Simultaneously, messages targeting civil society and other sectors began to appear,
most prominently on social media. The aim was to instill a fatalistic acceptance of the
inevitability and desirability of a Chinese identity for multiracial Singapore and to get
Singaporeans—and not just Chinese Singaporeans—to pressure the government to
align Singapore’s national interests with China’s interests. In essence, they asserted:
• Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, who had died in 2015, the current Singapore leadership
under Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong did not know how to deal with China.
Relations were so much better then.
• Singapore has no territorial claims in the SCS, so why was it siding with the
United States against China?
• Surely, as a “Chinese country,” Singapore should “explain” China’s position to the
others or stay neutral.
It is difficult to pin down the precise origins of such narratives, but they closely
resemble arguments made in the Chinese media, in particular the Global Times.
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Omitted was the historical fact that Lee Kuan Yew was the only noncommunist
leader who in the late 1950s and early 1960s went into a CCP-backed United Front
organization and emerged the victor. That drew a red line, which provided the basis on
which Lee and his successors developed Singapore’s relations with China. Also ignored
was the fact that even though Singapore has no territorial claims on the SCS, that does
not mean it has no interest there. And, most crucial of all, although the majority of
Singaporeans are ethnic Chinese, Singapore is a multiracial country organized on the
basis of meritocracy and it does not view itself as a mono-racial state like China.
Still, many Singaporeans, only cursorily interested in international affairs, did
not realize they were being fed oversimplifications and swallowed them, or played
along for other reasons. Businessmen, academics, and others with interests in China
were given broad hints that their interests might suffer unless Singapore was more
accommodating, and they passed the messages to the Singapore government. The Belt
and Road Initiative was dangled as bait and the possibility of being excluded loomed
as a threat, even though Singapore, as a highly developed country, did not need BRI
infrastructure. Communist Party chairman Xi Jinping himself had asked Singapore
to start a BRI-related project in Chongqing. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was
pointedly not invited to the BRI Summit held in Beijing in 2017, although Singapore
was represented at a lower level. Appeals to ethnic pride were made to yet others.
The operation was effective. The pressures on the government were great. It was
difficult to explain the nuances of the SCS issue or Singapore’s relations with China to
the general public.
Then Beijing went too far. In November 2016, nine Singapore armored personnel
carriers (APCs) en route home from an overseas military exercise were seized by China
on the flimsiest of excuses. 2 Singaporeans immediately understood that this was naked
intimidation. Even the leader of the opposition Workers’ Party criticized China in
Parliament. Beijing, by then increasingly concerned with the Trump administration,
decided to settle. In January 2017, the APCs were released. The influence apparatus
gradually stood down and relations returned to normal. Chinese leaders went out of
their way to project friendliness. In late 2017, when news of Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong being invited to the White House by President Trump became public, the prime
minister was hastily invited to come to Beijing first, where he was received by Xi and
other senior Chinese leaders.
Academia
Most of the means by which the Chinese narratives were spread in 2016–17 were not
illegal. However, in August 2017, Huang Jing, an academic born in China who was
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teaching at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
(LKYSPP), was expelled from Singapore and permanently banned from the country.
The Ministry of Home Affairs (responsible for internal security and counterespionage)
said in a statement announcing the expulsion that Huang had been “identified as
an agent of influence of a foreign country” who had “knowingly interacted with
intelligence organizations and agents of the foreign country and cooperated with
them to influence the Singapore Government’s foreign policy and public opinion in
Singapore. To this end, he engaged prominent and influential Singaporeans and gave
them what he claimed was ‘privileged information’ about the foreign country so as to
influence their opinions in favor of that country. Huang also recruited others in aid of
his operations.” 3 The statement went on to say that Huang gave supposedly “privileged
information” to a senior member of the school of public policy in order that it be
conveyed to the Singapore government. The information was duly conveyed to very
senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore’s foreign policy.
The intention, the statement said, was to use the information to cause the Singapore
government to change its foreign policy. The statement concluded that Huang Jing’s
collaboration with foreign intelligence agents was “subversion and foreign interference
in Singapore’s domestic politics.”
The Singapore government has not named the foreign country. In 1988, Singapore had
expelled an American diplomat for interference in domestic politics. But it is generally
accepted that Singapore’s moves in Huang Jing’s case were directed at China.
Implications for ASEAN
There has been no systematic study of Chinese influence operations in ASEAN member
states. As a major economy contiguous to Southeast Asia, China will always naturally
enjoy significant influence even in the absence of such operations. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that Singapore’s experience is generally consistent across the region.
The differences stem mainly from lax governance standards in other ASEAN member
states and their lower level of development. Economic inducements and the greater
dependence of these countries on Chinese investment, under the general rubric of the
Belt and Road Initiative, seem to play a more prominent role.
A common factor is the focus on overseas Chinese communities. Such operations are
leading China into sensitive territory in Southeast Asia, where the overseas Chinese are
not always welcome minorities. China’s navigation of these complexities has in many
cases been clumsy. Malaysia provides a particularly egregious example that betrays a
form of cultural and political autism. During the 2018 Malaysian general elections, the
Chinese ambassador to Malaysia openly campaigned for the president of the Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA) in his constituency. This was a blatant violation of the
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principle of noninterference enshrined in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. It exposed beyond the possibility of concealment what China
really thinks of noninterference. The MCA president lost his seat.
