ChineseInfluence&
AmericanInterests
PROMOTING CONSTRUCTIVEVIGILANCE
Report of the Working Group on
Chinese Influence Activities in the United States
Co-Chairs
Larry Diamond
Senior Fellow
The Hoover Institution
Stanford University
Orville Schell
Arthur Ross Director
Center on US-China Relations
Asia Society
H O O V E R I N S T I T U T I O N P R E S S
STANFORD UNIVERSITY | STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
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First printing 2018
24 23 22 21 20 19 18 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Working Group Participants
This report grew out of a series of discussions over the past year and a half at the Hoover Institution,
Sunnylands, and George Washington University in which the following scholars participated:
Robert Daly
Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
Larry Diamond
Hoover Institution,
Stanford University
Elizabeth Economy
Council on Foreign Relations
Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.)
Stanford University
Donald Emmerson
Stanford University
Francis Fukuyama
Stanford University
Bonnie Glaser
Center for Strategic &
International Studies
Kyle Hutzler
Stanford University
Markos Kounalakis
Hoover Institution
Winston Lord
Former US Ambassador
to China
Evan Medeiros
Georgetown University
James Mulvenon
SOS International
Andrew J. Nathan
Columbia University
Minxin Pei
Claremont McKenna College
Jeffrey Phillips
The Annenberg Foundation
Trust at Sunnylands
John Pomfret
The Washington Post
Orville Schell
Center on US-China
Relations, Asia Society
David Shambaugh
George Washington University
Susan Shirk
University of California–
San Diego
Robert Sutter
George Washington University
Glenn Tiffert
Hoover Institution
Ezra Vogel
Harvard University
Christopher Walker
National Endowment
for Democracy
International Associates
Anne-Marie Brady
University of Canterbury,
New Zealand
Timothy Cheek
University of British
Columbia, Canada
John Fitzgerald
Swinburne University, Australia
John Garnaut
Former Senior Adviser to
Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull, Australia
Timothy Garton Ash
Oxford University,
United Kingdom
Francois Godement
European Council on
Foreign Relations
Bilahari Kausikan
Former Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Singapore
Richard McGregor
Lowy Institute, Australia
Eva Pils
King’s College London,
United Kingdom
Volker Stanzel
German Council on
Foreign Relations
The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the participants in the workshop and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution
or the participant’s affiliated institutions. The convening organizations of this project have no
affiliation with the US government.
iv
Acknowledgments
This Working Group was jointly convened by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University
and the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society in New York. These co-conveners
have also been assisted, financially and logistically, by The Annenberg Foundation Trust
at Sunnylands. We are grateful to each of these institutions for their support of our work,
and to Thomas Gilligan, Director of the Hoover Institution, and Ambassador David Lane,
President of The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, for their personal support
of this project. We also thank the latter two institutions, as well as the China Policy
Program of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, for
supporting and hosting meetings of the Working Group.
This report has been a collaborative effort among a group of American scholars and policy
practitioners who have spent long careers studying and engaging China, Asia more broadly,
and a wide variety of political systems around the world. Each participant also has an
abiding interest in protecting and strengthening democratic institutions in the United
States and elsewhere in the world. While different participants took the lead in drafting
particular sections of the report, each section was reviewed and contributed to by a number
of participants in what became a truly collective and collaborative research effort. Our
general findings and policy principles represent a broad—though not necessarily complete—
consensus of the Working Group Participants.
This Working Group grew out of the Task Force on US-China Relations (chaired by Susan
Shirk and Orville Schell), and we thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the
Henry Luce Foundation for their support of the Task Force. Although the two efforts share
many members in common, they are separate and distinct endeavors.
We present this report as the collective product of discussions and research among a group
of distinguished American specialists on China and US foreign affairs. It analyzes the
growing challenge posed by China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States across
a number of important sectors of American public life. However, as we note throughout the
report, these influence activities are not confined to the US. Indeed, they appear in different
forms and to different degrees in a large number of other democratic societies around the
world (in some cases more deeply than in the US). We therefore have opted to include in an
Appendix short summary reports on China’s influence activities (and the resulting national
responses) in eight other countries.
We owe a particular debt of thanks to Kyle Hutzler, an MBA student at Stanford University
with significant experience in China. His superior organizational skills and uncomplaining
vi
capacity for prodigious work contributed enormously to the coordination of our work
throughout the project. We could not have produced this report without him.
We would also like to thank Barbara Arellano and Alison Petersen at the Hoover Institution
Press for their dedicated assistance in producing, editing, and publishing this report, as well
as Laura Chang at the Center on US-China Relations at Asia Society for her assistance in
helping to coordinate the project.
Finally, we would like to thank all of the Working Group participants for their generous
contributions of time and effort. None were remunerated for their contributions, and
everyone participated and contributed out of their professional and national sense of
responsibility.
Larry Diamond
The Hoover Institution
Stanford University
Orville Schell
Center on US-China Relations
asia Society
October 24, 2018
Contents
Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance
Introduction 1
ix
section 1 Congress 9
section 2 State and Local Governments 19
section 3 The Chinese American Community 29
section 4 Universities 39
section 5 Think Tanks 57
section 6 Media 79
section 7 Corporations 103
section 8 Technology and Research 121
appendix I Chinese Influence Operations Bureaucracy 133
appendix II Chinese Influence Activities in Select Countries 145
Australia 146
Canada 151
France 156
Germany 160
Japan 165
New Zealand 169
Singapore and Asean 173
United Kingdom 179
appendix III Chinese-Language Media Landscape 187
Dissenting Opinion 193
Afterword 195
About the Participants 197
viii
Policy Principles for
Constructive Vigilance
The members of this Working Group seek a productive relationship between China and
the United States. To this end, and in light of growing evidence of China’s interference
in various sectors of American government and society, we propose three broad principles
that should serve as the basis for protecting the integrity of American institutions inside the
United States while also protecting basic core American values, norms, and laws.
Transparency
Transparency is a fundamental tenet and asset of democracy, and the best protection against
the manipulation of American entities by outside actors.
• American NGOs should play an important role in investigating and monitoring
illicit activities by China and other foreign actors. They should as well seek to inform
themselves about the full range of Chinese influence activities and the distinctions
between legitimate and illegitimate influence efforts.
• Congress should perform its constitutional role by continuing to investigate, report
on, and recommend appropriate action concerning Chinese influence activities in
the United States. It should update relevant laws and regulations regarding foreign
influence, and adopt new ones, to strengthen transparency in foreign efforts to
exert influence.
• Executive branch agencies should similarly investigate and publicize, when
appropriate, findings concerning these activities, with a view to promoting healthy
and responsible vigilance among American governmental and nongovernmental
actors.
• The US media should undertake careful, fact-based investigative reporting of Chinese
influence activities, and it should enhance its knowledge base for undertaking
responsible reporting.
• Faculty governance is the key to preserving academic freedom in American
universities. All gifts, grants, endowments, and cooperative programs, including
x
Confucius Institutes, should be subjected to the usual procedures of faculty
oversight.
• US governmental and nongovernmental sectors should disclose financial and other
relationships that may be subject to foreign influence.
Integrity
Foreign funding can undermine the independence of American institutions, and various
types of coercive and covert activities by China (and other countries) directly contradict
core democratic values and freedoms, which must be protected by institutional vigilance
and effective governance.
• Openness and freedom are fundamental elements of American democracy and
intrinsic strengths of the United States and its way of life. These values must be
protected against corrosive actions by China and other countries.
• Various institutions—but notably universities and think tanks—need to
enhance sharing and pooling of information concerning Chinese activities,
and they should promote more closely coordinated collective action to counter
China’s inappropriate activities and pressures. This report recommends that
American institutions within each of the above two sectors (and possibly others)
formulate and agree to a “Code of Conduct” to guide their exchanges with Chinese
counterparts.
• When they believe that efforts to exert influence have violated US laws or
the rights of American citizens and foreign residents in the United States, US
institutions should refer such activities to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
• Rigorous efforts should be undertaken to inform the Chinese American community
about potentially inappropriate activities carried out by China. At the same time,
utmost efforts must be taken to protect the rights of the Chinese American
community, as well as protecting the rights of Chinese citizens living or studying in
the United States.
• Consideration should be given to establishing a federal government office that
American state and local governments and nongovernmental institutions could
approach—on a strictly voluntary basis—for advice on how best to manage Chinese
requests for engagement and partnership. This office could also provide confidential
background on the affiliations of Chinese individuals and organizations to party and
state institutions.
Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance
xi
• All American institutions—governmental and nongovernmental—that deal with
Chinese actors (and other potential sources of inappropriate foreign influence) should
review their oversight and governance practices and codify and exemplify best
standards of practice and due diligence.
Reciprocity
American institutions are deflected from their purpose of increasing US-China
understanding, and become distorted as one-way channels of Chinese influence, when they
are denied access to China on a basis that is reciprocal with the access Chinese institutions
are granted here.
• The asymmetry of scholarly research access is the most glaring example of the lack of
reciprocity. A whole variety of normal scholarly activities—including access to archives
and certain libraries, fieldwork, conducting surveys, and interviewing officials or
average citizens—have been cut off for American researchers in China while Chinese
enjoy all of these academic opportunities in the United States. Individually and
collectively, universities and other sectors of American democratic life should insist on
greater reciprocity of access.
