Hamdi asserts that he is a journalist. He argues that ABC requested that he arrange the interview with Osama bin Laden and that he did not purchase the phone or battery pack. He claims he has not had any ties to CDLR since 1995. He admits that he worked at IIIT as an editor. These factual disputes cannot be resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion.
 
[30] The Federal Plaintiffs have not alleged that Mr. Hamdi participated in the operation or management of any enterprise. The RICO claims against Mr. Hamdi must be dismissed. See Redtail Leasing, Inc. v. Bellezza, 1997 WL 603496 at *5. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Hamdi knew about bin Laden’s terrorist activities at the time he procured a phone for him because the first fatwas had already been issued. They allege he provided material support to bin Laden in the form of a satellite phone battery. The ATA includes communications equipment in its definition of material support. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b). “[E]ven small donations made knowingly and intentionally in support of terrorism may meet the standard for civil liability in section 2333.” Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015. These allegations are sufficient to notify Mr. Hamdi of the claims against him. Tarik Hamdi’s motions to dismiss the Burnett and Federal complaints are denied.
 


 B. Abdulrahman Alamoudi13
Defendant Abdulrahman Alamoudi has connections with several organizations that the Burnett and Federal Plaintiffs claim support terrorism. He is Vice President of Taibah International Aid Association’s U.S. branch. (Federal Compl. ¶ 245.) Plaintiffs claim Taibah was implicated in the 1998 embassy bombings. (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 66, 239, 244.) Additionally, Taibah allegedly works closely with designated-terrorist Global Relief Fund and SHC and has diverted funds to al Qaeda and its affiliates in Bosnia. (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 241, 243.) Through Taibah, Alamoudi is also connected with several SAAR Network entities, including American Muslim Council, American Muslim Foundation, Hajj Foundation, Happy Hearts Trust, IIRO, and Success Foundation. (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 245, 490; Burnett Compl. ¶¶ 237, 248.) He allegedly used his SAAR connections to funnel money to al Qaeda *568 through various fronts. (Federal Compl. ¶ 247.)
 
Plaintiffs allege that Alamoudi has openly stated his support for Hamas and Hezbollah, both designated terrorist organizations that cooperate with al Qaeda. (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 50, 53 Burnett Compl. ¶ 237.)
 
In August 2003, Alamoudi was detained at Heathrow Airport on his way to Syria. Customs officers seized approximately $340,000 in sequentially numbered bills, two U.S. passports, and one Yemeni passport. (Federal Compl. ¶ 246.) Alamoudi was arrested by U.S. officials at Washington Dulles Airport on September 28, 2003. (Federal Compl. ¶ 247.) He subsequently pleaded guilty to unlicensed travel to and commerce with Libya, false statements on his naturalization application, and tax offenses involving Libyan financial transactions. (Federal Mem. in Opp’n at 6.) He is currently serving a twenty-three year sentence. (Id.)
 
[31] [32] [33] The Burnett complaint does not allege any act taken by Mr. Alamoudi that could be considered the provision of material support for al Qaeda. The Federal complaint is sustained inasmuch as it claims that Mr. Alamoudi funneled money to al Qaeda through the charities with which he was involved. (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 241, 243.) See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) (including “currency or other financial securities [and] financial services” in definition of material support). This claim puts Mr. Alamoudi on notice that he is alleged to have provided financial material support to al Qaeda. Because the Federal complaint does not allege that Mr. Alamoudi had any role in directing an enterprise, however, the RICO claims against Mr. Alamoudi are dismissed. In sum, Mr. Alamoudi’s motion to dismiss the Burnett complaint is granted; his motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is denied.
 


 C. Success Foundation14
[34] The Burnett Plaintiffs claim that Success Foundation is a sister company to Defendant IIRO and that it “sends money back and forth with the IIRO and IRO” and other sponsors of terror. (Burnett Compl. ¶ 235.) If given the opportunity to replead its allegations against Success, the Plaintiffs would allege that, in 1998, Success Foundation entered into a contract to act as an agent for Defendant Taibah, which has since been designated a global terrorist.
 
