20 was like you could tell I was shy so I think that's why he 
21 didn't try. But 1 het:rd about other girls that he -- that 
22 he got flirtatious with them and he made them take off ['left 
23 clothe); and stuff. 
24 Q Okay. What -- that was the first lime you went, 
25 right'? 
2 (Pages 2 to 5) 
02421 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012360 
A Yeah. 
".? Q Okax . 
3 A wa. ito. II was the second nine that I gave him 
4 a Massaw. The first time I went up with 
5 Q Okay. You went upstairs with 
6 A No, I was in the kitchen. 
7 Q \rim Were in the kite-hen. That was -- you only had 
8 two limes that you went there? 
9 A Yeah. 
10 Q The first time von didn't do anything but just sit 
11 in the kitchen? 
1? A Yeah. 
13 Q Who did you sit in the kitchen with? 
14 A I le had a cook that was there and he had -- there 
15 was like two other girls there that live with him. 
16 Q Okay. Did you massage his back? Was he naked 
17 w lien
you were iiiiissriging liii ii? 
18 A Well, lie had like a towel around Ins -- his upper 
19 was (inaudible) but he had like a towel around him. 
20 Q Okay. Did he ever remove that towel'? 
21 A No. 
22 Q When you were massaging him he never removed the 
23 towel? 
24 A No 
25 Q Okay. Did you -- did he have you touch his 
1 L? 
2 A No 
3 (,) No I have to ask. 
Was=one of the two girls that was in the 
5 kitchen NvAllyraf? 
6 
8 A Well, I just went there twice. 
9 Q Right 
10 A After that 
Q After that you've never come back? Never went 
12 back? 
13 1low much did you receive for the massage? 
14 A 'Iwo hundred. 
15 Q You received 200. (Audio at 7:43) 
16 Okay. Did=explain to you whai was going to 
17 be involved? 
18 A She said the first time you go there you pretty 
19 much just give a massage, but the more you go there like the 
20 more he expects. And that's it. That scared mc. 
21 Q That's what scared you'? 
22 BY DEFECTIVE DAWSON: 
23 Q Did she sax' (inaudible) or did she (inaudible --
24 A Say didn't have to say it exactly but she implied 
25 like, you know, like taking your clothes off and !initial: 
Page 
Okay. I lave you received any massage training'? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. I lid you ever go back to his house'? 
8 
1 private area? 
2 A No. No. I wouldn't do that. 
Q You wouldn't do that? 
4 Okay. Did he touch you in your private area? 
5 A Ni. No. 
Page 7 
(Audio at 5:50) 
6 Q No. 
7 A I le kept like staring mine and like. I don't know, 
8 I just felt uneomfortahle and I left. Ihrt I heard other 
9 stories that like --
10 Q Right. Pin emcerned with on I know abtsit 
11 other stories and I've interviewed other people have told me 
12 different things. That's why I'm trying to find out what 
13 happened hi ion. Okay'? 
14 A h-huh 
15 Q You're the VielMi 111 fills so thireS why 1.11111-yille 
16 to lid out what happens to you. 
17 A Oh-huh. 
16 Q Okay? Who took you upstairs to the room'? 
19 A This girlMthat lives with him. 
20 Q Okay. Si) =took you up? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Did she tell you anything? Did she say anything? 
23 A I huh-huh, 'lhere's a massage table and she just 
24 laid a towel down and she said that Jeffrey will be out for 
25 his massage. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
29 
25 
Page 9 
1 that. 
9 I3Y DI RECAREY: 
3 Q Okay. So you didn't remove any of your clothing? 
4 A No 
5 Q What V\ ere you wearing? Can you remember'? 
A I t. 10111 kni tV It  was a long lime ago. I don't 
7 remeillber exactly. 
8 Q ( )Lay . 
A I don't w ant to tell you wrong. 
Q I know. And I know you already told your mom what 
happened. And like I said. I know this is hard far you 
but... 
A I was just seared. I just didn't w ant my name to 
like --
Q Don't worry. You're not the only person I've 
talked to. Okay? There's a lin of people that I've talked 
to and I'm going to talk to. 
I low did you get to his house'? 
A With 
Q I laley. took you the first time and you sat 
in the kitchen. 
A Yeah, 
Q What about the second time? 
A The second time I drove and she came with me. 
Because I didn't want to --
3 (Pages 6 to 9) 
02422 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012361 
1 Q 
2 A 
3 Q 
4 A 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1_6 
A 
You drove. 
Yeah. 
Okay, What is it you drive? 
I used to have a Cavalier. 
A Cavalier. What color? 
Red. 
Q Okay. Can you describe to me ‘aat M,. Epsteiu 
looks like? Jeffrey, looks like? 
A He's tall and he has like greyish/black hair and 
hc usually wears like glasses and he has blue cycs. 
Q Okay. When you massaged him, von massaged his 
back area'? 
A Yes. And I did his feet be. 
Q And his feet. Okay. Did you do his legs? 
A Yeah. like his calves. 
Q His calves. Thigh area'? 
17 A No. 
18 Q No. His chest area? 
19 A No. 
20 Q No. Can you desci ibe what his body looks like'? 
21 A He's not fat but he's not like thin. He's like 
22 normal like average. 
23 Q Average? Okay. Is he hairy? Is he not hairy'? 
24 A A little bit. 
25 Q A little bit'? A little bit he's got hair on his  
Page I 
I back? 
2 A Yeah. 
3 Q Yeah'? How about hair on his chest? 
A Lim --
5 Q You don't remember? Okay. 
He did not (ouch you inappropriately'? 
7 No. 
8 No. Did he masturbate? 
9 No. 
10 • No. Do you know what masturbate means? 
11 Yeah. 
12 • Okay. Why don't you tell inc what it means just so 
13 I know so you know. 
14 A Playing w ith yourself 
Q Okay. Okay. I have to make sure you understand 
16 %%hat it means. 
17 A Yeah. 
18 Q Okay'? I know it's difficult. 
1 9 He didn't touch himself --
20 A No. 
21 Q while you were massaging him? 
22 A No. 
23 Q No. Is there anything else you'd like to add'? 
24 A No. I mean I heard of other stories that he did 
25 and I don't think it's very like appropriate like  
..... 
A 
Q 
A 
A 
Page 12 
Q Right 
2 A -- the stories that t heard. 
3 Q Right Well. a lot tit people that I've been 
4 talking to aic about your age and a couple younger than you. 
5 St) that's the part that I have serious problems with. 
6 A Yeah. 
7 11,.(1:11V1-: RECARFY Do you have sly 
8 questions'? 
9 1W DETECTIVE DAWSON: 
1C Q Did you sec am others -- when you vere there you 
11 said you talked to two girls in the kitchen. The second 
1 2 iliac VOLI 0 Lilt. Viii! ‘Veni jai --
.13 A 1 laley. 
14 Q Ilalcy. Were there any other girls there? 
15 A Yeah, there were the same two girls that were 
16 there. 
17 Q Same two girls? Okay. 
18 A I'm rretty sure they like live and travel with 
19 him. 
20 RF.CAREY: Okay. All right. Well 
21 at this time I'm going to conclude this statement. 
22 Its 11:45 a.m. 
23 (Thereupon. the interview ended.) 
24 - - - 
25 
Page: -13 
. . :!:! ...... 