• US government public diplomacy activities are heavily circumscribed in China,
while nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have encountered an increasingly
difficult environment to carry out their work. More reasonable reciprocity for US
public diplomacy efforts in China, relative to China’s activities in the United States,
should be addressed in negotiations between the two countries. In addition, this
report recommends enhanced American efforts to promote independent news and
information, and democratic ideas, through US global broadcasting and efforts to
counter disinformation.
• The US government should actively promote and protect opportunities for American
actors to operate in China.
Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance
xii
Policy Principles for Constructive Vigilance
Introduction
For three and a half decades following the end of the Maoist era, China adhered to
Deng Xiaoping’s policies of “reform and opening to the outside world” and “peaceful
development.” After Deng retired as paramount leader, these principles continued to
guide China’s international behavior in the leadership eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Admonishing Chinese to “keep your heads down and bide your time,” these Party leaders
sought to emphasize that China’s rapid economic development and its accession to “great
power” status need not be threatening to either the existing global order or the interests
of its Asian neighbors. However, since Party general secretary Xi Jinping came to power in
2012, the situation has changed. Under his leadership, China has significantly expanded
the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. These policies not
only seek to redefine China’s place in the world as a global player, but they also have put
forward the notion of a “China option” ( 中国方案 ) that is claimed to be a more efficient
developmental model than liberal democracy.
While Americans are well acquainted with China’s quest for influence through the projection
of diplomatic, economic, and military power, we are less aware of the myriad ways Beijing
has more recently been seeking cultural and informational influence, some of which could
undermine our democratic processes. These include efforts to penetrate and sway—through
various methods that former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull summarized as
“covert, coercive or corrupting”—a range of groups and institutions, including the Chinese
American community, Chinese students in the United States, and American civil society
organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, and media. 1
Some of these efforts fall into the category of normal public diplomacy as pursued by many
other countries. But others involve the use of coercive or corrupting methods to pressure
individuals and groups and thereby interfere in the functioning of American civil and
political life.
It is important not to exaggerate the threat of these new Chinese initiatives. China has not
sought to interfere in a national election in the United States or to sow confusion or inflame
polarization in our democratic discourse the way Russia has done. For all the tensions in the
relationship, there are deep historical bonds of friendship, cultural exchange, and mutual
inspiration between the two societies, which we celebrate and wish to nurture. And it is
imperative that Chinese Americans—who feel the same pride in American citizenship as do
other American ethnic communities—not be subjected to the kind of generalized suspicion
or stigmatization that could lead to racial profiling or a new era of McCarthyism. However,
2
with increased challenges in the diplomatic, economic, and security domains, China’s
influence activities have collectively helped throw the crucial relationship between the
People’s Republic of China and the United States into a worrisome state of imbalance and
antagonism. (Throughout the report, “China” refers to the Chinese Communist Party and the
government apparatus of the People’s Republic of China, and not to Chinese society at large
or the Chinese people as a whole.) Not only are the values of China’s authoritarian system
anathema to those held by most Americans, but there is also a growing body of evidence
that the Chinese Communist Party views the American ideals of freedom of speech, press,
assembly, religion, and association as direct challenges to its defense of its own form of oneparty
rule. 2
Both the US and China have derived substantial benefit as the two nations have become
more economically and socially intertwined. The value of combined US-China trade
($635.4 billion, with a $335.4 US deficit) far surpasses that between any other pair of
countries. 3 More than 350,000 Chinese students currently study in US universities (plus
80,000 more in secondary schools). Moreover, millions of Chinese have immigrated to
the United States seeking to build their lives with more economic, religious, and political
freedom, and their presence has been an enormous asset to American life.
However, these virtues cannot eclipse the reality that in certain key ways China is
exploiting America’s openness in order to advance its aims on a competitive playing field
that is hardly level. For at the same time that China’s authoritarian system takes advantage
of the openness of American society to seek influence, it impedes legitimate efforts by
American counterpart institutions to engage Chinese society on a reciprocal basis. This
disparity lies at the heart of this project’s concerns.
China’s influence activities have moved beyond their traditional United Front focus
on diaspora communities to target a far broader range of sectors in Western societies,
ranging from think tanks, universities, and media to state, local, and national government
institutions. China seeks to promote views sympathetic to the Chinese Government,
policies, society, and culture; suppress alternative views; and co-opt key American players to
support China’s foreign policy goals and economic interests.
Normal public diplomacy, such as visitor programs, cultural and educational exchanges,
paid media inserts, and government lobbying are accepted methods used by many
governments to project soft power. They are legitimate in large measure because they are
transparent. But this report details a range of more assertive and opaque “sharp power”
activities that China has stepped up within the United States in an increasingly active
manner. 4 These exploit the openness of our democratic society to challenge, and sometimes
even undermine, core American freedoms, norms, and laws.
Introduction
3
Except for Russia, no other country’s efforts to influence American politics and society
is as extensive and well-funded as China’s. The ambition of Chinese activity in terms of
the breadth, depth of investment of financial resources, and intensity requires far greater
scrutiny than it has been getting, because China is intervening more resourcefully and
forcefully across a wider range of sectors than Russia. By undertaking activities that have
become more organically embedded in the pluralistic fabric of American life, it has gained a
far wider and potentially longer-term impact.
Summary of Findings
This report, written and endorsed by a group of this country’s leading China specialists and
students of one-party systems is the result of more than a year of research and represents
an attempt to document the extent of China’s expanding influence operations inside the
United States. While there have been many excellent reports documenting specific examples
of Chinese influence seeking, 5 this effort attempts to come to grips with the issue as a whole
and features an overview of the Chinese party-state United Front apparatus responsible for
guiding overseas influence activities. It also includes individual sections on different sectors
of American society that have been targeted by China. The appendices survey China’s quite
diverse influence activities in other democratic countries around the world.
Among the report’s findings:
• The Chinese Communist party-state leverages a broad range of party, state, and non-state
actors to advance its influence-seeking objectives, and in recent years it has significantly
accelerated both its investment and the intensity of these efforts. While many of the
activities described in this report are state-directed, there is no single institution in China’s
party-state that is wholly responsible, even though the “United Front Work Department”
has become a synecdoche for China’s influence activities, and the State Council
Information Office and CCP 6 Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission have
oversight responsibilities (see Appendix: “China’s Influence Operations Bureaucracy”).
Because of the pervasiveness of the party-state, many nominally independent actors—
including Chinese civil society, academia, corporations, and even religious institutions—
are also ultimately beholden to the government and are frequently pressured into service
to advance state interests. The main agencies responsible for foreign influence operations
include the Party’s United Front Work Department, the Central Propaganda Department,
the International Liaison Department, the State Council Information Office, the All-China
Federation of Overseas Chinese, and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with
Foreign Countries. These organizations and others are bolstered by various state agencies
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the
State Council, which in March 2018 was merged into the United Front Work Department,
reflecting that department’s increasing power.
Introduction
4
• In American federal and state politics, China seeks to identify and cultivate rising
politicians. Like many other countries, Chinese entities employ prominent lobbying
and public relations firms and cooperate with influential civil society groups. These
activities complement China’s long-standing support of visits to China by members
of Congress and their staffs. In some rare instances China has used private citizens
and/or companies to exploit loopholes in US regulations that prohibit direct foreign
contributions to elections.
• On university campuses, Confucius Institutes (CIs) provide the Chinese government
access to US student bodies. Because CIs have had positive value in exposing students
and communities to Chinese language and culture, the report does not generally oppose
them. But it does recommend that more rigorous university oversight and standards
of academic freedom and transparency be exercised over CIs. With the direct support
of the Chinese embassy and consulates, Chinese Students and Scholars Associations
(CSSAs) sometimes report on and compromise the academic freedom of other Chinese
students and American faculty on American campuses. American universities that host
events deemed politically offensive by the Chinese Communist Party and government
have been subject to increasing pressure, and sometimes even to retaliation, by
diplomats in the Chinese embassy and its six consulates as well as by CSSA branches.
Although the United States is open to Chinese scholars studying American politics or
history, China restricts access to American scholars and researchers seeking to study
politically sensitive areas of China’s political system, society, and history in country.
• At think tanks, researchers, scholars, and other staffers report regular attempts by
Chinese diplomats and other intermediaries to influence their activities within the
United States. At the same time that China has begun to establish its own network
of think tanks in the United States, it has been constraining the number and scale of
American think tanks operations in China. It also restricts the access to China and to
Chinese officials of American think-tank researchers and delegations.
• In business, China often uses its companies to advance strategic objectives abroad,
gaining political influence and access to critical infrastructure and technology. China
has made foreign companies’ continued access to its domestic market conditional on
their compliance with Beijing’s stance on Taiwan and Tibet. This report documents
how China has supported the formation of dozens of local Chinese chambers of
commerce in the United States that appear to have ties to the Chinese government.
• In the American media, China has all but eliminated the plethora of independent
Chinese-language media outlets that once served Chinese American communities. It
has co-opted existing Chinese-language outlets and established its own new outlets.