This was not the only instance of insensitive behavior by Chinese diplomats in
Malaysia. In 2015, the previous Chinese ambassador saw fit to make his way to
Kuala Lumpur’s Chinatown, where only days previously the police had to use water
cannons to disperse a potentially violent anti-Chinese demonstration. There the
Chinese ambassador delivered a speech that, among other things, pronounced
the Chinese government’s opposition to any form of racial discrimination, adding
for good measure that it would be a shame if the peace of the area were to be
disrupted by the ill-intentioned and that Beijing would not stand idly by if anything
threatened the interests of its citizens and Malaysia-China relations.
Under other circumstances, these sentiments would perhaps have passed unnoticed.
But the timing and context laid the ambassador’s remarks open to disquieting
interpretations and drew a protest from the Malaysian government. The PRC foreign
ministry spokesman defended the ambassador’s action as “normal, friendly behavior.”
Undaunted, in another speech a day later, the Chinese ambassador said, “I would like
to stress once more, overseas huaqiao and huaren, no matter where you go, no matter
how many generations you are, China is forever your warm national home.” 4
Such behavior is not atypical in Southeast Asia. If other Chinese diplomats have
behaved more prudently in their engagement of overseas Chinese communities in
other ASEAN countries, it seems a matter of differences between individuals rather
than policy. Since such behavior is patently not in China’s interest, China may be
beginning to believe its own propaganda. President Xi’s concentration of power and
insistence on greater party control seem to have created echo chambers where Chinese
diplomats and officials probably report only what is in accordance with preexisting
beliefs, resulting in situations where instructions are blindly given and followed.
This kind of behavior is not confined to countries where there are large overseas Chinese
communities. Cultural autism or insensitivity is one of the self-created obstacles to the
smooth implementation of the BRI that China is experiencing around the world. And as
the media report on the problems, awareness spreads. This does not mean that countries
will shun working with China. But countries are going to be increasingly cautious. They
will push back when the terms of engagement are too onerous and they will seek to forge
relationships with as many other major powers as possible.
Following the Malaysian elections, China is projecting friendliness toward Malaysia. But
as with Singapore, this is a pause, not the end of the story. Since influence operations are
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embedded in the intrinsic nature of the Chinese state, they cannot be abandoned unless
the nature of the Chinese state fundamentally changes. This is very unlikely.
NOTES
1 ​“Singapore Government Statement,” Government of Singapore, May 15, 1971, http://www​. nas​. gov​. sg​
/ archivesonline​/ data​/ pdfdoc​/ SGPress​_ 3​_ 15​. 5​. 71​. pdf.
2 ​Jermyn Chow, “SAF Armoured Vehicles Seized in Hong Kong Port, Mindef Expects Shipment to Return
to Singapore ‘Expeditiously,’ ” Straits Times (Singapore), November 24, 2016, accessed October 11, 2018,
https:// www​. straitstimes​. com​/ asia​/ se​- asia​/ 9​- saf​- armoured​- vehicles​- seized​- at​- hong​- kong​- port.
3 ​“Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence (SPR) Status—Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping,”
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, August 6, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https:// www​. mha​. gov​. sg​
/ newsroom​/ press​- release​/ news​/ cancellation​- of​- singapore​- permanent​- residence​-(spr)​- status—huang​- jing​
- and​- yang​- xiuping.
4 ​Shannon Teoh and Eunice Au, “KL Wants Chinese Envoy to Explain Remarks,” Straits Times (Singapore),
October 2, 2015, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.straitstimes​.com​/asia​/se​-asia​/kl​-wants​-chinese​
-envoy​-to​-explain​-remarks.
UNITED KINGDOM
Unlike the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the United Kingdom has had
no significant all-encompassing debate over Chinese influence operations. When
they have occurred, the debates tend to be confined to specific areas such as the
media, academia, or the economy. But so far, no one institute has attempted to bring
to light the full gamut of Chinese United Front and influence-peddling operations. As
such, Britain’s response to China’s attempts to insinuate itself within Britain’s critical
infrastructure, universities, civil society, political system, and think tanks has been
scattershot at best.
The United Kingdom has a complex political, economic, and historical relationship
with China, which is a significant trading partner and an increasingly significant
source of investment. 1 Especially since the official elevation of UK-China relations to
Golden Era status in 2014 and the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United
Kingdom has become more open to Chinese influence. 2 Areas of vulnerability
to improper interference include political and civil society actors as well as the
media. Chinese firms are involved in strategic parts of the British economy, including
telecommunications and nuclear power. Improper interference activities can be difficult
to distinguish from acceptable influence via civil society exchange, public diplomacy,
and commerce. Problem cases include not only Chinese cyberattacks on political
organizations and think tanks but also willing collaboration and reluctant complicity.
A report by GPPi and Merics characterized the most important areas for Chinese
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influence operations as civil society and the media. 3 But others have noted that
China’s leverage over the UK economy is equally, if not more, important.
Politics
Since 2012, the UK governments under prime ministers David Cameron and Theresa
May have progressively toned down criticism of China over human rights and Beijing’s
obligations toward the United Kingdom to respect the Sino-British agreement on Hong
Kong. While this may be in part due to the United Kingdom’s relatively weakening
position, these changes have coincided with Chinese efforts to influence British foreign
policy.
