registering as nonprofits, they were established to support Chinese government policies
and coordinate activities with PRC consulates in the United States. 16 “Over the years, the
China Peaceful Reunification Council in Northern California has actively cooperated
with the local Chinese consulate to work against ‘Taiwan independence’ and promote
national reunification activities, and has some influence in San Francisco’s overseas Chinese
community,” the Northern California Council candidly notes on its website. 17
Around the United States, the councils count numerous prominent Chinese Americans as
members. For example, one successful California businesswoman was for years the honorary
chairwoman of the council in Northern California. 18 While helping promote US-China
educational exchanges, this individual has also consistently advocated on behalf of PRC
policies in the United States, including China’s claims on Taiwan, and has helped to organize
demonstrations against “Taiwan independence.” She is listed as an advisor to the China
Overseas Exchange Association, which is part of the United Front Work Department. 19
The Chinese government has also sought to co-opt local Chinese American community
associations to serve its goals. 20 In the past, organizations such as regional associations,
known as Tongs ( 同乡会 ), had generally been close to the Nationalist government of Taiwan.
In San Francisco, however, that began to change as early as the 1980s when Soon Suey
Section 3
34
Sing, one of San Francisco’s six major community organizations representing Chinese
immigrants, became the first major Chinese group to fly the flag of the PRC on its building.
Then a second Tong declared its fealty to Beijing, and a competition broke out between the
PRC and Taiwan in San Francisco’s Chinatown to see which side could fly the most flags.
This competition can be vividly seen from the seventeenth floor of a public housing project
overlooking Chinatown, where PRC and Republic of China flags sit atop adjacent buildings
stretching into the horizon. The value of these associations to Beijing can be seen in this
example: When China’s president Xi Jinping visited the United States in September 2015,
one of the leaders of San Francisco’s local Chinese American community associations
was listed as first among twenty prominent Chinese Americans honored by the Chinese
president. 21
Chinese Americans and the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference
Several Chinese Americans are so trusted by Beijing that they are direct participants in
China’s most prominent national united front body, the Chinese People’s Consultative
Conference (CPPCC). The preamble of China’s constitution defines the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference as “a broadly based representative organization of the
united front which . . . ​will play a still more important role in the country’s political and
social life, in promoting friendship with other countries and in the struggle for socialist
modernization and for the reunification and unity of the country.” In practice, the CPPCC
has served as an important advisory committee to help legitimize Chinese Communist
Party’s rule both domestically and abroad.
Beijing has been appointing Chinese Americans to the CPPCC for years. In some cases,
authorities in Beijing seem to have had problems finding appropriately influential
Americans to take seats on the committee, such as in 2017, when a Chinese property
developer and educator (who appears to still be a Chinese citizen) was one of seven
“Americans” listed as CPPCC members. 22
In doling out prestigious positions on the CPPCC, China seeks to show overseas
Chinese that prominent members of their community want to be connected with
China’s government. The American contingent to the thirteenth CPPCC (announced in
March 2018) was no exception. Perhaps the most remarkable in years, the list of thirtyfive
overseas representatives included four highly successful Chinese American academics,
scientists, and businessmen. 23
The appointment of Chinese Americans to positions on this advisory body to the Chinese
Communist Party raises difficult questions of divided national loyalty. Americans should,
of course, be free to participate in whatever organizations they see fit, since freedom of
association is hardwired into the constitutional DNA of the United States. However, the
CPPCC is not an independent civil society NGO, but an organization controlled, managed,
The Chinese American Community
35
and dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. Members are expected to adhere to the
disciplines and goals of the Party and work to strengthen China and the Party’s rule of
China. Members of the CPPCC are expected to write reports about how their activities have
aligned with China’s interests and to detail their work on China’s behalf. 24 The potential
exploitation of Chinese American members in this body by the Chinese government not
only risks harming the interests of the United States but also has the potential to harm the
security, reputation, and welfare of these Chinese Americans.
A similar quandary could present itself to those Chinese Americans who have chosen
to accept positions as consultants for another united front organization, the All-China
Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, which also serves the Party’s interests. In 2018,
twelve representatives from the United States, including wealthy businessmen and civic
leaders, were listed as advisors of the Federation’s 10 th congress. The Chinese government
picked them in recognition of their prominence and efforts in advocating positions friendly
to Beijing. 25
To engender a sense of close support, state-owned Chinese media outlets routinely report
about such contacts made between prominent Chinese Americans and senior Chinese
officials. There are literally hundreds of such reports in the Chinese-language press
about prominent Chinese Americans escorting leading figures from China’s united front
bureaucracy in the United States or being hosted by them in China. 26 In May 2017, Li
Kexin, the deputy chief of mission at the Chinese embassy in Washington, praised the
Peaceful Reunification Council’s DC chapter for holding a “peaceful reunification forum”
in Washington and for opposing Taiwan’s independence. 27 Officials from China have also
traveled freely to the United States to take part in conferences and activities designed
to further China’s influence operations in the United States. For example, United Front
officials traveled to the United States in November 2016 for the council’s annual executive
meeting, during which the council pledged to renew its efforts to “oppose Taiwan’s
independence.” 28
Conclusion and Recommendations
As US citizens, Chinese Americans enjoy the same constitutional rights of freedom of speech,
association, and political participation as everyone else, and their exercise of these rights is
fully legitimate and protected by the Constitution and law. What’s more, it is incumbent
on the United States government and American society as a whole not to demonize
Chinese Americans for their feelings for and pride in China. However, it is also important
that all American citizens be aware that such feelings can sometimes be exploited by an
authoritarian regime to advance its goals and interests. Here it is not Chinese Americans who
are at fault for having an attachment to their “motherland,” but it is the Chinese Communist
Party for cynically attempting to use Chinese Americans to further its own interests in the
process making overseas Chinese communities vulnerable to distrust.
Section 3
36
While the US government needs to adopt a no-tolerance policy toward attempts by Chinese
security forces to travel to the United States to secretly harass, manipulate, intimidate, and
monitor China’s perceived enemies in the United States, the best antidote to such intrusion
is for federal and local governments to do more to strengthen ties to Chinese American
communities and to give greater visibility into the various inducements and pressures
Beijing exerts on these communities. That the FBI has begun to reach out to prominent
Chinese in the United States, offering protection, is a good beginning.
A sustained education campaign is also urgently needed to inform the members of the
Chinese American community of the potential adverse consequences of involvement with
China’s united front activities. Chinese American organizations also need to do a better job
of informing themselves about the underlying goals of PRC’s united front organizations
as there are potential reputational costs of allying with them and losing independence. It
can be taken as a positive sign that, for example, the Committee of 100, an organization
founded by many illustrious Chinese Americans, has begun to debate the possibility of
barring its leading members from accepting positions with PRC united front organizations
officially aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. 29
China’s activities in the United States can also be made more transparent by requiring
spin-off groups from united front organizations in Beijing to register under the Foreign
Agent Registration Act as agents of a foreign power. This would include all of the bureaus
of the Peaceful Reunification Council, the China Overseas Exchange Association, and the
China Overseas Friendship Association, among others that are, in fact, influence-seeking
organizations with political implications run by a foreign state. In addition, Chinese
Americans who accept positions in united front structures—such as the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference—should also be required to register as agents of a foreign
power seeking influence in the United States. China has tried to sell these “honors” to
the Chinese American community as a costfree way of expressing their sincere feelings
of pride in China. However, the reality is that once a person accepts such “honors,” along
with free travel to China and other emoluments, the Chinese Communist Party will always
seek to exact a further price. And where that price creates divided loyalties and results in
actions harmful to American interests and values, the US government must respond with
appropriate legal and regulatory measures.
Notes
1 ​For a broad take on the issue of Chinese influence operations, see Mattis, Peter, “An American Lens on China’s
Interference and Influence-Building Abroad.” The Asan Forum. April 30, 2018. http://www​. theasanforum​. org​
/an​-american​-lens​-on​-chinas​-interference​-and​-influence​-building​-abroad​/ ; for a more in-depth look at the
individuals involved both on the Chinese and American sides, see Eades, Mark, “China’s United Front Seeks
to Undermine US Support for Taiwan.” International Policy Digest. September 11, 2017. https:// intpolicydigest​
.org​/2017​/09​/11​/china​-s​-united​-front​-seeks​-to​-undermine​-u​-s​-support​-for​-taiwan​/ ; “Florence Fang’s
The Chinese American Community
37
‘100,000 Strong Foundation’: Education or Indoctrination?” Foreign Policy Association. May 27, 2016. https://
foreignpolicyblogs​.com​/2016​/05​/27​/florence​-fangs​-foundation​-china​-education​-indoctrination​.
2 ​www​. chinaqw​. com​/ node2​/ node2796​/ node2829​/ node3243​/ userobject6ai5003​. html.
3 ​See the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee. www​.zytzb​.gov​.cn​/html​/index​.html.
4 ​The following US chapters of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification
carry some content: United States: www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​/hnwtch​/bmz​/mg​/qmzgtch​/ ; one of
the two Washington DC chapters. www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​/hnwtch​/bmz​/mg​/hsdtch​/ ; one of the
two New York chapters. www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​/hnwtch​/bmz​/mg​/nyzgtch​/ ; one of the three
Chicago chapters. http://www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​/hnwtch​/bmz​/mg​/zjgtch​/ ; the west coast chapter.
http://www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​/hnwtch​/bmz​/mg​/mxzgtch​/ ; the San Francisco chapter. http://www​
. zhongguotongcuhui​. org​. cn​/ hnwtch​/ bmz​/ mg​/ jjswq​/ ; the Boston chapter. http:// www​. zhongguotongcuhui​
. org​. cn​/ hnwtch​/ bmz​/ mg​/ bsdzgtch​.
5 ​Wang, Zhongshen. Duiwai xuanchuan chulun [Introduction to Foreign Propaganda]. Fuzhou: Fujian
renmin chubanshe. 2000. 172.