State-owned Chinese media companies have also established a significant foothold
Introduction
5
in the English-language market, in print, radio, television, and online. At the same
time, the Chinese government has severely limited the ability of US and other Western
media outlets to conduct normal news gathering activities within China, much less
to provide news feeds directly to Chinese listeners, viewers, and readers in China, by
limiting and blocking their Chinese-language websites and forbidding distribution of
their output within China itself.
• Among the Chinese American community, China has long sought to influence—
even silence—voices critical of the PRC or supportive of Taiwan by dispatching
personnel to the United States to pressure these individuals and while also pressuring
their relatives in China. Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a
worldwide Chinese diaspora that presumes them to retain not only an interest in the
welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even political, allegiance to
the so-called Motherland. Such activities not only interfere with freedom of speech
within the United States but they also risk generating suspicion of Chinese Americans
even though those who accept Beijing’s directives are a very small minority.
• In the technology sector, China is engaged in a multifaceted effort to misappropriate
technologies it deems critical to its economic and military success. Beyond economic
espionage, theft, and the forced technology transfers that are required of many joint
venture partnerships, China also captures much valuable new technology through its
investments in US high-tech companies and through its exploitation of the openness
of American university labs. This goes well beyond influence-seeking to a deeper
and more disabling form of penetration. The economic and strategic losses for the
United States are increasingly unsustainable, threatening not only to help China gain
global dominance of a number of the leading technologies of the future, but also to
undermine America’s commercial and military advantages.
• Around the world, China’s influence-seeking activities in the United States are
mirrored in different forms in many other countries. To give readers a sense of
the variation in China’s influence-seeking efforts abroad, this report also includes
summaries of the experiences of eight other countries, including Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK.
Toward Constructive Vigilance
In weighing policy responses to influence seeking in a wide variety of American
institutions, the Working Group has sought to strike a balance between passivity and
overreaction, confidence in our foundations and alarm about their possible subversion,
and the imperative to sustain openness while addressing the unfairness of contending
on a series of uneven playing fields. Achieving this balance requires that we differentiate
constructive from harmful forms of interaction and carefully gauge the challenge, lest we
Introduction
6
see threats everywhere and overreact in ways that both undermine our own principles and
unnecessarily damage the US-China relationship.
The sections that follow lodge recommendations under three broad headings. The first
two, promoting “transparency” and “integrity,” are hardly controversial in the face of the
existing challenge, and they elicited little debate. Sunshine is the best disinfectant against
any manipulation of American entities by outside actors and we should shine as much light
as possible on Chinese influence seeking over organizations and individuals if it is covert,
coercive, or corrupting. We should also shore up the vitality of our institutions and our own
solidarity against Chinese divide-and-conquer tactics. Defending the integrity of American
democratic institutions requires standing up for our principles of openness and freedom,
more closely coordinating responses within institutional sectors, and also better informing
both governmental and nongovernmental actors about the potentially harmful influence
activities of China and other foreign actors.
It was in the third category, promoting “reciprocity,” where the Working Group confronted
the most difficult choices. In a wide range of fields, the Chinese government severely
restricts American platforms and access while Chinese counterparts are given free rein in
our society. Can this playing field be leveled and greater reciprocity be attained without
lowering our own standards of openness and fairness? Since complaints and demarches by
the US government and private institutions have not produced adequate results, is it possible
to get Chinese attention by imposing reciprocal restrictions that do not undermine our own
principles of openness?
The Working Group, not always in unanimity, settled on a selective approach. We believe
that in certain areas the only practical leverage resides in tit-for-tat retaliation. This
would not be an end in itself, but a means to compel a greater reciprocity. The Chinese
government respects firmness, fairness summons it, and American opinion compels it.
Each section of this report offers its own recommendations for responding to China’s
influence seeking activities in ways that will enhance the transparency of relationships,
defend the integrity of American democratic institutions, and grant American individuals
and institutions greater access in China that equates with the degree of access afforded
Chinese counterparts in the United States.
Our recommendations urge responses to China’s challenge that will promote greater
transparency, integrity, and reciprocity. We believe that a new emphasis on such
“constructive vigilance” is the best way to begin to protect our democratic traditions,
institutions, and nation, and to create a fairer and more reciprocal relationship that will be
the best guarantor of healthier ties between the United States and China.
Introduction
7
NOTES
1 Malcolm Turnbull, “Speech Introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and
Foreign Interference) Bill 2017,” December 7, 2017, https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speechintroducing-the-national-security-legislation-amendment-espionage-an.
2 See CCP Central Committee Document No. 9: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
3 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.
4 National Endowment for Democracy, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, Washington, DC,
December 2017, https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-
Influence-Full-Report.pdf.
5 Several other studies have recently been published concerning China’s influence activities and united
front work abroad, including: Bowe, Alexander. “China’s Overseas United Front Work.” US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission. August 24, 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
China%27s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20 Implications%20
for%20US_final_0.pdf; Jonas Parello-Plesner, The Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Interference
Operations: How the US and Other Democracies Should Respond: Hudson Institute, June 2018, https://
www.hudson.org/research/14409-the-chinese-communist-party-s-foreign-interference-operations-howthe-u-s-and-other-democracies-should-respond;
Anastasya Lloyd- Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study
of PRC Political Influence and Interference Activities in American Higher Education, Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, September 6, 2018, https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preliminary-study-prc-political-influence-and-interference-activitiesamerican-higher.
6 Throughout this report, we use the term “CCP,” which stands for Chinese Communist Party. It is
sometimes also referred to as the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Introduction
8
Introduction
SECTION 1
Congress
During past presidential administrations, the US Congress has generally served as a brake
on executive initiatives to “engage” China at the expense of other US interests that
members have historically valued, such as maintaining good relations with Taiwan,
interacting with the Tibetan government in exile, and expressing support for human
rights. When President Donald Trump assumed office in 2017 and actively began courting
Chinese President Xi Jinping, first at Mar-a-Lago and then at the Beijing summit, Congress
took a wait-and-see posture. But as his own ardor for a partnership with Xi cooled and his
administration became disenchanted with the idea of finding an easy new “engagement”
policy, momentum began to shift. Soon Congress was working toward one of the most
significant reevaluations of American-China policy since the start of normalization fifty
years ago. And with the White House increasingly skeptical about the prospects of winning
President Xi ‘s cooperation, a series of new initiatives began issuing forth from both the
administration and the Congress, suggesting a rapidly changing landscape for US-China
relations. What was telling was that this tidal shift now emanated not from Congress
alone—where it had strong bipartisan support—but from the White House and National
Security Council, the Pentagon, the Office of the US Trade Representative, the Department
of the Treasury, and even the Department of State. As sentiment shifted away from hopes of
finding common ways to collaborate, a spate of new US policy initiatives began appearing
that suggested a sea change. Congress passed the 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act, which sought to bolster US defenses against both Chinese military threats and
China’s influence-seeking operations inside the United States. Congress also passed the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRMMA), which empowered
CFIUS (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) to expand its oversight
of foreign direct investment (FDI) from China. At the same time, members of Congress also
began expressing ever more strenuous opposition to Chinese nonreciprocal practices in
trade and investment, such as: putting whole sectors of the Chinese economy out-of-bounds
to American investors; using Chinese companies to buy into sensitive high-tech areas of
the US economy through mergers and acquisitions; and making the transfer of American
advanced technology to Chinese partners the price of American companies being given
access to Chinese markets. Congressional concern rose over Beijing’s continued expansion
into and militarization of the South China Sea; the predatory lending practices that can be
involved in President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative; and Beijing’s continued
persecution of Taiwan and opposition to US support for the island.
This section reviews highlights of Chinese government’s efforts to influence the US Congress
since the start of the normalization process in 1972. As suggested above, because it has
10
viewed such “engagement” as too often taking place at the expense of more important
interests, the Congress has usually been more wary than the White House of allowing hopes
for a more positive US-China relations to determine our policy. At times, such as during
the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 and in reaction to the Chinese crackdown
around Tiananmen Square in 1989, Congress has actively resisted the White House and
sought to turn American policy in directions both the Chinese leadership and the US
administration have opposed. However, often Congress has played a somewhat passive role,
especially in recent years. Still, the control it formally exercises over US government budget
outlays, legislation, and the approval of appointments of senior administration officials
makes Congress not only important in the formation of US-China policy but also a prime
target for Chinese influence efforts.
By providing historical background, the review that follows informs contemporary US
concerns about Chinese government efforts to influence American leaders and public
opinion. The record over the past four decades shows some success in Chinese efforts to
win influence over congressional opinion. However, more often than not, whatever positive
results they have won have not lasted in the face of enduring differences between the two
countries.
Congressional Visits to China, 1972–1977
President Nixon’s second term featured the Watergate scandal, which forced his resignation
in 1974 and resulted in a lull in high-level communication with China. This circumstance
gave more prominence to the reports issued by the approximately eighty members of
Congress who traveled to China in the period between President Nixon’s visit in 1972
and the start of the Carter administration in January 1977. The visits of these congressional
delegations—including (repeatedly) top leaders from both parties—were by far the most
active channel of high-level communications between the United States and the PRC during
this time. And most of the members who went to China wrote reports that were published
as official documents. At the time, these congressional reports, as well as the media’s
coverage of their visits, became important vehicles through which American congressional
leaders voiced their views and opinions on domestic Chinese politics and on Sino-American
relations, both of which were having an increasingly important impact on American
interests in Asia and the world.
