conjunction with US think tanks represent efforts to find common ground, particularly
in line with PRC initiatives and policies, for example: “The New Model of Major Power
Relationship Research Project 2014,” “Taiwan Arms Sales Research Project 2014,” and
the “Pacific Community Initiative.”
CUSEF also funds a number of annual exchange programs, including for members of
Congress, state and local officials, historically black colleges and universities, as well as
several journalist delegations, including one for students of journalism. CUSEF often
partners with the Center for American Progress, the American Foreign Policy Council,
and the East-West Institute. However, each partnership is different. The Center for
American Progress, for example, pays its own way in its work with CUSEF. CUSEF also
funds projects with think-tank analysts who are not China scholars, such as a project
on US-China relations in the Arctic. One think-tank analyst who was involved in the
CUSEF-funded “Creating a Pacific Community” project became uncomfortable with
the overall orientation of the project and dropped out.
C.H. Tung is personally proactive, often visiting the United States and meeting with
think-tank experts. On one occasion, he encouraged an American scholar to write an
article together with a noted Chinese scholar on the South China Sea. He also offered
to establish a massive program with one institute in which the think tank would train
Chinese Party School officials on free market economics (the idea was eventually
rejected by the think tank). In addition, CUSEF has funded the publication of at least
two books in which US analysts were involved. In both cases, the analysts state that
C.H. was “hands-off” in the process. Yet, in another instance, when a US scholar
approached the CUSEF for possible funding of a major book on US-China relations,
the foundation insisted on two conditions: that half of the contributors be Chinese
scholars, and that the foundation would have the right to review the manuscript prior
to publication. The American scholar in question refused these conditions and looked
elsewhere for support.
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Taiwan’s TECRO also supports work at several think tanks. In rare cases—because one
usually excludes the other—US think tanks end up accepting funds from both Taiwan
and mainland China sources.
Visa Access
Most American scholars consider travel to China an important element of their ability
to do their job—attending conferences, participating in delegations, and undertaking
independent research. Given this imperative, the issue of visa access is a central one.
While most analysts receive single-entry professional exchange (F) visas, a few
routinely receive one-year multiple-entry F visas, while some have ten-year tourist (L)
visas. Others receive double-entry visas, if proof of specific invitations are produced.
One US think-tank scholar, a Chinese national, travels to China on a Chinese passport.
While ten-year multiple-entry tourist visas are, of course, optimal—there is also a serious
potential downside: namely, that they are for “tourism,” and, according to Chinese
law, professional activities are not permitted. One senior scholar who holds a ten-year
tourist visa was recently visited and interrogated at his hotel in Beijing after several
days of meetings with Chinese think tanks and universities.
Several think-tank analysts expressed the opinion that Chinese officials are now paying
more attention to the writings of American think-tank analysts—not only books,
articles, and op-eds, but also social media. This is done not only to become familiar
with changing views but to catalog who is supportive and who is critical of China’s
policies. One scholar believes that, as a result of a comment posted on Twitter, this
individual was required to go to the Chinese embassy for an interview before being
granted a visa. This had never happened in his previous decades of China-related travel.
In another instance, Beijing attempted to enforce its sovereignty claims through the
visa process. A visa was initially denied because an American scholar had stated that
“Hong Kong” and “Taiwan” were places he had previously visited, instead of “Hong
Kong SAR,” and “Taiwan, China.” Most of the scholars interviewed believe that the
process of gaining a visa has become much more politicized and difficult in the past
year or two, with much more scrutiny given to an applicant’s political views. Among
those interviewed, only one think-tank scholar reported actually being denied a visa.
(However, there have been reports of other think-tank analysts being rejected who
are reluctant to go public about their denials.) In addition, most of those interviewed
observed that the Chinese embassy now often issues visas the day before or even the
morning of departure, making the visa process laborious and nerve‐racking.
Two interviewees reported that companies that specialize in expediting visa
applications have indicated that their respective think tanks are on a blacklist that
makes obtaining visas problematic. In one case, an interviewee related a case in which
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a junior researcher was told not to list the think tank as her place of employment
on her visa application or it might be rejected. (To avoid this scenario, the senior
researcher reached out to a Chinese official to pave the way and the visa was issued.)
In another instance, a visa expediter was banned from doing business with the
Chinese embassy after it informed a think tank that it had landed on a list making
it difficult to get visas.
A senior Chinese official told one think-tank analyst that responsibility for reviewing
visa requests has shifted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of
Public Security, thus creating many delays and difficulties. One US think-tank scholar
reported that he has not only been advised on a number of occasions not to even
apply for a visa but also has had a planned invitation to a conference hosted by an
American company revoked because the Foreign Ministry told the company not to
invite him. Others have been granted visas only for “personal” trips, with the proviso
that they do no public speaking nor meet with anyone outside of family members or
cultural figures.
Think-tank scholars report that on several occasions, when one member of a
delegation has been in danger of not receiving a visa (or not receiving it in time),
reaching out to the Chinese Embassy or consular officials (in one case threatening to
cancel the delegation) has resulted in a favorable disposition. Two think tanks now
routinely reach out to Chinese officials before submitting applications in order to pave
the way. Nonetheless, a few think-tank analysts are concerned about being beholden
to the embassy or the consulate and the shadow such dependency casts on their ability
to continue their work. One analyst indicated that although he is asked to help other
members of the think tank with their visa issues, he does not want to be in debt to the
embassy and therefore does not offer to help proactively.
Chinese Media and Think Tanks
The Chinese media offer both opportunities and pitfalls to American think-tank
analysts. A significant part of a think-tank analyst’s job is to influence official and
public opinion—and the media, whether Chinese or Western, is an essential part of
that process. Think-tank analysts are under no illusion, however, that the Chinese
media can be trusted to present their ideas as they are delivered. As one interviewee
underscored, “The desire of Chinese media is to make Americans see things the
Chinese way—in a positive and beneficial light—and to present positive American
views to the Chinese public. You have to be prepared that the Chinese media will have
leading questions and know that they will not include critical things.” One senior
US scholar has had multiple experiences of censorship, and one case of fabricated
quotations, by Chinese newspapers. It is also apparent that Chinese journalists
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increasingly flood public events put on by US think tanks in Washington, using the
events as press conferences and to pose leading questions. While Western reporters are
not immune to this type of behavior, the Chinese media undertake such distortions
in a far more systematic manner, with a pointed political agenda that is usually
determined by the government’s current political “line.”
With this in mind, US think-tank analysts have developed a varied set of approaches
to their interactions with the Chinese media. Some see the Chinese media as an
opportunity to get their views across to the Chinese public, even though, as one think
tanker acknowledges, he knows he may be censored in “inappropriate ways.” Another
stated that despite the obvious biases, he still gives a lot of interviews—to CCTV,
CGTN, Xinhua, People’s Daily, and the Shanghai Media Group, among them. At least
one claims that while he does frequent CGTN interviews, he has never been censored.
Several US think-tank scholars indicate that they keep track of their interviews, and if
they are misquoted, they stop speaking to that journalist. One notes that he refuses to
do interviews on sensitive political issues, such as party congresses. Another indicates
he will only do live television as a hedge against being censored, while another
indicates he will only be interviewed in written email form. Two analysts refuse to
give interviews to Chinese media at all, with the exception of those that occur in
the immediate aftermath of a public talk when an analyst is approached by Chinese
journalists. In one case, an analyst reported that Xinhua conducted an in-person
background interview after she refused to write an op-ed, but she was willing to share
her views (which were negative). Xinhua then drafted a full, positive-sounding op-ed
in her name, which they planned to publish without her approval. She successfully
blocked it, and her institute now has a blanket ban on interviews with the Chinese
press unless there is a special reason. This is intended to send a message that they do
not believe the Chinese media can be trusted.
The opportunity to earn money through interviews was mentioned by one scholar. She
noted that CGTN pays $150 per interview. The network warned her, however, that if
she was too critical of the Chinese government, she would not be invited back. CGTN
also indicated that she should be “more like” another think-tank analyst who had
become a regular on CGTN.
Writing and Publishing in China
The majority of the think-tank analysts who have been interviewed for this section
have refused to write op-eds for Chinese newspapers, with several stating that they
have had bad experiences in which content has been censored. One scholar reports
several instances of pieces being commissioned by Global Times, only to have his piece
spiked after submission because of its controversial content. Others, however, have
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written for Chinese publications and have not experienced any such issues. Several
analysts noted that they have heard that their articles and reports have been translated
into Chinese in neibu (internal circulation) channels for consumption by think tanks
and government officials. One interviewee commented that if what she writes is
positive, it is published openly; if it is critical, it is only published internally.
A number of interviewees also reported that their work had been improperly published
on Chinese websites. Sohu has taken think-tank reports and put them online without
permission; one analyst forced the company to take them down from the web. Another
scholar reported that a Chinese think tank at one point claimed she was one of its
fellows and posted bogus content on its website that it alleged she had written.
While some of the think-tank scholars interviewed have had their books translated
into Chinese by mainland presses, most have not. A growing number do not try,
recognizing that significant parts of their books would never make it past the censors.
When informed privately by the translator of her book that large portions were being
excised, one scholar halted the Chinese publication process. Another scholar battled
for two years with the Chinese publisher after the contract had been signed between
the Western and Chinese publishers. The State Press and Publishing Administration
demanded more than seventy deletions, finally settling on five with the agreement
of the scholar. In the end, however, the Chinese publisher informed the scholar’s
publisher that the book could not proceed to publication because of “unfriendly
remarks” the scholar had been making in the media. Most US scholars simply do not
bother with mainland publishers and look for publication opportunities in Taiwan or
Hong Kong. Several US scholars believe that there are pirated copies of their books or
at least partially translated copies available within China. At least one scholar found
that a search on Baidu yielded half of her most recent book online.
Not all scholars are willing to sacrifice the opportunity to be published in China.
One analyst reported that a senior non-China expert at their think tank permitted
his book to be published in China, even though several pages had been mistranslated
and the editors had actually created some new passages that did not exist anywhere
in the original text. Even the title and subtitle of the book, as well as the author’s own
professional title, were incorrectly identified.
Public Voice
The issue of censorship also arises in the context of how think-tank analysts present
their own views publicly, especially when in China. On the whole, think-tank scholars
show determination to raise sensitive topics and be forthright in presenting their
views. But it is an understandable human instinct to want to be polite and diplomatic
while still conveying one’s own views honestly. As one scholar, who also does a lot of
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consulting, noted, “Access to China is my livelihood.” At the same time, he argues,
“I never say anything contrary to my views, but I write in a way that is less shrill.”