6 ​Siu, Phila. “The ‘Down-to-Earth Liberal’ Taking on China’s Top Advisory Job,” South China Morning Post,
March 15, 2018. http:// www​. scmp​. com​/ news​/ china​/ policies​- politics​/ article​/ 2137217​/ wang​- yang​- down​
- earth​- liberal​- taking​- chinas​- top​- advisory.
7 ​Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil.” The Daily Beast. August 14,
2018. https:// amp​. thedailybeast​. com​/ chinese​- police​- are​- spying​- on​- uighurson​- american​- soil.
8 ​O’Keeffe, Kate, Aruna Viswanatha, and Cezary Podkul. “China’s Pursuit of Fugitive Businessman Guo
Wengui Kicks Off Manhattan Caper Worthy of Spy Thriller.” Wall Street Journal. October 23, 2017. https://
www​. wsj​. com​/ articles​/ chinas​- hunt​- for​- guo​- wengui​- a​- fugitive​- businessman​- kicks​- off​- manhattan​- caper​
-worthy​-of​-spy​-thriller​-1508717977.
9 ​Conversations with Chinese exiles and businessmen.
10 ​ 吴锐成 . “ 发挥侨务资源优势为建设文化强省服务 .” 广东侨 . http://gocn​.southcn​.com​/dzkw2010​/hqyhr​/1​
/ 201009​/ t20100907​_ 116083​. htm.
11 ​Ching, Frank. “Beijing Seeks Loyalty from Ethnic Chinese with Foreign Passports.” EJInsight. May 3,
2016. www​. ejinsight​. com​/ 20160503​- beijing​- seeks​- loyalty​- from​- ethnic​- chinese​- with​- foreign​- passports​.
12 ​Li, Wei. “ 梁冠军当选中华海外联谊会副会长 ” The China Press. October 11, 2013. http://ny​.uschinapress​.com​
/spotlight​/2013​/10​-11​/20536​.html.
13 ​“ 中共走狗政协委员美东 “ 侨领 “ 梁冠军摊上大事了 .” YouTube. August 14, 2017. https://www​.youtube​.com​
/ watch​? v​= Dgu6FzlI1kA.
14 ​“36 位闽籍侨领受聘为十九大精神海外宣传员 .” 福建日报 . November 24, 2017. http://news​.163​.com​/17​/1124​
/ 10​/ D40JLF68000187VG​. html.
15 ​“ 美国华盛顿中国和平统一促进会 .” CCPPNR. February 28, 2012. http://www​.zhongguotongcuhui​.org​.cn​
/ hnwtch​/ bmz​/ mg​/ hsdtch​/ 201309​/ t20130916​_ 4889986​. html.
16 ​“ 北加州中国和平统一促进会声明 : 反独促统再创新局 .” People’s Daily. February 27, 2006. http://world​
. people​. com​. cn​/ GB​/ 1029​/ 42355​/ 4146500​. html.
17 ​See Chinese for Peaceful Reunification - Northern California. http://www​.cpu​-nc​.org​.
18 ​Eades, Mark. Ibid.
19 ​“ 方李邦琴 .” China Overseas Exchange Association. http://www​.coea​.org​.cn​/472​/2013​/1017​/246​.html; 来自北加州反 “ 独 ” 促统的声音 . CCTV. January 2, 2003. http://www​.cctv​.com​/lm​/523​/51​/75448​.html.
Section 3
38
20 ​The Chinese embassy also targets prominent Chinese Americans through the Committee of 100,
an organization of the most elite Chinese Americans in the United States. Committee members report
significant pressure from the Chinese consulate on committee members to toe the Party line. Some
prominent Committee members are openly sympathetic to the goals of the Chinese Communist Party. One
of them is George Koo, who in addition to serving in a senior position on the committee is also listed as an
“overseas director” of the China Overseas Friendship Association, based in Beijing.
21 ​“ 习近平主席在美过中秋与旅美华人华侨代表当面话家常二十几位华人翘楚都是谁 .” USA Phoenix
News. September 27, 2015. http://webcache​. googleusercontent​. com​/ search​? q​= cache:CaS​
- Q4Aug00J:usaphoenixnews​. com​/ m​/ article​. php%3Fid%3D115662+&cd​= 1&hl​= en&ct​= clnk&gl​= us.
22 ​“ 美中交流要从娃娃抓起 .” The China Press. March 14, 2016. http://ny​.uschinapress​.com​/m​/spotlight​/2016​
/03​-14​/90681​.html.
23 ​“ 列席今年全国政协会议的 35 名海外侨胞都有谁 ?” ChinaQW. March 3, 2018. http://www​. chinaqw​. com​
/ hqhr​/ 2018​/ 03​- 03​/ 180466​. shtml; “35 位海外列席代表受邀参加 4 位来自美国 .” US-China Press. March 2, 2018.
http://www​.uschinapress​.com​/2018​/0302​/1127148​.shtml.
24 ​Conversations with overseas Chinese members of the CPPCC.
25 ​“ 第十次全國歸僑僑眷代表大會聘請中國僑聯第十屆委員會顧問名單 .” Chinaql​. org. September 1, 2018. http://
www​. chinaql​. org​/ BIG5​/ n1​/ 2018​/ 0901​/ c421026​- 30265674​. html.
26 ​“ 旧金山中国和平统一美洲高峰论坛杨毅与会 .” China Review News. November 3, 2013. http://archive.fo
/KyKB7#selection-493.0-498.0.
27 ​“ 華盛頓和統會召開座談會暢談民進黨執政一週年兩岸形勢 .” NACPU. May 17, 2017. http://nacpu​.org​/news​
/News2017​/05172017nacpu​.html.
28 ​Zhu, Lia. “Reunification gets big boost.” China Daily. November 15, 2016. http://usa​.chinadaily​.com​.cn​
/ us​/ 2016​- 11​/ 15​/ content​_ 27388427​. htm; “ 美西和统会设宴欢迎民革中央代表团 .” US-China Press. August 15,
2016. http://www​.uschinapress​.com​/2016​/0815​/1075554​.shtml.
29 ​Interview with a Committee of 100 executive.
The Chinese American Community
SECTION 4
Universities
American universities have long played a leading role in relations between the United
States and China. Ever since the Carter administration first explored the possibility
with Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese counterparts of sending Chinese students to
the United States in 1977–78, 1 PRC government authorities (like their Republican-era
predecessors) have seen American universities as integral to China’s economic and
scientific development. For the first two decades after normalization, the Chinese
government placed a priority on sending students in STEM subjects (Science,
Technology, Engineering, Mathematics). Over time, however, fields of study broadened
into the humanities, social sciences, and the arts, a change that has mirrored the shift
in educational exchange from primarily a state-directed to a private consumer-driven
phenomenon that saw an increasing number of middle-class Chinese parents opting
to send their children to the United States for liberal arts undergraduate university,
and even secondary school education. The net result has been that several million
Chinese students have now successfully matriculated through the US higher education
system. During the 2017–2018 academic year, for instance, a record 350,755 Chinese
students were enrolled in American universities (with an additional 80,000 in high
schools), 2 out of a total of 1.5 million Chinese students studying worldwide in the
same year. 3 (Altogether, since the late 1970s, an estimated 5.2 million Chinese have
attended foreign universities.) 4 Unlike the early years of this epic exchange, a majority
of Chinese students have become able to pay full tuition, creating an extremely
significant source of revenue for financially stressed American universities and colleges.
(Chinese pay tuition worth an estimated $12 billion per year, according to the US
Department of Commerce.) 5
US universities and American society have benefited significantly from this exchange,
and from the presence of international students generally. Chinese students have
helped to diversify the makeup of US student bodies, they often contribute positively
in the classroom, and they have made a real contribution in joint research projects
with university faculty. Many have remained in the United States postgraduation to
pursue professional careers, build their lives, and become American citizens—a sizable
contribution to American society, to the US economy, and to technological innovation
and the knowledge base in numerous fields. The engineering, medical, and hard
sciences have benefited particularly, but so have the humanities and social sciences.
Indeed, those who negotiated the initial educational and scientific exchange accords
back in 1978–1979 could never have envisioned how much of a success story US-China
higher educational exchanges would become over the next four decades.
40
For their part, American universities and US scholars have also engaged in China during
this period, although in far fewer—but not insignificant—numbers. (For example, in
2015–2016, 11,688 American students and scholars were studying in China.) 6 For those
in the field of Chinese studies, it is de rigueur to study and do research in Chinese
universities. Professional collaboration among faculty—mainly in the sciences and
medicine—has also flourished. Some US universities—notably Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies (Hopkins-Nanjing Center), New York University
(NYU-Shanghai), and Duke University (Duke-Kunshan)—have gone so far as to
establish campuses in China, while others have opened centers (e.g., Stanford, Virginia,
Chicago, Yale, Harvard, Columbia). Many more American universities have forged
collaborative exchange programs with Chinese counterparts.
While US-China exchanges in higher education have primarily been a success
story, as in many other dimensions of the Sino-American relationship, clouds have
appeared on the horizon. 7 American students have become less keen than in the past
to study in China due to concerns about pollution, lack of open internet access, and
expanding political controls. American scholars trying to conduct research in China
have run into an increasing number of restrictions and impediments since 2010, due
to a broad campaign against “foreign hostile forces” and an increasingly draconian
political atmosphere that has cast a shadow across Chinese society, especially over
higher education. Whole subject areas and regions of the country are now off-limits
to American and other foreign scholars for fieldwork; previously normal interactions
with Chinese scholars are now often heavily circumscribed; many Chinese scholars
have become reluctant to meet with American counterparts; a growing number of
libraries are off-limits; central-level archives have been closed, and provincial; municipal
archives are increasingly restricted; interviews with government officials (at all levels)
are more difficult to arrange; public opinion surveys must be carried out with Chinese
partners, if they can be conducted at all; simple eyewitness social research in rural and,
even some urban areas, is considerably more limited than previously. In short, normal
scholarly research practices permitted elsewhere in the world are regularly proscribed
in China. These restrictions also include the inability to hold open and uncensored
public scholarly discussions, conferences, and other kinds of events. Meanwhile,
Chinese students and scholars enjoy unimpeded access to all of these activities in the
United States, resulting in a severe asymmetry in Sino-American scholarly exchange.