By and large, these American visitors were pleased by the post-1972 developments in
US-China relations, seeing them as likely to be both a source of strategic leverage against
the Soviet Union and a stabilizing influence in Asian affairs. The government in Beijing
was seen as preoccupied with domestic affairs, no longer opposed to the presence of
American forces in East Asia, and anxious to work with the United States and other
noncommunist countries to offset Soviet pressure against China. The Americans saw the
Taiwan question as the main impediment to improved bilateral relations, but they differed
Congress
11
on how the United States should deal with the problem. Although most members of
Congress accepted the Ford administration’s cautious approach to China as wise, many were
circumspect about the merits of China’s political, economic, social, and value systems, then
experiencing the last turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and the decline and death of Mao
Zedong in 1976.
These congressional visits to China seemed to help the Chinese government improve its
standing with Congress and favorably influence American public opinion. The resulting
reports show how granting these delegations access to China’s leaders and elements of
Chinese society that Beijing wished to highlight proved an effective strategy of calming
tensions. And the costs for Beijing were limited to modest in-country expenses, since
the members usually traveled as official congressional delegations on US government
aircraft.
One notable feature of this historical episode was the remarkable role played by Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT). Senator Mansfield was widely consulted in
Washington as an Asian affairs expert, meaning his observations arguably had more
influence than those of other members. He visited China three times during this period,
publishing separate reports with detailed assessments of various issues of concern to
Americans at the time. In the main, his reports conveyed information and opinions that
conformed with Chinese interests. Unlike many other members favoring a more cautious
pace of normalization with China and sustained ties with Taiwan, Senator Mansfield urged
the United States to promptly end ties with Taiwan and accept Beijing’s conditions for
normal diplomatic relations, warning that to do otherwise would lead to dangerous friction
in Sino-American relations and instability in Asia. Senator Mansfield portrayed China as a
power with fundamentally peaceful motives in international affairs and placed much of the
blame on the United States for past Sino-American conflicts in Asia. He also contradicted
those members who worried that China’s leadership change could lead to internal struggles
affecting China’s international and domestic policies. He insisted that such skepticism was
unwarranted, because what he called the Maoist system had been effectively inculcated
among the Chinese people. Some members complained that the limited itinerary for
congressional visits that was furnished by Chinese hosts did not provide a basis for any
meaningful assessment of conditions there. Despite the fact that many congressional
visitors questioned how durable China’s Maoist regime was and how lasting China’s
cooperation with the United States would actually prove to be, Mansfield countered that
he had had enough opportunity during his three visits to the PRC to move about and
obtain enough information through on-the-spot observation and talks with PRC leaders
to conclude that it was no passing phenomenon. So, while many members thought the
PRC’s system of indoctrination and control to be repressive politically, economically, and
socially—an affront to the human rights and dignity of its people—voices like Mansfield’s
served to mute the criticism, maintaining that the country’s political, economic, and social
system was uniquely well suited to the Chinese people.
Section 1
12
Influence Efforts after Establishing Official Relations, 1979–1988
As the Carter administration began moving toward full diplomatic recognition of the
PRC, it withheld many of the details about its plans from Congress. One of the largest
unresolved issues was the fate of Taiwan, in which Congress took a special interest. The
United States had already dropped recognition of Taiwan at the United Nations, and now
many in Congress worried that the United States would move to completely abandon the
island. In response, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which underlined
the importance of the United States keeping an ongoing relationship with Taiwan and
continuing to provide weapons for its defense.
After formal diplomatic relations were reestablished, China responded in the 1980s by
expanding the size and capacity of its Washington embassy staff dedicated to dealing with
Congress. Chinese officials lobbying Congress viewed with dismay the rise of pro-Taiwan
independence groups among Taiwanese Americans, such as the Formosan Association
for Public Affairs, which demonstrated an ability to promote their agenda despite the
fact that the United States had broken ties with Taiwan. Beijing would go on to borrow a
page from the Nationalist government’s playbook by beefing up a diplomatic arm capable
of building closer relations with important congressional members and staffers. 1 Since
then, the Chinese government has welcomed numerous US delegations composed of both
congressional members and staffers. The main host in China for such delegations has been
the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). 2 Founded in December 1949, this
organization focuses on international issues and foreign policy research and on conducting
international exchanges of officials and expanding people-to-people diplomatic activities.
This institute also works to establish contacts with foreign political activists, diplomats,
and other distinguished individuals while organizing public lectures and symposiums on
academic subjects and international policy affairs.
CPIFA is a so-called united front organization, similar to those found in the former Soviet
Union and other Leninist states that seek to opportunistically build alliances wherever
they can. Such organizations, or GONGOs (“government-organized non-governmental
organizations”), carry out government-directed policies and cooperative initiatives with
influential foreigners without being perceived as a formal part of the Chinese government.
CPIFA’s experience in dealing with foreign visitors is broad. Between 1972 and 2002, it
hosted more than four thousand leading Americans in China. Being well connected with
the Chinese government’s State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is positioned
to organize meetings with high-level officials when the Party deems it in its interest to do
so. The funding arrangements for congressional staff delegations visiting China usually
provide for their travel to be paid by the US side, so as to avoid falling victim to ethics
committees and overseers or violating rules regarding conflicts of interest and foreign
lobbying. CPIFA often assumed in-country expenses.
Congress
13
The staff delegation trips to China were welcomed and sought after by congressional staff
and congressional support agency personnel, mainly from the Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress, which had a growing interest in China and the issues
it posed for US policy. The trips generally came twice per year and involved meetings with
Chinese government officials and others responsible for key foreign affairs and domestic
issues of interest to the Congress. The exchanges in these meetings were generally cordial
and substantive, although the trips also included sightseeing and visits to parts of China of
interest to the Congress.
In the United States, there have been a number of counterpart groups that have facilitated
congressional exchanges. Among them are the Washington, DC-based US-Asia Institute
(USAI), which has played a leading role in managing the congressional staff delegations
side since 1985. 3 The National Committee on US-China Relations did a pilot congressional
staff delegation visit to China in 1976 and resumed involvement with such exchanges
again during the past decade. 4 In the 1980s, the Asia-Pacific Exchange Foundation (also
known as the Far East Studies Institute) also managed a number of congressional staff
delegations to China, while the US-Asia Institute has, since 1985, coordinated over
120 such delegations and exchanges to China. These visits have been done in cooperation
with the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and the Better Hong Kong
Foundation (BHKF). But the National People’s Congress (NPC) has perhaps hosted the
most trips, taking over a thousand congressional staff members to China. In these trips,
members have traveled to nearly every corner of China, including Xinjiang and Tibet. In
their discussions, they have covered a wide range of themes important to the US-China
relationship. Staffers participating in such trips have clearly advanced their understanding
of Chinese developments.
Congress and Turmoil in US-China Relations, 1989–2001
The number of the congressional staff delegations to China slowed following the collapse
of congressional support for engagement with China after the Tiananmen crackdown in
1989. Congressional anger and the impulse to punish the Chinese government overrode
past interest in constructive engagement. As a result, Beijing began relying more heavily on
the US business community and its organizations, notably the Emergency Committee for
American Trade, to persuade Congress not to end the most-favored nation tariff treatment
for Chinese imports. The Chinese embassy and various lobbyists who were, or at least
claimed to be, supported by the Chinese government also tried to limit the damage by
seeking to convince congressional members that conditions in China were much better
there than were depicted in American media at the time. 5
Based on the reputation of its past efforts, the US-Asia Institute, presumably with
the encouragement of its Chinese counterparts, strove to resume the staff dialogues
and attracted a wide range of senior staff and support personnel, including some of
Section 1
14
those working for the harshest congressional critics of China’s crackdown. One trip in
December 1989 featured very heated debates with Chinese officials, especially after it
was announced that National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger were also in Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders and that
the two had made an earlier secret trip in July, soon after the crackdown. As the Bush
administration had publicly promised Congress that all such contacts would end, the staff
delegates’ anger at and criticism of China’s repression was compounded by their harsh
reaction to the Bush administration’s actions.
As US-China relations continued during a tumultuous post-Tiananmen crackdown period,
Congress played important roles on such key issues as the debate over most-favored nation
tariff treatment, the visit of Taiwan’s president to the United States in 1995, and the decision
to approve China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. The Chinese government
endeavored to build influence with and gain access to Congress by encouraging US
businesses to lobby Congress on China’s behalf and by continuing to receive member and
staff delegations in China.