Another scholar noted, “I don’t self-censor, but there is no need to launch a polemic
every day of the week . . . ​polemics get your visa cut off. China’s greatest power is
the power of visa control.” A third commented, “I don’t censor the substance, but
I may modulate what I say.” He argued that he sometimes indulges the sensibilities of
the PRC in order to get his deeper point across. As another analyst noted, “I avoid
sensationalizing. I am willing to be critical, but I try not to make attacks on Xi.”
And different interviewees distinguish between writing and speaking: “I do not
compromise on writing, but I am cautious in interviews: I will say the same message
but indirectly, not confrontationally.” One analyst said, “I make sure that if I go into
battle, I do so thoughtfully, not accidentally.” She tries to be very strategic about the
messages that she sends and tries not to weigh in on every small issue or bluntly
charge, “You are wrong!” In a similar vein, one other scholar says he often uses an
interrogatory, rather than accusatory, approach when raising challenging issues, such
as human rights.
The knowledge that what an analyst says publicly reflects not only on the individual
but also on the analyst’s institution also shapes at least one scholar’s thinking: “There
is a conflict between protecting your institute and speaking truthfully. Whether it is
over access or money. Sometimes I put the positive first—and then say . . .’but some
people say.’ I might not start right off with Xi Jinping—I might be more indirect. In
public meetings, there is a tacit understanding that you will not be super critical of
China.” Another suggests that it is “very hard not to subconsciously self-censor.” This
person indicated that when their institute does projects on counterterrorism in the
Middle East or Southeast Asia, they are very careful about discussing China’s restive
region of Xinjiang where up to one million Uighurs are presently believed to be in
reeducation camps. In general, they do not take on projects concerning Taiwan or
Xinjiang.
Interviewees expressed a deep sensitivity around the issue of Taiwan and how to refer
to the island and its officials. One analyst observed that in an invitation, his institute
would not identify Taiwan’s representative to the United States as an “ambassador,” but
during the event, he would indeed orally introduce the official as the “ambassador.” Or
as another scholar noted, “I am tactful but keep to my original point of view. I don’t
change the substance. On Taiwan, in private conversations, I use President Tsai—but I
also maintain neutrality in public to ensure that is acceptable to Taiwan and the PRC.”
Two analysts stated that they do not self-censor “at all.” They understand the
temptation, but they try to write and say in public exactly what they would in private.
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Pressure from Think-Tank Boards or Outside Influencers
Interaction between think-tank analysts and the members of their institution’s boards
of trustees varies significantly. Some engage frequently, socialize, and consult on
China-related issues—while others have virtually no contact. Only three interviewees
reported incidents of attempted interference. In one case, a prominent former board
member complained to the head of the think tank about an article that was “too tough”
on China. However, no pressure, besides the obviously intimidating impact of having
a piece of writing singled out by an overseer, was brought to bear on the scholar. In
another case, a board member tried to pressure a think-tank president to avoid hosting
the Dalai Lama, but failed. A third instance involved the Hong Kong political activist
discussed earlier. The tendency can also work in the other direction. One scholar
indicated that his board is very involved and has lately become tougher on China in
recent years, focusing on “how do we still counter China, yet still engage.”
Chinese Nationals in US Think Tanks
American think-tank analysts differ in their assessment of the risks and rewards
for hosting Chinese scholars as visiting fellows or employing Chinese nationals on
staff, with most suggesting that it is better to have them inside the think tanks to
understand how they are thinking and working. One analyst said he “assumed some
or all would be interrogated” when they returned to China. “RAND,” he said, “should
be worried.” One researcher noted that she is “careful to keep Chinese nationals from
attending sensitive meetings featuring US officials or military officers,” but otherwise
welcomes them to events.
Only one Washington think tank hosts Chinese scholars on a regular and continuous
basis (although Washington-based universities do so more often), including them in
programming and most meetings, even when funded by a Chinese host institution.
Scholars at this institution view them as valuable for gaining insights and for training
purposes. Another think-tank analyst who has hosted visiting fellows from China
pointed out that two prominent Chinese scholars who spent time at their institution
went back and wrote “important papers.” Still, some expressed concern over all the
“bright young Chinese showing up on Mass [Massachusetts] Ave.” and the potential
that they might have for reporting back to Beijing. The scholar noted that think
tanks want young people to “plow through the Chinese literature,” and this means
hiring Chinese nationals, Chinese Americans, or Taiwanese because of their language
abilities. Some analysts expressed concerns that think-tank analysts who are of
Chinese nationality (either nationals or American citizens) may face special pressures
from the imputation that as ethnic Chinese, they are susceptible to Chinese influence
and control.
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Broader Concerns
Think-tank analysts voiced a range of concerns around the issue of Chinese
influence–seeking activities in the United States. One is the deliberate effort to manage
US perceptions and to frame issues in ways that are favorable to the Chinese
Communist Party. As one analyst noted, “This requires pushback, which is tough work.”
While many believed that they could adequately defend themselves against efforts to
influence them, noting as one did that the “the general capacity of US society to push
back is not bad,” they worried about their colleagues who were not knowledgeable
China experts and might therefore be more easily deceived. For example, one scholar
pointed out that with US-China cooperation, the incentive is to come up with shared
values and ideas. He noted that in the case of the Sanya Initiative (the US-China
dialogue featuring retired military officers from both sides), he has had to “talk them
(the American participants) off the ledge; they think they are being tough, but they
are mistaken.” This same analyst sees the American media as complicit in echoing
Chinese perspectives, noting that when Xi Jinping delivered his speech in Davos in
January 2017, few reporters understood that the Chinese were in the midst of a major
propaganda campaign to promote globalization 2.0. He also suggests that there is “de
facto self-censorship” of entire areas of scholarship: human rights for one. Another
analyst noted that outside of the National Endowment for Democracy, she does not see
much foundation interest in normal discourse in this issue either.
One scholar worried about growing Chinese control over all areas of US-Chinese
interaction: “The Chinese are following people, bugging our hotel rooms. There is
imbalanced control that serves CCP interests not ours. There is lack of serious training
by the US side on how to deal with Chinese influence.” The potential for Chinese
money to give China leverage over American think tanks also provoked a degree of
anxiety. Several scholars expressed concern over funding issues, noting that reliance
on a single funder with an agenda makes scholars vulnerable. In addition, one scholar
worried that the amount of money China is spending to promote its views, whether
through think-tank cooperation or the Chinese media (such as CGTN paying for its
interviews) means that China will ultimately be able to “buy its way in.”
A number of analysts believed that the involvement of the US government in these
issues will only make things more contentious. There is concern that Washington will
overreact. As one analyst noted, there is a type of “binaryism in Washington, in which
you must be ‘for or against’ China; you are either friendly to China or producing stuff
that says China is evil.” This scholar, along with several others, raised the issue of
the rise of anti-China sentiments, such as the “yellow peril” and McCarthyism, and
expressed concern about Chinese Americans and anyone who has interests with China
coming under attack. One analyst mentioned the Committee of 100, a collection of
prominent Chinese Americans, as being particularly vulnerable to unfair attack.
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Another analyst noted that we need “a granular view on issues of sharp power.”
He pointed in particular to Confucius Institutes, arguing that he would not accept
Confucius Institute–sponsored research, but was fine with language training, although
it would be better to get them off campuses. He laughed at the idea that they were
“effective instruments of Chinese propaganda.” Along these lines, a few individuals
indicated that they were less concerned about Chinese influence in the social sciences
and more concerned about reports that Chinese students and postdocs in scientific
research labs bring restricted technologies back to China.
Finally, there were calls from some analysts for far more reciprocity than currently exists.
These analysts felt that the playing field between the two countries was out of balance
and argued that there should be a much stronger dose of reciprocity and “hardball” in
US-China exchanges, arguing that the American side should curtail or cut off contacts
until Chinese institutions were willing to operate at a level of openness similar to that
found in their American counterparts.
Conclusion and Recommendations
American think-tank scholars working on China face an increasingly challenging
research environment. But in this challenge, they are hardly unique. Members of
the media and the civil society/NGO world also share similar, even more daunting,
challenges. The process for obtaining visas has become more onerous; the quality of
engagement with Chinese counterparts has declined and become more difficult; and
opportunities to do field-based research, as well as archival work, have diminished.
Track 2 dialogues are viewed with increasing skepticism as to their value by more
and more US scholars and policy specialists, who find their Chinese colleagues ever
more unable and/or unwilling to share their perspectives in an open and meaningful
manner. Many think-tank analysts are responding by limiting their Track 2 efforts and
changing the way they conduct their research.
At the same time, a small but growing group of well-funded Chinese scholars and
officials are proactively seeking to shape the American narrative and American views
of China. They are doing so by supporting and funding joint projects with American
partners in ways that reflect Chinese government priorities, but they give them the
opportunity to choose and work with only those American scholars viewed by China
as sympathetic to China’s goals. To date, these efforts do not appear to have influenced
the US debate over China in a significant manner, but it is important to be aware of
the money and effort being thrown at the endeavor.
Chinese funding of American think tanks remains limited. C.H. Tung, through his
China-US Exchange Foundation, is to date the most common source of financial
support, although most report his funding as “hands-off.” A few Chinese companies
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have also bankrolled a limited number of American think-tank activities. However,
American think tanks with centers in China have actively engaged in fund-raising
from mainland Chinese sources. With only a few exceptions, American think-tank
analysts do not foresee that Chinese money will become a significant factor in their
work at home any time soon, although because of endemic funding shortages at most
nonprofits, worries about reliance on Chinese money are not unfounded.
Chinese media relentlessly solicit American think-tank scholars’ opinions for
consumption within both the United States and China. At least one outlet pays
participants for their time and makes it clear that criticism of China is unwelcome.
Censorship of written work is common, even expected, so that few interviewees expect
to have their books published in China. American think-tank analysts appear most
annoyed when their work is illegally and/or incorrectly published on Chinese websites.
In most instances, they seek to have the work taken down from the web.