This contravenes the spirit of the bilateral US-China educational exchange accords.
At the same time, storm clouds are also gathering on American campuses with respect
to another aspect of this important relationship, namely, growing concerns about
unfair Chinese “influence-seeking activities” in the United States.
Universities
41
Confucius Institutes
One of the most controversial aspects of the whole US-China educational exchange
is the Confucius Institutes (CI), of which there are now 110 (plus 501 Confucius
Classrooms in secondary schools) across the United States. 8 For secondary schools and
colleges that have no or little other coverage of China on campus, CIs are an important
resource. Sponsored by the Hanban, an organization directly under the Ministry of
Education in Beijing, but also with ties to the External Propaganda Leading Group of
the CCP Central Committee, the primary mission of CIs is to teach Chinese language
and culture abroad. However, faculty and other watchdogs have warned that they may
present risks to intellectual freedom by using American universities as vehicles through
which to advance Chinese Communist Party propaganda. Accusations leveled at CIs
revolve mainly around the exclusive use of PRC materials that promote PRC Chinese
viewpoints, terminology, and simplified characters; the avoidance of discussion
on controversial topics such as Tibet, Tiananmen, Xinjiang, the Falun Gong, and
human rights in American classrooms and programs; and potential infringement on
theoretically independent studies curricula on American campuses.
Although proponents of CIs like to compare them with branches of France’s L’Alliance
Francaise, Germany’s Goethe Instituts, and Spain’s Cervantes Institute, they are
different in important ways. Unlike these other institutions, CIs are joint operations
located inside—and co-funded by—a host university or secondary school for which
the Hanban arranges a Chinese university to supply teachers, textbooks, and other
materials. The teachers are paid by the Chinese university (and hence do not hold
green cards or pay US taxes). Typically, the Hanban provides a $150,000 start-up grant
with $100,000–$200,000 per year follow-on funding (depending on the institution)
directly to the American university. Secondary schools normally receive $50,000 in
initial funding and $15,000 subsequently per annum. Most troublesome are two
provisions in the Hanban contracts with US host institutions: One forbids the CIs
from conducting any activities that contravene Chinese law while the other requires
that the enabling contract remain confidential, making oversight by the academic
community difficult.
Some participating American institutions have belatedly had second thoughts about
their partnerships. In 2014, the University of Chicago terminated its CI contract
with the Hanban after months of controversy among faculty, spurred by a highprofile
critical article by an emeritus member. 9 Since that time, at least two additional
American universities have also closed their branches (Pennsylvania State University
and University of West Florida), 10 and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), a leading critic of
alleged Chinese “influence activities,” has written letters to a number of other Florida
institutions hosting CIs requesting that they also be closed. 11 Representatives Michael
McCaul (R-TX) and Henry Cuellar (D-TX) called for the same termination in their own
Section 4
42
state, stating in a letter addressed to their state’s universities that these organizations
“are a threat to our nation’s security by serving as a platform for China’s intelligence
collection and political agenda.” They added that, “We have a responsibility to uphold
our American values of free expression, and to do whatever is necessary to counter any
behavior that poses a threat to our democracy.” The Texas A&M system complied with
this request by ordering the closure of all CIs. 12 Then, in August 2018, the University
of North Florida announced the closure of its CI. 13
Similar calls have been made in other states, and the 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act restricts Department of Defense language study funding if a
university hosts a Confucius Institute. 14 Several other universities (including Dickinson
State University in Pennsylvania, the University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton
University) that had been contemplated opening CIs, have now decided not to do so.
At the same time, Columbia University (and elsewhere) has come under criticism, more
for lack of transparency than for its specific violative activities. 15 That said, the majority
of CIs have so far carried out their mission of language and cultural education without
controversy.
In 2014, both the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) and the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) called on universities to
terminate CIs unless their agreements with Hanban were renegotiated to provide for
total transparency and compliance with norms of academic freedom. 16 In 2017, the
National Association of Scholars (NAS), a politically conservative nonprofit advocacy
group, 17 undertook an exhaustive study of CIs in the United States and produced a
183-page report. 18 Echoing the AAUP’s recommendations, the NAS urged closing all
CIs on the basis of four areas of concern: a restriction of intellectual freedom; lack
of transparency; “entanglement” (with Chinese party–controlled institutions); and
worries about them being used for Chinese “soft power” or pro-PRC propaganda.
In addition to the above concerns, some have argued that the fact that CI language
programs exclusively use PRC textbooks with “simplified” (or mainland-style) Chinese
characters biases the contribution CIs make to Chinese language instruction on
American campuses. In our view, this is not a serious problem, since students should
learn this vocabulary and this form of written characters, so long as the university
also provides the opportunity for students to learn traditional “complex” characters
(used in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and many diaspora communities) and to learn
non-mainland vocabulary. A review of the entire set of Hanban textbooks used by CIs
undertaken for this report finds they contain no overt political content. Only in one
of six levels of textbook was there a single lesson on US-China relations, and it was a
speech by former president Barack Obama, in which he asserted that the United States
does not seek to “contain” China. Nor have we found any evidence of interference by
Universities
43
CIs in the mainstream Chinese studies curricula on US campuses to date. (See below
for our recommendations concerning CIs.)
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) on American campuses maintain
regular contact with China’s diplomatic missions in the US. Even when these contacts
are purely for cultural purposes, the CSSA provides a ready channel or entry point
for the political departments of China’s embassy and consulates in the US to gather
information and coordinate action, which in some cases includes pressuring the
behavior of Chinese students. Sometimes pressure is even applied by China’s security
services on the family members of those students it finds speaking out in unacceptable
ways back in China. What is more, Chinese scholars and diplomats have sought to
influence on-campus debates in China’s favors and have even protested when American
universities have exercised their right to invite speakers whom China identifies as
unfriendly. Finally, some Chinese students and scholars have exploited the collaborative
research environment on US campuses to obtain sensitive American technologies.
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations now exist on approximately 150 US
campuses. 19 A second type of on-campus association has also recently started up,
the China Development Student Think Tank (CDSTT), with chapters at Syracuse
University, Boston University, and George Washington University. As voluntary
associations of Chinese citizens on campus, these groups perform many appropriate
social functions, such as orienting new students to life in the United States and
arranging networking get-togethers. Nonetheless, their links with Chinese diplomatic
missions and some of their activities, because of their attempts to interfere with
other campus activities and broader political discourse and debate, present cause for
concern. CSSAs at Washington, DC, universities make no secret of their ties to the
Chinese embassy and receive small amounts of operating funds directly from it. CSSAs
elsewhere have similar ties to nearby Chinese consulates, which also provide them
with funding, other kinds of support, and surveillance. It has also been reported that
Chinese Communist Party cells have been established on several US campuses. 20
CSSAs often alert PRC diplomatic missions about events on campus that offend official
PRC political sensitivities, e.g., speeches or discussions on Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, human
rights, and Chinese elite politics. Once notified, the local PRC mission has sometimes
contacted university faculty or staff members to prevent such events from proceeding.
In some instances, it is difficult to know whether opposition to events originates with
a CSSA or the local PRC mission. In 2017, the CSSA at the University of California San
Diego mobilized opposition to the chancellor’s invitation to the Dalai Lama to be the
commencement speaker, which at least some CSSA members ultimately coordinated with
the PRC consulate in Los Angeles. 21 After the event finally took place anyway as planned,
Section 4
44
the Chinese government retaliated by banning students and scholars with funding from
the Chinese government’s China Scholarship Council from attending UCSD. Other US
universities have come under similar pressure when they have contemplated inviting
the Dalai Lama or his associates to campus. Academic authorities at one Washington,
DC, university were even warned by the Chinese embassy that if an event concerning
Xinjiang went ahead, they risked losing their Confucius Institute.
CSSAs also serve as a channel of political “peer monitoring” of Chinese students,
constraining the academic freedom of Chinese students on campus—and thereby
also undermining core principles of free speech and academic freedom. This issue has
become more serious over the past several years, as the political environment in China
has tightened and Chinese students widely fear that things they say on campus (even
in class, at other campus activities, or in private conversations) that contradict official
PRC policies are liable to be reported to the Chinese authorities and risk putting their
families into jeopardy back home.
A very public example of this kind took place during the commencement ceremonies
at the University of Maryland in May 2017, after a Chinese student was selected as the
commencement speaker. When Yang Shuping praised the “fresh air of free speech” and
contrasted what she had found in the United States with China—and her comments
went viral on the internet and social media in China—she received an avalanche of
email threats, and her family in China was harassed. 22 Another well-reported incident
occurred at Duke University in 2008 when a twenty-year-old female undergraduate
student became caught up in a pro-Tibetan independence demonstration. She was
vilified online, and her parents were harassed back in China. 23 In other cases, Chinese
government authorities have visited students’ families in China and warned them
about their children’s allegedly subversive statements abroad.
In Australia, another kind of disturbing phenomenon has occurred: Several instances
have occurred in which Chinese students have recorded professors’ lectures that were
deemed critical of the PRC and then uploaded them onto the internet, thereby
prompting harassment of the lecturers on social media. 24 There is no evidence that this
has occurred on American campuses to date. But the presence on campus of a student
organization linked to the Chinese government creates an understandable concern
that faculty lecturing on politically sensitive topics might fear that their lectures are
being monitored and thus self-censor themselves. This prospect is especially concerning
when it involves a faculty member who, because he or she needs to travel to China for
research or other professional purposes, feels under duress.