4 (Pages 10 to 13) 
02423 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012362 
TAB 10 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012363 
Page 1 
IN RE: JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
DRAFT 
VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW OF 
02528 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012364 
(.1.herotillon, the rollowing videotaped interview "a3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2 
3 - - - 
4 13Y )ET1'.CTIVF. lCAREY: 
5 Q All right. I appreciate you coining down again. 
6 All right. The reason why I asked you to come down was that 
7 I'm investigating a case in which my investigation. I 
8 believe that you have information on Jeff Epstein. Okay? 
A Okay. 
Q First of all, iiefive we even begin, lvi me Just 
swear yOU Ill. Okay? Raise Your right hand for me. J )o You 
swear to tell the truth, the cc hole truth and 
nothing. but Ate truth so help you God? 
A 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
A 
Yes, I do. 
Okay. Do von Understand What I'm saving? 
Yeah. 
knoyx you're J-41Janish. 
I know Yeah. 
I can speak Spanish. 
Yeah. 
All right. First of all: do you remember Jell? 
Yeah. 
Okay. Lives on1113rillo? 
(No audible response.) 
Okay. Why don't you tell me from the beginning 
Page 4 
couldn't take inc. 
2 () Oka\ . 
3 A 
4 Q Okay. Okay When you got there. \vital 
5 happened? 
6 A It seems really weird, the whole situation. 'there 
weiv more girls in the house and then they just saw me go 
8 ii 15151 the show mc the room, it was a massage rOOTII. 
9 Prel ty nonnal Then he came and_ you know, l give him a 
10 massage. 
11 Q I Actiy. I've talked to a lot of girls and it lot of 
12 girls have told me different things. 
13 A 111/-huh. 
14 Q 010Y.1) So I'm very aware of what happens when you 
15 provide a massage. Okay'? 
16 A Yeah 
17 Q When you got to the house you went there with 
18 
19 
2C 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. I low did you come into the house? Do you 
remember? 
A What do you mean'? 
Q Did you go into the front door? 
A Yeah. 
Q Did you come through the garage'? 
Page 3 
1 how You met Into. 
2 A Okay. It Was something in higli school. I Ivery body 
3 was like trying to make money and at the time I had two jobs 
4 I guess. That was like two years ago. 
Q About two years ago? 
A Yeah. 
Q When you first met him? 
A No audible response 
Q t )ktic 
10 A Yeah F WilS 17. 
YML 'acre 17 Ilicin? 
l 2 A (Video at 1:37) 
13 Q What is it that You c‘ere told you would have to 
14 do? 
15 A (-jive him a massage 
16 Q Okay. 
17 A Thai was it 
:18 Q Okay Who took you there? 
19 A Her name is 
20 (1 Al ;1 Aldo
von have inly rOTTllal 
21 massage training? 
22 A No. 
2.3 Q NO. Did -- so =took you there. 
24 A MI didn't take me there. look one olmy 
25 Ii tends and then Faith was the one who took me because= 
5 
6 
8 
9 
had;) 
Page 5 
A Well, when you go inside there's like a door. I 
2 don't know if it's the front door. I don't know. 
3 Q Is it a wood door? 
A A wood door, yeah. 
5 Q It is a wood door? 
A It's probably the back because it goes through the 
7 kitchen. 
Q It goes through the kitchen'? 
9 A Yeah. 
10 Q Okay. And you were brought into the kitchen. 
11 right? 
12 A Yeah. 
13 Q Who was in the kitchen there? 
14 A Oh. my God. it's so long ago. 
15 Q So long ago? 
16 A Yeah. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A I don't remember. 
1 9 Q Do you remember any of his assistants? 
20 A 
21 
22 A She sc as ihe one. 
23 Q She Was the one that you met with'? 
24 A And there was the one that call me andl told her 
25 I wasn't going to do it anymore. I think her name was 
2 (Pages 2 to 5) 
02529 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012365 
1 
'2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
95 
M6Q) Okay So when you wine mto the house: 
you go tnto the -lichen, you meet with sonic people there who 
takes you up --
A With 
Q You met with =*? 
A Yeah. Theiity sit down and tell sit down 
and everything I go and call Jeffrey. That's what I wins 
coin -used when you say Jell. I don't know any Jeff And 
then she takes me upstairs and=tays there and Faith 
stays there like the lime whil717 upstairs 
Q Okay Okay. SiM takes you upstairs. Did 
You use the stairs --
A Yes. 
() -- to go upstairs? 
Okay. Do you recall anything lNeird w hen on were 
going up the stairs'? 
A 'he pictures. 
Q Okay. Pictin es of what? 
A Naked people. 
Q Naked people. Okay. Okay. She brings you into 
this you said it was a massage room'? 
A Yes. 
Q Is Jeffrey already there? 
A No. 
Page t-.• 
1 Q his back aild on his legs. Okay I low \vete you 
2 dressed when you were giving the mitssagc." 
3 A 1 w as in leans and a .f -shirt 
Q Okay. Okay.. At aoy point did he ask you to 
5 remove your clothes? 
6 A Yeah 
7 Q Okay.. This is during the first massage'? 
8 A Yeah And I say no. 
9 Q And you said no. ( /Kay. Okay 11ti you continue 
10 with the massage? 
11 A Yeah ti was kind of weird that he asked me take 
12 My clothes Off. 
-3.13 Q Okay. So take me through then lion there. You're 
14 doing the massage? 
15 A I do the massage. Aker I firusIt he's like okay. 
16 Actually lie pay me before I start doing the massage 
17 Q Ile paid llow much did he pay 1:01I? 
18 A S2tiO. 
19 Q 1;200. At any Lime during when you're giving him 
20 the massage; did he ever trim over --
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q -- onto his back'? 
23 A Illt-huh. 
24 Q Okay. Tell me what happened alter that. 
95 A I massage like on I don't know how you say it. 
Q No? Winn did you do nest? 
2 A I sit down there and she tells Inc just Wil il a 
3 second. Then she comes back and we put like the little bed 
4 for the massage and she's like okay, there's SOMe lotions 
and he'll be right out 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A Then he comes in, he a like okay_ Then he k.nows 
my name already. I'm Ihen he's like okay, just a 
9 massage. 
1 Okay. WIlell he Caine 111 lVati Ile M a I01.‘eP WIIN he 
11 in a robe'? 
L2 A No. He had like clothes. Ile was miming or 
13 something like that. 
14 Q I lad regular clothes oil? 
L5 A Yeah. 
16 Q And he got on the table with the clothes on'? 
17 A No. He took his clothes off and he puts like a 
18 towel. 
19 Q Ile put a little -towel over hint Okay. So at any. 
20 point did you sec him naked? 
21 A Not on the first time. 
22 Q No. Okay. So he lays on the bed, massage bed 
23 with his towel and you start massaging hint. Do you remember 
24 where you provided the massage? 
25 A On the back and his legs. 
Page 7 
Page 9 
1 Q in his chest area? 
2 A C hi his chest. yeah. 
3 Q During the time you're massaging lUrn on his chest: 
4 is he touching Itinnselr? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q t &ay. Explain, explain tItat to me. 
7 A Well, he start getting a little excited about it 
8 :aid he start touching himself and I told him stop. ;aid that, 
9 that was it. 
10 Q >Lay. When you mean by touching himself. you mean 
11 he IN us masturbating'? 
12 A Yes. 
Q And You told him to stop? 