Other entities in the Chinese official structure, including the Chinese Communist Party
and the Chinese military, at times attempted to gain access to Congress. The International
Department of the Chinese Communist Party engaged in growing exchanges with the
major American political parties on a party-to-party basis. A Chinese “united front”
organization, the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAIFU), managed
some of these ensuing trips. Also involved was the China Association for International
Friendly Contact (CAIFC). This “united front” organization’s link to the Chinese
government was not then well known, though in recent years it has been publicly linked
to the People’s Liberation Army’s Political Warfare Department, which has intelligence
responsibilities. 6 Meanwhile, other exchanges with US congressional specialists on China
were promoted by a mysterious “united front” operative with excellent official contacts
in China named Jimmy Wong. In this troubled decade, Wong made himself known to a
wide range of Americans playing a role in China policy as having the ability to set up visits
to China and meetings with key officials very quickly. He occasionally even opened his
spacious Beijing home to congressional staffers. His precise affiliation with the Chinese
authorities remains obscure. 7
The approaches of the Chinese government to gain influence and gather information
abroad differ from the tradecraft of Russia and the former Soviet Union. 8 Notably, the
Chinese focus more on individuals rather than effects, and on shaping the personal
context rather than operational tricks. It is person-to-person relationships that carry the
weight of Chinese information operations. Working on these personal ties, the Chinese
authorities focus on facilitating meetings and contacts that may or may not result in
opportunities to influence foreign targets. Still, because Chinese influence seeking is
largely a governmental undertaking, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese mix influence
Congress
15
operations with espionage. In one instance, after a visit to China supported by CAIFC, an
American congressional official was asked by two employees at CAIFC who facilitated his
trip to host them during a return visit to Washington. He obliged, and they were seemingly
satisfied, having shopped extensively during their stay. Subsequently, the Chinese embassy
officers who had arranged the congressional official’s visit to China with CAIFC were
arrested and expelled for trying to steal US weapons technology, causing the US official to
end all contact with CAIFC.
Current Era
Tensions in US-China relations subsided after the terrorist attack on America in September
2001 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq preoccupied the Bush administration
and Congress. Chinese and American leaders also proved to be sufficiently pragmatic to
reach common ground on advancing relations in mutually agreeable ways and managing
differences through a wide range of dialogues. Such exchanges only catalyzed visits by
more congressional members and staff delegations visits to China. At this time, members
often traveled to China in US government–funded trips as guests of the US embassy. Some
member trips and very frequent staff delegation visits were authorized under provisions
of the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act (MECEA) that were in line with the
guidance of congressional ethics committees. 9 In addition to the work of the US-Asia
Institute, those organizing and facilitating staff delegations grew to include the Aspen
Institute, the National Committee on US-China Relations, and the US-China Policy
Foundation. 10
China also increased its own capacity to engage Congress beyond trips. Having moved into
a new embassy in Washington in 2009, the Chinese embassy increased its congressional
affairs staff to twelve (as of 2011), while also retaining the lobbying services of the firm
Patton Boggs. 11 During his time as ambassador, Zhou Wenzhong boasted that he had visited
some one hundred members of Congress in their home districts. When certain measures,
such as a bill that would have penalized China for being a “currency manipulator,” came
before Congress, the embassy’s in-house team’s efforts reflected what some US officials
called a much more “nuanced” and “sophisticated” understanding of the body. Whether or
not Chinese officials or lobbyists interacting with congressional offices endeavored to exert
influence by means beyond persuasion—such as by offering material benefits or threatening
to withdraw Chinese investments or other tangible benefits to the congressional district—
remained hard to discern given the very limited public reporting on such matters. 12
Congress, for its part, had already formalized efforts to better understand China through
a variety of working groups. By 2006, both the House and the Senate had formed a
US-China Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Group, which conducted periodic exchanges with
China’s National People’s Congress. Also showing stronger American interest in China at
that time were the Congressional China Caucus (led by members tending to be critical
Section 1
16
of China); the China Working Group (led by members supportive of closer engagement
with China); and the Senate China Working Group (led by members supportive of closer
relations). Earlier legislation had established the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, focused on human rights conditions in China (a perennial negative aspect
in US‐China relations), and the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
which was known for its annual report listing a variety of developments in China seen
as adverse to US interests and values. While the latter two commissions continue to be
active, are robust, and have growing impact, many of the other exchange mechanisms
have proven less than durable. Once the leading members who founded such groups leave
Congress, interest usually wanes. The National People’s Congress became even more active
in supporting the growing number of congressional staff delegations to China during
this period. In 2018, the House China Working Group remained active, but the House
Congressional China Caucus and the Senate China Working Group were inactive.
Most recently, the 115th Congress has actively embraced the Trump administration’s view
that China has benefited more from the bilateral relationship than has the United States.
In fact, amidst all the partisan warfare currently dividing Republicans and Democrats in
Washington, a skepticism about China’s intentions and reliability and a willingness to
push back in a bipartisan manner against its un-reciprocal, and sometimes even predatory,
policies, is one of the most surprising phenomena. In 2018, for example, the Congress
unanimously passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages the Trump administration to
host more high-ranking officials from Taiwan, a move that angered Beijing. Still, Congress is
hardly united, even on trade. Some members have objected to the adverse impacts punitive
tariffs are having on their constituencies, or they have opposed imposing tariffs on allies
at the same time tariffs are imposed on China. And some members criticized President
Trump’s decision in May 2018 to ease harsh sanctions against the prominent Chinese
high-technology firm ZTE, in response to a personal plea from the Chinese president.
Nevertheless, President Trump’s dominance in the Republican Party means that few in the
Republican ranks controlling Congress are inclined to oppose him, especially on China.
Indeed, Congress is generally endorsing the most significant reevaluation of American-
China policy since the start of normalization fifty years ago. As such, it can be said that
Chinese influence on Capitol Hill has reached a low point.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Congress is in the midst of a major reevaluation of the very assumptions underlying
the decades-old American policy of “engagement” with China. Because of this increasingly
competitive, even adversarial, new climate, Chinese influence and information operations
are widely coming to be seen as expressions of a political system whose values are
antithetical to those of the United States and as a threat to the integrity of Congress and
our democracy. Arguing, as many have done as far back as Majority Leader Mike Mansfield,
that Congress should move forward with positive engagement with China while seeking to
Congress
17
pragmatically manage our differences now seems, in the current environment, both naïve
and quixotic.
Promote Transparency
Follow-on congressional oversight will go far toward educating the Congress, the media,
and the public about these important topics. The issues are complicated and have no simple
solutions. Various specialists within and outside the US government should be consulted
in determining the full scope of the problem and what should be done.
Promote Integrity
Congress needs also to distinguish between issues that present a real threat to the United
States, such as Chinese espionage and Chinese-directed monitoring of Chinese students
on US campuses, and institutions such as Confucius Institutes, which, as we have noted
elsewhere in this report, can be better regulated by universities themselves.
Promote Reciprocity
In coming up with remedial steps, Congress must consider the broader bilateral relationship.
It is asked to weigh carefully the continued important positive elements in the US-China
relationship, the negative consequences that might arise from a confrontational approach
to China, and America’s need to protect and foster its strengths and interests.
NOTES
1 ​Sources for the information and judgments in this section include: United States Congress. House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Executive-Legislative Consultations over China Policy, 1978–1979. Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980; Ramon Myers, Michel Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh
(eds.), Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001); Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The US and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1992); David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations,
1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California, 2001); James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious
Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999); Robert Sutter, US-Chinese Relations:
Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Nancy B. Tucker, Strait Talk:
United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
2 ​See website at http://www​.china​.org​.cn​/english​/features​/38189​.htm.
3 ​See the institute’s website at https://www​.usasiainstitute​.org​/delegations​/chin​.
4 ​See the committee’s website at https:// www​. ncuscr​. org​/ content​/ congressional​- committee​- staff​
- delegation​- china​- 1976.
5 ​Sources for this section rely on sources seen in source note 2 and Shambaugh, David, ed., Tangled
Titans, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013; Sutter, Robert, US-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain
Present, Boulder CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018, 119–164.
Section 1
18
6 ​Bowe, Alexander. “China’s Overseas United Front Work.” US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission. August 24, 2018. https:// www​. uscc​. gov​/ sites​/ default​/ files​/ Research​/ China%27s%20
Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20​- %20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US​_final​
_ 0​. pdf.
7 ​Information from a participant on one trip to China arranged by Jimmy Wong.
8 ​Mattis, Peter. “Contrasting China and Russia’s Influence Operations.” War on the Rocks. January 2018.
https:// warontherocks​. com​/ 2018​/ 01​/ contrasting​- chinas​- russias​- influence​- operations​.
9 ​See Foreign Travel Paid for by a Foreign Government, US Congress, House Ethics Committee https:// ethics​
.house​.gov​/travel​-information​/travel​-paid​-foreign​-government (accessed October 5, 2018).
10 ​This section relies heavily on Gill, Bates, and Melissa Murphy. Meeting the Challenges and Opportunities
of China’s Rise. Washington DC: CSIS. 2006: 6–12.
11 ​Pomfret, John. “China’s Lobbying Efforts Yield New Influence, Openness on Capitol Hill.” Washington
Post. January 9, 2010. http:// www​. washingtonpost​. com​/ wp​- dyn​/ content​/ article​/ 2010​/ 01​/ 08​
/ AR2010010803710​. html​? sid​= ST2010010900293; Reid, Tim and Cornwell, Susan. “Exclusive: China Launches
Lobbying Push on Currency Bill.” Reuters. October 11, 2011. https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-usa​-china​
-lobbying​/exclusive​-china​-launches​-lobbying​-push​-on​-currency​-bill​-idUSTRE79A76S20111012.