Gifts and Grants
Thanks to growing wealth accumulation in China, prosperous Chinese are beginning
to develop the practice of philanthropy and to exercise giving both at home and
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abroad. 25 This is potentially a good thing for American universities. Indeed, since 2011,
Chinese sources have participated in at least 1,186 donations or contracts worth more
than $426 million to seventy-seven American universities, according to disclosures
made to the US Department of Education, making China the fifth most active country
by number of gifts, and fourth, behind Qatar, England, and Saudi Arabia, in total
monetary value of gifts. (These disclosures are only required of universities that accept
federal aid, and the figures also include funds from Taiwanese sources.) 26
All US institutions of higher education cultivate lifetime giving from both graduates
and their families. Given the numbers of Chinese students matriculating from
American universities and the wealth of many of their families back in China as well
as their own potential career earnings, Chinese students have become a growing
priority for university development officers. Indeed, some Chinese families also
seem to believe that they can ensure, or at least enhance, their children’s chances
of acceptance into top colleges through charitable gifts. 27
Given the government’s extensive role in China’s economy, acceptance of all Chinese
gifts and grants requires due diligence that should be above and beyond the standard
practices currently employed by universities for other charitable giving. This is
obviously the case when funding comes from the Chinese government itself, for
example via the Hanban (the oversight body of the Confucius Institutes), which doles
out research grants via its Confucius China Studies Program, 28 the “Young Sinologists”
program of the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 29
and, in one instance, the endowing of a faculty position at Stanford University.
Chinese corporate and private donors are now also starting to pour millions of
dollars into the US educational system, think tanks, and nonprofit organizations.
Given that privately owned companies in China exist and prosper at the sufferance
of political authorities there, even seemingly independent actors are often likely to
act at government direction or in ways that they believe will please the government.
Major mainland Chinese and Hong Kong companies and individuals with active
business ventures in China have now pledged or donated substantial funds to
US universities.
This is also the case with some Hong Kong-based or US-based foundations that are
linked directly or indirectly to the Chinese government or to enterprises and families
that have prospered with the help of the Beijing government. The most notable case is
the China-United States Exchange Foundation. 30 CUSEF was established in 2008 on the
initiative of former Hong Kong chief executive and shipping magnate Tung Chee Hwa
(C.H. Tung) who continues to be the chairman of the foundation. Tung is also the vice
chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China’s
highest-level “united front” organization 31 and he attended the Communist Party’s
19 th Congress in October 2017. Moreover, the number of mainland-based members of
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46
the foundation’s official advisors and the foundation’s easy connections with Chinese
government organs belie the foundation’s assertion that it is independent of the
Chinese Communist Party and the PRC government.
CUSEF undertakes a range of programs aimed at Americans that can accurately be
described as “influence-seeking activities”; as such, it has registered in the United
States under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). Its lobbying activities include
sponsoring all-expense-paid tours of China for delegations composed of what the
foundation’s website refers to as “thought leaders,” including journalists and editors,
think-tank specialists, and city and state officials. 32 CUSEF has not often collaborated
with American universities and think tanks, but it recently offered funding to the
University of Texas at Austin for its China Public Policy Center. However, after receiving
criticism from Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) and others, the university declined the grant. 33
CUSEF grants have generally gone to leading US think tanks, such as the Brookings
Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Asia Society.
There have not yet been many offers by Chinese donors—private, corporate, or
government—to fund faculty positions or centers for Chinese studies on US campuses,
although many universities are believed to be seeking such gifts. In one instance in
2014, a leading Washington, DC, university was approached by a Chinese university
with a proposal for a $500,000 annual grant to establish a Center for Chinese studies in
partnership with the Chinese university. 34 The Chinese side had three main conditions
for the grant: (1) that a series of Chinese officials and other visitors would be given public
platforms for frequent speeches; (2) that faculty from the Chinese partner university
could teach China courses on the US university campus; and (3) that new Chinese
Studies courses would be added to the university curriculum. The Washington-based
university turned down the lucrative offer, on the advice of its Chinese studies faculty.
In August 2017, the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS) announced that it had received a substantial gift from CUSEF for
an endowed junior faculty position, as well as program funding for a “Pacific
Community Initiative.” SAIS administrators stated that there were no political or
other strings attached to these grants, despite media insinuations to the contrary. 35
At Yale Law School, the China Law Center founded in 1999 was renamed the Paul
Tsai China Center after receiving a $30 million endowment from Joseph C. Tsai, a
Taiwanese Canadian billionaire who is a cofounder and executive vice chairman of the
China-based Alibaba Group. 36 Tsai, an alumnus of Yale College and Yale Law School,
made the gift in honor of his father, also an alumnus of Yale Law School.
China is not the only authoritarian government that has given or facilitated gifts
to American academic institutions or think tanks, but it is the wealthiest. There
is no evidence so far that any of these gifts has compromised the independence
of the recipient institution. But the trend toward large gifts from Chinese sources,
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many with some kind of government linkage underscores the need for vigilance in
enforcing a stricter code of due diligence and transparency on the part of university
administrations and faculties.
Pressure on University Administrations
There are a large number of successful exchange programs between American and
Chinese universities. Three US universities have developed campuses in China (Johns
Hopkins, Duke, NYU), more than one hundred universities participate in cooperativeeducation
programs in China, and countless US faculty members participate in
collaborative projects with Chinese colleagues (principally in the sciences). These
relationships have not been easy to establish or maintain, but they have generally
been successful. A 2016 report by the Government Accounting Office, which reviewed
the cooperative programs of twelve American universities, found that the universities
“generally indicated that they experienced academic freedom,” while noting that
self- and internet censorship remains a problem.
In recent years, the outlook for these collaborations has deteriorated in line with
broader restrictions on academic freedom on Chinese campuses. In 2013, and
commensurate with CCP Central Committee Document No. 9, universities were
reportedly instructed to avoid discussing topics including “universal values” and civil
rights, 37 and admonitions against teaching of Western values have continued. Since
2017, foreign university collaborative institutions have been required to institute
Communist Party committees and place a Party secretary on their management
boards. 38 In July 2018, the Ministry of Education ended 234, or one-fifth, of its
international university partnerships. More than twenty-five programs with
American universities were among them. 39
The Chinese government has demonstrated a penchant for turning to these
collaborations as points of leverage when US universities have hosted the Dalai
Lama or held other events deemed politically sensitive or offensive to the Chinese
government. In such instances, existing collaborative exchange programs have been
suspended or put on hold, planned visits of university administrators have been
canceled, programs between university institutes and centers have been suspended,
and Chinese students wishing to study at these US institutions have been counseled
to go elsewhere. Such punitive actions resulting from campus visits by the Dalai Lama
have been taken against Emory University, the University of Maryland, the University
of California–San Diego, and others. In the case of the University of Maryland, which
hosted the Dalai Lama in 2013, there was temporary fallout, and then following the
2017 graduation incident the Chinese government again halted cooperation, seriously
damaging one of the most extensive exchange programs with China.
Section 4
48
Such cases establish a worrying precedent of Chinese intrusion into American
academic life. The message from China to US universities is clear: Do not transgress the
political no-go zones of the Chinese Communist Party or government, or you will pay
a price. Sometimes the pressure is overt; other times it is more subtle and indirect, but
no less alarming. Some American faculty members report troubling conversations with
university administrators who continue to view Chinese students as such a lucrative
revenue stream that it should not be endangered by “needlessly irritating Chinese
authorities.”
Censorship and Self-Censorship
The final category of troubling Chinese influence on American campuses involves the
vexing issue of self-censorship among faculty and students in Chinese studies. 40 In a
much-quoted essay, Perry Link described censorship within China as the use of vague
threats to induce academics, writers, and others to self-limit what they say; he called
this “the anaconda in the chandelier” syndrome. 41 More recently, the phenomenon
has begun to loom over scholars working outside China, and the Chinese government
has started deploying a variety of techniques to also encourage self-censorship beyond
China’s borders, including in the United States. In some cases, this syndrome has led to
outright self-censorship of academic work. To cite some of the most egregious examples:
• Denial of visas to qualified scholars and students seeking access to China for
research or training purposes. The State Department estimates that fifteen to
twenty individuals are on an outright “black list,” while scores of others appear
to be on a “gray” list, where denials are less absolute and sometimes temporary
or limited only to certain categories of visa. But being cast into the “gray” status
helps create exactly the kind of uncertainty about what behavior might lead to
visa denial, thus inducing self-censorship in the hopes of not offending anyone
further, much less turning one’s status from “gray” to “black.” In other words,
the power to withhold or deny access through the issuance of visas affords the
Chinese government a full spectrum of powerful control mechanisms over
scholars.
• Denial of access to interviewees, archives, libraries, and research institutes, even
when visas are granted.
• Restriction of visiting scholar status for American researchers to a few institutes
under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and
some universities. Other think tanks and research institutes do not permit foreign
resident researchers. At the same time, it should be noted, Chinese researchers
from a wide variety of institutes are free to regularly come to US universities and
think tanks for short- and long-term stays.
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• Attempts to control the agendas, participant name lists, what is written, and
what is said at joint scholarly conferences held in China, and now sometimes
even in the United States. (A recent technique is to require that a talk or paper
by an American participant in a Chinese organized event be handed over to the
organizing group for vetting well before the event itself, so a participant can be
disinvited, if necessary.)
• Restriction of internet and email communications when in China.
• Monitoring, even following, some American scholars by security services while
in China.
• Demands for censorship by foreign publishers of their digital content as a
condition for allowing it to be made available online in China.
• Insistence on censorship of Chinese-language editions of foreign books by the
State Press & Publishing Administration. This places foreign authors in the
difficult position of having to acquiesce to such censorship in order to have
translations of their books published in China.
• Censorship of online archives of PRC journals and publications, such as
the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database. American
universities each pay tens of thousands of dollars annually for access to these
electronic databases. However, recent research has shown that CNKI in particular
is now “curating” its catalogs and holdings by deleting articles the current
government appears not to wish to see remaining in the historical record. 42 Since
American universities have started to dispose of paper copies of many of the
journals carried in CNKI (China National Knowledge Information) periodical
index, this amounts to PRC distorting the historical record, not just for China
but for the entire world.
In addition to these specific restrictions affecting American scholars, the PRC
government also influences the field of Chinese studies in the United States (and
elsewhere) via controls over key regions of their country (especially minority areas
such as Tibet and Xinjiang) and by putting no-go zones around a wide variety of
research subjects within the broader areas of politics, religion, ethnography, and civil
society that cannot be researched in-country. As a result, American professors cannot
themselves work in these areas, nor can they in good conscience advise their graduate
students to work on these subjects either because of risk to the researcher’s career, as
well as to the human subjects whom researchers would be observing or interviewing.