14 A No I didn't tell him to stop. 
15 Q I. okay. Okay. So while you're rubbing his 
16 chest, did he ever take oil his towel? 
17 A Ni 
18 Q So how would he he able to masturbate Jr--
19 A Welk like lie had his hand under the towel. 
20 Q Under. So you never saw him. Did you exet see 
21 him naked? 
22 A No. Not the first time hut I saw him like the 
23 second time. 
24 Q okay. Okay. Okay. So then you did your ma --
2 5 continued with Your massage?  
3 (Pages 6 to 9) 
02530 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012366 
1. A Yes. 
2 Q Okay. What clsc happened alter that? 
3 A Nothing elsc. After I was finished. Acnizilly 
4 like it was supposed to be an hour. But the first time it 
5 was just 30 minutes. 
6 Q Okay. The time you were rubbing his chest and he 
7 was masturbating, did he ever elimaN? 
8 A No. 
9 Q You know what I mean by that? 
1 0 A Yeah. 
11 Q Okay. How did you cad the massage? Did he just 
12 say that's enough? 
13 A Yeah. 
1 4 Q Okay. Okay. So then you went back downstairs? 
A Yeah. And I say toMinkay.l'in done, and we 
16 left. 
Q Okay. Did he ever ask you to leave your telephone 
8 ntimber to call you back if you wanted to work? 
19 A He asked for my phone number. 
20 Q He asked for your phone number? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q Did=give him your phone number? 
23 A (Nods head yes.) 
24 Q Okay. Did Mget paid for taking you'? 
25 A Yes. 
Page 12 
go to go work. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. The same thing, you go into the back door 
4 to the kitchen area? 
5 A Oh-huh. 
Q You meet with= 
A Yeah. And she takes me upstairs. 
Q She takes you upstairs. Okay. He offered you 
9 more money to get naked? 
10 A Yes. Well, he told mc just to take my shirt off. 
11 He didn't say anything clsc. 
12 Q Okay. Okay. And did you? 
13 A No. 
14 Q No. But that's not the only two times you'd gone. 
15 You've gone more times'? 
1 6 A It was like around three, four times and then I 
17 just --I was just scared that he was gonna do something. 
1 8 Q Did he ever photograph you'? 
19 A No. Not that I know, 
20 Q Did he ever take videos of you? 
21 A No. 
nn Q Okay. Did you ever give the massage with any 
23 other woman? 
24 A No, 
25 Q Okay. Did you ever get naked while doing the 
Page n 
Q Ilow 'ouch did she Oct paid'? 
2 A $200 
3 Q She gut paid S200 for taking you as well. Okay. 
4 So tell toe about the second time. 
5 A Second time1 don't rernerni-yer who took me I never 
6 went by Inv self. I was seared to go but it was kind of like 
7 ...le same. Same situation than the first one but he offer rue 
6 more money just to lake my shirt off and I didn't do it rind 
9 he Nlas the some. I le did the same things and then he took 
10 hi; low el off 
1 Okay. 
12 A And like after he was done like he never like got 
1 .3 to the climax. I never saw him. 
14 Q You IleVet SM.. 
15 A (Shakes head no.) 
16 Q Okay. You o ere going U. 
17 
18 A Yeah. That's how everything started. 
19 Q ihuits boo everything started'.' 
20 A 11allof the school knew about it. 
21 Q flail of the school knew about it? Let me, let me 
22 back up for a second. You go the second time. Who calls 
3 you to go back to house? 
24 A 
25 Q calls you Novi you make an appointment to 
Page 13 
1 massage'? Any of the massages'? 
2 A Once. 
3 Q Once. 
4 A But it xvas in my underwear. It was never 
5 completely naked. 
Q Okay. You staved in your Mixon'? I littler wear? 
7 A And my top. 
8 Q And your top So you staved in bra and panties' 
9 A (Nit aIldible reSp011Se.) 
10 )kaV. 
11 A I think there w as one that I take :it). lira off hut 
12 that was it. 
13 Q Okay. And each time you went did he offer you 
I 4 more monies to do mole tInugs'? 
15 A Yes, Actually I knew that because of she 
1. naudthle). I don't know her Iasi name. 
17 Q okay. 
18 A 13ccau.se site ask me, she says he'd offer more money 
19 if I have sex with him and I said that's never going to 
20 happen. 'there's no way IM going to do that for money. 
21 Q Okay. And by having sex means intercourse or --
22 A Yes. I guess. I don't know. I don't like talking 
23 about 
24 Q Okay. 'line second time, did he offer you more 
25 money to do more things') 
4 (Pages 10 to 13; 
02531 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012367 
)RAF_ 
A Q 	Yeah. $100 more just to take iny shirt off Okay. And you said you didn't do it. 
3 	A 	No. 
Q 	Okay. Did hc masturbate on the second time? 
5 	A 	Yeah. 
6 	Q 	And did he ever climax? 
7 	A 	Actually the second time like it wasn't that bad 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1.6 
17 
JR 
.L9 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
because he Nvas like on the phone all the time and so he 
wasn't paying attention to what was going on. 
Q Did he ever at any point masturbate the second 
time? 
A No. Not that I remember. 
Q Did he ever ask you any questions or speak to you 
or ask you anything? 
A Well, he tried to talk to you just to make you 
comfortable with thc situation like where do you work and 
like how much do yon make at your work and then he start 
saying you can make more with we. but I didn't feel like it 
was right. 
A 
A 
A 
Did he er.er know your real age? 
After a while like because somebody told him. 
That you w ere --
Yeah. 
17'? 
Like told us_ we were supposed to say wc 
Page 15 
1. were 18. 
2 (.,? Arid who 11)1d 1oil that to say that'? 
3 A 
4 Q 
5 A was the one who broug.lu everythtng to 
6 everyone at school. That's how we know about it. Then she 
t()ok=und =took me. .fdltitilio 15:02) 
8 Q I )kay. So each time nit did go, did =get 
9 
10 
11 
13 
ii 4$, reilmioinigivaiL 
16 A 
.................................................................................. i3tilldidn't get 
18 money out of that. 
19 Q Okay. Did anybody ever help you do a nias.,;age with 
20 hint? 
21 A No.=isked me to do it with her and I didn't 
22 feel comfortable. 
23 Q All right. All right. Talk to me about the third 
24 time you went. 
25 A I don't remember it was like kind of always --
(Video at 1-1:57) 
looney fol 
A Well. went oith mehlice I guess. And that 
was it. Then I went n, ith 
Q Okay. And did she make money? 1)id =make 
for taking you to him? 
3 
4 
5 he paid you more to do more things. right? 
6 A Yeah. The thirdlime it was when I took my shin 
7 off. 
8 Q Staved with your bra or were you --
9 A Stayed in my bra 
10 Q Okay. 
11 A And that was when he paid me 300. 
12 Q He paid yon 300 for that'? 
13 A Uh-huh. 
14 Q And same thing --
15 A Yeah. 
16 Q He came ill. Was he naked again'? 
17 A Yeah. 
18 Q Okay. You gave hint a massage and at that point 
19 was he still playing with hi insell? 
20 A Yeah. 
21 Q Masturbating? 
22 A Uh-huh. 
23 Q Okay. Do you know if at any point did he ever 
29 climax during this'? 
25 A No. 
Page 16 
it was always -- It was the same_ 
2 Q ti was the same? 
A It was the same. 