12 ​Ibid.
Congress
SECTION 2
State and Local Governments
In late 2017, an American city in the mid-Atlantic region was invited to form a sister
city relationship with a town in southern China. The American partner city was home
to a large number of national security professionals and university and government
scientists, including many of PRC origin. The partnership was proposed and
shepherded by the manager of a for-profit Chinese “exchanges” company—a woman
of PRC origin. She was assisted by an American citizen of PRC origin who was running
for a position on the local school board.
In a briefing, an American China expert told the local sister city committee that there
was no reason not to explore a partnership, provided the American side had defined
goals and was aware of Beijing’s increasingly repressive domestic policies, its growing
suspicions of US influence, and its well-funded efforts to increase its influence overseas.
The man running for the local school board objected to this characterization and
pointed out that China’s constitution gives the CCP paramount authority in China.
After a long debate, the new sister city agreement was signed in the fall of 2018.
Some Americans involved objected to China’s insistence that all sister city activities
be carried out “in accordance with the principles on the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China
( 根据中美两国建交原则 ),” because this seemed to be a reference to the One China
Principle, which might be invoked to preclude exchanges with Taiwan. Despite these
objections, the phrase appeared in the signed agreement because the Chinese side said
that the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries required
that all sister city agreements include such language and the US side did not want to
derail the agreement by insisting otherwise.
The story of this sister city agreement illustrates the challenges and opportunities
“sub-national entities” (local governments, cities, and states) face in the United States
when dealing with a China intent on maximizing its influence in America and across
the globe. As this report details in other sections, the age of innocent engagement
is over, and this is now true for American local officials as well as for representatives
20
of the US federal government. Because most PRC attempts to influence American
opinion and practices occur at the local level, and because local media, universities,
companies, and advocacy agencies are often involved in these efforts, knowingly and
unknowingly, local leaders, just as much as national leaders, need an understanding
of PRC goals and strategies.
“We Have Friends All Over the World”
China pursues sister city relationships under an organization called the Chinese
People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which is part of China’s
united front bureaucratic structure (See Appendix: Chinese Influence Operations
Bureaucracy) that aims to strengthen the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and
increase China’s influence overseas. With its long-standing Maoist slogan, “We Have
Friends All Over the World,” the association had its heyday in the 1950s, when China
was isolated and the group became a bridge between China and overseas supporters.
It was marginalized in the 1980s, as China opened to the West and established
diplomatic relations with hundreds of countries. However, under the administration of
Communist Party leader Xi Jinping, the association has been revitalized as China seeks
to groom local business, political, and media leaders in countries around the world. Its
new standing is exemplified by the splendor of its headquarters located in the elegant
old Italian Embassy compound near Tiananmen Square.
The way the association and other Chinese organizations cultivate relationships
with local officials follows a general pattern. First, in the United States, China
demands that sister city relationships and state-to-province sister relations be carried
out under “principles” on which Sino-US relations were established in the 1970s
(as interpreted by the Chinese side). This means that China’s representatives will
likely protest should local officials seek to maintain ties with representatives of Taiwan
or with other individuals, such as the Dalai Lama, whom China regards as hostile
forces. Second, it is important to understand why China seeks a relationship with
localities, especially during times of tension with the federal government: China
seeks to build alternative networks of interaction and support, while using these new
relationships to help gain new traction back in Washington. Local American expertise,
information, and opinion are also of more than passing political interest to Beijing,
even if on paper an exchange relationship is only to “enhance people’s friendship,
further international cooperation, safeguard world peace and promote common
development,” 1 for Beijing understands clearly that local leaders today become the
State and Local Governments
21
national leaders of tomorrow. For China, all exchanges have a political character and
hopefully a political harvest.
Third, it is important for local officials to understand that local American “exchange”
companies that bring Chinese delegations to the United States and promote
professional interactions between the United States and China all depend on official
PRC sanction and have received approval to receive Chinese delegations. The business
model of such companies is, of necessity, as much political as financial. Even if they
conduct high-quality programs, they should not be viewed as disinterested actors.
They, too, are subject to rules made by the Chinese Communist Party, its united front
bureaucracy, and united front strategic imperatives.
Finally, American citizens of PRC origin have played a key role in promoting mutually
beneficial engagement over the past forty years. As US-China relations grow more
contentious, however, and as Beijing calls more aggressively for diaspora Chinese to
serve the “motherland,” it will be necessary for citizen diplomats (including those who
are not of PRC origin) to better educate themselves about American national interests
in the US-China competition and the areas in which the nation’s values, institutional
practices, and strategic goals are incompatible. Such awareness is even more vital for
Chinese Americans who seek political office and whose abilities to navigate these
shoals will depend on their knowledge of this complex system of interaction.
American Communities as Engines of Engagement
The American federal system allows sub-national governments considerable leeway
to pursue local interests generally regardless of Washington’s security concerns. Free
from geostrategic worries, state, county, and municipal leaders who have formed
commercial and people-to-people relationships with the PRC have been a bulwark
of better US‐China relations since the early 1970s, and their efforts to build mutual
understanding and solve joint problems formed the bedrock of bilateral relations over
four decades. However, as China becomes more reliant on its old Leninist system and
“united front” tactics ( 统战战略 ), Sino-US relations become more contentious, and
the CCP seeks to more forcefully build influence in American communities through
channels detailed in this study, local leaders will be called upon to give greater
weight to national interests when forming exchange relationships with PRC actors.
Conversely, as Beijing’s relations with Washington worsen, China will likely seek to
use tried-and-true “divide and conquer” tactics by cultivating new relations with more
state and local-level officials.
Section 2
22
Beginning in the early 1970s, China and the United States built trust and common
prosperity through cooperation at the local level. The work of two hundred sister city
pairs and over forty sister state/province partnerships was reinforced by state and city
trade and investment promotion offices, chambers of commerce, Chinese American
and traditional clan associations, Chinatown cultural centers, and various and sundry
activities at US colleges and universities, secondary schools, church groups, and
museums. Following the establishment of the pioneering Washington State China
Relations Council in 1979, 2 centers for joint innovation and entrepreneurship, such as
the Michigan China Innovation Center 3 and the Maryland China Business Council 4
were set up in nearly every state. Twenty-seven states now maintain trade offices in
China—more than in any other nation. 5 Americans of Mainland, Taiwanese, and
Hong Kong ancestry have founded cultural centers like the Asia Institute–Crane House
in Louisville, Kentucky, 6 and the China Institute in New York. 7 After forty years of
engagement, the US-China focused foundations, educational and exchange programs,
research institutes, and arts and entertainment initiatives throughout the country
are too many and various to be cataloged. American mayors, county executives, and
governors—many of whom travel to China often and host an unending stream of
Chinese visitors—have leveraged the work of these groups to enrich local coffers and
local culture.
American Communities as Targets
While American local governments value such “exchanges” for financial and cultural
reasons, “exchange” ( 交流 ) has always been viewed as a practical political tool by
Beijing, 8 and all of China’s “exchange” organizations have been assigned political
missions. The US-China People’s Friendship Association, for example, has over thirty
sections across the United States that promote “positive ties.” While its activities
are not usually overtly political, the USCPFA Statement of Principles includes the
following: “We recognize that friendship between our two peoples must be based on the
knowledge of and respect for the sovereignty of each country; therefore, we respect
the declaration by the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China that
the resolution of the status of Taiwan is the internal affair of the Chinese on both sides
of the Taiwan Straits.” 9 Some 190 Chinese Students and Scholars Associations 10 (CSSA)
at American colleges and universities (see the section on “Universities”) also promote
local exchanges and, in some cases, political activities, 11 as do the 110 Confucius
Institutes in America. The China General Chamber of Commerce–USA was founded
in 2005 to build stronger investment environments for Chinese companies through
local corporate citizenship programs planned by its six regional offices and municipal
State and Local Governments
23
affiliates. 12 These and other organizations maintain close ties to China’s diplomatic
missions in the United States and are often in contact with training or “cultural
exchange” companies that bring delegations of PRC experts and Communist Party
members to US cities and states for so-called study tours.
US and Chinese groups promoting exchanges and investment have often been a
valuable resource for American local leaders—see, for example, the Virginia Museum of
Fine Arts annual China Fest 13 or the Chinese investment program in Greenville, South
Carolina 14 —but there have been other instances in which American politicians working
with Chinese organizations have been drawn into schemes that cost them their jobs.
Perhaps the most telling case is that of four officials in Ypsilanti, Michigan, who, in
2017, accepted a trip to China that they had been told was paid for by the Wayne State
CSSA. The trip was eventually revealed as a boondoggle funded by a developer, Amy
Xue Foster, who hoped to build a $300 million “Chinatown” in the area. 15 The four
officials, including the mayor, were fired.
This is not to suggest that shady Chinese nationals are always plotting to corrupt
otherwise innocent American leaders; US politicians have a long history of willingly
accepting free trips, gifts, and other favors from the PRC or its fronts. As other
sections of this study make clear, however, Beijing-directed activities such as the secret
purchase of American Chinese-language newspapers and radio stations, harassment of
local Chinese American dissidents, and the operation of CCP cells in local American
businesses and universities do require heightened vigilance by US sub-national
authorities, regardless of how much investment, how many tuition-paying students,
or how many tourists China is able to produce.