Influence activities by China have included not only apparent attempts to engage
in cyberattacks on the Scottish Parliament and on think tanks specializing
in international security issues with connections to government but also reports
of intimidating messages sent to politicians seen as enemies of China. 4 China has
also denied UK politicians, such as members of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee and the deputy chair of the Conservative Party’s Human Rights Commission,
Ben Rogers, access to Hong Kong to investigate human rights issues there. 5
China has also acquired influence by offering jobs to former politicians, potentially creating
dependencies. Former prime minister David Cameron is a case in point. Cameron
distanced himself from the Dalai Lama in 2013 and embraced a Golden Era of
UK-China ties in 2015 while still in office, positioning himself as China’s best friend in
Europe. 6 Once out of office, Cameron accepted a senior role in the UK-China Fund, a
major infrastructure fund connected with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 7
Academia and Civil Society
The Chinese government can exercise influence in the United Kingdom through a
number of mechanisms: repression in China that affects China-related work, such
as the new Foreign NGO Management Law; remote cybermonitoring; the creation of
new institutions it controls; collaborations based on Chinese funding, with strings
attached; control of Chinese nationals in the United Kingdom; and reporting on or
pressuring domestic institutions and individuals in the United Kingdom. The targets of
such influence activities include the communities these actors serve: students, clients,
and the wider public.
Chinese scholars and students in the United Kingdom (as of March 2018, some
170,000) register with the Chinese Students and Scholars Association UK, which
organizes political education events and is supposed to monitor its members in
accordance with its “patriotic” mission. 8 Reportedly, students at some universities in
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181
the United Kingdom have also established Chinese Communist Party cells. 9 The use of
the CSSA UK to monitor dissent among Chinese students in the United Kingdom is a
direct violation of the principles of the United Kingdom’s democracy.
Institutions created or managed by the Chinese authorities include the country’s
twenty-nine Hanban-managed Confucius Institutes as well as the new Peking
University HSBC Business School Oxford Campus—the first overseas campus of a
Chinese university. These institutions have triggered some concerns. They openly
discriminate against certain groups, such as Falun Gong practitioners who are excluded
from employment, as North American cases have shown. 10 Reportedly, agreements
with universities that host Confucius Institutes require adherence to Chinese law
according to Hanban policies and they are subject to nondisclosure agreements. 11 The
concern that these institutions practice (self-)censorship is somewhat mitigated as long
as the authorship of censored accounts is clear and robust and critical discussion takes
place elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
Activities benefitting from Chinese funding or commercial ties with China are all
the more concerning when Chinese influence is less easy to trace. It is impossible
to tell, for example, if Huawei’s donation to Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific program
will affect this venerable institution’s independence and if UK universities’ selfcensorship
on their Chinese campuses will bleed into their home bases. 12 It is clear,
on the other hand, that funding provided to research students and researchers who
come to the United Kingdom from China leads to self-censorship. The increased
role of the China Scholarship Council, a PRC-funded grant provider, is therefore
of great concern, as it clearly would not approve projects that might anger China’s
government. 13 UK-based publishing in China gives rise to concerns about censorship,
as in the case of Cambridge University Press temporarily censoring the online version
of its journal China Quarterly in China to accommodate government censorship
requests. 14
China’s treatment of UK-funded educational institutions in China is also of concern
in Britain. In June 2018, the University of Nottingham’s campus in Ningbo removed
its associate provost, Stephen Morgan, after he wrote an online piece criticizing the
results of China’s Nineteenth Party Congress. 15 Nottingham has previously given the
appearance of buckling to Chinese pressure. In 2016, Nottingham abruptly shut its
School of Contemporary Chinese Studies just as students were preparing for exams. The
action led to the departure of its director, Steve Tsang, a China scholar known for his
integrity and independence from Beijing. Sources close to the incident said that PRC
pressure on the university played a direct role in the closure of the institute. Tsang is
now the director of the China Institute at the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at
the University of London.
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182
Media
The UK media have long been important international sources of information and
insight on China, reporting independently and critically. While independent reporting
continues, Chinese official media have become more influential in the United Kingdom
and internationally through their UK presence. Primarily, they have expanded their
operations and reach. For example, the re-branded China Global Television Network
Europe Ltd (CGTN), headquartered in London, is seeking to increase activities and
China Daily now distributes its China Watch “supplement” as an advertisement inside
the respected conservative newspaper the Daily Telegraph. The UK and Chinese
governments have also concluded a Television Co-Production Agreement that provides
a framework under which TV producers in both countries can share resources but have
to respect “stipulations in the relevant Party’s law and regulations.” 16
Given the United Kingdom’s special historical relationship with Hong Kong, the
central authorities’ heavy influence on the Hong Kong media and the deterioration of
media freedom in Hong Kong are of relevance in the United Kingdom, where the case
of rising self-censorship at the South China Morning Post, for example, has been noted. 17
According to confidential reports, some journalists who have left Hong Kong for the
United Kingdom have encountered intimidation attempts.
The effects of media-influencing activities taking place in the United Kingdom are
hard to assess. Critical reporting continues, but the rise of commercial ventures
transporting censorship into the United Kingdom looks set to continue too. For the
moment, increasingly difficult access to information and insight in China, as a result
of domestic repression, is at least as great a problem as attempts to influence or repress
remotely in the United Kingdom.
The Economy
For years, the United Kingdom was a bit of an outlier in its openness to Chinese
investment and its willingness to grant Chinese firms, even state-owned ones, access to
its critical infrastructure. Nonetheless, there is now growing concern in London about
China’s ability to leverage its growing economic power into political influence and to
use its riches to buy, borrow, or steal key Western technologies that sit at the heart of
Western economies.