The complaint does not allege that Success Foundation knew the money it was transferring between IIRO and IRO would somehow assist al Qaeda, nor does it allege facts showing that Success Foundation knew the other unnamed organizations to which it transferred money were in the business of supporting terrorism. See Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012 (“To hold the defendants liable for donating money without knowledge of the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability. Nothing in the language of the statute or its structure or history supports that formulation.”). The Burnett complaint is against Success Foundation is dismissed without prejudice.
 


 D. Wa‘el Jalaidan
[35] For the reasons the Court found that it has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Jalaidan, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief against him. Plaintiffs have alleged facts, that if true, would be sufficient to prove that he knowingly provided material support to al Qaeda in the form of financial and logistical support. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) (including *569 “currency or other financial securities, financial services, ... weapons, [and] personnel” in definition of material support). The Federal complaint does not allege that Jalaidan directed an enterprise and the RICO claim is dismissed. Wa‘el Jalaidan’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied
 


 E. IIRO
[36] Similarly, for the reasons the Court found that Plaintiffs made a prima facie demonstration that IIRO has purposefully directed its activities at the United States, the Court finds they have stated a claim under the ATA in that IIRO has allegedly funded al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, supported al Qaeda guest houses, and been involved in other terrorist attacks and plots. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) (including “currency or other financial securities, financial services, ... weapons, [and] personnel” in definition of material support). IIRO’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied.
 


 F. Rabita Trust
[37] Rabita Trust moves to dismiss the complaints against it for failure to state a claim. These motions are denied without prejudice until this Court determines whether it has personal jurisdiction over Rabita Trust.
 


 G. SAAR Network Defendants15


 1. Entities
The Burnett and Ashton complaints’ allegations against the SAAR Network entities are substantially similar to one another.16 Paragraph 267 of the Burnett complaint and paragraph 339 of the Ashton complaint both state:
 
 Co-conspirators, material sponsors, and/or aiders and abettors of the SAAR Network include Defendants ... African Muslim Agency, ... Grove Corporate, Inc., Heritage Education Trust, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Mar–Jac Investments, Inc., Mar–Jac Poultry, Inc., ... Reston Investments, Inc., ... Safa Trust, ... and York Foundation, all located doing business or registered to do business in the United States.
In support of their claims against these Defendants, Plaintiffs rely primarily on their allegations against the “SAAR Foundation and network.” (See Burnett Compl. ¶¶ 261–67; Ashton Compl. ¶¶ 333–39.) The SAAR Foundation, allegedly a financial sponsor of terror, was formed in the 1970s by a group of Muslim scholars and scientists. (Burnett Compl. ¶ 261; Ashton Compl. ¶ 333.) It was incorporated in Virginia in 1983 and dissolved in December 2000. (Burnett Compl. ¶ 261; Ashton Compl. ¶ 333.) Its largest donor is the al Rajhi family of Saudi Arabia. (Burnett Compl. ¶ 261; Ashton Compl. ¶ 333.)
 
The complaints claim that over one hundred “affiliated organizations” are registered or are doing business at one of the SAAR Foundation’s addresses in Herndon, Virginia, but many “do not maintain a physical presence at that address, or elsewhere.” *570 (Burnett Compl. ¶ 262; Ashton Compl. ¶ 334.) The complaints further allege that many of the “SAAR Network” organizations’ offices in Herndon were raided in March 2002 as part of Operation Greenquest to investigate “potential money laundering and tax evasion activities and their ties to terrorist groups such as ... al Qaeda as well as individual terrorists ... (including) Osama bin Laden.” (Burnett Compl. ¶ 263; Ashton Compl. ¶ 335.) As noted above, Plaintiffs claim that the entity Defendants are among numerous co-conspirators, material sponsors, and/or aiders and abettors of the SAAR Network. (Burnett Compl. ¶ 267; Ashton Compl. ¶ 339.) The Plaintiffs also refer the Court to their allegations regarding charity sponsors of terror. (See, e.g., Burnett Compl. ¶¶ 150–53 (alleging, for example, that charity Defendants “are used as terrorist fronts, to mask money transfers and provide cover for terrorist operatives”).) Additionally, the Ashton complaint claims that IIIT received its “operating expenses” from SAAR and “in turn financed two Florida charitable organizations accused of being cells for Islamic Jihad in Florida.” (Id. ¶ 579.)
 