American think-tank analysts have a highly developed understanding of Chinese
efforts to influence their views —whether in the form of heavy-handed criticism
from the Chinese embassy for an article or a proposed meeting with someone like the
Dalai Lama, a Hong Kong dissident, or via more subtle efforts that arise through joint
projects funded by Chinese partners. To the last one, all interviewees for this study
indicated that they refuse to be pressured into changing their practices. Some
think-tank scholars acknowledge that they try to be diplomatic in their public discourse
on China—but insist that they do not change their overall message, only their tone
or choice of wording. Some argue that they save their tough language to deliver the
most important messages. But some also admit to acceding to Chinese demands on
how to present Taiwanese officials in public settings—such as in the announcements
of a meeting on the think tank’s website—but then adopting the Taiwanese preference
during the meeting itself. The general view—although not shared by all—was that
seeking to avoid unnecessarily insulting or upsetting the Chinese is the better strategy.
But most agreed that the arena of acceptable parlance was shrinking and that pressures
were growing.
As an antidote, the American think-tank community should understand that its position
is one with significant leverage. Chinese officials and scholars seek to use think tanks
as venues for visiting Chinese officials, as legitimating partners for Chinese-supported
research projects that will influence the American narrative, and as important sources
of information concerning the changing US political landscape. The American scholars
should celebrate their principles of independence, use the leverage their institutional
frameworks provide to resist incursion, and constructively push for greater reciprocity.
Some specific recommendations include:
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Promote Transparency
• Think tanks should—in partnership with universities—jointly and regularly
produce summaries of difficulties in China-related research (access to regions,
agencies, persons, visas, etc.) and make these available to each other and to
US officials. The latter, in turn, should be mindful of the reciprocal nature of
think-tank work and how the inability of American scholars to secure meetings
with Chinese officials and scholars when Chinese scholars are afforded such
privileges is harmful to the stability of the overall relationship.
• Think tanks should publicly disclose the source of funding for events, publications,
and other activities. If think-tank leaders elect to solicit funds from Hong Kong
or mainland Chinese sources, they should be transparent about from where the
money came and how it is being used, to ensure that there is no opportunity for
the Chinese funder to harmfully affect the research agenda or outcome.
Promote Integrity
• A Code of Conduct should be worked out among US think tanks—perhaps in
conjunction with American university China studies centers—to establish “do’s and
don’ts” in their exchanges with Chinese institutions. Once this is worked out among
American institutions, then counterparts in other democratic countries should also
be approached with an eye toward establishing multilateral Codes of Conduct.
Promote Reciprocity
• US think-tank representatives—the presidents and senior China scholars—should
arrange a meeting with the Chinese ambassador to express their collective
perspectives on these issues and call for changes. Such a meeting could be
usefully coupled with a jointly signed letter of concern by directors of all major
US think tanks.
• If any member of any think-tank delegation is denied a visa, the delegation
should cancel the trip. It sends a profoundly wrong signal to proceed, if China
is able to control the composition of a delegation. The think tank should also
consider a moratorium on Chinese officials visiting or speaking at the think tank
until the visa issues are resolved. The same principle may be applied to Chinese
think tanks that refuse to receive American scholars for visits. In such cases,
US think tanks should seriously consider not hosting residential stays for Chinese
visiting scholars from institutions that do not offer parallel opportunities for
American scholars in China. (At present, only the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies permit foreign
scholars in residence.)
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• The US government should not unilaterally grant Chinese think-tank or university
scholars ten-year visas, as it has been doing, without exacting across-the-board
reciprocal treatment for US think-tank and university scholars. At the same time,
the US government should also advocate consistently on behalf of US think-tank
and university scholars who have been barred from visiting China.
Two core values cut across all of our concerns: freedom of speech and reciprocity. As a
democratic society, we should tolerate no infringements—overt or covert—on our
freedom of speech and freedom of analysis concerning China. A “leveling of the
playing field” in terms of upholding the principles and practicalities of reciprocity in
our exchanges with Chinese counterparts is needed, because it is an essential part of
making the relationship both more equitable and reciprocal and more stable and thus
durable.
Notes
1 ​These include: the American Enterprise Institute, Asia Society, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Brookings Institute, Center for American Progress, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, International Peace Institute, Institute for China-American Studies, Kissinger
Institute on China and the United States, and Stimson Center.
Think Tanks
SECTION 6
Media
When the Xinhua News Agency leased a massive sign in Times Square in 2011 and then
agreed to a twenty-year lease for a new US headquarters on the top floor of a Broadway
skyscraper, it was clear that, as analyst He Qinglian put it, “The Chinese have arrived.” 1
Xinhua’s foray into Manhattan was followed by a website of the People’s Daily, the
mouthpiece of the Communist Party, which set up shop in the Empire State Building. 2
At a time when Western media outlets are challenged by the internet and weakened
by uncertain business models, China’s rise as a major player in the media landscape
around the globe has become all the more worthy of attention. The Chinese
government’s campaign to “grab the right to speak” from Western media outlets and
independent Chinese voices, which it accuses of distorting news about China and
sullying China’s image, has come with a rapid expansion of China’s English-language
media operations, a concerted campaign to control overseas Chinese-language media,
and ongoing efforts to block attempts by Western media to contend inside China.
Xinhua News Agency journalist Xiong Min summed up the motivation for China’s
new campaign in 2010. “The right to speak in the world is not distributed equally,” she
wrote. “Eighty percent of the information is monopolized by Western media.” 3 It was
time, she said, to end that monopoly by means of what China has called the Grand
External Propaganda Campaign ( 大外宣 ).
Since coming to power, President Xi Jinping has overseen the intensification of this
external propaganda blitz, which was launched in 2007 by former Party general
secretary Hu Jintao. As Xi told the November 2014 Foreign Affairs Work Conference
in Beijing: “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative,
and better communicate China’s messages to the world.” 4 This is the task CCP
propagandists have now undertaken in an increasingly fulsome way. On February 19,
2016, Xi visited the headquarters of the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and China
Central Television, where he again stressed the importance of external propaganda
work. 5 At the August 2018 National Meeting on Ideology and Propaganda, Xi stated:
“To present good images, we should improve our international communication
capability, tell China’s stories well, disseminate China’s voice, show an authentic
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and comprehensive China to the world, and raise the country’s soft power and the
influence of Chinese culture.” 6 External propaganda work has long been an important
foreign policy instrument for the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic
of China, but under Xi it has become a top priority of China’s party-state.
State Media
China’s Communist Party and government have a long history of trying to influence
international opinion. Over the years, the themes of its external propaganda have
varied substantially—usually in parallel with dramatic fluctuations in its own domestic
political campaigns ( 运动 ) and related slogans ( 口号 ), shifts in ideology ( 意识形态 ), meta
propaganda narratives ( 提法 ), and substantive elements in China’s diplomacy ( 外交 ).
The shifts in Beijing’s propaganda lines ( 宣传路线 ) throughout PRC history have been
dizzyingly consistent, but they are always important to follow as indicators of the
country’s direction.
During the 1950s, Communist China used organizations such as the China News
Service, a successor to the Party’s International News Agency (founded in 1938), to
appeal to overseas Chinese for support of the new revolution. The Party placed this
news service under the State Council’s Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs. Other
propaganda campaigns targeted allies in the Western world, such as black nationalist
figures from the United States like Robert Williams, who were given airtime on
shortwave broadcasts from Beijing, and a few Western writers and journalists, like
Edgar Snow, Felix Greene, and William Hinton, who were offered rare, and sometimes
lucrative, peeks behind the Bamboo Curtain.
During the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, Beijing’s propaganda outreach to
overseas Chinese slowed, as the Party persecuted those in China with foreign ties. But
following the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 and the economic reform program
led by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, the Party once again directly engaged with
the overseas Chinese community as well as with mainstream Western society and
media, appealing to all comers to help China modernize. In 1980, the Party formed
the External Propaganda Group ( 对外宣传小组 ) and placed it under the Propaganda
Department of the CCP Central Committee. Zhu Muzhi, the former chief of the
Xinhua News Agency and a vice minister of propaganda, was its first head. In 1991, the
group was transferred to the State Council, where it was still internally referred to as
the External Propaganda Group. For foreign consumption, however, it was called the
State Council Information Office.
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From 1980, Beijing added to its stable of foreign-facing propaganda publications—such
as Beijing Review, China Reconstructs, and China Pictorial—by starting or reopening
more than twenty periodicals, including the English-language China Daily, the overseas
edition of the People’s Daily, the overseas edition of Outlook ( 望 ), and the Voice of China
( 华声报 ). The Party also resumed publishing material for overseas Chinese. During the
Cultural Revolution, the number of magazines targeting overseas Chinese had shrunk
to ten, whereas by the end of the 1980s, it had surpassed 130. Before 1982, the state-run
Xinhua News Agency had focused almost solely on providing news to domestic Chinese
clients. In 1983, however, it also began sending news to international clients. The China
News Service, which had suspended operations during the Cultural Revolution, also
resumed work, sending hundreds of stories a day to overseas Chinese-language media.
Today the CNS employs more than two thousand people worldwide, working out of
forty-six bureaus. The Party directed its media outlets in their overseas work to support
socialism with Chinese characteristics, push the policies of reform and opening up, and
oppose hegemonism, or, in other words, fight against Western ideological control.
In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s propaganda agencies redoubled
their efforts to “grab the right to speak,” or gain “discourse power” ( 话语权 ).
The worldwide torch-lighting ceremony touched off free-Tibet rallies and other
human rights protests that angered Chinese authorities and some Chinese as well.
An anti-CNN movement began in China, alleging that Western media outlets were
distorting “China’s story.” This was the genesis for what has come to be known as the
Grand Overseas Propaganda Campaign ( 大外宣 ), first promoted by the administration
of Party Chief Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The International Herald Leader, a
publication of the Xinhua News Agency, reported in 2009 that foreign propaganda
work had been elevated by the Party to a “systematic, strategic position,” the goal of
which was to “grab back the right to speak, and improve China’s international image.” 7
Reports that had first surfaced in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post in 2009, that
China had earmarked $7 billion for the campaign, were soon repeated by the Chinese
media, most notably in the March 14 edition of Phoenix Weekly. 8
The Grand Overseas Propaganda Campaign has been grand, indeed, with Chinese
sources reporting hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on a multitude of projects
designed to bolster China’s image. The expansion of the Xinhua News Agency is but
one example. From 120, the number of Xinhua bureaus around the world has now
grown to more than 200 9 and its client base has expanded to more than 1,450. What is
more, it now reports in seven languages and competes directly with all the major wire
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services of the world. In the United States, Xinhua doubled the number of bureaus,
adding Chicago, Houston, and San Francisco to its original footprint in Washington,
DC, New York, and Los Angeles. Xinhua, like other state-owned Chinese media outlets,
also began hiring local talent, and in 2009 it began a TV broadcast in English.