Q Obviously more stuff happened because, you know. 
Page 17 
1 
2 say that's it, that's enough? 
3 A Yeah, he would just stand up and take a shower and 
4 I unild grab my things and leave. 
5 Q May. All right. Talk to me about the pail when 
6 von got diiwn lii votir underwear 
7 A That was the last time that I saw han. 
8 Q When was the lust time? Was that --
9 A It w as 'mg ago. M4we than six month:•tago. 
1.0 Q You sure it's not any lime sooner than that? 
11 A I don't remember I ike I told I didn't 
12 want to do it anymore I was scared he was going to do 
13 something_ 
14 Q t )kay Why do VI KI sa yr itt ii ere scared he was going 
15 to do sornething-.' 
16 A Ikeanse I like know he has a lot ur girls and I 
17 don't know, like he was olIering=inore money for it. 
18 Like I think he bought her a car or something like that. 
19 She Just got a car and she told me he got it for her. 
20 Q Do you know what kind of ear it was? 
21 A I think it's a Dodge or something. 
22 Q A Dodge" 
23 A And then she like then had money or anything and 
24 she ended up going to Europe for like the summer. 
95 Q Did she go with Inin? 
Q Okay. I IUNV 1‘1/1.11d the in issages end" Would he Just 
5 (Pages 14 to 17) 
02532 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012368 
11) 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 A I don't know. We never talk about it because I 
2 was -- I didn't like the whole situation. 
3 0 Okay. Did he ever touch you? 
4 A Yeah. 
5 Q In what way.? 
6 A My hack and my butt. 
7 Q Did he ever, did he ever take out any toys? 
A No. 
9 Q Did he ever touch your breast area? 
10 A (Nods head yes.) 
11 Q Did he touch your vaginal area'? 
12 A Yeah. 
13 Q All right. Did he touch you with his hands or 
14 with something else? 
15 A With his hands. 
16 Q Okay. Okay . Was this over your underwear or 
17 under? 
1.8 A Over my underwear. 
19 Q Over or under? 
20 
2] 
22 
2.3 
24 
25 
A Over. 
Q Over. Did he ever insert his fingers in you'? 
A (Shakes head no.) 
Q And as he was doing this, he was paying more 
money? 
A The maximum that he paid me was 300. 
Page 1 9 
Q Three hundred. And that was the last time you 
2 went? 
3 A (Nods head yes.) 
4 Q When he touched your breast area you didn't have 
5 a bra on'? 
6 A I didn't have a bra on. 
Q You didn't have a bra on. And your buttocks? 
8 A Uh-huh. 
9 Q Was that over your panties or under your panties? 
A Like I have a thong on so... 
You had thongs. Okay . All right. Did he pull 
you close to him? 
A Yeah. 
Q And all this while hc was masturbating'? 
A (Nods head yes.) 
Q Did he have you touch him? 
A No. 
Q Aside front the massage. touch him in his penis 
area? 
A I Iuh-huh. No. 
Q Did y.ou bring anyone else other than --
A 
A 
(Video at 20:22) 
Do you know last name? 
2 
3 
5 
-7 
8 
9 
10 
11 Q Did you ]uccive luoucy forM or --
12 A I don't remember. I'm pretty sure I didn't. 
13 Q Okay. When was the last time you had contact with 
14 anvone from the house? 
15 A Wel1,1 don't know because she told me they were 
16 going to New York the last lime we talked. the last limel 
17 went. 
18 Q What's a while ago'? 
19 A Probably two months or more. 
20 Q Who called you? 
21 A 
23 A And she said that she was going where? 
I hey were going to New York. 
24 Q New York? Nobody else from the house has called 
25 you to say the police are looking into it? 
A 
A 
A 
A 
No. No idea. 
lotA about• 
Does she also go to 
1111-huh. 
And \vital about M? 
Yes. 
Did von receive monies for taking =mil 
Page 20 
Page 21 
1 A (Shakes head no.) 
2 Q Okay. This case is basically an investigation, an 
3 open investigation, so I appreciate it what we discuss stays 
4 here. Okay? 
5 A 1th-huh. 
6 Q Don't tell anybody that we. that we talked ()km-) 
7 A )kav 
8 Q Did y ouel.er have any intercourse with him? 
(Video at 22:41) 
1'-'10 A Nr (tl, orar? 
11 A i Shakes head no.) 
I 2 Nothing? 
13 A Nothing else. 
14 Q C /Lay. I'm going to show ymi mi group of 
15 photographs. I'm going to show yon a group of sms 
1 6 photographs. Oka '? I'm trying, trying to see if thisM 
1 7 is in these six photos. Okay? 11's important that you look 
18 at all six of them and be sure who you pick as the person as 
19 =, okay? She may or may not be in these six photos but 
20 it's imrx tam foi you to pick the right one. Okay? 
21 A 1.1h-huh. 
22 Q Take your time looking at those six photos there. 
23 A l don't see her. 
24 Q She's no: in those photos there? 
25 A No. 
6 (Pages 18 tc 21) 
02533 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012369 
tr________________ 
I Q Him. would you describe 1)RA 
1 appreciate you coming down. Okay? 
2 A She would be here but she'.  :she's= A Thank you. 
3 and slit, looks like her hi it I'm not •.tit-L: 3 0 All right. 
4 Q Okay. That's why I needed you to be ribr'lutel 4 (Thereupon_ the interview ended.) 
5 sure. I appreciate you being hifflest and not picking anyone 5 - - - 
out bee:11.3tie i hat's important You know'' You have my card, 6 
7 right? 
8 A No, I lost it. lake I think I left it at my job. 8 
9 Q Okay. I gave your sister one. Thai's MY enrd. 9 
10 A You +vent hack 10 ms house? 10 
Q Yeah,11.vent by today. She's the one ho gave MC 11 
12 your cell. Your sister 12 
I 3 A You tell her what it was? 13 
14 Q No, No. I just told her thatt.ou were a witness 14 
15 and I needed to talk to you. 1 .`) 
16 A Is he going In know ally thing about any ()I this') 16 
17 Q About the investigation? Fvent natty I'm sure he 17 
113 ;111irl 1 1 1;; 1.1 
W,.. out about the investigation. . would appreciate 1 fi 
19 it if anyone did contact you that you call me and give me 19 
20 JUSt -- basically let me know that somebody called you. 20 
71 A If they call me? 
22 Q If they call von. Is there anything else you'd 
23 like to add to this statement or -- 73 
24 A No. just seared that he's gonna knots 
25 Q Why are you scared of him'? 25 
Page 23 
1 A 'that he's gratin) tlo something. 
2 Q Trot gonna do am. thing. 
3 What did he tell you he did for a living? 
4 A Ile was in brain something. I le studied the brain. 
5 Q 1-le's an investor and that's it. Just a money 
6 investor That's it les unit -- hall of ilie thmes that 
7 lie to.c.H  some of these people, he's just a money invcsiiit. 
8 That's it. So don't be afraid. And if they do call you, 
9 just cull me and let me know 
10 A If they ask me to come over there should I just 
11 say no? 1. ike I don't Ns ant to go 
(3 You haven't been there? 
13 A (Shakes head no.) 
i'iwt When .s 1.11.2 ,USt time ou said you were there? 
lb A I.ike three_ four months ago. Longer than that. 1 
1 C. don't remember. 
17 Q I think it's about three or lour months ago. I 
18 think it's three or hour months ago because -- is there 
19 anything else you'd like to add? 