Unlike the SAAR Network entities whose motions to dismiss the Federal complaint the Court considered in its previous opinion and order, see Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 822–23, these Defendants do not dispute that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Although each of these moving Defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss, their arguments in favor of dismissal are similar.17 They argue that, even “assum[ing] that plaintiffs have stated a claim against the ‘SAAR Network,’ ” (see, e.g., African Muslim Agency’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 3, n.1) the complaints must be dismissed because they contain only conclusory allegations that they are “co-conspirator[s], material sponsor[s], and/or aider[s] and abettor[s] of the SAAR Network.” (Burnett Compl. ¶ 267; Ashton Compl. ¶ 339.) Further, they argue that the complaints must be dismissed because they do not allege that they donated any money improperly, or with the knowledge that it would be given to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or to any other charity allegedly funneling money to terrorists.
 
[38] Plaintiffs offer the legal conclusion that the SAAR Network entities conspired with the SAAR Network. These Defendants, however, have no notice of the factual grounds on which Plaintiffs’ claims of conspiracy are based. See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1271 (explaining Swierkiewicz does not permit bare conclusory allegations without notice of the factual grounds on which they purport to be based); see also Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.Supp.2d 117, 125 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (noting the Second Circuit “has dismissed complaints which plead conspiracy in vague or conclusory terms and which do not allege specific instances of misconduct in furtherance of the conspiracy”); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 534 (2d Cir.1993) (explaining that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness”) (internal quotations omitted)). The Burnett complaint against African Muslim Agency, Grove Corporate, Heritage Education Trust, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Mar–Jac Investments, Mar–Jac Poultry, Reston Investments, Safa Trust, *571 and York Foundation is therefore dismissed without prejudice. For the same reasons, the Ashton complaint against Mar–Jac Poultry is dismissed without prejudice.
 
[39] The Ashton complaint alleges one action by IIIT in support of its claims—that it allegedly financed two charitable organizations in Florida accused of being Islamic Jihad cells. The complaint does not allege that IIIT knew these charities were Islamic Jihad cells or whether and how these cells participated in or contributed to al Qaeda’s agenda of terror. See Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011–12 (making donations to an alleged terrorist group, without “knowledge of and intent to further payee’s violent criminal acts,” cannot sustain cause of action). Accordingly, the Ashton complaint against IIIT is dismissed without prejudice.
 
[40] In support of the claim that Mar–Jac Poultry is a material sponsor of terrorism, Plaintiffs allege two acts: first, that it donated money to African Muslim Agency, which the Plaintiffs claim was later “laundered,” and second, that it donated money to unnamed SAAR Network entities, which was later forwarded to al Qaeda. (See Federal RICO Statement Applicable to SAAR Network Entities at 5(f) and Ex. A.) The RICO claim against Mar–Jac Poultry is dismissed because it is not alleged that Mar–Jac had any role in directing an enterprise, see Redtail Leasing, Inc., 1997 WL 603496, at *5. The Federal complaint does not provide Mar–Jac Poultry with notice as to how it could be liable for the terrorist attacks. See Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012 (“To hold the defendants liable for donating money without knowledge of the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability. Nothing in the language of the statute or its structure or history supports that formulation.”). Mar–Jac’s motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is therefore granted.
 


 2. Executives
[41] Taha Al–Awani, Muhammad Ashraf, M. Omar Ashraf, M. Yaqub Mirza, and Iqbal Unus are SAAR Network executives who are mentioned once in the Federal complaint in a long list of Defendants who allegedly “have aided and abetted, conspired with, and provided material support and resources to, defendant al Qaida and/or affiliated FTOs, associations, organizations or persons, as described herein.” (Federal Compl. ¶ 66.) The complaint does not include any other allegations against these Defendants.
 