As part of this vigorous propaganda campaign, the Party has sought to turn China
Central Television into a global competitor to CNN. CCTV was already airing in
America as of 2004, when it cooperated with EchoStar, America’s second-largest
satellite TV company, to launch the Chinese “Great Wall Platform” package, including
twelve Mandarin channels, two Cantonese channels, one Hokkien channel, and one
English channel. That same year, Rupert Murdoch’s News Group helped CCTV place
programming on Time Warner and NewsCorp’s US television network. CCTV also
expanded its offerings in the United States, growing its bureau in Washington and
hiring American reporters too. By 2012, CCTV, recently renamed the China Global
Television Network (CGTN), was broadcasting in seven languages. Its programs
for American audiences regularly feature personalities from Russia’s state-funded
propaganda outlet, RT, which was recently required to register as a foreign agent; RT,
in turn, regularly features CGTN personalities.
China Radio International (CRI) was also given a foreign platform. Decades ago, the
Beijing-based propaganda outlet relied solely on shortwave broadcasts to beam China’s
message to the world, but in the late 2000s it began leasing local stations around the
globe and across the United States that it supplied with content made in Beijing. CRI
has used a US-based company through which it leases stations. That firm is EDI Media
Inc. ( 鷹龍傳媒有限公司 ), which also owns other media properties that tow Beijing’s line:
G&E TV ( 環球東方衛視 ), G&E Studio Network ( 環球東方電台 ), and EDI City Newsweek
( 城市新聞週刊 ). 10 A CRI subsidiary in China, Guoguang Century Media, holds a majority
stake in G&E Studio. 11 When it comes to reporting on mainland China, the content of
all of EDI’s outlets mirrors that of China’s state-owned media.
China’s state-run media have proved to be nimble in accomplishing Beijing’s goal of
penetrating US markets. In 2013, the Hong Kong–based Phoenix Satellite TV group,
which has close ties to the Chinese state and broadcasts in China, attempted to
purchase two major FM stations in Los Angeles that shared the same frequency. One of
them, KDAY, covers West L.A., while KDEY stretches into Riverside and San Bernardino
counties to the east of the city. Greater Los Angeles is home to more than a half million
Chinese, the second-biggest concentration next to New York City. But none of the
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region’s Chinese-language radio stations are particularly loyal to Beijing, representing
either independent Chinese voices or those supporting the banned religious sect, Falun
Gong. According to sources close to the deal, Phoenix structured the offer to avoid a
US law that limits foreign ownership of US radio stations to 25 percent. In filings with
the Federal Communications Commission, Phoenix was listed as owning 20 percent of
the US-based investor, RBC, while the remaining 80 percent was owned by an editor
at Phoenix who is also a US citizen. 12 Under such a setup, no FCC regulations would
have been broken. To be extra sure that the deal would go through, however, advisors
to Phoenix convinced the Hong Kong company to seek approval from the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a Treasury Department bureau
that monitors foreign investments in the United States on national security grounds.
In a ruling that surprised the potential investors, CFIUS declined to approve the deal,
referring it to then-president Obama. Sources close to the deal noted that the fact that a
Phoenix employee in the United States had pleaded guilty to espionage-related charges
did not help Phoenix’s case. 13 RBC pulled out of the deal on September 25, 2013.
But the efforts to break into the L.A. radio market did not end there. In the summer
of 2018, a New York firm, H&H Capital Partners, announced that it was buying a
Mexican radio station, XEWW, that broadcasts throughout Southern California. 14
Sources involved in that deal said that H&H sought to buy a Mexican station in
order to avoid scrutiny in the United States. H&H is a New York-based firm led by
several individuals who spent years working as reporters for Global Times, a state-run
newspaper in China. Filings from H&H to the FCC about the deal suggest that Phoenix
Satellite TV remains a player in the purchase as the address that H&H gave for its Los
Angeles–based holding company was the same as Phoenix’s offices in L.A. 15 H&H’s
attempt to buy XEWW to broadcast into the United States has been challenged at the
FCC by a Chinese-language radio station linked to Falun Gong. 16
China’s main English-language newspaper, China Daily, has also expanded operations
into America, starting a North American edition in 2009. In addition, through its
marketing arm, China Watch, the paper began distributing English-language content
directly as advertising inserts in the Wall Street Journal, the Des Moines Register, and the
Washington Post, among other leading US newspapers. Often, it’s hard to tell that China
Watch’s material is an ad, as was the case highlighted by President Donald Trump with
an advertising insert in the Sunday Des Moines Register—an insert that the president
suggested was aimed at undermining political support both for the president and the
Republican party. 17 Rough estimates from newspaper executives indicate that China
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Daily pays $250,000 for each insert in major US dailies. In 2009, the Global Times ( 环球
时报 ), part of the People’s Daily group, started an English-language newspaper as well.
Chinese investment in the US media market is not limited to the central government.
Chinese provincial media firms also have a footprint in the United States. Sky Link TV
( 天下衛視 ) is one example. It is fully owned by Guangzhou Media American Co, Ltd.
( 美國廣視傳媒有限公司 ), which, in turn, is owned by GZ Television Media ( 广州影视传媒有限公司 ), a Chinese state-owned media outlet. Sky Link’s story also illustrates the switch
from Taiwan money to mainland money in the US Chinese-language media world. Sky
Link was established in 1989 by a Taiwanese corporation. In 2009, it was purchased by
a private Chinese company; three years later, the Chinese state-owned GZ Television
Media bought Sky Link TV, a takeover that was hailed by the PRC’s Ministry of
Commerce as a key “cultural export” in 2014. 18 When Sky Link TV reports on China,
the Sino-US relationship, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other important issues concerning
China, it follows and quite often repeats verbatim the official line from PRC media. Its
major business partners include CCTV and Xinhua.
The Grand Overseas Propaganda Campaign has continued under the regime of General
Secretary Xi Jinping, who, in his 2014 New Year’s address, called on all media friendly
to the CCP to “better tell China’s story.” In March 2018, the Party announced plans
to unite these individual efforts into a mammoth overseas-facing propaganda organ,
known as the Voice of China, by merging the foreign operations of China Global
Television Network, China National Radio and China Radio International. 19 (It is not
clear whether the parallel with the Voice of America was intentional.)
Despite all of these efforts, President Xi still appears to be unsatisfied with the Party’s
efforts to “grab the right to speak.” In August 2018, the Chinese government announced
a shake-up in its propaganda organs, reflecting significant concern at the heart of the
Party that China was not winning its ideological battle with the West. 20
Diaspora Media
In the early 1990s, the state-owned China News Service and the Overseas Chinese Office of
the State Council dispatched editorial personnel to the United States to found the Chineselanguage
TV broadcaster, SinoVision, and the newspaper Qiaobao ( 侨报 ). Shanghai’s
Xinmin Wanbao sent staff to the United States to start up an American edition as
well. Chinese officials backed this push as part of an effort to fight back against the
negative publicity generated by the Party’s crackdown on protests around Tiananmen
Square on June 4, 1989.
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The SinoVision/Qiaobao story is illustrative of Beijing’s push to dominate Chineselanguage
media in the United States. SinoVision, Qiaobao, and the Sino American Times
( 美洲时报 ) all belong to the Asian Culture and Media Group ( 美國亞洲文化傳媒集團 ).
Sources in these firms say that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council
of PRC ( 中國國務院僑務辦公室 ) set up the firm in the early 1990s but hid its financial role
in these companies.
All the major executives of these firms appear to have been either appointed directly
or approved by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. 21 Most of the major executives
and editors in these businesses served either as editors or reporters for the China News
Service or in the Overseas Chinese Office of the State Council. The group’s flagship
newspaper, Qiaobao, is divided into two divisions: the Western US Qiaobao ( 美国西侨胞 )
and the Eastern United States. Qiaobao ( 美国东侨报 ). The president of the Western division
is also the chairman of the board of directors of Rhythm Media Group, a corporation
that consists of Qiaobao and a few other media outlets, including radio stations in
Seattle and elsewhere. 22 The chairman worked for the official China News Service ( 中新社 ) for many years as a reporter before coming to the United States to establish the
Western US Qiaobao in the 1990s. The China News Service is a branch of the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office. In 2015, the service described the work of the top executives of
the Eastern US Qiaobao’s ( 美东侨报 ) work as part of the PRC’s broader push to strengthen
its “soft power” and fight back against “Western media hegemony.” 23 Qiaobao is the
sole major newspaper to use simplified Chinese characters in an effort to appeal to
immigrants from mainland China living abroad. Almost all the news stories in Qiaobao
about China, the Sino-US relationship, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other important issues
important to China are taken directly from official Chinese media outlets or websites,
including CCTV, Xinhua, and the People’s Daily. Its current editor is I-Der Jeng, and in an
email communication with Foreign Policy magazine, he stated that the paper receives no
editorial direction from Beijing. 24 However, like its parent company, numerous reporters
and editors on the paper come from China’s state-owned press outlets. 25
The group’s main TV outlet is SinoVision. It operates two twenty-four-hour channels
(one Chinese and one English language), and it is on the program lineups of cable
systems covering about thirty million people. SinoVision’s website (http:// www​
. sinovision​. net) ranks twelfth among all the Chinese websites in the United States. Like
its sister newspapers, SinoVision was established in 1990 as part of the PRC’s first push
to establish propaganda outlets in the United States. It is headquartered in New York
City, with branches in Boston, Washington, DC, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Seattle. According to Wang Aibing ( 王艾冰 ), a former executive of SinoVision,
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starting in 1990, the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office gave $800,000
a year to SinoVision, ultimately increasing its subsidy to between $2 million and
$3 million a year. Wang made this charge in a 2011 letter to the Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office alleging widespread corruption at the station. 26 Allegations of corruption
and governmental subsidies have not been corroborated.