20 A Not neal l\ . 
Q No? Okay. 1 appreciate you coming do;wn. And let 
22 me walk you out. 
23 A Is something going to happen to me'? 
24 Q No. No. I just, like I said, you're not in ;Inv 
25 trouble whatsoever. I just wanted to talk to you. I  
Page 24 
Page 25 
(Pages 22 to 25) 
02534 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012370 
TAB 11 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012371 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Legislative Affairs 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530 
November 9, 2007 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciary 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
This letter presents the views of the Department of Justice (the Department or DOT) on 
H.R. 3887, the "William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2007," as introduced by Congressman Lantos on October 18, 2007. The Department has 
significant concerns, which are detailed below in a section-by-section analysis. The proposed 
legislation, as drafted, would eliminate the Department's role in several important steps in the 
victim identification process, and thereby negatively impact our ability to ensure the safety of 
victims and their families, rescue additional victims, and apprehend and prosecute human 
traffickers; it would broaden the criminal statutes regarding prosecution in a manner that detracts 
from effective enforcement efforts and raises serious federalism implications; and it would 
unconstitutionally intrude into Executive authority. 
1. Section 102 
The provision in subsection (e)(2)(B) authorizing the Director of the Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) at the Department of State to interview victims 
should clarify that the Director is authorized to do so only with the consent of the Attorney 
General in any case where an ongoing investigation or prosecution may exist. Otherwise, 
serious issues could arise that would complicate or even scuttle prosecution. For example, any 
statements made to the Director would presumptively have to be turned over to the defense and 
any statements that contradict statements made to law enforcement or prosecutors would be 
required to be turned over to the defense. 
2. Section 103 
DOI finds section 103 unnecessary and duplicative of existing efforts and, therefore, 
opposes its inclusion in the bill_ DOJ and other Federal agencies are already offering the types 
of assistance that are described in the section. Furthermore, the new subsection (a)(i)(3) would 
require the United States Government to provide "technical assistance to provide legal 
frameworks and other programs to foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations to 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012372 
ensure that foreign migrant workers are provided protection equal to nationals of the foreign 
country." This provision does not differentiate between legal and non-legal migrant workers, nor 
does it distinguish between forced labor and non-coerced migrant labor. DOJ believes that any 
international standard that we promote must mirror our domestic standards. Similarly, the new 
subsection (a)(i)(4) could be read as encouraging countries to loosen their immigration Iaws, 
'something that the United States Government might not be willing to do. 
Subsection (b) amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq) to 
provide specific assistance for anti-trafficking investigation and prosecution units in foreign 
countries. This subsection could be construed as prioritizing sex trafficking over labor 
trafficking. As stated above, DOJ believes that any international standard that we promote must 
mirror our domestic standards, which prioritize both sex trafficking and labor trafficking. 
Further, the amendment to 22 U.S.C. § 2152(d)(a)(2) should include a reference to labor 
trafficking and should, therefore, read "including investigation of individuals and entities that 
may be involved in trafficking in persons involving sexual exploitation or forced labor." 
3. Section 104 
The Department objects to the language in this section that specifies the groups with 
which the United States Government must consult and coordinate in offering assistance and 
protection to victims of human trafficking. Such language both places undue restrictions on the 
United States Government and could limit the Government's ability to deal with some necessary 
groups. It has been the consistent practice of the Department to consult widely with a range of 
stake holders and others before designing a program of foreign assistance on human trafficking. 
Such an additional requirement in the statutory language is unnecessary. We suggest that the 
language be amended to read, "[l]n cooperation and coordination with organizations which may 
include the [UNHCl2], the International Organization [for] Migration, and other relevant 
organizations...." 
4. Section 105 
DOJ recommends that subsection (a) also require that the effectiveness of assistance 
programs be measured based on best efforts to facilitate cooperation with law enforcement, along 
with the other criteria. 
5. Section 106 
DOJ opposes the bar in subsection (b)(1) against including cases in which probation or 
low sentences are given. Some of the most important cases are the ones against cooperating 
defendants that result in minimal sentences in exchange for information or testimony. Embassies 
should have the discretion to take such situations into account when evaluating foreign 
government efforts to combat trafficking. The Department recommends amending section 
(b)(1 )(B) by striking "shall not be considered to be an" and inserting in its place "shall be 
considered on a case by case basis to determine if it will be considered an" so that it will give the 
Secretary of State greater flexibility in evaluating the efforts of other countries. 
2 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012373 
The Department also objects to the new paragraph (11), which lists as a criterion for 
ascertaining whether the government in question has made "serious and sustained" efforts to 
eliminate trafficking "[w]hether the government has made serious and sustained efforts to reduce 
demand for commercial sex acts and for participation in international sex tourism by nationals of 
the country." We object to this language because it is vague and will, by implication, require the 
United States Government to evaluate itself under this "serious and sustained" standard. The 
Depatiment prefers the language that was added by the 2005 reauthorization of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act, which evaluated whether countries "adopted measures" to reduce 
demand. 
6. Section 107 
Section 107(a) of the Act raises separation of powers and Chadha concerns. Section 
I07(a) would add a new 22 U.S.C. § 7107(b)(3)(D), which would limit the amount of time that a 
country could remain on the Tier IT Watch List to two years, "unless the Secretary of State 
provides to the appropriate congressional committees credible evidence that" the country had 
taken certain steps to make significant efforts to counter trafficking. That provision further 
requires that "[s]uch credible evidence" shall be provided to Congress in a report. 
To the extent that section 107(a) purports to give congressional committees authority to 
determine whether the Secretary's decision to exempt a country from the watch list is based on 
sufficiently "credible evidence," the provision would give the committees a role in executing the 
law that the Constitution does not allow. "[O]nce Congress makes its choice in enacting 
legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment 
only indirectly—by passing new legislation"—that complies with the bicameralism and 
presentment requirements of Article I. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986); ,sree also 
NS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52, 958 (1983). To avoid this concern, we recommend 
replacing "provides to the appropriate congressional committees credible evidence" with 
"determines;" and replacing "Such credible evidence" with "Such determination." 
7. Section 108 
DOJ opposes the requirement in section 108 to create a database "combining all 
applicable data collected by each Federal department and agency represented on the Interagency 
Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking." The database would contain law enforcement 
sensitive information, which would prevent the data from being accessible to non-law 
enforcement agencies, many of which are a part of the interagency task force. Furthermore, such 
a database would be difficult to create, particularly within the timeframe provided in the statute, 
because it would require information from multiple agencies that collect data in varying forms 
and levels of specificity. 
8. Section 109 
This section authorizes the President to establish an award for efforts against trafficking 
and directs him to establish procedures for selecting recipients of the award. DOJ opposes this 
provision, as it interferes with the President's policy-making authority. 
3 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012374 
9. Section. 110 
The Department opposes the statutory language in subsection I 10(a)(1)(B) that 
specifically mentions the U.S. Government sponsored hotlines for reporting instances of 
trafficking in persons. Statutorily providing for the names of the hotlines would interfere with 
the President's policy-making authority to change the hotline structure at a later date. 
Furthermore, the Act, as written, misnames the hotlines. 