In partnership with France and Germany, the UK government has also introduced
mechanisms to monitor and block Chinese takeovers of high-technology companies in
sensitive sectors. 18 The three nations also support efforts to tighten EU-wide regulations
to govern Chinese investment so that Chinese entities cannot exploit the weaker
regulatory systems of some European countries to gain access to potentially sensitive
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183
technologies. It is unclear how the United Kingdom’s Brexit plan will affect the stated
desire of the UK government to ensure that critical technologies do not fall into Chinese
hands.
For years, the Chinese telecom behemoth Huawei has provided broadband gear and
mobile networks to its clients in Britain, which include British Telecom and Vodafone.
And for years, Huawei executives used their substantial business opportunities in
Britain as an example to counter allegations in the United States and other Western
countries that Huawei was linked to the People’s Liberation Army and therefore a
security risk. Now it seems that Britain’s government is having second thoughts.
A government report issued in July 2018 noted that technical and supply-chain
issues with equipment made by Huawei have exposed Britain’s telecom networks
to new security risks. 19 Earlier in 2018, Britain’s cybersecurity watchdog warned
telecommunications companies against dealing with the Chinese manufacturer
ZTE, citing “potential risks” to national security. 20 ZTE was involved in widespread
sanctions-busting in deals with Iran and North Korea.
Another area of growing concern is nuclear power. China General Nuclear Power
(GNP)—the main player in China’s nuclear industry—is considering the purchase of a
49 percent stake in the United Kingdom’s existing nuclear plants. 21 The nuclear power
giant has already taken a 33.5 percent stake in the Hinkley Point C power station,
which is being built with French technology. China experts in the United Kingdom
such as Isabel Hilton, the CEO of Chinadialogue​. net, have observed that in opening
up its vital infrastructure to China, the United Kingdom was without parallel in the
Western world. “No other OECD country has done this. This is strategic infrastructure,
and China is a partner but not an ally in the security sense. . . . ​You are making a 50-year
bet, not only that there will be no dispute between the UK and China but also no
dispute between China and one of the UK’s allies. It makes no strategic sense.” 22
Responses to Interference Activities
In addition to some limited pushback on Chinese economic moves, there are signs
that the United Kingdom is slowly understanding the challenge presented by Chinese
influence activities. UK media have continued to report pressure on journalists, the
media, civil society, and those involved in politics. This reporting has been somewhat
effective in correcting perceptions of the nature and functioning of Chinese governance.
The media have also focused attention on how China monitors and obstructs the work
of foreign reporters in China.
The political system has also begun to respond to some influence activities. At the
domestic level, a parliamentary inquiry on the United Kingdom’s relations with China,
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184
launched in 2015 and relaunched in 2017, has sought input on some of the issues
discussed here. 23 A newly launched NGO, Hong Kong Watch, focuses on drawing
attention to the United Kingdom’s special responsibility toward Hong Kong. The
Conservative Party Human Rights Commission has produced its own report on the
deteriorating human rights situation in both China and Hong Kong and has organized
inquiries and events on topics such as the United Kingdom’s Confucius Institutes. 24
While the Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents the relationship with China
as primarily collaborative, it is also conducting research on Chinese influence and
interference activities. 25 At the international level, the United Kingdom has joined
several open letters to signal its position on China’s violations of human rights. 26
Civil society has also sought to raise the Foreign NGO Management Law as well as
to highlight intensified repression. By contrast, responses from academic institutions
have so far been sporadic. For example, in 2011, the University of Cambridge
disaffiliated CSSA Cambridge due to its undemocratic organization. 27 In 2017,
international academics joined together to convince the Cambridge University Press
to stop censoring its publications available in China. 28 Still, despite experiencing such
influence campaigns in the past, such as with Libya, which was spelled out in the
2011 Woolf Inquiry, there seems to have been no coherent initiative on protecting
academic freedom and maintaining wider ethical standards in the face of these types
of campaigns. 29
NOTES
1 ​$9.6 billion in the United Kingdom according to Godement and Vasselier, “China at the Gates.”
2 ​“New Phase in Golden Era for UK-China Relations,” Government of the United Kingdom, December 15,
2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.gov​.uk​/government​/news​/new​-phase​-in​-golden​-era​-for​-uk​
- china​- relations.
3 ​Benner et al., “Authoritarian Advance.”
4 ​Paul Hutcheon, “China Accused of Being Behind Recent Cyber Attack on Scottish Parliament,” Herald
(Scotland), September 16, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, http://www​.heraldscotland​.com​/news​
/15540166​.China​_accused​_of​_being​_behind​_recent​_cyber​_attack​_on​_Scottish​_Parliament; Gordon
Corera, “UK Think Tanks Hacked by Groups in China, Cyber-Security Firm Says,” BBC, February 26, 2018,
accessed October 11, 2018, http://www​.bbc​.co​.uk​/news​/uk​-43172371.
5 ​George Parker, “British MPs Banned from Hong Kong Visit,” Financial Times (UK), November 30, 2014,
accessed October 11, 2018, https:// www​. ft​. com​/ content​/ 08919562​- 78ba​- 11e4​- b518​- 00144feabdc0;
Tom Phillips and Benjamin Haas, “British Conservative Party Activist Barred from Entering Hong Kong,”
Guardian (UK), October 11, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2017​/oct​
/ 11​/ british​- conservative​- party​- activist​- benedict​- rogers​- hong​- kong.