Such restrictions have real consequences for the open future of Chinese studies around
the world.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
US-China academic exchanges are valuable to both China and the United States and
should be maintained and developed. However, in doing so, universities must be alert
to the risks of engaging with the Chinese government, institutions, and funders and
be proactive in applying a higher level of due diligence and vigilance as a defense of
the core principle of academic freedom, especially when conflicts take place at home
in their own universities.
Promote Transparency
Confucius Institutes We do not endorse calls for Confucius Institutes to be closed,
as long as several conditions are met. US institutions should make their CI agreements
public to facilitate oversight by members of the university community and other
concerned parties. Those agreements, in turn, must grant full managerial authority
to the host institution (not on a shared basis with the Hanban), so the university has
full control over what a CI teaches, the activities it undertakes, the research grants it
makes, and whom it employs. The clause in all Hanban contracts that CIs must operate
“according to China’s laws” must be deleted.
If these standards cannot be attained, then the CI agreements should be terminated.
Furthermore, universities should prevent any intervention by CIs in curricular
requirements and course content in their overall Chinese studies curricula or other
areas of study by maintaining a clear administrative separation between academic
centers and departments on the one hand, and CIs on the other. Finally, universities
must ensure that all public programming offered by their CIs conform to academic
standards of balance and diversity and do not cross the line to become a platform
for PRC propaganda, or even a circumscribed view of a controversial issue. In fact,
this report would suggest that universities not permit Confucius Institutes to become
involved in public programming that goes beyond the CI core mission of education
about Chinese language and culture. To go beyond these two categories invites
opportunities for politicized propaganda.
Apply Due Diligence To minimize the risks just identified, universities must rigorously
apply far stricter due-diligence procedures to scrutinize the sources and purposes of
gifts and contracts from China to ensure that they do not interfere with academic
freedom. Universities accepting gifts from Chinese nationals, corporations, or
foundations must insist that there be no restrictions on academic freedom. Foreign
donations should continue to be welcomed, but universities must ensure that the
conditions of acceptance are reasonable, consonant with their principles, subject to
oversight, and do not allow the program to become a beachhead for inappropriate
influence. It is important that all universities exercise high standards of due diligence
and not only scrutinize the source of the gift but consider the implications of such
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things as naming rights. Above all, they must insist that the terms of each gift
impose no restrictions on academic freedom. The activities of all chairs, centers,
and projects funded by Chinese support need to be fully transparent and supervised
by independent faculty committees and university administrators, who must bear
in mind that even when a joint project, research grant, or gift has undergone due
diligence and has no explicit or evident strings attached, it can still produce a natural
sense of obligation because no institution wants to offend a generous donor. This is a
problem, not restricted to grants from China, but one that is deeply entrenched in the
fund-raising structure on which American institutions of higher education depend for
their well-being.
Defend Academic Freedom Faculty governance is the core technique for protecting
academic freedom in American universities and is the key to their leading role in
research and teaching. It takes various forms in various institutions, but its key
principles must be applied consistently to interactions involving China. Transparency
must be maintained in the terms of a university’s contracts with all outside actors,
whether individuals, foundations, donors, or collaborating institutions such as the
Hanban, which funds Confucius Institutes. Such actors must be subject to regular
oversight by faculty bodies and by administrators answerable to faculty bodies so that
faculty, students, visiting scholars, and others associated with the university in an
academic capacity will have uncompromised freedom of speech, research, teaching,
and programmatic activities.
Universities and their associated institutions—such as university presses—must
refuse all forms of censorship of—or interference in—their publications, conferences,
curricula, participants in events, and other academic activities. Some universities have
formal rules barring such censorship, but they need to increase awareness, training,
and enforcement. Other universities may need to enact or update such rules. While
maintaining the openness of US universities to Chinese students, scholars, and
researchers, universities should push for reciprocity from Chinese partner institutions
with respect to various forms of research access.
In short, universities should enhance protection for faculty and students—especially
international students—from interference in their academic freedom, and campuses
with large numbers of international students from authoritarian countries should
introduce training for students on their academic rights in the American educational
system, and on the proper distance that independent student organizations should
maintain from government actors. Finally, universities should provide a confidential
complaint procedure for students who feel they have come under pressure that
threatens their academic freedom, and university advisors should stand prepared to
counsel and assist these students to deal appropriately with such pressures.
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Promote Integrity
Be Alert to Risks The primary risk is of inappropriate influence over admissions,
course content, and program activities stemming from the influence of Chinese
government-linked donors, diplomatic missions, student groups, and institutions.
This is not a new challenge for US university administrators and development officers.
They have dealt with political quid pro quos from donors from South Korea, Taiwan,
Japan, Israel, Russia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the past and
currently, and American universities have long learned how to refuse donations with
strings attached. This historical experience and the existing safeguards should also
help inform and guide US universities when it comes to dealing with this new wave of
Chinese money. Faculty and administrators must continue to protect the open debate,
diversity of opinion, freedom of expression, faculty autonomy, and transparency on
which the health and reputation of their institutions are based. Funding from Chinese
sources should be as welcome as funding from other sources, but only to the extent
that fundamental academic values can be maintained and protected.
A second risk is a loss of sensitive or proprietary technology through academic
instruction of cooperation. There are indications that the US government is now
strengthening measures to protect the theft of sensitive technology and intellectual
property that is being developed on US campuses. These measures may require
heightened screening and, in some cases, outright denial of visas to individuals from
certain state-run institutions or even from certain sensitive research fields. Such
calls have understandably prompted concern from the academic community fearing
that this will undermine the principles of academic freedom, hinder collaboration,
and deny American universities access to a rich talent pool. These reservations are
merited and require that any tightening of visa categories be as narrow as possible.
For their part, universities will of course have to comply with whatever regulations are
imposed. They should, additionally, proactively review and update their procedures
for protecting both proprietary and classified research. They should also enter into
far closer collegial discussions with one another, relevant professional associations,
and government agencies to collectively refine solutions to the difficult problem of
balancing the pursuit of innovation and academic freedom with preventing the theft
of technology and other IP.
To meet these challenges, American universities may need to update their rules and
intensify faculty and researcher training and institutional oversight for protection of
proprietary research information. Some US universities refuse to accept contracts for
classified research. Those that do accept such contracts must comply with government
regulations for the protection of research findings. But all research universities
conduct research that produces valuable intellectual property, which is proprietary
in various proportions to the funder. And so, it is necessary for the university and
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researchers to intensify efforts to protect their proprietary intellectual property
from loss.
Promote Reciprocity
The academic community nationwide should work toward a common set of principles
and practices for protecting academic freedom and promote greater reciprocity.
To prevent influencers from using divide-and-conquer strategies (by rewarding
some institutions while punishing others), it is important for the national academic
community as a whole to come together to formulate and implement these principles.
US universities should not only work together but they should also work with other
universities around the world to develop a “Code of Conduct” for acceptable and
unacceptable practices in academic exchanges with Chinese institutions and funders.
(The section on think tanks in this section recommends similar measures.) The
academic community and government should also monitor instances where Chinese
entities may acquire financially challenged American colleges outright, ensuring that
their academic integrity is not compromised. 43
Universities can and must continue to play a positive role in the US-China relationship.
Indeed, by introducing international students to American life and values, and
connecting them to new personal and professional relationships, universities are
arguably the important means by which the United States exercises its soft power.
Generally—but not always—individuals undergoing such an experience take a more
positive view of the country. Unfortunately, as Chinese students contribute much, not
least monetarily, to American universities, universities have been too slow to help them
integrate themselves more organically into campus life. As a result, Chinese students
report unacceptably high levels of depression and isolation or simply clubbing up with
each other. 44 While acting to mitigate the risks of improper interference, universities
must not forget their obligations to these students nor lose sight of the far greater
opportunity to advance cooperation and understanding.
NOTES
1 ​This process is well documented in Li, Cheng (ed.). Bridging Minds Across the Pacific: US-China Educational
Exchanges, 1978–2003. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2005.
2 ​“Places of Origin.” Institute of International Education. 2017. https://www​.iie​.org​/Research​-and​-Insights​
/ Open​- Doors​/ Data​/ International​- Students​/ Places​- of​- Origin.
3 ​“For China’s Elite, Studying Abroad Is de Rigueur.” Economist. May 17, 2018. https://www​.economist​.com​
/ special​- report​/ 2018​/ 05​/ 17​/ for​- chinas​- elite​- studying​- abroad​- is​- de​- rigueur.
4 ​Ibid.
5 ​Ibid.
Section 4
54
6 ​“Destinations.” Institute of International Education. 2017. https://www​.iie​.org​/Research​-and​-Insights​
/ Open​- Doors​/ Data​/ US​- Study​- Abroad​/ Destinations.
7 ​A particularly useful survey of examples of China’s interference on US campuses can be found in Lloyd-
Damnjanovic, Anastasya. A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities in American
Higher Education. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Kissinger Institute
on China and the United States. 2018. https://www​.wilsoncenter​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/prc​_political​
_influence​_full​_report​.pdf.
8 ​“About Confucius Institute/Classroom.” Hanban. http://english​. hanban​. org​/ node​_ 10971​. htm.
9 ​Sahlins, Marshall. “China U.” Nation. October 30, 2013. https:// www​. thenation​. com​/ article​/ china​- u​.
10 ​Redden, Elizabeth. “Another Confucius Institute to Close.” Inside Higher Ed. October 1, 2014. https://
www​. insidehighered​. com​/ quicktakes​/ 2014​/ 10​/ 01​/ another​- confucius​- institute​- close; Baucum, Joseph.
“UWF Cuts Ties with Controversial Chinese-Affiliated Confucius Institute.” Pensacola News Journal.
February 7, 2018. https://www​.pnj​.com​/story​/money​/business​/2018​/02​/07​/uwf​-cuts​-ties​-chinese​-run​
- confucius​- institute​- criticized​- controversial​- chinese​- government​- affiliated​/ 312966002​.