10. Section 201  
In section 201, the Department objects to the new subsection "(bb)." To the extent that 
such a subsection is necessary, a question that we defer to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the decision regarding cooperation should include the Attorney General in addition to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as it does in Section 201(b). 
DOI. defers to DHS in regard to subsection (a)(1)(E), although we would note that by 
removing the "unusual and severe harm" standard, victims will be eligible for a T-visa upon a 
lower showing of "extreme hardship." 
The Department also defers to DHS in regard to subsection (a)(2), which would extend 
T-visas to parents and siblings of trafficking victims. As a factual matter, however, the provision 
should be amended to strike any reference to "as a result of the alien's cooperation with law 
enforcement." Traffickers threaten victims to intimidate them into compliance with traffickers' 
demands and to retaliate for victims' escape, not because of law enforcement cooperation. It is 
counter-factual to describe the pattern of threats and retaliation as linked to law enforcement 
cooperation, and disregards the fact that threats often only subside when law enforcement takes 
measures to secure the family or punish the traffickers and their associates who threaten victims' 
families. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the reference to siblings encompasses both minor 
and adult siblings, and whether spouses and children of adult siblings would be eligible for a T-
visa. 
In subsection (b), DOJ opposes the new subsection (8)(B), which grants sole authority to 
the Secretary of DHS to consider whether "extreme hardship" exists. The new section, however, 
also requires consultation with "prosecutors," which presumably refers to prosecutors at DOJ, 
since DOJ is the lead prosecutorial agency for cases involving human trafficking. Since these 
prosecutors are under the Attorney General's authority, the consultation requirement should 
include consultation with the Attorney General. 
Subsection (c)(1), which creates the new subsection (3)(A)(i) in section 107(c) of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), should limit applications for continued presence to 
those being made by "Federal" law enforcement officials. Limiting the applications to those 
submitted by Federal law enforcement assists in the victim identification process. The 
Department has established a memorandum of understanding with DHS that ensures that the 
Department's prosecutors are informed when investigators apply for continued presence. 
Furthermore, limiting the applications to those submitted by Federal law enforcement ensures the 
uniformity of standards in making the determination as to whether an individual is a victim of a 
4 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012375 
severe form of trafficking in persons and eligible for continued presence. Finally, Federal law 
enforcement involvement in the process allows Federal prosecutors the ability to identify 
patterns of human trafficking activity that might span multiple local law enforcement 
jurisdictions. For these same reasons, the new subsection (3)(B) should add "Federal" before 
"law enforcement" to limit the authority to request parole for relatives to Federal law 
enforcement officials. 
The new subsection (c)(3)(A)(ii) should add "endeavor to" after "shall" so that a legally 
actionable obligation is not created as to Federal law enforcement's role in protecting the safety 
of trafficking victims and family members. While the U.S. Government makes every effort to 
protect trafficking victims, the statutory language, as written, could be construed to create a 
legally cognizable right and could lead to litigation. 
In the new subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii), DOJ opposes extending continued presence for the 
duration of a civil suit. It also raises the potential for abuse because of the lengthy and 
plaintiff/victim-controlled delays in conducting civil litigation. Furthermore, physical presence 
in the United States is not necessary for the successful maintenance of a civil action. Victims 
have other options to obtain status in the United States, such as T- and U-visas. 
DOJ notes a technical change to subsection (d), which currently has two subsection (2)s. 
DOJ recommends striking the second "(2)" and replacing it with a "(3)." 
11. Section 202 
The Department opposes the language in section (a) that legislates the existence of a 
specific task force, such as the Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force. DOJ 
recommends deletion of this reference and the replacement of the named task force with "the 
Attorney General." 
DOJ also opposes the 120 day deadline in subsection (f) as unreasonable due to language 
barriers and translation needs. 
12. Section 203 
In subsections (a), (b)(1-2), and (c), DOJ opposes the language removing the Attorney 
General's role in determining whether the relevant applicant has complied with reasonable 
requests for assistance, an important factor in the decisions regarding T-visas, and that the 
investigation or prosecution is complete. Because the Department is involved in its prosecutorial 
as well as its investigative roles, DOJ participation is critical in assessing assistance with law 
enforcement, and it is well-situated to assess whether a victim has complied with reasonable 
requests for assistance that went through investigative agencies outside DHS, such as cases 
investigated by FBI or DOL. Therefore, a joint determination is appropriate because of the 
number of different law enforcement agencies that may be involved in a particular matter. 
5 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012376 
13. Section 205 
D0.1 opposes the addition of the new subsection 240A(b)(6)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality 21 Act (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)) unless the word "Federal" is added before "law 
enforcement official." The same proposed subsection currently states that the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security "shall grant parole" to the relatives of trafficking victims. 
DOI. recommends changing this language to read "may grant parole" so the Secretary has the 
latitude to make an appropriate decision. There may be reasons pertaining to the circumstances 
of the relatives of the trafficking victim for which the Secretary should have discretion to deny 
parole. Further, DOJ finds it necessary to strike any reference to "as a result of the alien's 
cooperation with law enforcement" for the reasons noted above. 
In subsection, (6)(B)(ii)(II), DOI opposes a statutory requirement that parole be extended 
during pending civil actions. As indicated above, this action would create a potential for abuse 
because of the lengthy and plaintiff/victim-controlled delays in conducting civil litigation. 
14. Section 211  
The Department opposes the change of the "and" in subsection (1)(A) to an "or." Both 
the Attorney General and the Secretary of DHS need to be involved in the certification process. 
The current certification process is well-established and needs no statutory revisions. DOJ also 
opposes the change in subsection (1)(B), which would remove the Attorney General's authority 
in stating whether a person's presence is necessary in ensuring an effective prosecution. As the 
agency that prosecutes cases of human trafficking, DOrs involvement is vitally important. The 
Department has the same concern with the proposed change in subsection (2). 
15. Section 213 
We strongly oppose the language in this section that inappropriately removes law 
enforcement from any initial determination of victim status or benefits eligibility. DOJ and DHS 
play a critical role in protecting the safety of victims and service providers. Any failure to 
involve Federal law enforcement immediately upon suspicion that a crime has been committed 
could threaten the safety of the victim, impeded efforts to promptly rescue victims still in 
jeopardy, and possibly man that the offenders avoid apprehension. DOJ recognizes the 
important of including HHS at the initial stages for the purpose of facilitating prompt delivery of 
the full range of available benefits and services to trafficking victims. DOJ will continue to work 
with DHS and BM to ensure that interagency procedures afford victims of trafficking prompt 
protection and access to these services. 
The Department further objects to the provision set forth in paragraph (G), which would 
require both Federal and state law enforcement officials to inform the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) of the existence of a potential victim, but does not require HHS, other 
Government officials, or non-governmental service providers to inform Federal or state law 
enforcement of such a victim. To the extent that such a notification procedure must exist, it must 
also include notification to the Attorney General and the Secretary of DHS, who bear 
responsibility for prosecuting and investigating instances of human trafficking. 
6 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012377 
DOJ also opposes subsection (b). Since the passage of the TVPA, DOS has been one of 
the principal agencies conducting trainings for a multitude of audiences, including task forces 
and Federal, state, and local law enforcement, on the issue of trafficking in persons. The 
Department also has experience in conducting training on juvenile victims through the Innocence 
Lost National Initiative. Effective efforts to combat trafficking must mobilize the expertise of 
HHS, DHS, and DOJ. 