The Federal complaint alleges that Jamal Barzinji, another SAAR Network executive who moves to dismiss the complaint, is a Saudi national who, “through his various for-profit enterprises and involvement with charities and individuals operating within al Qaida’s infrastructure, has long provided material support and resources to al Qaida.” (Federal Compl. ¶¶ 490–91.) Barzinji has served as a board member of, or been associated with, several SAAR Network entities, including IIIT, WAMY, Safa Trust, Mar–Jac Poultry, and SAAR Foundation. Id. ¶ 490 (claiming that while he was the President of Safa Trust, he “held authority over eighteen bank accounts”). He is a business associate of the designated terrorist Yousef Nada. (Id.) According to unnamed federal authorities, Barzinji “committed and conspired to: transit money internationally for the purpose of promoting offenses against foreign nations involving murder or the destruction of property by means of explosive, fire, kidnapping or extortion ...; provide material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations ...; and provide material support or conceal or disguise the source of ownership of material support *572 intended for use in preparation for or in carrying out a terrorist act.” (Id.)
 
The RICO statement provides additional associations between each of these SAAR Network executives and the SAAR Network. (See Federal RICO Statement Applicable to the SAAR Network Executives at Ex. A (alleging in their roles as executives of SAAR Network entities, each of these Defendants committed multiple acts of conspiracy to commit multiple crimes).) Specifically, Taha Al–Alwani was President of IIIT and an officer of Heritage Education Trust; Muhammad Ashraf was an officer and/or director of Sterling Investment Group, Sterling Charitable Gift Fund, and York Foundation; M. Omar Ashraf was an officer and/or director of Grove Corporate Plaza, Mar–Jac Investments, and Sterling Charitable Gift Fund; Yaqub Mirza served as an officer and/or director of African Muslim Agency, Mar–Jac Investments, Mar–Jac Poultry, Reston Investments, SAAR Foundation, Safa Trust, where he was the principal signatory on Safa Group checks, and York International; Iqbal Yunus was a director of Child Development Foundation, a SAAR Network entity, and was associated with Sterling Charitable Gift Fund, and Sterling Management Group; finally, Jamal Barzinji was president of Safa Trust and a director of Mar–Jac Poultry, Reston Investments, IIIT, and Safa Trust. (Id. at 5(f) and Ex. A.)
 
The complaint does not state a claim for relief against Taha Al–Awani, Muhammad Ashraf, M. Omar Ashraf, M. Yaqub Mirza, or Iqbal Unus on a civil RICO theory or under the ATA. Reading the complaint as a whole and considering the overlap of executives among the SAAR Network entities, the complaint does not adequately provide these Defendants with notice as to how they provided material support to al Qaeda terrorists. See Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1023 (explaining a claim under the ATA must include allegation that defendant knew about terrorists’ illegal activities, defendant wanted to help those activities succeed, and defendant engaged in an act of helping). The Federal complaint against Taha Al–Awani, Muhammad Ashraf, M. Omar Ashraf, M. Yaqub Mirza, and Iqbal Unus is dismissed without prejudice.
 
[42] [43] Jamal Barzinji controlled several bank accounts. (Federal Compl. ¶ 490.) He has allegedly transmitted money internationally for terrorist purposes. (Id.) He allegedly made these transfers to support al Qaeda. (Id. at ¶¶ 490–91.) The Federal Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr. Barzinji participated in the operation or management of their claimed RICO enterprise, and the RICO claim against him is dismissed. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163. But Mr. Barzinji does have sufficient notice of the claims against him regarding his alleged provision of material support in the form of financial transactions to al Qaeda. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A) (including provision of “currency or other financial securities [and] financial services” in definition of material support) Accordingly, his motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is denied.
 


IV. NCB’s Motion for Reconsideration
In deciding NCB’s motions to dismiss the Ashton and Burnett complaints, the Court ruled that NCB’s status as a foreign sovereign for purposes of immunity under the FSIA was unclear. It also questioned whether it had personal jurisdiction over NCB. The Court ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on both issues. Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 792, 820. In light of the possible lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the Court refrained from deciding NCB’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. NCB *573 moves for reconsideration of those decisions.
 