11 ​“Rubio Warns of Beijing’s Growing Influence, Urges Florida Schools to Terminate Confucius Institute
Agreements.” Office of Senator Marco Rubio. February 5, 2018. https://www​.rubio​.senate​.gov​/public​/index​
.cfm​/2018​/2​/rubio​-warns​-of​-beijing​-s​-growing​-influence​-urges​-florida​-schools-to-terminate-confucius​
-institute-agreements.
12 ​Wang, Jackie. “Texas A&M System Cuts Ties.” Dallas Morning News. April 5, 2018. https:// www​
.dallasnews​.com​/news​/higher​-education​/2018​/04​/05​/congressmen​-urge​-ut​-dallas​-texas​-universities​-cut​
- ties​- chinas​- confucius​- institute.
13 ​Martina, Michael. “Florida University Latest to Cut Ties . . .” Reuters. August 15, 2018. https:// www​
. reuters​. com​/ article​/ us​- usa​- china​- education​/ florida​- university​- latest​- to​- cut​- ties​- with​- chinas​- confucius​
- institute​- idUSKBN1L012Z.
14 ​115th Congress. “John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act of 2019.” https:// www​. gpo​. gov​
/ fdsys​/ pkg​/ BILLS​- 115hr5515enr​/ pdf​/ BILLS​- 115hr5515enr​. pdf.
15 ​Feith, Dore. “Exploiting a Reputation: The Chinese Communist Party and Columbia’s Brand.” Current.
Fall 2017. http:// www​. columbia​- current​. org​/ exploiting​- a​- reputation​. html.
16 ​AAUP. “Partnerships with Foreign Governments: The Case of Confucius Institutes.” June 2014. https://
www​. aaup​. org​/ file​/ Confucius​_ Institutes​_ 0​. pdf.
17 ​“National Association of Scholars.” Wikipedia. https://en​.wikipedia​.org​/wiki​/National​_Association​_of​
_ Scholars.
18 ​Peterson, Rachelle. “Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher
Education.” National Association of Scholars​. https:// www​. nas​. org​/ images​/ documents​/ confucius​
_ institutes​/ NAS​_ confuciusInstitutes​. pdf.
19 ​Statistic given in Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Chinese Government Gave Money to Georgetown Chinese
Student Group.” Foreign Policy. February 14, 2014. http://foreignpolicy​.com​/2018​/02​/14​/exclusive​-chinese​
-government​-gave​-money​-to​-georgetown​-chinese​-student-group-washington-china-communist-party​
-influence.
20 ​Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting Up Cells at Universities Across
America.” Foreign Policy. April 18, 2018. https://foreignpolicy​.com​/2018​/04​/18​/the​-chinese​-communist​
- party​- is​- setting​- up​- cells​- at​- universities​- across​- america​- china​- students​- beijing​- surveillance​.
21 ​Ibid.
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22 ​Ibid.
23 ​Dewan, Shaila. “Chinese Student in US Is Caught in Confrontation.” New York Times. April 17, 2008.
http://www​.nytimes​.com​/2008​/04​/17​/us​/17student​.html.
24 ​Reynolds, Emma. “Tensions Rise as Chinese Government’s Influence Infiltrates Aussie Universities.”
News​.com​.au. September 1, 2017. http://www​.news​.com​.au​/finance​/economy​/australian​-economy​
/tensions​-rise​-as​-chinese​-governments​-influence​-infiltrates​-aussie​-universities​/news​-story​/e7768b0bb1f5
953a7608884527387372.
25 For example, to cite cases, in the last few years Wang Jianlin from Wanda is reported to have
personally pledged substantial amounts to Harvard and Yale. SOHO China founders Pan Shiyi and Zhang
Xin reportedly set up a $100 million dollar scholarship fund for American universities in 2014 to facilitate
attendance of underprivileged Chinese students, and they have already made substantial gifts to Harvard
and Yale.
26 ​See the list of 18,467 foreign gifts to US institutions of higher education for the period 2011–2017
accessible at https://studentaid​.ed​.gov​/sa​/about​/data​-center​/school​/foreign​-gifts, accessed 2018.07.17.
27 ​Admissions officers at leading universities say this is an increasingly common practice.
28 ​“China Studies Program.” Hanban. english​.hanban​.org​/node​_43075​.htm.
29 ​This program, created in 2014, has been for short-term visits to China, but in 2018 has added a research
grant component. See http://en​.chinaculture​.org​/2016​-07​/21​/content​_845260​.htm.
30 ​“About Us.” China-United States Exchange Foundation. https://www​.cusef​.org​.hk​/about​-us​.
31 ​The CPPCC is a body in which the Communist Party liaises with China’s eight so-called democratic
parties. It is comprised of representatives of these parties as well as CCP members.
32 ​These activities are all listed in the CUSEF Annual Reports: https://www​.cusef​.org​.hk​/annual​-reports​.
33 ​Redden, Elizabeth. “Thanks, but No Thanks.” Inside Higher Education. January 16, 2018. https:// www​
.insidehighered​.com​/news​/2018​/01​/16​/ut​-austin​-rejects​-funding​-chinese​-government​-linked​-foundation.
34 ​It was assumed that the funding came from Chinese government funds.
35 ​Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “This Beijing-Linked Billionaire Is Funding Policy Research at Washington’s
Most Influential Institutions.” Foreign Policy. November 28, 2017. https:// foreignpolicy​. com​/ 2017​/ 11​/ 28​
/ this​- beijing​- linked​- billionaire​- is​- funding​- policy​- research​- at​- washingtons​- most​- influential-institutions​
-china​-dc.
36 ​“Paul Tsai China Center: About Us.” https://law​.yale​.edu​/china​-center​/about​-us.
37 ​Li, Raymond. “Seven subjects off-limits for teaching, Chinese universities told.” South China Morning
Post. May 10, 2013. https://www​.scmp​.com​/news​/china​/article​/1234453​/seven​-subjects​-limits​-teaching​
- chinese​- universities​- told.
38 ​Feng, Emily. “China tightens grip on university joint ventures.” Financial Times. August 7, 2018.
https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/dbb7b87e​-99f7​-11e8​-9702​-5946bae86e6d.
39 ​Feng, Emily. “China closes a fifth of foreign university partnerships,” Financial Times. July 18, 2018,
https:// www​. ft​. com​/ content​/ 794b77e8​- 8976​- 11e8​- bf9e​- 8771d5404543.
40 ​See Greitens, Sheena Chestnut and Rory Truex. “Repressive Experiences Among China Scholars:
New Evidence from Survey Data.” Paper presented at American Political Science Association.
September 2018.
Section 4
56
41 ​Link, Perry. “China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier.” New York Review of Books. April 11, 2002.
http:// www​. nybooks​. com​/ articles​/ 2002​/ 04​/ 11​/ china​- the​- anaconda​- in​- the​- chandelier​.
42 ​See Tiffert, Glenn. “Peering Down the Memory Hole: History, Censorship and the Digital Turn.”
August 21, 2017. https://www​.washingtonpost​.com​/r​/2010​-2019​/WashingtonPost​/2017​/08​/23​/Editorial​
- Opinion​/ Graphics​/ Tiffert​- Peering​_ down​_ the​_ memory​_ hole​_ 2017​. pdf.
43 ​“Chinese companies are buying up cash-strapped US colleges.” Bloomberg. March 21, 2018. https://
www​. bloomberg​. com​/ news​/ articles​/ 2018​- 03​- 20​/ cash​- strapped​- u​- s​- colleges​- become​- targets​- for​- chinese​
- companies.
44 ​Fischer, Karin. “Many Foreign Students Find Themselves Friendless in the US” Chronicle of Higher
Education. June 14, 2012. https:// www​. chronicle​. com​/ article​/ Many​- Foreign​- Students​- Find​/ 132275;
“Do Years Studying in America Change Chinese Hearts and Minds?” Foreign Policy, December 7, 2015.
https:// foreignpolicy​. com​/ 2015​/ 12​/ 07​/ do​- years​- studying​- in​- america​- change​- chinese​- hearts​- and​- minds​
- china​- u​- foreign​- policy​- student​- survey​.
Universities
Section 5
Think Tanks
Think tanks play an unparalleled role in shaping American public opinion, media
narratives, and US government policy. For this reason, they are high-value targets for
lobbying and influence activities by foreign governments and nongovernmental actors,
including those from the People’s Republic of China.
Think tanks in the United States date to the early twentieth century, when industrial
capital and private philanthropy (led by the likes of Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller,
Andrew W. Mellon, and Henry Ford) began to endow private nonprofit research
institutions at a time when there was increasing government demand for expertise on
a growing range of public policy issues. Over the past century, think tanks have come
to play ever more vital roles in the American public policy process, and they contribute
both directly and indirectly to public education, a richer public dialogue via the
media, greater civic engagement, and better-informed government policy formulation.
Of the approximately 1,800 think tanks in the United States today, about half are
research institutions located within US universities. For the purpose of this section,
however, only those think tanks located in nonuniversity private sector settings are
considered. Most of these think tanks and research institutions enjoy tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which stipulates that
they are restricted from legislative lobbying as “action organizations.” Institutions that
receive this tax-exempt status must either be charitable philanthropic organizations or
research organizations (think thanks) that operate in a supposedly nonpartisan way
and in the general public interest. Because they are largely privately funded through
donor contributions, US think tanks compete tenaciously for support, professional
expertise, and public impact.
Roles of Think Tanks in American Society
The universe of think tanks in the United States is very diverse, and each think tank
performs different missions for different audiences and clients through different means
of output. Four roles are especially relevant to discussions of Chinese interest and
potential influence seeking.
The first and most important role is educating the public and better informing the
“policy community.” The majority of mainstream think tanks consciously perform
these functions through a variety of mechanisms: publishing books, articles in
58
journals, shorter “policy briefs,” or “op-eds,” and by contributing to policy “task
force” reports on specific issues; holding public seminars, briefings, and conferences;
speaking to the print, television, radio, and electronic media; and maintaining
informational websites that disseminate publications of the think-tank videos of
events on a worldwide basis.