6 ​Lucy Hornby, James Kynge, and George Packer, “ ’Golden Era’ of UK-China Trade Links in Peril,” Financial
Times (UK), January 26, 2018, subscription required, https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/cb552198​-02c0​-11e8​
- 9650​- 9c0ad2d7c5b5.
Appendix 2
185
7 ​“Summary of Business Appointments Applications—Rt Hon David Cameron,” Advisory Committee on
Business Appointments, Government of the United Kingdom, February 28, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018,
https:// www​. gov​. uk​/ government​/ publications​/ cameron​- david​- prime​- minister​- acoba​- recommendation
/summary-of-business-appointments-applications-rt-hon-david-cameron; Emily Feng, “David Cameron
Takes Senior Role in China Infrastructure Fund,” Financial Times (UK), December 16, 2017, subscription
required, https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/07a05ac2​-e238​-11e7​-97e2​-916d4fbac0da.
8 ​“Chinese Embassy Concerned as Lasting UK University Strike Affects Students,” Xinhua (China), March 1,
2018, accessed October 11, 2018, http://www​.xinhuanet​.com​/english​/2018​-03​/01​/c​_137006815​.htm.
9 ​Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting Up Cells at Universities Across
America,” Foreign Policy, April 18, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2018​/04​/18​
/ the​- chinese​- communist​- party​- is​- setting​- up​- cells​- at​- universities​- across​- america​- china​- students​- beijing​
-surveillance.
10 ​James Bradshaw and Colin Freeze, “McMaster Closing Confucius Institute over Hiring Issues,” Globe and
Mail (Toronto), May 11, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theglobeandmail​.com​/news​/national​
/ education​/ mcmaster​- closing​- confucius​- institute​- over​- hiring​- issues​/ article8372894.
11 ​Rachelle Peterson, “Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher
Education,” National Association of Scholars, April 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https:// www​. nas​. org​
/ images​/ documents​/ confucius​_ institutes​/ NAS​_ confuciusInstitutes​. pdf; Daniel Sanderson, “Universities
‘Sign Chinese Gagging Clause,’ ” Times (London), September 5, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://
www​. thetimes​. co​. uk​/ article​/ universities​- sign​- chinese​- gagging​- clause​- q7qz7jpf3.
12 ​“Chinese Power ‘May Lead to Global Academic Censorship Crisis,’ ” Times Higher Education (London),
December 7, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.timeshighereducation​.com​/news​/chinese​
- power​- may​- lead​- global​- academic​- censorship​- crisis#survey​- answer.
13 ​For example, King’s College London increased its CSC PhD scholarships tenfold “in recent years.”
King’s College London, July 12, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.kcl​.ac​.uk​/newsevents​/news​
/ newsrecords​/ 2017​/ 12​- December​/ King’s​- China​- scholarship​- programme​- expands​- tenfold​. aspx.
14 ​Tom Phillips, “Cambridge University Press Censorship ‘Exposes Xi Jinping’s Authoritarian Shift,’ ”
Guardian (UK), August 20, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/uk​-news​/2017​
/ aug​/ 20​/ cambridge​- university​- press​- censorship​- exposes​- xi​- jinpings​- authoritarian​- shift.
15 ​Emily Feng, “China Tightens Party Control of Foreign University Ventures,” Financial Times (UK), July 2,
2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/4b885540​-7b6d​-11e8​-8e67​-1e1a0846c475.
16 ​“Exploratory Memorandum on the Television Co-production Agreement between the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the People’s Republic of China,” accessed
October 11, 2018, https://assets​.publishing​.service​.gov​.uk​/government​/uploads​/system​/uploads​
/attachment​_data​/file​/649774​/EM​_UK​_China​_TV​.pdf.
17 ​Tom Phillips, “Mysterious Confession Fuels Fears of Beijing’s Influence on Hong Kong’s Top Newspaper,”
Guardian (UK), July 25, 2016, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2016​/jul​/25​
/ south​- china​- morning​- post​- china​- influence​- hong​- kong​- newspaper​- confession.
18 ​Bates Gill and Benjamin Schreer, “The Global Dimension of China’s Influence Operations,” Strategist,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 11, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https:// www​. aspistrategist​
. org​. au​/ global​- dimension​- chinas​- influence​- operations.
19 ​Jack Stubbs, “Exclusive: Britain Says Huawei ‘Shortcomings’ Expose New Telecom Networks Risks,”
Reuters, July 19, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-huawei​-security​
-britain​-exclusive​/exclusive​-britain​-says​-huawei​-shortcomings​-expose​-new​-telecom​-networks​-risks​
- idUSKBN1K92BX.
Appendix 2
186
20 ​“China’s ZTE Deemed a ‘National Security Risk’ to UK,” Guardian (UK), April 17, 2018, accessed
October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/technology​/2018​/apr​/17​/chinas​-zte​-a​-national​-security​
- risk​- to​- uk​- warns​- watchdog.
21 ​Zoe Wood, “China Looking to Buy Stake in UK Nuclear Plants, Say Reports,” Guardian (UK), July 8, 2018,
accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/environment​/2018​/jul​/08​/china​-interested​
- majority​- stake​- uk​- nuclear​- power​- stations​- reports.
22 ​Adam Vaughan and Lily Kuo, “China’s Long Game to Dominate Nuclear Power Relies on the UK,”
Guardian (UK), July 26, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.theguardian​.com​/environment​/2018​
/ jul​/ 26​/ chinas​- long​- game​- to​- dominate​- nuclear​- power​- relies​- on​- the​- uk.