What is clear, however, is that, like Qiaobao, SinoVision’s content echoes China’s
official media. The vast majority of its stories about China, Sino-American relations,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other important issues for the PRC government are taken
directly from official Chinese media outlets or websites, including CCTV, Xinhua,
and the People’s Daily. In an essay, Qiaobao’s Eastern Group president, You Jiang,
defended his paper’s support of the PRC’s agenda by saying that it stemmed not
from Beijing’s direction, but from demands from pro-Chinese immigrants in the
United States. 27
Forays by PRC organizations to assert direct control over Chinese-language media in
the United States sparked a battle with publications owned by private interests from
Taiwan and Hong Kong that did not share the PRC’s ideological bent. PRC officials
openly acknowledged the political nature of this battle, and in a 2007 interview, Guo
Zhaojin, the president of the state-owned China News Service, noted that if China
could gain control of Chinese-language publications in the United States, China would
be better able to influence the overseas Chinese community, have a say in American
politics, and “protect the national image.” Guo further observed that more than onequarter
of America’s minorities relied on foreign-language media to obtain their news.
Foreign-language media, said Guo, was a “giant hiding in plain sight.” 28
Beijing seems to be winning the battle with Chinese-language outlets expressing views
that dissent from Beijing’s. Over the course of the last twenty years, a series of onceindependent
Chinese-language media have fallen under Beijing’s control. The Sing Tao
Newspaper Group was established in Hong Kong in 1938. In the mid-1990s, its original
owner 29 was forced to divest of interests in the paper, and it was soon taken over by
a pro-PRC businessman, 30 who, starting in 1998, became a member of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, which functions as part of the broader
united front organization network. Sing Tao’s coverage of China is clearly now aligned
with that of state-run media from Beijing. In fact, in May 2001, the year he purchased
Sing Tao, the owner established a joint venture with the Xinhua News Agency to create
an information-service company known as Xinhua Online.
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Another case in point is the World Journal ( 世界日报 ), for years the premier Chineselanguage
paper in the United States serving immigrants from Taiwan and only one of
the six newspapers owned by the United Daily News (UDN), Taiwan’s most influential
newspaper company. The paper once dominated news coverage in Chinatowns across
America, and it acted as the voice of the Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan. Unlike
PRC-controlled outlets, the World Journal did cover events such as the death of the
jailed Chinese human rights advocate and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiabo. But
the Journal’s coverage has shifted in recent years and become more pro-PRC in a
variety of areas, such as China’s militarization of the South China Sea and its handling
of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Sources at the Journal observe that the paper’s owners in
Taiwan are interested in growing their business in China, which may help explain
the paper’s evolving editorial stance. For example, in March 2004, the World Journal
published recruitment notices on the front page, announcing its intention to establish
a mainland news group and recruit reporters in China. In a 2015 essay, an executive 31
at Qiaobao, one of the Journal’s main competitors, noted the Journal’s shifting editorial
stance. “No longer do they only report negative news about the mainland,” he wrote. 32
According to sources inside the newspaper, Chinese consulates in both New York and
San Francisco have pressured World Journal’s local offices not to publish ads related to
the religious sect, Falun Gong, which has been outlawed in China. The New York office
has already acquiesced in full for the East Coast edition. The West Coast edition now
only runs Falun Gong ads in throwaway sections of the paper.
Ming Pao is another formerly independent newspaper that has fallen under Beijing’s
control. For years, its US edition was popular among Cantonese-speaking immigrants
in the United States. In January 2007, the Hong Kong Ming Pao Group announced a
$600 million merger with the two largest Chinese-language media outlets in Malaysia,
the Xingzhou Media and Nanyang News. The merger was welcomed in Beijing. Guo
Zhaojin, then president of the China News Service, said the new company would
develop into one of the largest Chinese print media platforms in the world, with more
than five newspapers in major cities in North America, Southeast Asia, and Greater
China and a daily circulation of more than one million copies.
China’s efforts to dominate Chinese-language media coincided with two other
developments in the 1990s. The Chinese immigrant community boomed in
the United States, as hundreds of thousands of mainland Chinese became US
citizens, transforming the complexion of a community that had been dominated
by immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Second, Taiwan’s political system
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transitioned from an authoritarian state to a democracy, leading to new calls from
the island and from some of its immigrants in the United States for an independent
Taiwan. Seeking to capitalize on the ever-larger number of mainlanders in the United
States and to battle the nascent Taiwan independence movement, PRC authorities
established organizations and Chinese-language schools to bolster their propaganda
work in the United States. The Party’s United Front Work Department founded the
China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in 1988, and
within a decade it had more than one hundred chapters in sixty countries, including
more than a dozen offices in the United States. Chinese officials described Chineselanguage
media, Chinese-language schools, and Chinese-backed organizations as the
“three treasures” ( 三宝 )of united front work overseas. 33
Chinese-language media. By the mid-1990s, analyst He Qinglian estimated that, of
the some one hundred Chinese-language newspapers in the United States, more than
one-third were funded by money from the mainland. 34 Owners of these newspapers,
seeking subsidies from Beijing, cozied up to PRC authorities with statements such as
“opposing Taiwan independence and fostering peaceful unification are the glorious
missions and historical responsibility of overseas Chinese publications.” 35
Beijing also moved to take control of online and social media outlets. Wenxuecheng
( 文学城 , http://wenxuecheng​. com) is the most popular Chinese-language website
in the United States. Launched in 1997 by a group of students from the University
of Michigan, the website was sold in 2003 to a Taiwanese-American businessman 36
with investments in China. Since being purchased, Wenxuecheng has signed deals
to run news from Xinhua and the China Daily. 37 There is even an unsubstantiated
rumor that the purchase of the website was subsidized by $1 million from the CCP
Propaganda Department.
Duowei is another online source that was for years an independent Chinese-language
media outlet. Among its many scoops was the prediction of the composition of the
sixteenth Politburo Standing Committee. But in 2009, Duowei was purchased by a
Hong Kong businessman 38 with substantial business interests in China, including two
companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The businessman is a founding
member of the Tsinghua University Center for US-China Relations and is also fond
of writing pro-Beijing essays on China’s claims to the South China Sea. Duowei is
now headquartered in Beijing. Indeed, since selling Duowei, the online news source’s
founder 39 has moved to Mingjing (Mirror Media), a Chinese-language web presence
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based in Canada, where he indicated that last year he received a large investment from
the PRC. Since then, Mingjing has significantly modified its editorial stance, switching
its focus from politics to real estate, immigration, and investing. Part of the reason
for this modification appears linked to the disappearance in China of the wife of
one of Mingjing’s reporters after Mingjing aired interviews with a dissident Chinese
businessman. 40
Beijing has also moved to tighten the ideological consistency for these papers. In 2001,
the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs and the China News Service began a biannual
conference, the Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media, hosting representatives
from hundreds of Chinese-language periodicals from around the world. Kicking off
the first conference in 2001, Guo Zhaojin, the president of the China News Service,
said a key goal of the meeting was to persuade participating Overseas Chinese media
to use copy from the China News Service instead of reports from competing Chineselanguage
news services from Taiwan or from the West. 41 The conference also appears
to serve as a platform for Beijing to convince critics to modify their tone and to ensure
that overseas Chinese-language newspapers follow the Party’s line. Essays released
during the conferences praised the censorship of views opposed by the Party and
stressed the necessity of, in the words of one piece in 2015, “properly telling China’s story”
(echoing Xi Jinping’s instructions).
And Beijing’s efforts have had some successes. Ranked the number-five Chinese website
in the United States, http://backchina​. com was once an independent media voice like
Duowei. But in 2017, its editors attended the ninth forum in China, and since then
backchina’s reporting has become far more positive about the PRC.
In 2006, the China News Service started holding an Advanced Seminar for the Overseas
Chinese Language Media, for select groups of editors and reporters from overseas;
a seminar in 2006, for example, focused on the correct reading of “socialism with
Chinese characteristics,” while a workshop in 2010 concerned China’s policies in Tibet
and Xinjiang. At the thirteenth Seminar in 2015, He Yafei, then the assistant director
of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, argued that overseas Chinese media needed to
promote the Belt and Road Initiative and essentially embrace the role of becoming a
mouthpiece of the CCP promoting China’s national strategy. 42 Beijing also dispatched
Chinese officials overseas to instruct Chinese-language media on how to “correctly”
report the news. As the Beijing 2008 Olympics approached, Politburo member and
head of China’s Olympic Committee Liu Qi met at the PRC consulate in New York
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with representatives of the Chinese-language press to lay out China’s demands for their
coverage of the event. 43
In a further effort to control the overseas Chinese press, the China News Service
established the China News Service Overseas Center, which provides news reports,
editorials, and layout for overseas Chinese media outlets around the globe. The idea
behind the center was that if Beijing were to provide and package content for overseas
Chinese papers, and could convince them to run it, Beijing would then completely
control the message. 44
Given these efforts by Beijing, the space for truly independent Chinese-language media in
the United States has shrunk to a few media outlets supported by the adherents of Falun
Gong, the banned religious sect in China, and a small publication and website called
Vision Times. According to the publisher of its New York edition, Peter Wang, Vision Times
was formed expressly to address the issue of the shrinking space for independent Chinese
voices in the United States. Since then, it has focused on two areas—human rights
reporting and traditional Chinese culture. Wang noted that while some of the staff of
the paper may be Falun Gong adherents, the paper is not a Falun Gong operation. Vision
Times began its online presence in 2001, started printing a newspaper in 2005, and claims
a circulation in the United States and Canada of below 60,000. 45
WeChat as a Source of News in the Diaspora Community
China’s social media giant, WeChat, is another major source of news within the
Chinese American community. But it is more than that; for many users in the United
States, China, and around the world, WeChat is a digital ecosystem so ubiquitous that it
constitutes a lifestyle—a drumbeat that determines the rhythms of the day. In the United
States, as in China, WeChat censors news and comments in accordance with rules set by
China’s Communist Party. In an analysis of WeChat articles popular in the United States,
researcher Zhang Chi found that the most successful pieces skewed significantly to the
right of the US political spectrum. 46 Zhang noted that the right-wing view on WeChat
generally embraces a social Darwinist, zero-sum conception of racial politics, with
Chinese in America portrayed as beaten down by a system that favors other racial groups
and illegal immigrants from Latin America. One popular WeChat channel blamed the
wildfires in 2017 in Northern California on an undocumented immigrant.