 A. Standard
[44] [45] A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where a court overlooks “controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion ... and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y.2000); see also Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995) (“The standard for granting a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and ... will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked....”). A motion for reconsideration may also be granted to “correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir.1983).
 


 B. The Court Will Consider NCB’s Personal Jurisdiction Defense First
NCB offers two bases for reconsideration. First, NCB argues that even if the Court becomes assured of its subject matter and personal jurisdiction over NCB, Plaintiffs’ claims are doomed because the Court dismissed similar claims against Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and Arab Bank. NCB contends that Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194–95 (2d Cir.2002), supports its theory that the Court does not need to establish jurisdiction over NCB because the Court’s dismissal of other Saudi banks “foreordains” NCB’s dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds. Alternatively, NCB urges the Court to limit this litigation’s intrusion on Saudi Arabia and postpone resolution of its FSIA immunity defense until after the personal jurisdiction question is resolved.
 
The Ashton and Burnett Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider NCB’s reliance on Bush because it was not raised in NCB’s original motion to dismiss. Moreover, they are adamant that jurisdictional questions must be resolved first. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). And in Plaintiffs’ view, the subject matter jurisdiction question must be resolved before the Court addresses personal jurisdiction. See Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 746 (2d Cir.2000) (“The initial question to be answered in this case is not whether there is personal jurisdiction within the meaning of the New York [C.P.L.R.] but whether there is subject matter jurisdiction within the meaning of the [FSIA].”). Plaintiffs submit that it would be inefficient to separate the personal jurisdiction discovery from the FSIA discovery since the two inquiries are related. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court’s rulings on the other Saudi banks’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions cannot apply to NCB because the allegations against the various banks are not identical.
 
In Bush, following the Supreme Court’s instructions in Steel Co., the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. On appeal, the Second Circuit found the case “exceptional,” because twelve years earlier it had “entertained and rejected, on the merits, the same constitutional challenge to the provision at issue.” Bush, 304 F.3d at 186; *574 see also Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am. v. Agency of Int’l Devl., 915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1990) (rejecting same constitutional challenge to same governmental provision). It explained two exceptions to the general rule that courts “ordinarily ... are not to assume the existence of jurisdiction in favor of reaching an ‘easier’ merits issue.” Bush, 304 F.3d at 193 (quoting Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust, Co. of N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir.1998)).
 
The only exception relevant here is “in those ‘particular circumstances’ where the outcome on the merits has been ‘foreordained’ by another case such that the ‘jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome,’ provided the court ‘does not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed.’ ” Bush, 304 F.3d at 194 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98, 118 S.Ct. 1003). The exception stems from Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 94 S.Ct. 3039, 41 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1974), in which the Supreme Court dismissed a constitutional challenge to a governmental provision on the merits before reaching the jurisdiction question because the Court had earlier rejected a similar constitutional challenge to the same provision in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). See Bush, 304 F.3d at 194 (describing Avrech and Parker ). Accordingly, in Bush, the Second Circuit skipped the initial-and “novel”—standing question because that analysis would have been rendered “advisory” by “a controlling decision of this Court [that] has already entertained and rejected the same constitutional challenge to the same [governmental] provision.” Id. at 195 (limiting holding to constitutional challenges to governmental provisions).
 
NCB’s reliance on Bush cannot prevail here. The exception relied on in Bush is limited to constitutional challenges to governmental provisions. Bush, 304 F.3d at 195; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Here, the merits of NCB’s liability for the attacks of September 11 do not present a constitutional challenge to a governmental provision such that skipping the jurisdiction question would be appropriate.
 
In its alternative argument for reconsideration, NCB requests that the Court postpone resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction question posed by the FSIA until NCB’s personal jurisdiction defense is resolved. NCB argues that such a course would lead to its quicker dismissal from the litigation and would limit the intrusion into Saudi affairs since personal jurisdiction discovery would involve only NCB’s contacts with the United States and not Saudi Arabia’s relationship to NCB.
 