China Exchanges and Chinese Leverage
The over forty years of engagement with China has created for American cities
and states, as it has for American corporations and universities, deep interests and
traditions with regard to China. However, the local policies that have guided these
relationships are sometimes at odds with Washington’s policies, even our larger
national interest. Although the United States has pulled out of the Paris Agreement, the
seventeen governors who have joined the United States Climate Alliance, for example,
continue to work with Beijing, which many would agree is a very salutary thing. But
sometimes sub-national solidarity with China can become overexuberant, as it did
on a July 2018 trip to Hong Kong by Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti, who declared
Section 2
24
his city’s independence from the looming Sino-US trade war. Garcetti stated that Los
Angeles and China “have closely integrated economies, closely integrated cultures and
closely integrated geography. . . . ​We hope to be the leading Chinese city in America
for investment, tourism and students.” 17
Sometimes federalism, in the form of local leaders’ independent China policies,
is a good thing and may, during times of upheaval in Washington, DC, help to
offset unwise national policies. But if US-China relations continue on their current
downward trajectory, there will be an increased danger that independent state and
municipal China policies will sometimes conflict with national interest and hinder the
United States in its competition with China to shape global norms
and practices. As China’s wealth and ambition grow and as Beijing is becoming more
adept at turning local American “China interests” into Chinese leverage, sub-national
American governmental entities that formed their China policies in the Era of
Engagement must become mindful that a new era will require them to develop new
strategies for a new Era of Competition.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The following practices can foster the kind of constructive vigilance that local
governments will need to exercise in their continued cooperation with China.
Promote Transparency
Sub-national governments should:
• Not have secret agreements with Chinese entities, including foundations,
corporations, or individuals. All MOUs and contracts should be transparent
and public. All cooperative proposals should be subject to public hearings.
All potential projects should receive the same due diligence that partnerships
with American entities would demand. No exceptions to American laws or best
practices should be made to placate allegedly “Chinese” customs. And in no way
should China be allowed to have a veto over potential exchanges with other
countries, entities, or individuals such as Taiwan or the Dalai Lama.
• Share experiences and concerns with peers through the National Conference of
Mayors, the National Governors Association, the National Council of County
Association Executives, and the National Conference of State Legislatures. Best
State and Local Governments
25
practices for cooperating with China in ways that do not undermine national
interests should be a regular topic at annual meetings.
• Meet with stakeholders across sectors—local leaders of industry, academia,
the arts, religious groups, Chinese American organizations, and professional
associations—to discuss issues emerging from cooperation with China, because a
community-wide approach is required.
• Celebrate successes and share best practices. In the era of US-China competition,
there is more reason than ever to publicize cooperative projects that enrich local
communities, build understanding, and solve common problems, while always
being mindful of the larger framework of China’s goal and American interests.
Promote Integrity
Sub-national governments should:
• Educate themselves and other stakeholders on the goals and methods of
Chinese influence operations. While Americans are quick to label any
wariness of communist parties as McCarthyism, and while the potential for
racial stereotyping is real, the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work
Department and International Liaison Department—two of the main bodies
overseeing such exchanges—are in fact active and well resourced and determined.
No mainland Chinese organization in the United States—corporate, academic, or
people-to-people—is free of Beijing’s control, even if it is not formally part of the
United Front.
• Keep abreast of Washington’s China policies and improve political risk
analysis capabilities. American China policy is evolving rapidly and cannot be
incorporated into local practice without expert counsel and advice. China’s
responses to US actions are also fast-moving, as are Chinese domestic events
that have an impact on local American interests. The 2018 sell-off of Chineseowned
properties in the United States was instructive in this regard. 18 State and
municipal governments should therefore improve their political risk analysis
capabilities and continually reassess their cooperative relationships with China.
In effect, to successfully play in the China arena, sub-nationals need to develop
their own sources of expertise.
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26
• Communicate regularly with federal agencies like the FBI whenever doubts arise
about a cooperative proposal or the Chinese institutions promoting it. Pay attention
to who is on Chinese delegations. Get name lists beforehand and do due diligence
on them.
Promote Reciprocity
Sub-national governments should:
• Follow the money, and the power. In any cooperative venture, US local
governments should determine exactly where Chinese investments originate and
know which Beijing ministry has final decision-making authority related to the
project. They should also check lists of funders and organizations against lists of
known United Front agencies and registered foreign agents.
• Not treat other stakeholders—other countries, Taiwan, or companies—in a
prejudiced manner to win favor in Beijing.
NOTES
1 ​As promised in the referenced sister cities agreement.
2 ​Washington State China Relations Council. https://www​.wscrc​.org.
3 ​Michigan-China Innovation Center. https:// www​. michiganchina​. org.
4 ​Maryland-China Business Council. http://www​.mcbc​.net.
5 ​Burnett, Jennifer. “State Overseas Trade Offices, 2015.” Council of State Governments. November 4, 2015.
https://knowledgecenter​. csg​. org​/ kc​/ content​/ state​- overseas​- trade​- offices​- 2015.
6 ​Asia Institute - Crane House. http:// www​. cranehouse​. org.
7 ​China Institute in America. https://www​.chinainstitute​.org.
8 ​Washington also views “exchanges” with China as a form of public diplomacy that serves American
interests, but it does not direct the activities of American local governments and NGOs that do most of the
work of engagement.
9 ​US-China People’s Friendship Association. http://www​.uscpfa​.org​/about​.htm.
10 ​“List of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations.” ImmigrationRoad​. com. https:// immigrationroad​
. com​/ resource​/ cssa​- list​- chinese​- students​- scholars​- association​- us​. php.
11 ​Lloyd-Damnjanovic, Anastasya. “A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference
Activities in American Higher Education.” https://www​.wilsoncenter​.org​/publication​/preliminary​-study​-prc​
- political​- influence​- and​- interference​- activities​- american​- higher.
12 ​China General Chamber of Commerce - USA. https://www​.cgccusa​.org​/en​.
State and Local Governments
27
13 ​St. George, Donna. “Holidays for All: Asian Students Ask for a Day Off on Lunar New Year.” Washington
Post. July 8, 2018. https://www​.washingtonpost​.com​/local​/education​/holidays​-for​-all​-asian​-students​-ask​
-for​-a​-day​-off​-school​-on​-lunar​-new​-year​/2018​/07​/08​/e7f3d004​-7bf3​-11e8​-80be​-6d32e182a3bc​_story​.html.
14 ​Bell, Rudolph. “Chinese Continue to Eye SC for Investment.” Upstate Business Journal. June 11, 2017.
https:// upstatebusinessjournal​. com​/ chinese​- continue​- eye​- sc​- investment​.
15 ​Perkins, Tom. “How a Bizarre $300M ‘Chinatown’ Scandal Played Out in Ypsilanti, Beijing, and Wayne
State.” Detroit Metro Times. April 9, 2018. https://www​.metrotimes​.com​/news​-hits​/ archives​/2018​/04​/ 09​
/ how​- a​- bizarre​- 300m​- chinatown​- scandal​- played​- out​- in​- ypsilanti​- beijing-and-wayne-state.
16 ​United States Climate Alliance. https://www​.usclimatealliance​.org​/governors​-1​.
17 ​Bland, Ben. “L.A. Mayor Vows to Strengthen China Ties Despite Trade War Fears.” Financial Times.
July 31, 2018. https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/cee7c58a​-9498​-11e8​-b67b​-b8205561c3fe.
18 ​Fung, Esther. “Chinese Reversing Big US Real Estate Buying Spree That Had Helped Boost Prices.” Wall
Street Journal. July 24, 2018. https://www​.wsj​.com​/articles​/chinese​-real​-estate​-investors​-retreat​-from​-u​-s​
- as​- political​- pressure​- mounts​- 1532437934.
Section 2
28
State and Local Governments
Section 3
The Chinese American Community
Chinese Americans have made essential contributions to almost every aspect of American
life for over a century. Although they form a vital strand in the social fabric of the United
States, Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora
that, whatever the actual citizenship of individuals may be, presumes them to retain
not only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even
political, allegiance to the so-called Motherland ( 祖国 ). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership,
diaspora Chinese have been called on to help achieve the Rejuvenation of the Chinese
Nation—a summons that places growing pressure on ethnic Chinese around the world to
serve the “China Dream” ( 中国梦 ). While many overseas Chinese do feel pride in China as a
country and the Chinese as a race, Beijing’s claims on their loyalty can have the untoward
effect of calling into question their devotion to their own home nations.
Under both the Nationalist and Communist parties, overseas Chinese have played an
important role in modern Chinese politics as well as in China’s relations with the outside
world. Diaspora communities worldwide have been key sources of legitimacy and support
for whatever government held power in Beijing, but just as often they have been centers of
antigovernment agitation. With PRC influence-seeking activities now expanding, China’s
long-standing focus on diaspora communities has also intensified to become an important
element in overall US-China relations. Such trends demand not only greater societal
attention and understanding but also an appropriate response from the US government
as well as non-governmental institutions.