Numerous other channels reported on alleged plans for mass riots and a civil war in the
United States led by the leftist group Antifa. When a Chinese jogger was struck and killed
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in a DUI case in a suburb of Los Angeles, a popular WeChat channel reported that the
motorist was undocumented and had committed the act to extend his stay in the United
States. 47 Zhang noted that another cause of concern was the fact that these WeChat
channels helped foster anxiety among first-generation Chinese. As with other Chinese
immigrants who rely on traditional Chinese-language media for information, the anti-
American hothouse created by WeChat’s “news channels” leads to a type of resentful pro-
Chinese nationalism that is ripe for exploitation by the Chinese government.
WeChat may be no more slanted in its treatment of information than American media
that serve domestic political extremes, but there is no precedent for the situation
WeChat has created: A vast and vital community of Americans gets most of its “news”
from, and does most of its communicating via, a platform known to be censored by a
foreign government that opposes free speech and has been named by the US National
Security Strategy as the greatest long-term security challenge the nation faces.
Western Media
The Chinese Communist Party has always recognized the usefulness of the overseas
media (both in local languages and Chinese) as a means to get its message out. Foreignand
Chinese-language media have always served the cause of China’s revolution. For
example, in the 1930s, foreign journalist Edgar Snow sang the praises of the Chinese
Communist Party and specifically its chairman, Mao Zedong. The Party conducted a
campaign in the United States in the 1940s to turn the American public against the
regime of Chiang Kai-shek and to soften criticism of China’s Communists. Organizations
such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, which provided Americans with in-depth
coverage of Asia, were staffed by Communist agents and played an important role in
fashioning public opinion on America’s relations with China. To be sure, these techniques
were not unique to the Chinese Communist Party. The government of Chiang Kai-shek
and its “China lobby” also used the overseas press to serve its purposes. In the 1950s,
the KMT government conducted a campaign against pro-Communist newspapers in the
United States, convincing the US government to shutter several pro-PRC outlets and expel
pro-PRC journalists.
The events of 1989 sparked a significant change in China’s foreign propaganda campaign.
Following China’s crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing and other
cities, China’s image sank to a low not seen by Chinese officials in decades. 48 China
Books and Periodicals, which had been operating in the United States since the 1950s,
closed its offices on Fifth Avenue in New York City. And the Foreign Languages Press
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(a department of the China International Publishing Group) saw its cooperative
agreements dwindle.
It was then that Chinese officials revived an old tactic that the Communist Party
had employed before the revolution—using friendly foreigners and pro-PRC Chinese
immigrants to publicize China’s story. Chinese officials called this tactic of localizing
the work of foreign propaganda, the “borrowed boat” strategy. 49
One such friendly American was a China scholar 50 who was for years associated
with Random House. According to Huang Youyi, the chief editor of the Foreign
Languages Press posted to the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this
American argued that for China to improve its image in the United States, it needed to
work through American organizations, and so he collaborated with Huang on a book
series, “The Culture and Civilization of China,” which the Yale University Press began
publishing in 1997. The American’s “understanding of the US publishing industry and
his friendly attitude towards China became an indispensable condition for the success
of the cooperation,” Huang wrote. 51 Books from the series are still given to foreign
guests of the Beijing government.
In a period of deep crisis for China’s reputation, Huang’s success in using foreigners
to publish material beneficial to China’s image became a model for other Chinese
operations. From the early 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party began to seek
opportunities to cooperate with Westerners, Western media and publishing companies,
and overseas Chinese to tell its story.
Lack of Reciprocity
It is important to compare Beijing’s efforts to “grab the right to speak” and obtain
“discourse power” overseas with the efforts, and ability, of Western media organizations
to access China’s market to a similar degree. For decades, those efforts have faced
roadblocks placed in their path by the Chinese government. A key roadblock has been
China’s ban on Western investment in media except when it involves such things as
fashion, cars, and lifestyle.
Private media
Unlike the United States, where Chinese reporters are only restricted from entering
high-security military installations, Western reporters in China are subject to a panoply
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of regulations, many of them unwritten. A 2017 report by the Foreign Correspondents’
Club of China notes that in a survey of 117 foreign journalists based in China,
40 percent felt reporting conditions had deteriorated compared to 2016, nearly half said
they had experienced harassment, interference, and physical violence during their work
in China, while 15 percent said they encountered difficulties during their visa renewal
process and over 25 percent said they had learned that Chinese contacts had been
detained and otherwise hounded by Chinese authorities for speaking with them. 52
China has also moved against Western media outlets on many fronts. Both Chineseand
English-language websites of the New York Times have been blocked in China since
2012 following a story detailing the wealth of the family of China’s then premier Wen
Jiabao. 53 The English- and Chinese-language sites of the Wall Street Journal and Reuters
are also blocked, and those belonging to the Financial Times and the Economist are
blocked on an intermittent basis.
The Chinese government has also made it difficult for resident foreign reporters to
obtain and renew journalist visas. Following the New York Times’ report on Wen’s
family money, China did not approve a new journalist visa for a Times reporter for
three years. While the situation has improved somewhat since 2015 for resident
journalists, the Chinese government still delays visa applications for journalists and
uses the threat of expulsion from China as a way to pressure Western media outlets
to soften their coverage of China. This is especially true of freelance journalists or
independent documentary filmmakers who are dependent on onetime visas to carry
out a specific assignment. Here delays and outright refusal to process visas in a timely
manner have been common.
There is some indication that China’s pressure tactics have paid off. In 2013,
Bloomberg News was preparing to publish a report detailing connections between one
of China’s richest men and members of the Politburo—the top organ in the Chinese
Communist Party, when Bloomberg spiked the story. The outlet’s editor in chief,
Matthew Winkler, was quoted on a conference call likening the decision to censorship
of foreign news bureaus that wanted to continue to report in Nazi Germany. 54 Other
observers noted that the real reason Bloomberg News killed the story involved the
company’s substantial business interests—especially in “Bloomberg Boxes” selling
access to financial information—in China. Indeed, the organization’s founder
recently doubled down on China and now even headlines a new forum focusing on
China’s global influence with a state-owned Chinese partner. 55 (Interestingly, the
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November 2018 gathering in Beijing was cancelled by Beijing and forced to move to
Singapore.)
International service broadcasters
Another roadblock has been China’s efforts to limit the influence of the Mandarin
services of the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. Starting in the first decade of the
2000s, the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, and the leadership of VOA’s Mandarin
service began an annual meeting to allow embassy officials to voice their opinions
about VOA’s content. PRC embassy officials have also reached out to VOA hosts to
convince them to be more supportive of the regime. VOA personalities have hosted
events at the embassy. One of VOA’s TV editors even publicly pledged his allegiance
to China at an embassy event. 56 It is not surprising, then, that some VOA staffers
interviewed for this report believe that China’s outreach campaign has succeeded in
pushing the VOA Mandarin service away from programs with direct relevance to China
toward programming that seeks instead to highlight American everyday life or teach
American-style English to Chinese listeners. An example would be a program called
Cultural Odyssey, a VOA TV series that focused on Americana, such as fried chicken,
doughnuts, and national parks. For years, Cultural Odyssey ate up one-third of the
Mandarin service’s travel budget. Another program featured English teacher Jessica
Beinecke, which launched her on a career as an English-teaching TV personality on
mainland China itself. VOA officials internally praised these programs as both “nonpolitical
and non-sensitive,” a current senior VOA staff member noted. What’s more,
VOA officials sought to scale back what were perceived to be sensitive reports. After
running two years of a radio series on aspects of modern Chinese history, including the
Cultural Revolution and other events post-1949, VOA cut the program in 2009 despite
several of those shows garnering well over three million hits each on the web. In 2011,
the Broadcasting Board of Governors sought to cut 65 percent of the workforce from
the Mandarin service. However, reporters and editors in the service fought back, they
lobbied Congress, and the cuts were restored. In 2012, a Chinese immigrant, who was
also a former Chinese dissident and a specialist on the US political system, became
the first female Chinese head of the service. She was later fired over a controversial
interview that drew the official ire of the PRC, which threatened repercussions. 57
Since her dismissal, VOA’s Mandarin service has resumed a pattern of avoiding stories
that could be perceived to be too tough on China, according to several staffers. For
example, blogs written by dissidents such as Cao Yaxue, who runs the human rights–
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related http://chinachange​. org site, have been removed from the VOA website. Several
prominent Chinese commentators are no longer on VOA’s lineup of analysts. Many
staffers now describe VOA’s content as neither pro- nor anti-China. The emphasis, the
staffers observed, is on travel, culture and language, programming the likes of which
Chinese viewers can access equally well on CGTN or China’s internet. By contrast, the
content of Radio Free Asia remains far more hard-hitting than its counterpart, VOA.
Conclusion and Recommendations
China has used America’s openness to convey its message both to English- and
Chinese-speaking residents of the United States. US rules allow foreign media
companies, even ones run by foreign governments, to broadcast freely via American
cable and satellite networks. Unlike in China, the United States government does
not block any Chinese websites, many of which are funded by the PRC government.
While the Communications Act of 1934 theoretically only allows foreigners to own
20 to 25 percent of terrestrial wireless radio and TV stations, the law has been loosened
considerably over the past decade, and it does not even apply to cable channels or leasing
arrangements wherein a foreign entity, including one owned by a foreign government,
can pay an American licensee for airtime. Chinese media outlets have used all such
strategies to publicize the views of the Beijing government. 58 Perhaps more worrisome,
China has also been successful in funding or convincing pro-PRC businessmen to fund
pro-PRC media outlets in the United States that nominally appear independent so that
the three most important traditionally independent Chinese-language newspapers now
increasingly side with Beijing.
By contrast, the Chinese government severely limits the scope of US and other Western
media outlets in China and has banned Western media investment in China, except in
very limited innocuous areas, such as in fashion, automobiles, investing, health, and
lifestyle. The idea that a Western TV news network could lease a Chinese station and
broadcast news to China around the clock—as their Chinese counterparts do here in
the United States—is not even thinkable. Equally, there is no chance that a Western
media company would be allowed to invest in a Chinese publication that reported
mainstream news.
Both the expansion of Chinese state-owned English-language media in the United
States and Beijing’s increasing control of Chinese-language media outlets in the United
States are very problematic for an open dialogue. For one, these media are under the
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control of a foreign government, not simply a foreign individual or firm. Second,
the diminishing space within America’s Chinese-language media for independent
voices runs counter to the goals of a liberal society seeking a diversity of perspectives.