23 ​“UK Relations with China Inquiry,” Parliament of the United Kingdom, June 8, 2017, accessed
October 11, 2018, https:// www​. parliament​. uk​/ business​/ committees​/ committees​- a​- z​/ commons​- select​
/foreign​-affairs​-committee​/inquiries1​/parliament​-2015​/inquiry; “New Inquiry: China and the International
Rules-based System,” Parliament of the United Kingdom, November 21, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018,
https:// www​. parliament​. uk​/ business​/ committees​/ committees​- a​- z​/ commons​- select​/ foreign​- affairs​
-committee​/news​-parliament​-2017​/china​-inquiry​-launch​-17​-19.
24 ​“The Darkest Moment: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China, 2013-16,” Conservative Party Human
Rights Commission, June 2016, accessed October 11, 2018, http:// conservativehumanrights​. com​/ reports​
/ submissions​/ CPHRC​_ China​_ Human​_ Rights​_ Report​_ Final​. pdf
25 ​Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, “Why Does China Matter to the UK?” YouTube, November 29, 2017,
accessed October 11, 2018, https:// www​. youtube​. com​/ watch​? v​=​YWwBDB1KPeY.
26 ​Godement and Vasselier, “China at the Gates.”
27 ​“Chinese Students & Scholars Association Disaffiliated from University,” Varsity online, December 3,
2011, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www​.varsity​.co​.uk​/news​/4166.
28 ​James A. Millward, “Open Letter to Cambridge University Press about Its Censorship of the China
Quarterly,” Medium, August 19, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://medium​.com​/ @millwarj​/open​
- letter​- to​- cambridge​- university​- press​- about​- its​- censorship​- of​- the​- journal​- china​- quarterly​- c366f76dcdac.
29 ​“The Woolf Inquiry: An Inquiry into the LSE’s Links with Libya and Lessons to be Learned,” Council of the
London School of Economics, October 2011, accessed October 11, 2018, http://www​.lse​.ac​.uk​/News​/News​
-Assets​/PDFs​/The​-Woolf​-Inquiry​-Report​-An​-inquiry​-into​-LSEs​-links​-with​-Libya​-and​-lessons​-to​-be​-learned​
- London​- School​- of​- Economics​- and​- Political​- Sciences​. pdf.
Appendix 2
APPENDIX 3
Chinese-Language Media Landscape
Official and Semi-Official Chinese-Language Media
By 2018, all of the major official Chinese media outlets had embedded themselves
deeply into the communications and broadcasting infrastructure of the
United States.
• CCTV or CGTN (English and Chinese), the semiofficial Hong Kong–based
Phoenix TV, and a few Chinese provincial TV channels are available in add-on
packages of two major satellite TV providers in the United States, DISH Network
and DIRECTV. CCTV channels (English and Chinese) are in the cable systems of
all the major metropolitan areas of the United States.
• The major official Chinese TV networks, including CCTV and major Chinese
provincial TV networks, and the quasi-official Phoenix TV, are all in the
program lineups of Chinese TV streaming services that have become popular
among Chinese communities in the United States. There are four major Chinese
streaming services in the United States: iTalkBB Chinese TV ( 蜻蜓電視 ), Charming
China ( 魅力中國 ), Great Wall ( 長城平台 ), and KyLin TV ( 麒麟電視 ). All these services
carry the major official Chinese TV channels, including major provincial
channels, and are accessible nationwide.
• The major official Chinese media organizations, CCTV (CGTN), Xinhua, the
People’s Daily, and China Daily (the only major official newspaper in English),
have a heavy presence on all major social media platforms of the United States
and have many followers. All these outlets use Facebook and Twitter and other
platforms, even though those platforms are blocked in China.
• Quasi-official Phoenix TV ( 鳳凰衛視 ), a global TV network with links to the PRC’s
Ministry of State Security and headquartered in Hong Kong with branches around
the world, including the United States, also has a substantial presence on all the
major social media platforms in the United States.
188
Chinese media social media presence
(E) = English version; (C) = Chinese version
Platform Official Organizations and Subscribers/Followers Quasi-official
CCTV (CGTN) Xinhua People’s
Daily
China
Daily
Twitter CCTV: 532K (E+C) 11.8M (E) 4.54M (E) 1.8M (E) 7K (C)
CGTN: 7.19M (E) 11.6M (C) 221K (C)
Facebook CCTV: 48.04M (E);
46.92M (E) 43.15M (E) 35.17M (E) 14K (C)
3.44M (C)
171K (C)
CGTN: 58.28M (E)
CGTN America: 1.2M (E)
YouTube 289K (C) 173K (E) 25K (E) 3K (E) 75K (C)
Instagram 550K (E) 111K (E) 696K (E) 23.5K (E) N/A
Phoenix TV (fully
controlled by Chinese
government)
PRC-Funded and PRC-Controlled Media Outlets
The Chinese Communist Party liaises with Chinese-language media mainly through
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (or Qiao Ban 侨办 ). The Qiao
Ban holds an annual conference on Chinese-language media called the World Chinese
Media Forum. These media outlets are registered in the United States by US citizens
or permanent residents, but they might actually be owned by Chinese state-run
companies.
The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of PRC ( 中國國務院僑務辦公室 )
appears to directly control the Asian Culture and Media Group ( 美國亞洲文化傳媒集團 )
in America, which has three media subsidiaries: SinoVision ( 美國中文電視 ), the China
Press (Qiaobao or 僑報 ), and the Sino American Times ( 美洲时报 ). Sky Link TV ( 天下衛視 )
is another media outlet in the United States. Unlike SinoVision and Qiaobao, it is fully
owned by Guangzhou Media American Co, Ltd. ( 美國廣視傳媒有限公司 ), which in turn
is owned by GZ Television Media ( 广州影视传媒有限公司 ), a Chinese state-owned media
outlet.
