also
carry their genes. Their altruism is
likely to be proportional to the
percentage of their genes that others
carry. This insight was further
developed by the concept of parental
investment. Ronald Fisher and Robert
Trivers (1972) defined it as “any
investment by the parent in an individual
offspring that increases the offspring’s
chance of surviving…at the cost of the
parent’s ability to invest in other
offspring.” 13 These insights were at the
core of the emerging field of
sociobiology and were first brought to
the wider public attention by E.O.
Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New
Synthesis (1975). 14
But the moral implications of the
concept of inclusive fitness, parental
investment, and kin altruism have
received competing interpretations.
Richard Dawkins in his The Selfish Gene
(1976) turned these ideas into a defense