The Supreme Court and Second Circuit agree that there are certain circumstances in which it is appropriate to give priority to the personal jurisdiction inquiry. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 588, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (holding “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy ... [and] there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry” and finding no abuse of discretion where a court resolves a straightforward personal jurisdiction question before a novel subject matter jurisdiction question); Cantor Fitzgerald v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.1996) (upholding district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction before considering whether it had subject matter jurisdiction and finding “[o]n some occasions ... considerations of judicial economy and restraint may persuade the court to avoid a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the case may be disposed of on a simpler *575 ground”). Further, deference to foreign sovereigns under the FSIA “need not imply priority of immunity determination.... If one (or more) of the other jurisdictional defenses hold out the promise of being cheaply decisive, and the defendant wants it decided first, it may well be best to grapple with it (or them) first.” In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C.Cir.1998).
 
[46] Here, the Court finds that the personal jurisdiction issue raised by NCB is “straightforward” when compared to the more “difficult” subject matter jurisdiction question posed by NCB’s status within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588, 119 S.Ct. 1563; see also Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 789–792 (analyzing NCB’s status as a foreign sovereign). Additionally, NCB acknowledges that personal jurisdiction discovery will only involve it, its relationship to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is sufficiently remote that an inquiry into NCB’s contacts with the United States will not intrude on the inner workings of the Kingdom’s government. Finally, discovery regarding NCB’s FSIA defense would necessarily subject the Kingdom to discovery, which the Court is hesitant to do unnecessarily. See First City, Texas–Houston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1998); see also Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir.1992) (recommending that “discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination”).
 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court reconsiders its order regarding simultaneous subject matter and personal jurisdiction discovery. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (“[I]n light of [defendant’s] introduction of additional relevant case law ... we cannot say that reconsider[ation is] an abuse of discretion.”). Further inquiry into NCB’s status as a foreign sovereign is postponed until the parties have completed their personal jurisdiction discovery and this Court has determined whether it has personal jurisdiction over NCB. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588, 119 S.Ct. 1563; In re Arbitration Between Monegasque De Reasurrances S.A.M., 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d Cir.2002) (noting “dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is independent of the merits and does not require subject-matter jurisdiction”) (quoting In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255–56).
 


V. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, SHC’s motion to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted. Prince Salman’s motion to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction is granted. Prince Naif’s motion to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction is granted. Rabita Trust’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied without prejudice. Wa‘el Jalaidan’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied, but the RICO, TVPA, negligence, and Federal intentional tort claims against him are dismissed. IIRO’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied, but the RICO, TVPA, negligence, and Federal intentional tort claims against it are dismissed. Tarik Hamdi’s motions to dismiss the Burnett and Federal complaints are denied, but the RICO, TVPA, negligence, and Federal intentional tort claims against him are dismissed. Abdulrahman Alamoudi’s motion to dismiss the Burnett complaint is granted; his motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is *576 denied, but the RICO, TVPA, intentional tort, and negligence claims are dismissed. Success Foundation’s motion to dismiss the Burnett complaint is granted. The motions by African Muslim Agency, Grove Corporate, Heritage Education Trust, IIIT, Mar–Jac Investments, Reston Investments, Safa Trust, and York Foundation to dismiss the Burnett complaint are granted. IIIT’s motion to dismiss the Ashton complaint is granted. Mar–Jac Poultry’s motions to dismiss the Burnett, Ashton, and Federal complaints are granted. The motions to dismiss the Federal complaint by Taha Al–Awani, Muhammad Ashraf, M. Omar Ashraf, M. Yaqub Mirza, and Iqbal Unus are granted. Jamal Barzinji’s motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is denied, but the RICO, TVPA, intentional tort, and negligence claims against him are dismissed. National Commercial Bank’s motion to reconsider the Court’s January 18 opinion and order is granted to the extent that it requests the Court to consider its personal jurisdiction defense before resolving the FSIA issue.
    So ordered.
 