SinoVision
The group’s main TV outlet is SinoVision. It operates two twenty-four-hour channels
(one Chinese and one English), and it is on the program lineups of cable systems Time
Warner Cable-73, Verizon FiOS-26, Cablevision-73, and RCN-80, covering about thirty
million people. Sinovision’s website ( 美国中文电视 , ht t p : //w w w​.s i n o v i s i o n ​.n e t ) r a n k s
Appendix 3
189
twelfth among all the Chinese websites in the United States. Its reporting hews closely
to China’s official media:
• Example 1: On June 27, 2017, the US Department of State, in its annual Trafficking
in Persons Report 2017, put China at Tier 3, the lowest class. In reporting this
news, SinovisionNet simply reposted comments from the official website of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China attacking the human rights record of the
United States. 1
• Example 2: In March 2017, the US State Department published its 2016 Human
Rights Report. SinovisionNet published two stories on this topic. One reported
the reaction to the story by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other story
came from Xinhua, which was highly critical of the US human rights situation.
SinovisionNet also published two reports by the Information Office of the State
Council of China on America’s human rights record. It did not publish State
Department’s human rights report. 2
• Example 3: On the tensions in the South China Sea, almost all the stories posted
on SinovisionNet are from official Chinese media outlets and websites. They are
naturally critical of US actions in that area. 3
Qiaobao and the Sino American Times
Qiaobao, or the China Press ( 僑報 , http:// www​. uschinapress​. com), is the flagship
pro-PRC newspaper published in the United States. Its website ranks forty-first among
all the Chinese websites in the United States. Qiaobao was established in 1990. It is
headquartered in New York City with branches in twelve major metropolitan areas of
the United States. The Sino American Times ( 美洲时报 ) is a free paper and not a major
media presence in the United States.
Independent Media
Over the course of the last decade, most of the independent Chinese-language media
outlets in the United States have been taken over by businessmen sympathetic to the
PRC.
• Wenxuecheng ( 文学城 , wenxuecheng​. com) is the most popular Chinese-language
website in the United States. In 2003, it was purchased by a Taiwanese American
Appendix 3
190
businessman with business interests in China. There is an unsubstantiated
rumor that the investment was subsidized by $1 million from the Ministry of
Propaganda.
• Duowei is another online source that was for years an independent Chineselanguage
media. It was purchased in 2009 by a pro-PRC Hong Kong businessman.
• Mingjing, or Mirror Media, a Chinese-language web presence based in Canada,
was once considered independent of Beijing’s control but has modified its
reporting in recent years.
• Backchina​. com, ( 倍可亲 , ranked as the fifth most popular Chinese website in
the United States), was once a staunch critic of China like Duowei. But in 2017
its editors attended the ninth World Chinese Media Forum in China and its
reporting became far more positive about the PRC.
• Sing Tao Newspaper Group was established in Hong Kong in 1938. In 2001, it
was purchased by a pro-Beijing businessman.
• The World Journal ( 世界日报 ) was for years the premier Chinese-language paper in
the United States. It, too, has softened its stance on the PRC in recent years.
• Ming Pao served the Hong Kong-immigrant community. It is another formerly
independent newspaper that has fallen under Beijing’s control.
• Boxun is a Chinese-language news site whose servers are located in North
Carolina. It was founded by an immigrant from China. Its news is highly
unreliable.
• The Epoch Times ( 大纪元 ), the Hope Radio, and New Tang Dynasty TV, remain
independent of PRC control. They are either owned or operated by adherents
to the Falun Gong sect, which is banned in China. Their reporting on China
is uneven.
• Vision Times (secretchina​. com) was founded in 2001 as a website, secretchina​
. com, and began publishing a free weekly newspaper in 2005.
Appendix 3
191
NOTES
1 ​“ 美国务院欲将中国人权状况调为最差等级外交部回应 .” Sinovision. June 27, 2017. news​.sinovision​.net​/politics​
/201706​/00411546​.htm.
2 ​“ 中国国新办发布《 2016 年美国的人权纪录 .” Sinovision. March 9, 2017. news​.sinovision​.net​/politics​/201703​
/00401996​.htm; “ 中国外交部就美国人权报告涉华内容等答问 .” Sinovision. March 6, 2017. news​.sinovision​.net​
/ politics​/ 201703​/ 00401682​. htm.
3 ​“ 航行自由 ≠ 军事行动自由中方驳斥对南海问题误读 .” Sinovision. February 19, 2018. news​.sinovision​.net​
/ politics​/ 201802​/ 00431582​. htm; “ 过年也不消停 ? 美国航母 “ 卡尔森 ” 号春节前南海巡航 .” Sinovision. February 13,
2018. news​.sinovision​.net​/politics​/201802​/00431309​.htm.