DOJ also notes a misspelling in the new subsection (F)(ii)— "edibility" instead of 
"eligibility". 
16. Section 214 
Section 214 of the bill authorizes the Attorney General to make grants to assist victims of 
severe forms of trafficking up to $2.5 million in 2008, increasing to $15 million in 2011. The 
Department of Justice already has authority to make grants for the provision of services for crime 
victims and does so at a level in excess of $250 million a year. Also, the authorization of yet 
another grant program runs counter to the Administration's proposal in the 2008 Budget to 
consolidate DOJ's more than 70 grant programs. 
Moreover, any provision purporting to expand or alter definitions of individuals of 
qualifying for victim benefits must include the requirement that a Federal law enforcement agent 
must declare the individual to be a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, and that the 
victim agree to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution, or that the victim be under the age 
of 18. 
DOJ opposes the consultation requirement in subsection (a)(1) with the Secretary of State 
for establishing programs to serve domestic, U.S. citizen trafficking victims. Such domestic 
authority falls outside of the mission and expertise of the Department of State. DOJ also opposes 
the mandatory consultation with non-government organizations (NG0s) regarding the provision 
of services. This creates a conflict of interest since many of the NGOs will apply for and could 
receive grants under the program. Finally, any section regarding the provision of victim services 
must also contain language that includes organizations that provide services to "juveniles 
subjected to trafficking, as defined in section 203(g) of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2005," which would ensure that the funds authorized to the Attorney 
General for establishment of grants will go toward the work and development of the Innocence 
Lost Task Forces. 
DOS opposes subsection (b) because it provides Victims of Crime Act of 1984 funds to 
prostitutes implicated in violations of the Mann Act (criminalizing transportation of prostitutes in 
interstate commerce). Such persons do not meet the legal defmition of "victim" as that term is 
defined in the law, unless the person prostituted is under the age of 18 at the time the crime was 
committed or the person, through the application of another Federal statute or regulation, 
satisfies the legal definition of a victim. Such persons are already eligible under the Crime 
Victims Fund Act to receive benefits. 
7 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012378 
Dar opposes section 214(d), as it could be construed to require the Attorney General and 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to make legislative recommendations to Congress in 
violation of the Recommendations Clause. To avoid this concern, we recommend inserting ", if 
any," after "recommendations" in section 214(d)(2)(E). Further, DOJ finds subsection (d) 
redundant. A thorough study of services available to domestic and foreign victims was 
conducted by the Senior Policy Operating Group in 2005-2006 and found few statutory 
differences between the treatment of domestic and foreign victims. 
Subsection (d)(2)(C) contains a redundant statement. Victims of sex trafficking are 
victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons. 
17. Section 221  
In subsection (a), DOJ opposes the proposed change of MO*g thc içhw!edgc, of 
AgOI0000000#0i010404:03 to:i',14Y.PF*Vir.,01go!, 
This change of law would 
create a strict liability crime, similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), with similarly severe 10 year 
mandatory minimum sentence. However,16W04004kig44(a)**40#Xa) is exceedingly 
.1iii*KtiiitifitAkt0A0t***.grilgOgogfogoo Therefore, the suggested subsection (a) 
would create a rare circumstance wherein there is a substantial mandatory minimum sentence for 
an already unusual strict liability crime. Accordingly, this provision is likely to face significant 
legal challenges. 
DOJ opposes subsection (b) in its entirety, The proposed language is both over-inclusive 
and under-inclusive of human trafficking activities, and the language is vague. Moreover, the 
provision is unnecessary because section 1589 already prohibits many of these activities when 
they result in "serious harm," whether physical or emotional, to the victim. 
The Department opposes subsection (0(1), which would expand the Mann Act to include 
cases "affecting" interstate commerce. The Department does not require any additional statutory 
authority or expanded jurisdiction in order to continue its successful prosecution of human 
trafficking cases and related criminal conduct. Agrg#0.0,:01010::*:-which  ',!ktdtt*.- 
!toiNio:: #.',g*aittatimoffdt0 :,„,i:::.:::: .t ' 
::44011i iri t.i-400:ifit 
:•0I'11dLer1:ww: ?t. cruon is prLsunlcd, t e, .‘'11.:1#00i. ::= .04 0.00' 
;00t,titjpqpqigiv '. aft Amol.t*  crvitude, rnd civiieroiatsi.x-411Y6.1Yillgi :all titta :D)i;:.i.AV 
iiiiitt.-04t0i000704.0tkoi, The Department's record during the last six years demonstrates its success 
in investigating and prosecuting trafficking and retated crimes and in convicting and securing 
appropriate sentences for traffickers. 
At efia historicali 
'been prosecuted at the',igAtoxim,01.00.-i 'This allocation between state and Federal 
enforcement authority does not imply that these crimes are less serious, but rather reflects 
important structural allocations of responsibility between state and Federal governments. The 
federalization of these crimes would treat them differently than other serious crimes such as 
murder and rape, which are prosecuted at the state level. Kidnapping, similarly, is a Federal 
crime only when it involves transportation "in" interstate commerce. . 
8 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012379 
Departi state aid localator1tits are not eutrently 
4 
high volume of prostitution-related crimes, 
and capacity to prosecute these offenses. 
,00.0.74.;pmj§0043g*...pppggyo Finally, due to the 
the Federal government lacks the necessary resources 
Therefore, to the extent that this !!: 414 ...okikigrittliOigl 
ti-000040!. 
!ti.iAt:04.iilbiii:F000%).114*00000.000.Pt 0000Wittga4 
DOJ also opposes subsection (g), which would expand the sex tourism offenses to 
include those who travel for purposes of illicit sexual activity with adults. The Department's 
current efforts with regard to extraterritorial offenses focus on child sex tourism, which are very 
demanding and resource-intensive cases, requiring gathering evidence abroad, bringing victims 
to the United States to testify, and coordination with foreign law enforcement agencies and 
foreign governments generally, among other matters. Any expansion of authority would be a 
distraction from those priority cases and would exacerbate existing burdens on investigation and 
prosecution. 
The Department believes that the addition of 18 U.S.C. § 2423A is unnecessary and that 
18 U.S.C. § 2423 does not need to be amended. 
Should Congress create 18 U.S.C. § 2423A, DOJ believes that language should be 
retained in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(e) that allows the Government to charge attempt or conspiracy for 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) crimes. Finally, DOJ notes that the definition of illicit sexual conduct 
needs to be updated to include production of child pornography. 
18. Section 222 
As a general matter, the Department opposes the expansion of jurisdiction over offenses 
involving non-American offenders or victims that are committed outside the United States. The 
expansion ofjurisdietion in this section would place an enormous strain on available resources. 
In addition, this new section's jurisdiction description overlaps with 18 U.S.C. § 3271. Should 
the choice be made to keep the jurisdictional provisions provided for in this section, perhaps it 
would be more effective to expand section 3271. 
19. Section 223 
These provisions are not directly related to trafficking. As this section is related to aliens 
brought into the country for the purposes of prostitution, without a showing of force, fraud, or 
coercion, and the International Marriage Brokers Act (IMBRA), this bill is not the vehicle for 
this language. Furthermore, subsection (a)(1) removes the requirement from section 278 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act that such conduct be done in furtherance of the importation of 
the alien. By removing this requirement, the bill extends the statute to cover all instances of 
"pimping" an alien. 