Furthermore, the PRC’s control of Chinese-language media outlets in America and
its increasingly strong position among English-language outlets provides China
with the potential of mobilizing Chinese Americans and Americans alike to espouse
policies counter to US interest. The constant drumbeat of anti-American reporting
in pro-Beijing media outlets headquartered in the United States creates an unhealthy
environment.
Promoting Transparency
A major challenge is the fact that China has worked successfully to mask its influence
operations with respect to US media. On paper, for example, the Asian Culture and
Media Group controls the pro-China SinoVision and Qiaobao as a private company.
The reality is that it is staffed by people who served the state-run China News Service
and were, sources insist, dispatched to the United States by the Chinese government
to establish propaganda operations in the United States. Given its nominal status
as a private company, taking action to shut down its operations would be fraught
with even more legal and ethical challenges than those involving media corporations
directly owned by the PRC. The same holds true for publications and websites that
were once independent but have now increasingly fallen under the sway of the PRC. If
US law protects the rights of publishers of newspapers or websites to put their personal
political imprint on their enterprises, how can the US government move to deny it to
those of a pro-PRC bent?
At a minimum, what US authorities can do is work to establish the real ownership
structure of Chinese (and other foreign) companies purchasing US-based media. Any
foreign-owned or foreign-controlled media (including print media), and particularly
those that advance a foreign government line, should be required to register under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
Beyond FARA, there should also be a review to see whether these organizations and
their employees should also register under existing lobbying laws as foreign agents.
In addition, there is an argument to be made to ensure that employees of these
organizations should be given a disclosure package making them aware that they are
working for a foreign agent institution.
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Promoting Integrity
Figuring out how to properly counter the PRC’s influence operations in both
English- and Chinese-language media presents enormous challenges in a free society.
The United States could consider restrictions on state-controlled media outlets,
which would not include publicly funded broadcasters, such as the BBC, which
maintain editorial independence. Failing that, the recent requirement that state-run
publications, TV and radio broadcasters, and potentially their employees, register as
agents of a foreign government is a partial solution. 59 And in late 2017, Russia’s RT
registered as a foreign agent 60 while in September 2018, the US Justice Department
reportedly also ordered CGTN and Xinhua to register as agents of a foreign power. 61
When it comes to independent Chinese-language media, the US government should
consider doing more to help such independent outlets survive, including using
grants via the Fulbright program or other vehicles, such as the State Department
International Visitors or Speakers’ Bureau. Domestically, the US government could also
consider aiding the operations of independent Chinese-language media, including
manufacturing credits for printing press operations, and nonprofit tax designations
to allow journalism business models to survive the current transitional crisis. Private
charitable foundations can also make a difference in helping independent Chineselanguage
media remain editorially independent and financially viable.
Promoting Reciprocity
The time has come for the US government to demand reciprocity for American
journalists attempting to do their professional work in China. To the extent that they
are prevented from doing so as a result of visa denials and restrictions of access, the US
State Department should respond in kind by restricting visas and access for Chinese
journalists in the United States. To the extent that American journalists experience
harassment and physical violence, this should also have a bearing on the granting of
visas and access to Chinese journalists.
NOTES
1 ​He Qinglian has written the most detailed study of the Chinese-language media landscape in the United
States. It is currently unpublished.
2 ​Troianovski, Anton. “China Agency Nears Times Square.” Wall Street Journal. June 30, 2010. https:// www​
.wsj​.com​/articles​/SB10001424052748704334604575339281420753918.
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3 ​Xiong, Min ( 熊敏 ). “ 新华社出海 ‘ 踩油门 ’.” 21 世纪经济报道 ,August 17, 2010. http://finance​.eastmoney​.com​
/ news​/ 1355,2010081790350313​. html.
4 ​“At National Meeting on Propaganda and Ideological Work, Xi Jinping Stresses That it is Necessary to
Raise the Banner High, Win the Support of the People, Cultivate New personnel, Invigorate Culture, Present
a Good Image, and Urges to Better Accomplish the Mission and task of Propaganda and Ideological Work
Under the New Situation.” Xinhua. August 22, 2018.
5 ​“Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech at Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs,” Foreign
Ministry of the PRC. November 29, 2014. http://www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn​/mfa​_eng​/zxxx​_662805​/t1215680​.shtml.
6 ​“Xi Completes Media Tour, Stresses Party Leadership.” Xinhua. February 19, 2016. http:// www​. xinhuanet​
.com​/english​/2016​-02​/20​/c​_135114528​.htm.
7 ​“ 中国全面启动国家公关 , 改善中国国际形象 .” 国际先驱导报 . February 3, 2009. http://news​.qq​.com​/a​/20090203​
/ 000783​. htm.
8 ​“ 中共 450 亿争夺话语权 .” 凤凰周刊 . 2009.7.320. http:// www​. mediaview​. cn​/ article​. asp​? id​= 554.
9 ​The Associated Press reports from some 80 bureaus, AFP from 110, and Reuters from 150.
10 ​EDI’s CEO, James Su ( 鷹龍 ), has a long history of working with state-owned Chinese media. In 1994, Su
helped CCTV begin its broadcasts through the US cable-TV network. In 2011, Su was honored as a cultural
ambassador at the Second Global Chinese Broadcasting Awards in Beijing. Su is a regular guest of the
Chinese consulate in Los Angeles and is routinely pictured with Chinese diplomats and officials.
11 ​Qing, Koh Gui and John Shiffman. “Beijing’s Covert Radio Network Airs China-friendly News Across
Washington, and the World.” Reuters. November 2, 2015. https://www​.reuters​.com​/investigates​/special​
- report​/ china​- radio​. Confirmed by Su in a 2015 interview with Reuters.
12 ​“Application for Consent to Assignment of Broadcast Station Construction Permit or License.” US
Federal Communications Commission. https:// licensing​. fcc​. gov​/ cgi​- bin​/ ws​. exe​/ prod​/ cdbs​/ forms​/ prod​
/ cdbsmenu​. hts​? context​= 25&appn=101561101&formid=314&fac_num=10100. The application identified the
Phoenix editor as Anthony Yuen.
13 ​Bhattacharjee, Yudhijit. “How the F.B.I. Cracked a Chinese Spy Ring.” New Yorker. May 12, 2014. https://
www​. newyorker​. com​/ news​/ news​- desk​/ how​- the​- f​- b​- i​- cracked​- a​- chinese​- spy​- ring.
14 ​“SoCal-Targeting Mexican AM Flipping to Chinese.” Inside Radio. July 10, 2018. www​. insideradio​. com​
/ free​/ socal​- targeting​- mexican​- am​- flipping​- to​- chinese​/ article​_ d5c425c0​- 840c​- 11e8​- 889e​- df1a4cd5925c​
. html.
15 ​Interviews with sources close to the deal, and Gertz, Bill, “Mexican Radio to Beam Chinese Propaganda.”
Washington Free Beacon. August 13, 2018. https://freebeacon​.com​/national​-security​/mexican​-radio​-beam​
- chinese​- propaganda​.
16 ​“Petition to Deny.” US Federal Communications Commission. August 8, 2018. http:// licensing​. fcc​. gov​
/myibfs​/download​.do​?attachment​_key​=1487042.
17 ​Eller, Donnelle, “China-backed newspaper insert tries to undermine Iowa farm support for Trump, trade
war.” September 24, 2018. https://www​.desmoinesregister​.com​/story​/money​/agriculture​/2018​/09​/24​/china​
- daily​- watch​- advertisement​- tries​- sway​- iowa​- farm​- support​- trump​- trade​- war​- tariffs​/ 1412954002​.
18 ​“China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette.” Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. 2014.
images​.mofcom​.gov​.cn​/bgt​/201408​/20140813101828934​.pdf.
19 ​Buckley, Chris. “China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media.” New York Times.
March 21, 2018. https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2018​/03​/21​/world​/asia​/china​-communist​-party​-xi​-jinping​.html.
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20 ​Zhou, Xin, Choi Chi-yuk, and Nectar Gan. “Xi Jinping to Shake Up Propaganda, Censorship Chiefs as
China’s Image Abroad Suffers.” South China Morning Post. July 26, 2018. https://www​.scmp​.com​/news​/china​
/ policies​- politics​/ article​/ 2156921​/ china​- reshuffles​- propaganda​- cyber​- administration​- chiefs.
21 ​The group’s current chairman of the board, Cen Gong ( 岑工 ), was sent from Beijing to the United States in
the 1990s. Previously, Cen had served as a deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the PRC.
22 ​Xie Yining ( 谢一宁 ).
23 ​You, Jiang. “ 游江 . “ 游江 : 美国《侨报》跨区域发展面临的机遇和挑战 .” China News. August 17, 2015. http://
www​.chinanews​.com​/kong​/2015​/08​-17​/7472496​.shtml. Qiaobao is headed by its president, You Jiang ( 游江 ),
and general editor, Zheng Yide ( 郑衣德 ). You Jiang graduated from People’s University in the late 1980s.
24 ​Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Beijing Builds Its Influence in the American Media.” Foreign Policy.
December 21, 2017. https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2017​/12​/21​/one​-of​-americas​-biggest​-chinese​-language​
- newspapers​- toes​- beijings​- party​- line​- china​- influence​- united​- front​.
25 ​An example would be Fan Dongsheng, who in 1999 served as Qiaobao’s president and editorial director.
Before coming to the United States, Fan worked for the China News Service and had established two
magazines funded by the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.” 范东升的 BLOG.” Personal
website. February 3, 2011. http://fan​-dongsheng​.blog​.sohu​.com​.
26 ​“ 美国中文电视首席记者反腐更艰难 .” Boxun. January 16, 2011. https://www​.boxun​.com​/news​/gb​/china​
/2011​/03​/201103130653​.shtml.
27 ​http://www​.chinanews​.com​/kong​/2015​/08​-17​/7472496​.shtml.
28 ​Yu, Baozhu ( 虞宝竹 ),“ 中国新闻社社长郭招金专访 : 共建和谐世界华文传媒任重道远 .” 人民网一中华新闻报 .
August 31, 2007. http://media​.people​.com​.cn​/GB​/40606​/6198886​.html.
29 ​The colorful Sally Aw Sian—known as the Tiger Balm Lady.
30 ​Charles Ho ( 何柱國 ).
31 ​You Jiang.
32 ​You, Jiang. 游江 . “ 游江 : 美国《侨报》跨区域发展面临的机遇和挑战 .” China News. August 17, 2015. http://
www​.chinanews​.com​/kong​/2015​/08​-17​/7472496​.shtml.