The second role is to influence government policy. This is done through face-toface
meetings with government officials, providing testimony before congressional
committees, track-two discussions, emails and other communications aimed at
targeted audiences, and a wide variety of publications.
The third role, undertaken by some, but not all, US policy think tanks, is to provide
specific research on a contractual basis for government agencies that is generally not
for public consumption.
The fourth role is to provide personnel to go into government service for fixed periods
of time through the famous American “revolving door,” whereby think tanks become
“governments in waiting” for ex- and would-be officials until just after an election,
when there is usually a large-scale turnover of personnel in Washington as each new
administration is formed.
In American think tanks, selection of general research topics can be influenced by
outside sources (management, external funding agencies, or government policy
shifts). But the final selection is usually subject to mutual agreement, and the findings
of research are not supposed to be dictated by outside pressures. At the same time,
both US think tanks and university research institutes are expected to maintain
analytical independence from their funders. If the funding body does seek to interfere
with a research project or promote its own agenda, there is an established expectation
that its funding should be rejected. More often than not, there is a process of
mutual consultation between researcher, think tank, and potential external
funding bodies—through which interests are de-conflicted and grants are negotiated
to the mutual satisfaction of all parties. While this is the optimal scenario, there have
been cases revealed in the US media in recent years in which such principles were
abridged.
The Role of China in American Think Tanks
It is against this general backdrop that the role of expanding Chinese influence on
American think tanks needs to be considered. What follows are the findings gleaned
through interviews with seventeen think-tank analysts from eleven Washington- and
New York–based think tanks 1 that explore the nature of interactions that US think-tank
specialists have recently been having with Chinese counterparts. The analysts are all
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recognized China experts (with the exception of one who is more broadly an Asia
expert but has extensive experience with China-related projects) who have served as
directors of programs or centers in their respective institutions. About half have served
in the US government. One directs a think tank that is partially supported by Chinese
government funds. The interviews were all conducted in 2018.
China has become a priority field for US think tanks concerned with international
relations, and most now have staff members (often several) devoted to researching and
publishing on China. Many possess PhD degrees, Chinese language skills, and have
lived in or visited China over many years with some originally from the PRC. Some
stay on staff for many years, while others work on short-term (two- or three‐year)
contracts. Most think tanks also employ student research assistants and interns
(including those from China).
There is significant interaction between American and Chinese think tanks—as
think-tank researchers need to visit China as well as host and receive visitors in the United
States to be well informed and to perform their own research work. Most interviewees
reported hosting or participating in ad hoc meetings in their home institutions with
visiting Chinese officials or scholars on a regular basis; although two do not host any
meetings with Chinese, they will attend such events if hosted by others. All but one
of the interviewees travel to China for their work: to deliver lectures, to participate in
conferences or Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues, and to do research for articles, books,
and reports.
A number of scholars noted a marked shift in the nature of their interactions with
Chinese colleagues and research projects over the past few years. While longstanding
Track 2 dialogues continue on issues such as cyber policy, nuclear policy,
and US-China interactions in third countries and regions, overall they seem not as
open, robust, and productive as in the past. Indeed, several long-standing Track 2
dialogues have been curtailed or stopped altogether—with scholars reporting that
it is increasingly difficult to establish sustained dialogues that are meaningful with
Chinese think tanks because of new rules, restrictions, and uncertainties. For instance,
Chinese institutions (both think tanks and universities) must now obtain central-level
government approval, such as vetting dialogue topics and foreign participants, before
being able to host foreign participants in China. New Chinese government regulations
generally limit Chinese think-tank scholars and university professors to one foreign
trip per year, and even go so far as to hold passports to make even personal travel more
difficult.
When dialogues do occur, another noticeable recent trend has been a decline in
candor and greater uniformity in what Chinese interlocutors say. One US think tanker
noted, “The conversations have declined in productivity,” while another commented
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that he had “moved away from Track 2 because China does not have much to say
beyond the Xi Catechism. Even in private conversations, we are not getting anything
interesting.” And yet another indicated that he no longer participates in many joint
events because they need to be “framed in a way to fit the Chinese narrative, including
the speakers, agenda, topics and writing.” Achieving true candor in such dialogues
with the Chinese side has long been difficult, as Chinese interlocutors routinely stick
to “talking points” and stock slogans, stay strictly “on message,” and are afraid to say
anything in front of their peers that might subsequently get them in political trouble
back home.
One US analyst commented that at a recent conference in Beijing, Chinese scholars
demonstrated little interest in putting forth ideas for cooperation, a marked change
from earlier meetings. This individual believes that tensions in the US-China
relationship are at least partially responsible. And it is not only the Americans who
see less utility in such dialogues. One Track 2 initiated by the Chinese side concerning
global norm cooperation ended abruptly when the Chinese said they did not see any
productive benefits, despite the willingness of the US side to move forward with the
project.
While these are long-standing problems, they have gotten demonstratively worse
during the Xi Jinping era. As one think tank scholar commented, “Collaboration
has become much more difficult, more authoritarian, and finding a common
definition of a program is more difficult. We could usually find areas on which to
work collaboratively, but there is a gap in worldview.” One US think tank analyst who
directs an innovative program to foster dialogue among rising American and Chinese
strategic thinkers, which used to be hosted alternately in both China and the United
States, has moved the program entirely out of China because of the repressive political
atmosphere. Another institution has transitioned away from cooperative projects with
China to emphasize bolstering the capacity of other countries in their dealings with
China.
Many US think tank scholars have also become concerned that the relationship
between Chinese and American scholars has regressed into a one-way street—with
Americans providing intelligence to Chinese interlocutors, whose main purpose is to
take the information back to their government. Indeed, some Chinese interlocutors
arrive in the offices of American think tanks with barely disguised “shopping lists”
of questions, which are presumably set by government “taskers” in Beijing. This is
a regular occurrence, but it tends to spike when a high-level governmental visit or
summit meeting is pending. A related Chinese goal is to transmit Chinese government
policy perspectives to American think-tank counterparts.
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Since 2010, American (and other foreign) researchers have encountered a
progressively more restrictive research environment in China. One American scholar
noted that a previous research project that involved on-the-ground interviews
across many provinces was no longer possible. The registration and information
requirements of the 2017 Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs is part of the
problem, she believes, by severely constraining opportunities to conduct joint
projects and research in China. It has also become exceedingly difficult to arrange
interviews with Chinese think-tank scholars and government officials; many
institutional libraries are now off-limits; central-level archives are inaccessible
with provincial and local ones also increasingly circumscribed; survey research is
impossible (unless in partnership with an approved Chinese counterpart, which is
increasingly hard to find); and other bureaucratic impediments make it increasingly
difficult for foreign think-tank researchers to undertake their basic jobs of
researching China. At the same time, Chinese researchers working in the US are able
to schedule appointments easily with their American counterparts and government
officials, enjoy open access to American libraries and government archives, are able
to conduct surveys anywhere, and may travel freely around the United States to do
field work.
US Think-Tank Centers in China
Only two American think tanks operate real satellite centers in Beijing, and one does
so in Hong Kong. Both Beijing centers are cohosted by, and located on, the campus
of Tsinghua University. One has a robust program of research by Chinese fellows,
brings in people from the think tank’s other centers, has a young ambassador program
for Americans and Chinese, and boasts a “wide open internet.” One center uses its
facilities primarily for presentations from the resident fellows and other visitors. Some
talks are open to the public, but most are restricted to faculty and graduate students.
The center’s ambitions were originally greater: for example, to host a set of annual
conferences with senior experts and officials on both sides. However, the Chinese side
could not live up to its side of the bargain, demanding that senior US officials attend
while not delivering Chinese officials of equivalent rank.
These two centers have also become caught up within the increasingly strained
US-China relationship as well as the tightening political atmosphere inside China.
According to one affiliated research fellow, “connections with the center are a liability
because institutions and people can cause you problems if you don’t say the right
things.” At least one of the centers in Greater China has occasionally limited its public
programming from addressing sensitive political issues, because it did not want to
jeopardize the institution’s presence in China and Asia. Yet that think tank’s other
staffers and fellows have also proved adept at circumventing political restrictions by,
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in one instance, inviting a well-known Hong Kong activist denied access at one center
event to participate in an event at the US headquarters later.
Chinese Outreach to US Think Tanks
Chinese outreach to American think tanks takes several forms, including via embassy
and consular officials, Chinese think-tank scholars, and representatives of China’s
state-run media.
Embassy and Consular Officials
Chinese embassy and consular officials meet frequently with many (but not all) of
the interviewees. Sometimes their aim is to assess Americans’ views on particular
issues or offer feedback on particular articles (generally those that are critical of
China). In one case, for example, a Chinese official stated that a particular analyst’s
understanding was “too gloomy,” and in another that a scholar “didn’t have the
correct data.” One think-tank scholar noted that Chinese officials use both threats
and praise to try to influence her. On the one hand, they took her to lunch and
expressed “concern with her mind set” indicating that she just “just do[es] not
understand the situation.” But embassy and Chinese government officials can also be
effusive in their praise and offers of assistance, suggesting that she “knows too much
about Chinese policy.”
Oftentimes officials ask for meetings with think tankers to transmit messages after
important Communist Party or government events. After the annual meeting of
China’s legislature (the National People’s Congress) in 2018, for example, one thinktank
analyst was invited to lunch, only to endure an hour-and-a-half lecture on how
US media and analysts misunderstood the new change in presidential term limits and
Xi’s reform efforts. Another was visited by military attachés from the Chinese embassy
in an effort to convey China’s opposition to the Taiwan Travel Act, US Defense
Authorization Act, possible prospects for US Navy ship visits, and submarine sales to
Taiwan. In concluding his stern warnings, one attaché warned: “We are no longer
weak, and can inflict pain on Taiwan, if the United States is not careful and does not
abide by the Three Communiques.”
On other occasions, Chinese embassy officials ask for meetings to warn think tanks
against hosting speakers on topics often related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Tibet.