Appendix 3
192
Appendix 3
Dissenting Opinion
SUSAN SHIRK
Although I have no problem with the factual research that has gone into specific sections
of the report, I respectfully dissent from what I see as the report’s overall inflated
assessment of the current threat of Chinese influence seeking on the United States. The
report discusses a very broad range of Chinese activities, only some of which constitute
coercive, covert, or corrupt interference in American society and none of which actually
undermines our democratic political institutions. Not distinguishing the legitimate from
the illegitimate activities detracts from the credibility of the report. The cumulative effect
of this expansive inventory that blurs together legitimate with illegitimate activities is to
overstate the threat that China today poses to the American way of life. Especially during
this moment in American political history, overstating the threat of subversion from
China risks causing overreactions reminiscent of the Cold War with the Soviet Union,
including an anti-Chinese version of the Red Scare that would put all ethnic Chinese under
a cloud of suspicion. Right now, I believe the harm we could cause our society by our own
overreactions actually is greater than that caused by Chinese influence seeking. That is why
I feel I must dissent from the overall threat assessment of the report.
194
Dissenting Opinion
Afterword
ORVILLE SCHELL AND LARRY DIAMOND
What makes this report timely and important is China’s increasingly forward and aggressive
posture on the global stage. Once largely a form of economic competition, China’s recent
turn to military and political rivalry with the United States has changed the whole
equation of the bilateral relationship. If the United States is to fare well in this increasingly
adversarial competition, Americans must have a far better sense than they now do about
both the nature of the system and values that underlay the People’s Republic of China and
the challenges Beijing’s ambitious agenda of multi-faceted outreach is beginning to pose
for our country—especially our media, universities, think tanks, and other civil society
institutions that make our society so unique, vibrant, and strong.
However, at the same time that we fortify ourselves against harmful outside interference,
we must also be mindful to do no harm. In particular, we must guard against having this
report used unfairly to cast aspersions on Chinese, whether Chinese American immigrants
who have become (or are becoming) United States citizens, Chinese students, Chinese
businesspeople, or other kinds of Chinese visitors, whose contributions to America’s
progress over the past century have been enormous.
Just because the Chinese Communist Party presumes that all ethnic Chinese (wherever
they may reside) still owe some measure of loyalty “to the Chinese motherland,” zuguo
( 祖国 ), does not mean that they are collectively in possession of compromised loyalty to
their adopted home or place of study. Our Working Group’s findings do suggest that the
leadership of the PRC has stepped up a new and well funded campaign of influence seeking
in the United States. However, this should not be viewed as an invitation to a McCarthy eralike
reaction against Chinese in America. Rather, it is a summons to greater awareness of the
challenges our country faces and greater vigilance in defending our institutions.
In helping to convene this Working Group on Chinese influence seeking in the United
States (and elsewhere in the world), the intention of the Task Force on US-China relations
has been to limit the growing PRC challenge to American institutions and values, which
is being played according to rules that are increasingly lacking in reciprocity. Developing
strategies to counteract and protect our society when influence seeking becomes
interference is the charge of this report, and perhaps the most effective defense is to
strengthen our own democratic values and institutions. But at the same time we would be
naïve not to want to become more familiar with the full dimensions of Beijing’s overseas
ambitions, the state organs, and the resources now dedicated to “overseas propaganda,”
196
waixuan ( 外宣 ), and the less than transparent manner in which Chinese influence seeking is
often carried out.
We reiterate: it is absolutely crucial that whatever measures are taken to counteract harmful
forms of Chinese influence seeking not end up demonizing any group of Americans, or
even visitors to America, in ways that are unfair or reckless.
Afterword
About the Participants
Robert Daly is Director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Larry Diamond is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli
Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
Elizabeth Economy is the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.) is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow, Director of the US-Asia
Security Initiative and faculty member at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific
Research Center.
Donald Emmerson is Director of the Southeast Asia Program and Senior Fellow Emeritus at
the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.
Francis Fukuyama is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development,
and the Rule of Law, and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies, Stanford University.
Bonnie Glaser is Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Kyle Hutzler is an MBA candidate at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Markos Kounalakis is a foreign affairs columnist for the McClatchy newspapers and
Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Winston Lord is a former US Ambassador to China and former Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Evan Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Georgetown University
Walsh School of Foreign Service.
James Mulvenon is General Manager at SOS International.
198
Andrew J. Nathan is the Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.
Minxin Pei is the Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and George
R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College.
Jeffrey Phillips is the Policy Director at The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands.
John Pomfret is a Washington Post journalist and author.
Orville Schell is the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on US-China Relations at Asia
Society.
David Shambaugh is Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science &
International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program at the Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University.
Susan Shirk is Research Professor and Chair of the 21st Century China Center at the
University of California San Diego’s School of Global Policy & Strategy.
Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the George Washington
University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Glenn Tiffert is a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Ezra Vogel is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard
University.
Christopher Walker is Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment
for Democracy.
About the Participants
199
International Associates
Anne-Marie Brady is Professor at the University of Canterbury and a Global Fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.
Timothy Cheek is Director of the Institute of Asian Research, Louis Cha Chair in Chinese
Research, and Professor of History at the University of British Columbia.
John Fitzgerald is an Emeritus Professor in the Center for Social Impact at Swinburne
University of Technology.
John Garnaut is a political risk consultant to the Australian government and private sector
and was Senior Advisor to former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
Timothy Garton Ash is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor of European
Studies at the University of Oxford.
Francois Godement is the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Asia and
China Program.
Bilahari Kausikan is a former Permanent Secretary of the Singapore Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
Richard McGregor is a Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute and journalist.
Eva Pils is a Professor of Law and Director of Doctoral Studies at the Dickson Poon School
of Law, King’s College London.
Volker Stanzel is Vice President of the German Council on Foreign Relations and former
German Ambassador to China and Japan.
About the Participants
200
About the Participants