33 ​Wu, Ruicheng ( 吴锐成 ). “ 发挥侨务资源优势为建设文化强省服务 .” 广东侨 . 网 ​. h t t p: //g o c n ​.s o u t h c n ​.c o m ​
/d z k w 2 0 10 ​/h q y h r ​/1​/2 0 10 0 9 ​/t 2 0 10 0 9 0 7​_116 0 8 3 ​.h t m .
34 ​He Qinglian estimates that 70 percent of Canada’s thirty Chinese-language papers, almost all of
Australia’s twenty papers, and 80 percent of Japan’s thirty papers received PRC funds.
35 ​Zhang, Dawei ( 张大卫 ). “ 宣传和推动反独促统是海外华文媒体的光荣使命 .” 第三届世界华文传媒论坛学术集锦 .
世界华文传媒网 .” September 22, 2005.
36 ​Wayne Lin ( 林文 ).
37 ​“ 美国《文学城》网站 CEO: 想给重庆开一个关注度较高的栏目 .” China Daily. September 17, 2011. www​
.chinadaily​.com​.cn​/dfpd​/chongqing​/2011​-09​-17​/content​_3809264​.html.
38 ​“Yu Pun-hoi.” Wikipedia. https://en​.wikipedia​.org​/wiki​/Yu​_Pun​-hoi.
39 ​He Pin.
40 ​“Chinese-American Journalist Says Wife Kidnapped By China.” Associated Press. January 17, 2018.
https:// www​. cbsnews​. com​/ news​/ china​- wife​- chinese​- american​- journalist​- chen​- xiaoping​. The businessman
is identified in this story as Guo Wengui.
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41 ​“ 首届华文传媒论坛将如期开幕 (The First Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media Opens as
Scheduled).” China News Service. September 14, 2001. http://www​.fcm​.chinanews​.com​.cn​/2001​-09​-14​/2​/91​
. html.
42 ​Yang, Kaiqi. “78 位海外华文媒体负责人聚北京研修 (78 Executives of Overseas Chinese Language Media
Gathers in Beijing for Seminar).” China News Service. May 11, 2015. http://www​.chinanews​.com​/hr​/2015​/05​
- 11​/ 7267777​. shtml.
43 ​“ 北京奥组委在纽约召开华文媒体见面会刘淇出席 .” 新华网 .” November 2, 2007. http://news​.xinhuanet​.com​
/sports​/2007​-11​/02​/content​_6998448​.htm.
44 ​Zhang, Qiaosu. “ 中国新闻社海外中心 ” (the China News Service Overseas Center).” Xinhua. November 2,
2007. August 26, 2016. http://news​.xinhuanet​.com​/zgjx​/2007​-11​/02​/content​_6998084​.htm.
45 ​Interview with Peter Wang, publisher of New York edition of Vision Times.
46 ​Zhang, Chi. “WeChatting American Politics: Misinformation, Polarization, and Immigrant Chinese
Media.” Tow Center for Digital Journalism. April 19, 2018. https://www​.cjr​.org​/tow​_center​_reports​
/ wechatting​- american​- politics​- misinformation​- polarization​- and​- immigrant​- chinese​- media​. php.
47 ​This has led some like Zhang to question whether or not WeChat is at least tacitly supporting the
creation of fake news about the United States.
48 ​Yan, Dongsheng ( 翟东升 ). “ 外宣工作脱困 .” IT 经理世界 . July 5, 2006. http://www​.ceocio​.com​.cn​/12​/93​/148​
/ 165​/ 6876​. html.
49 ​Li, Haiming. My 35 Years in CCTV. China Democracy & Rule of Law Publishing House. 2013.
50 ​James Peck.
51 ​Huang, Youyi ( 黄友义 ). “ 时代的创新 : 与美国合作出版的往事 .” 中国网 . November 2, 2009. http://www​.china​
. com​. cn​/ culture​/ zhuanti​/ wwj60n​/ 2009​- 09​/ 02​/ content​_ 18450217​. htm.
52 ​Gao, Charlotte. “Foreign Journalists in China Say Life Increasingly Harder in 2017.” Diplomat. February 3,
2018. https://thediplomat​.com​/2018​/02​/foreign​-journalists​-in​-china​-say​-life​-increasingly​-harder​-in​-2017​.
53 ​Smith, Craig S. “The New York Times vs. the ‘Great Firewall’ of China.” New York Times. March 31, 2017.
https://www​.nytimes​.com​/2017​/03​/31​/insider​/the​-new​-york​-times​-vs​-the​-great​-firewall​-of​-china​.html.
54 ​Demick, Barbara. “The Times, Bloomberg News, and the Richest Man in China.” New Yorker. May 5, 2015.
https:// www​. newyorker​. com​/ news​/ news​- desk​/ how​- not​- to​- get​- kicked​- out​- of​- china.
55 ​“Bloomberg and the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) Announce . . .”
PRNewswire. May 15, 2018. https://prn​.to​/2OCNvbR.
56 ​Interview with VOA staff.
57 ​As head of this VOA service, Sasha Gong pared down the budget for Cultural Odyssey and reapproved
funding for more hard-hitting pieces on modern Chinese history and a program, Histories Mysteries, was
started. With its reports on the famine during the Great Leap Forward, the suppression of the Falun Gong
religious sect of 2001, and the June 4th crackdown on pro-democracy protesters of 1989, the program
became popular among viewers in China. However, Gong’s time at the head of the service ended in 2017,
after she and VOA management had a falling-out over an interview VOA was doing with Chinese billionaire
dissident Guo Wengui. Gong had arranged the interview to air on VOA’s TV channel on April 19, 2017. VOA
advertised the interview, which was going to be live, on its website beforehand. Prior to the interview,
however, the Chinese government warned VOA’s correspondent in Beijing of serious repercussions should
the interview air. Chinese embassy officials also contacted VOA in Washington threatening retribution.
Despite concern from VOA’s management, Gong went ahead with the interview. While circumstances
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surrounding what happened next are murky, VOA’s management ended up pulling the plug on the interview
in the middle of a live broadcast. Gong and several other employees were suspended and subsequently
fired for insubordination. Gong is contesting her dismissal through the Broadcasting Board of Governors,
while VOA management denies that it was responding to Chinese pressure to stop the interview or
fire Gong.
Chinese authorities have used both a charm offensive and tougher tactics to deal with both VOA and
Radio Free Asia. China’s retaliation goes far beyond trying to block their transmissions into China. Security
officials from the PRC government have been involved in a campaign of intimidation against some VOA
and RFA staffers and their family members. In early 2018, relatives of some Uighur reporters on Radio Free
Asia were detained by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang province. VOA’s Mandarin service has approximately
one hundred employees. Although many of them write under pseudonyms, it appears that Chinese state
security knows who they are. Five Chinese staff members interviewed for this report said that while visiting
family in China they had been contacted by representatives from state security who have impressed upon
them the necessity to change how they have reported on China. In one case, a young woman who is in
the United States on a journalist visa and who does not yet have American citizenship was threatened
with imprisonment during a visit last year to China if she did not reveal the names of her editors. She did
so. In some cases, those affected have contacted the security department at the Broadcasting Board of
Governors. In other cases, worried about potential Chinese retribution against family members still in
China, they have not.
58 ​Interview with FCC official.
59 ​O’Keeffe, Kate and Aruna Viswanatha. “Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State Media
Firms to Register as Foreign Agents.” Wall Street Journal. September 18, 2018. https://www​.wsj​.com​
/ articles​/ justice​- department​- has​- ordered​- key​- chinese​- state​- media​- firms​- to​- register​- as​- foreign​- agents​
- 1537296756​? mod​= hp​_ listc​_ pos4.
60 ​Stubbs, Jack and Ginger Gibson. “Russia’s RT America Registers as ‘Foreign Agent’ in US” Reuters.
November 13, 2017. https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-russia​-usa​-media​-restrictions​-rt​/russias​-rt​
- america​- registers​- as​- foreign​- agent​- in​- u​- s​- idUSKBN1DD25B.
61 ​O’Keeffe, Kate and Aruna Viswanatha. “Justice Department Has Ordered Key Chinese State Media
Firms to Register as Foreign Agents.” Wall Street Journal. September 18, 2018. https://www​.wsj​.com​
/ articles​/ justice​- department​- has​- ordered​- key​- chinese​- state​- media​- firms​- to​- register​- as​- foreign​- agents​
- 1537296756​? mod​= hp​_ listc​_ pos4.
Section 6
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Media
SECTION 7
Corporations
American corporations wield significant political influence domestically and are some of
the most significant sources of American soft power abroad. Foreign leverage over American
corporations can thus advance important strategic interests of the country in question.
In addition, as Chinese corporations go abroad, they, too, bring with them the potential
of being leveraged by the Chinese government to advance China’s interests. This section
examines improper influence in the US corporate sector, as well as the potential for future
influence because of significant economic exposure to China.
The US-China economic relationship is large and multifaceted. Trade statistics illustrate just
one aspect of this tangled web: In 2017, the United States exported goods worth $130 billion
to China, while importing goods worth $505 billion. 1 With trade also comes extensive
foreign investment, as well as significant levels of employment of each country’s citizens.
Since 2000, the cumulative value of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United
States has exceeded $140 billion, with US investment in China being more than double
that amount. 2 In the United States, there is more Chinese investment in the real estate
sector than any other area. But until recently more deals are being done in the information
technology sector, which has attracted the growing attention of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
China is increasingly willing to engage in aggressive forms of economic statecraft. 3
This includes not just denial of access to, or harassment in, China’s own market, but
also targeting of other countries’ domestic economies and companies. These actions are
sometimes state-led; at other times China’s state-run media will encourage “consumer-led”
boycotts (as in the cases of Japan, Norway, and South Korea, among others). 4 Chinese
corporations abroad are all well aware of Chinese official policy and understand the value
of acting in support of their country’s foreign or industrial policy objectives. China’s
growing commercial presence in other countries’ economies strengthens its ability to
potentially influence their politics.
This section examines corporate sector influence through three lenses: (1) the use of
business-related United Front organizations in the United States; (2) Chinese companies
operating in America; and (3) Chinese pressuring and manipulation of American
companies as vectors of influence. All three approaches are cause for concern, yet
the pressuring manipulation of American corporations has generally attracted less
attention.
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