All Citations
392 F.Supp.2d 539, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789

Footnotes
	
1
	SHC moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, Federal, Barrera, and Salvo complaints. The Court consolidated Barrera v. al Qaeda Islamic Army, 03 Civ. 7038, with Ashton on December 6, 2004. Similarly, at Plaintiffs’ request, the Court consolidated Salvo v. al Qaeda Islamic Army, 03 Civ. 5071, with Burnett on August 16, 2005.
	
2
	Prince Salman moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints.
	
3
	Prince Naif moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints.
	
4
	The French Interior Minister named one charity, the World Islamic League, during his meeting. Plaintiffs claim this is another name for the Muslim World League.
	
5
	Plaintiffs bring the Court’s attention to Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2005), in which the D.C. Circuit found that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were subject to personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) because they had “engaged in unabashedly malignant actions directed at and felt in this forum.” Id. at 13 (citing, among other examples, bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’s orchestration of the Nairobi embassy bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, their plot to bomb various landmarks in New York City, their fatwas against Americans, the criminal indictment against them arising from the Nairobi attack, and the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission). As a result, their “decision to purposefully direct their terror at the United States, and the fact that the plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of one of those terrorist activities, should suffice to cause the defendants to ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into’ an American court.” Id. at 14. In light of the level of bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’s unquestionably direct involvement in the Nairobi attack, Mwani supports this Court’s conclusion that a defendant’s actions must be personal or direct so that the defendant has fair warning that his activities could subject him to personal jurisdiction in the United States. Id.
	
6
	Rabita Trust moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints.
	
7
	Certain Defendants have been designated Specially Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In response to the attacks of September 11, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 on September 23, 2001, pursuant to the authorities of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 287(c), and 3 U.S.C. § 301. The Secretaries of State and Treasury, in consultation with each other and the Attorney General, may designate individuals or entities if they determine the individual or entity has committed or poses the risk of committing acts of terrorism, or are owned or controlled by terrorists, or assist in or sponsor terrorism. As a result, the property and interests of the SDGT that come within the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked. The process is intended to deter contributions to designated persons and entities and heighten public awareness regarding links to terrorism. See Executive Order 13224 Fact Sheet available at http:// www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm.
	
8
	Wa‘el Jalaidan moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints.
	
9
	At oral argument Plaintiffs alleged and Defendant heard for the first time, that Saudi Arabia and the United Nations have also designated him a terrorist.
	
10
	In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not consider the supplemental material that the Burnett and Federal Plaintiffs submitted in opposition to Mr. Jalaidan’s motions to dismiss. (See Letter from Sean P. Carter to Court of June 23, 2005; Letter from Jodi Westbrook Flowers to Court of June 24, 2005.)
	
11
	IIRO moves to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints.
	
12
	Tarik Hamdi moves to dismiss the Burnett and Federal complaints.
	
13
	Abdulrahman Alamoudi moves to dismiss the Burnett and Federal complaints.
	
14
	Success Foundation moves to dismiss the Burnett complaint.
	
15
	Certain of these Defendants object to the label “SAAR Network Defendants,” arguing there is no such entity and that, even if there were, Plaintiffs cannot agree as to which Defendants are included in the network. The Court refers to these Defendants under this label solely because Plaintiffs have so-identified these Defendants in their complaints.
	
16
	African Muslim Agency, Grove Corporate, Heritage Education Trust, IIIT, Mar–Jac Investments, Mar–Jac Poultry, Reston Investments, Safa Trust, and York Foundation move to dismiss the Burnett complaint. IIIT and Mar–Jac Poultry also move to dismiss the Ashton complaint. Mar–Jac Poultry moves to dismiss the Federal complaint as well.
	
17
	The Burnett Plaintiffs filed one opposition brief in response to all of the SAAR Network entities’ motions, except Mar–Jac Poultry. The Ashton Plaintiffs filed a single opposition brief in response to IIIT’s and Mar–Jac Poultry’s motions to dismiss. The Burnett and Federal Plaintiffs filed separate briefs opposing Mar–Jac Poultry’s motions to dismiss.
	



End of Document
                                        	© 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
	




In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005)
		
10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789
		


 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.