Several think-tank analysts reported that they or others in their institutions had
received calls from senior Chinese embassy officials regarding projects related to the
Dalai Lama, in one case stating, “This is very troubling—it will have consequences.”
As far as the analysts were concerned, however, there turned out to be no consequences.
Another received a complaint from the Chinese embassy after the think tank hosted
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a delegation from Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—but again there were
no discernible consequences. In a separate case, a senior Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs official warned that a particular interactive website focusing on Chinese
security issues was “anti-China.” In response, the think tank invited contributions by
a prominent Chinese think-tank scholar: “The content of the website didn’t change,
but the official didn’t complain again.” In another instance, the Chinese government
withdrew an offer to a US think tank to host Foreign Minister Wang Yi after that think
tank refused to disinvite a Taiwanese speaker for a separate event.
Chinese officials have also requested that US think tanks bar certain scholars or
NGO activists from participating in discussions with senior Chinese officials. When
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke at one high-profile Washington think tank,
the embassy requested the guest list in advance and then demanded that several
individuals—including at least one senior China scholar—be disinvited. The think
tank refused. In yet another case involving the director of the National People’s
Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, Fu Ying, a US think tank was strongly advised
to exclude a well-known China specialist as a condition for a meeting going forward.
Think-tank analysts report that in most cases, but not all, such requests have been
rejected and events continue as planned.
Generally speaking, PRC visitors either steer clear of or limit their contact with think
tanks that have strong relations with, or extensive funding from, Taiwan. One analyst
who writes extensively on Taiwan and PRC-Taiwan relations finds that Chinese
officials typically do not engage with him. At one time, there was a conflict between
an event that he was hosting for a Taiwanese official with a significant event that same
afternoon hosted by a colleague that featured very prominent Chinese and American
officials. The Chinese embassy instructed them to move the Taiwan event, but they
refused. Both events took place with no apparent negative repercussions.
Think Tank to Think Tank
As noted above, Chinese officials and think-tank counterparts reach out to American
think-tank China specialists for the purposes of information/intelligence collection
and influencing US policy debates. One Chinese scholar reported to an American
think-tank analyst that that every time an American expert meets with a Chinese
interlocutor, a report is written afterward. Another Chinese visitor indicated to
a leading Washington think-tank expert that China’s Foreign Ministry has staff
dedicated to tracking the activities and publications of about twenty leading
American-China specialists.
Any number of Chinese think tanks sponsor meetings and conferences in China
and the United States with American counterparts. In some instances, the Chinese
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partners are well-known government entities. The Chinese Institute of Contemporary
International Relations and the University of International Relations, both of which
have links to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), host conferences on US-China
relations and/or Track 2 dialogues. So do the Foreign Ministry–affiliated China
Institute of International Studies, Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs,
and the China Foreign Affairs University. The Charhar Institute is also involved
in such activities, although its institutional linkages are unclear.
More recently, Chinese think tanks professing to be independent from direct
government control have begun to actively engage US counterparts. The think-tank
Intellisia is one such organization that has sponsored dialogues with US scholars. The
Center for China and Globalization is another such “independent” think tank, with
more than a hundred researchers and staff. According to several think-tank analysts,
its founder and head, Wang Huiyao, actively solicits invitations to speak in US thinktank
settings. In May 2018, however, Senator Marco Rubio publicly questioned why
Wang’s CCP affiliations—most particularly his work with the CCP’s United Front Work
Department as a standing director of the China Overseas Friendship Association—
were not mentioned as part of his biography in an invitation to an upcoming event at
a DC-based think tank. Despite the fact that the think tank planned to acknowledge
Wang’s position during the panel presentation, given the ensuing public scrutiny,
Wang dropped out of the event. He later appeared, however, at another US think-tank
event without his government affiliation noted and without provoking attention from
any member of Congress. For such “independent” Chinese think tanks, organizing
conferences can give them a significant boost in prestige at home. One Chinese
think-tank director informed an American think-tank analyst that he received several
hundred thousand dollars from the university’s party secretary as a bonus for bringing
such a prestigious delegation of Western China watchers to China.
Finally, a group of several senior Chinese government officials and think-tank scholars
from different institutions has emerged as an important generator of China-US think
tank cooperation. This group includes such well-known figures as Fu Ying (director of
the NPC’s Foreign Affairs Committee), Wang Jisi (director of Peking University’s Institute
of International and Strategic Studies), Yuan Peng (president of CICIR), and Wang Wen
(executive dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University),
who are all well funded and able to pay for the activities of the Chinese side, as well as
travel and hotel stays for Americans who participate in their projects in China.
Fu Ying emerges as the senior figure in a growing number of US-China interactions.
According to several think-tank analysts, she works hard to structure projects in ways
to ensure the best possible outcome from the Chinese perspective. This includes,
for example, partnering primarily—although not solely—with scholars who are
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considered to be more favorably disposed to the Chinese government perspective
and ensuring that those with challenging views are excluded. One analyst noted that
former Hong Kong chief executive C.H. Tung’s and Fu’s relationships with US thinktank
scholars and presidents provide them with frequent opportunities to speak before
large public audiences at prestigious American venues and to advance an official
Chinese narrative while gaining a certain added legitimacy at home.
Fu is also explicit in her desire to cultivate relations with think-tank experts she
believes may enter government. Following the election of Donald Trump, she “rushed
in to see” one think-tank analyst with ties to the new administration and a flurry of
embassy officials followed. However, when it became evident that said analyst would
not be going into the administration, there was no more interest. In addition, at a
meeting around a project on US-China relations advanced by Fu, she noted that she
hoped some of the people would be entering the government; otherwise it would not
prove to have been worth much to have done the project.
Chinese president Xi Jinping has also encouraged Chinese think tanks to “go
global”—establishing a presence within the United States and other countries as
a way “to advance the Chinese narrative.” In 2015, the Institute for China-America
Studies (ICAS) set up shop in Washington, DC, as a 501(3)(c) nonprofit organization.
ICAS is funded by the Hainan-Nanhai Research Foundation, which receives its
seed funding from the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, a Chinese
government–supported entity, as well as from the China Institute of the University of
Alberta, Nanjing University, and Wuhan University. The head of ICAS, Hong Nong,
retains ties to these institutions. ICAS maintains a small staff of researchers as well
as a diverse board of international experts from China, the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Indonesia. ICAS projects focus on the central issues of the US-China
relationship, including US-China cooperation, maritime security, North Korea, and
trade relations. Hong herself focuses on the South China Sea and the Arctic policies
of non–Arctic Council member countries, of which China is the largest and most
significant. The institute also holds an annual conference.
While President Xi’s call to establish think tanks was contemporaneous with the
establishment of ICAS, Hong has made it clear that the decision to set up ICAS in DC
came as a result of an effort by her and some of her colleagues both in China and in
Canada to understand better how American think tanks operate. She was asked to
lead ICAS, and she then selected a board of directors, as well as advisory members.
She views the mission of the think tank as being to serve as a bridge in perception
between the United States and China. Hong does not want people to view the institute
as advancing a Chinese government perspective or as wearing a “Chinese hat,” but
she believes that in DC there are too few voices that reflect a Chinese (not necessarily
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government) perspective. While she acknowledges that there is not much diversity in
the nature of the views represented by ICAS—there is no overt criticism of Chinese
government policies—she is hopeful that once ICAS gains greater standing, it will be
able to attract senior scholars from other institutions with a greater range of views to
write for its website.
More recently, Chinese publishing entrepreneur Zhou Zhixing has established the
US-China New Perspectives Foundation, with offices in both Los Angeles and
Washington, DC. As of yet, these offices have no track record of activities or publications.
It is likely that more such think tanks initiated with or without formal Chinese
government support will follow in the United States.
Think-Tank Funding
Different US think tanks have different funding models. At least one type (Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers, or FFRDCs) is funded entirely by the
US government, while several others accept some US government funding, as well
as money from other governments on a contracted work basis. Three think tanks
interviewed accept no US or other government funding: One is funded entirely
by central operating funds from an endowment, while two others rely on a mix
of foundation and private support. One think tank’s work is funded entirely by
foundations. Most interviewees allow Chinese funders to pay for travel and meeting
costs to Beijing for conferences, while a few categorically do not—either because of
regulations or on the principle of conflict of interest.
At least one think tank differentiates between funding that is dedicated to its work
in Washington and that which supports its center in China. For the center in China,
a US-based scholar has raised funds from the China Development Bank, Huawei
Corporation, and private entrepreneurs from Hong Kong. This same think tank has a
“China Council” of donors (including Chinese Americans, but no Chinese nationals)
that supports the think tank’s activities. Some US institutions refuse to accept funds
from China-based commercial entities, although they are occasionally willing to
accept donations from their US-based subsidiaries. Other think tanks, however, accept
funds from Chinese corporations and individual businesspeople. One has taken money
from Alibaba America for a particular event celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of
WTO accession; another has taken money from the Chinese real estate firm Vanke for
a project on the environment. A Chinese businessman, Fu Chen, supports work at one
China center that also has several prominent Chinese businesspersons on its board.
One has an advisory council with Chinese Americans, and yet another think tank
is building an advisory council that will include Chinese, but only those who have
become American citizens. (This analyst is also considering accepting private Chinese
money but not money from Chinese state-owned enterprises.)
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C.H. Tung and his China-US Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) have emerged as a
leading funding source for several think tanks, providing financial assistance for a
variety of projects ranging from supporting book research and writing, to funding
collaborative projects, to promoting exchanges. CUSEF’s work in this area extends back
to the mid-1990s (for more on CUSEF, see the section on universities in this report).
The interviewees differ, however, in their assessments of whether CUSEF funding
reflects direct linkages with Beijing. As one analyst noted, “C.H. is a special figure
because he is half Hong Kong and half PRC.” Another commented that he currently
has the potential to undertake a joint project with C.H. Tung and will “probably do
it for the money and the contact.” Another has accepted funds for work on cultural
exchange and climate change, while yet another is far more circumspect, describing
Mr. Tung as an “open united front agent” in his capacity as vice chair of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Congress. Many of the partnerships CUSEF establishes in