As the Chinese Communist Party seeks to encourage, even entice, ethnic-Chinese
communities and individuals overseas to more fully support its interests, the Chinese
Americans in the United States and other free societies need to better inform themselves
as to the nature of this dynamic, and our governmental institutions may need to do more
to defend their freedoms against harmfully intrusive and coercive activities. At the same
time, it is essential that we not allow overseas Chinese as an ethnic group to fall under
any kind indiscriminate cloud of suspicion. Above all, it is important to bear in mind
that while ethnic Chinese can be quite naturally expected to take an interest in things
Chinese, it is the Chinese Communist Party that puts a target on their backs through its
presumption that they are all somehow the “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor”
( 炎黄子孙 ) and thus owe some measure of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.
30
Origins and Structure
From the 1950s to the 1970s, when the United States maintained an alliance with the
regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, pro-PRC organizations faced challenges gaining
traction in the United States. During the 1950s, the FBI, aided by pro-Kuomintang security
organizations, closely monitored their activities and participants. This antagonistic state
of affairs began to change after President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972. 1 On
February 24, 1973, more than forty Chinese on the East Coast, most of them immigrants
from Taiwan, established the Washington Association to Promote China Unification to
help advocate for Beijing’s official positions. One of the founders was a professor at the
University of Maryland who was actively involved in organizations that already supported
China’s position on Taiwan and Tibet. 2 However, a more beneficial contribution came
in the form of advancing US-China scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges that
started to be promoted by a growing number of preeminent Chinese American scientists,
engineers, and academics who were also advising the Chinese government to launch
reforms in science and education. These Chinese Americans were also personally helping
them establish various programs to bring thousands of talented Chinese students to
American institutions of learning.
Recognizing the achievements, influence, and growth of the Chinese diaspora, Beijing
undertook a systematic program designed to target and exploit overseas Chinese
communities as a means of furthering its own political, economic, and security interests.
The Beijing government used specialized bureaucracies to manage what it called “united
front” activities abroad. Organizations such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office inside
the Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Department 3 and the State
Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office led the charge. Almost all of these agencies have established
nongovernmental fronts overseas, including the China Council for the Promotion of
Peaceful National Reunification, the China Overseas Exchange Association, and the China
Overseas Friendship Association. 4 Other “united front” organizations, such as the Chinese
Enterprise Association and other Chinese chambers of commerce, are almost always linked
both to the United Front Work Department and to the Ministry of Commerce.
Following the violent crackdown on the prodemocracy movement in Beijing on June 4,
1989, the Chinese Communist Party redoubled its efforts to reach out to overseas Chinese.
Many members of these communities had supported the student democracy movement,
providing funds and safe havens for fleeing dissidents. But senior Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping was not dissuaded. In 1989 and again in 1993, he spoke of the “unique
opportunity” overseas Chinese offered the PRC. Deng insisted that by drawing on their
help, China could break out of international isolation and improve its international
political standing. Gaining influence over overseas Chinese groups in order to “turn them
into propaganda bases for China” became an important task of overseas Chinese united
front work. 5
The Chinese American Community
31
In China, all of the organizations involved in outreach to the overseas Chinese community
are led by senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Sun Chunlan, the former
head of the United Front Work Department, is listed as the president of the China Overseas
Friendship Association and the executive vice president of the China Council to Promote
Peaceful Reunification. The head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Qiu Yuanping,
also leads the China Overseas Exchange Association. Madame Qiu has a career background
with the Party’s International Liaison Department. The president of the China Council for
the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification is none other than Yu Zhengsheng, the former
chairman of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference and a former member of the
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. 6
Goals and Methods
The key goal of the Party’s united front work with overseas Chinese is to gain support for
the Communist Party’s efforts to modernize the country by convincing members of overseas
Chinese communities that the Party is the sole representative of China and to isolate
competing forces that the Party perceives to be adversarial, or even hostile. For example,
as part of a massive campaign to monitor, control, and even intimidate China’s ethnic
minorities (no matter where in the world they are), Chinese authorities are creating a global
registry of Uighurs who live outside of China. Chinese authorities threatening to detain
Uighur relatives who remain in China if they do not provide personal information of their
relatives living abroad to the Chinese police. This campaign has particularly targeted Uighurs
living in Germany but is now reaching Uighurs in the United States as well. 7 Uighurs are not
alone; Tibetan exiles living in the United States have long reported similar campaigns against
members of their families and community. Chinese security officials have even been known
to travel to America on tourist visas to exert pressure on Chinese dissidents living here. 8 FBI
agents have contacted prominent Chinese exiles in the United States offering them protection
from Chinese agents who might travel to the United States to menace them. 9
For most Chinese Americans, however, China’s efforts to influence them are far more
anodyne. The official description of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) states
its purpose as: “to enhance unity and friendship in overseas Chinese communities; to
maintain contact with and support overseas Chinese media and Chinese language schools;
[and] to increase cooperation and exchanges between overseas Chinese and China related
to the economy, science, culture and education.” Over the past three decades, the OCAO
has dispatched former reporters and editors from the OCAO-run China News Service to
establish pro-Beijing Chinese media organizations in the West. (Chinese officials have
described such Chinese-language media outlets, schools, and other kinds of organizations as
the “three treasures” ( 三宝 ) of united front work overseas.) 10
Officials from Beijing have stated clearly that they do not view overseas Chinese as simple
citizens of foreign countries, but rather as “overseas compatriots” ( 华侨同胞们 ) who have both
Section 3
32
historical connections and responsibilities as “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor”
to support the PRC’s goals and the “China Dream.” As Xi Jinping 11 described it in a 2014
speech to the Seventh Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations, “The Rejuvenation of
the Chinese Nation is a Dream shared by all Chinese” [emphasis added]. In January 2018,
Politburo member and former state counselor and foreign minister Yang Jiechi made this
presumption even clearer when he called upon the government to expand and strengthen
“Overseas Chinese Patriotic Friendly Forces” in the service of the “Great Rejuvenation” of
the Chinese nation.
In addition to appealing to the cultural affinities of Chinese Americans, the Chinese
government has also implemented a wide range of programs to strengthen ties with
elite members of this community. China has appointed hundreds of Chinese Americans
to positions in its united front organizations and provided thousands with free trips to
China, during which they have been feted by senior united front officials. In some cases,
Chinese Americans are offered senior positions in united front organizations. For example,
in 2013, one Chinese American, a native of Guangdong Province, became the first and
only foreigner to become a vice president of the Chinese Overseas Friendship Association
(COFA). 12
China has used this tactic of handing out what one senior Chinese American called
“honors” to Chinese Americans as a way for united front departments, and even
espionage agencies, to cultivate contacts in the United States, often to the detriment of
other groups—such as Tibetans, Taiwanese independence supporters, supporters of the
Republic of China, Uighurs, prodemocracy activists, and other independent Chinese
voices with which the Party does not agree. Chinese Americans appointed to such
positions in organizations established by the Communist Party have subsequently led
protests against Taiwan and Tibet and participated in campaigns to silence Chinese
dissidents, such as the exiled billionaire Guo Wengui. For example, a Chinese American
who is a vice president of COFA spearheaded a campaign against Guo that was encouraged
by officials from the PRC. On a video posted to YouTube, this individual is seen railing
against Guo, vowing that he will “not rest” until Guo is returned to China to answer
charges against him. 13
United Front organizations in China have been surprisingly aggressive and transparent
in their public tasking of Chinese Americans to carry out activities that support the PRC
policies. One example occurred after the 19th Party congress in October 2017. The stateowned
Fujian Daily reported on November 24, 2017, that representatives of local Chinese
community associations based in the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and Europe
had gathered in Fujian and received letters of appointment from local provincial and city
United Front agencies in China to serve officially as “overseas propaganda agents” on their
return to their home countries. These commissions obliged them to accept responsibility for
promoting the decisions of the Party’s recent national congress in their home countries. The
The Chinese American Community
33
article noted that this practice of offering Party commissions to overseas Chinese to work
overseas on united front tasks was not new. The president of the United Fujianese American
Association ( 美国福建公所 ) told reporters: “I have received quite a few letters of appointment
on previous occasions, but none for which I have felt such deep significance as the one
today. It’s a heavy responsibility.” 14
Peaceful Reunification Councils
A key goal of PRC overseas activities is to convince, and sometimes pressure, Chinese in
the United States to accept that the PRC government in Beijing is the sole representative
of China and Chinese, and that the Republic of China on Taiwan is an illegitimate
government. To this end, in 1988, the Party’s United Front Work Department founded the
China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, and the Washington,
DC, Association to Promote China Unification was folded into the council. The DC
chapter’s assignment was to organize concerts, demonstrations, and other gatherings
to support the PRC. 15 Other chapters soon opened, so that by 2018, the council had
established thirty-three in the United States and more than two hundred branches overseas.
In America, these organizations are generally registered as domestic nonprofit community
organizations, even though their leadership in Beijing includes senior members of the
Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, an article in the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of
the Chinese Communist Party, spoke in glowing terms about how useful the Peaceful
Reunification Councils were in furthering China’s goals of taking over Taiwan, noting
that while chapters of the Peaceful Reunification Council complied with US law by