9 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012380 
20. Section 224 
This section misunderstands the purpose and effect of the model law and should be 
deleted. The Department's model law was never designed to supplant pre-existing state laws 
which target pimping, pandering, or prostitution, but rather to supplement those laws. At the 
time that the Department's model law was issued, most states had comprehensive laws 
addressing prostitution, pimping, and pandering. However, most states did not have laws 
focused on human trafficking. The Department's law was designed to raise awareness of the 
issue of trafficking and to encourage states to closely examine cases to ensure that cases 
involving fraud, force, and coercion are not labeled as prostitution offenses. The Department 
believes the law has been successful in accomplishing this goal. 
2L Section 231 
The Department opposes any statutory changes to the annual report. The change in 
subsection (1) is unnecessary as this language is currently included in the annual report. The 
information requested in the new subsection (I) would be excessively burdensome to gather. 
22. Section 232 
DOJ opposes this addition as unnecessary. Human trafficking laws that do not require 
the proof of force, fraud, or coercion, namely laws that concern minor victims of severe forms of 
human trafficking, are already discussed at the annual conferences. To the extent that this 
provision would require the Department to discuss human trafficking laws pertaining to adult 
victims that do not require the showing of force, fraud, or coercion, such laws would not fail 
under the definition of human trafficking and the annual conference would be an inappropriate 
venue for the discussion of such laws. However, DOJ trafficking prosecutors utilize a wide 
range of statutes in addition to Chapter 77 offenses to address all criminal conduct associated 
with human trafficking. This includes the Mann Act, money laundering, visa fraud, immigration 
offenses, criminal labor violations, and extortion, in addition to other criminal statutes. 
Accordingly, DOJ training at annual conferences, the National Advocacy Center, the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and field training with the Department of Justice 
funded Human Trafficking Task Forces and provided through the Innocence Lost National 
Initiative include discussion on the importance of using all available criminal statutes as essential 
tools in charging decisions. Thus, this section is unnecessary. 
23. Section 233 
DOJ opposes the change to section 206 of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, which would remove the discretion of agencies in informing the 
Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) of grants. Such a change could be read as giving the 
SPOG oversight authority over grants. It also fails to take into consideration situations where 
grant-making agencies may be unable to notify the SPOG of the grant. 
10 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012381 
24. Section 234 
The Department opposes subsection (a) as an excessively burdensome and unnecessary 
creation of a new layer of bureaucracy within our agency. The Department does not believe 
that there is currently any lack of coordination, and a new position could lead to duplication of 
efforts. Furthermore, subsection (a)(2)(A) incorrectly lists the Civil Division and not the Civil 
Rights Division. 
25. Section 236 
In subsection (a), DOJ questions the reliability of the congressional findings, especially 
with respect to the estimated number of victims and the inference that the lack of child victims is 
directly related to a lack of education individuals who may come into contact with human 
trafficking victims. Such findings, without a full body of evidence, are counter-productive. 
The Department also opposes subsection (b). The Attorney General should be involved 
in any program that focuses on combating child trafficking at the border. We propose that 
section (b)(1) is amended to read "The Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services." Further, 
most of the children interdicted at the border are used for smuggling and are not trafficking 
victims, In subsection (b)(5)(D), DOJ believes that the proceedings for removal to non-
contiguous countries are problematic because DHS needs more flexibility to handle gang 
members, terrorists, repeat offenders, and state offenders. Furthermore, the terrorism exception 
provided is too narrow to protect the national security interests of the country. 
We oppose subsection (c)(1) to the extent that it limits the Administration's ability to 
determine the best arrangement for custody or various classes of UACs. The administration will 
work with DHS, DOJ, and MIS to refme and modify current detention practices where 
necessary. The interagency process is the best forum to consider the various interests of 
unaccompanied minors and law enforcement and to develop and adapt policies that, among other 
things, provide for the safety of all concerned. We look forward to discussing these 
developments with Congress in the future. 
The Department opposes subsection (d)(2) as too narrowly construed. There are 
numerous reasons, outside of the child proving to be a danger to himself or others, that require 
children to be kept in a secure facility, including the safety of the child from danger that is not 
self-imposed. In addition, the standard for placing minors in "secure" care is too strict. It 
requires the "least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child." HE-IS only places 1.4 
percent of minors in its care into a "secure" custody arrangement. This could mean that minors 
who need this arrangement would instead be housed with children who have no history of 
violence or criminal behavior. HHS needs more flexibility and there should not, therefore, be 
required to make an "independent finding" of the child's danger to self or others. 
DOJ opposes the language of subsection (d)(3Xc) that would afford HHS access to law 
enforcement sensitive databases. 
11 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012382 
The language of subsection (d)(5) must be changed from "shall ensure." This implies a 
legal obligation on the Federal government to provide counsel and a concomitant right on behalf 
of victims to government-funded counsel, which is inappropriate and would subject the 
government to litigation over the nature and scope of the purported obligation and right. 
The Department also opposes subsection (d)(6), which creates a guardian ad 'item 
program. Such program raises serious conflict of interest concerns, and DOJ has opposed similar 
language in the past. Establishment of a guardian ad [item program is also unnecessary in that 18 
U.S.C. §3509(h) already sets forth detailed procedures which provide for court appointed 
guardians ad litem for children who are victims of or witnesses to crimes involving abuse or 
exploitation. 
Subsection (d)(7) may result in unintended consequences due to this confidentiality 
section. To effectively combat trafficking, relevant information must be transmitted to law 
enforcement. Law enforcement is well-equipped to preserve confidentiality concerns, 
The Department believes that subsection (e) undermines the 1997 Special Immigrant 
Juvenile reforms and opposes turning this back over to the states, where it was inherently flawed. 
In section 236(j), the effect of the apparent retroactivity of the general applicability of 
these amendments to "all aliens in the United States before, on, or after the date of enactment of 
this Act" raises serious concerns about the provision of benefits and services and has the 
potential to create serious problems for the Department in its implementation of the programs 
described in this section. 
26. Section 301 
DOJ recommends striking the 2 percent cap on funding for training and technical 
assistance that is in 22 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2)(B). The unique.complexity of the trafficking issue and 
the level of coordination necessary to effectively serve trafficking victims requires much more 
training and technical assistance than a typical OP program. Striking the cap on training and 
technical assistance will allow OJP to better allocate the trafficking funds it receives. The 
change could be implemented by the following statutory language: 
"Paragraph 107(b)(2)(B)of Pub. L. 106-386 is amended by: 
"(I) inserting 'and' after the first semicolon; 
"(2) striking '(ii)' through ';and'; and 
"(3) striking 'OW and inserting `(ii)." 
27. Section 302 
Section 302 re-authorizes the $5,000,000 appropriation for the Pilot Program that was 
first authorized by Section 203 of the 2005 version of this Act. The 2007 version, therefore, 
should add language amending section 203 of the 2005 version to provide that HHS does not 
have the exclusive authority for development of the pilot program. DOJ and DES must be 
included in the development of this program to ensure that the ability of Federal prosecutors and 
12 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012383 
law enforcement to gain access to these victims is not negatively impacted. Moreover, the 
Departments' knowledge about these victims, their behaviors, and the dangers that are inherent 
in providing shelter and services to them would be instrumental to ensuring the success of the 
pilot program. This section should also amend subsection 203(a) of the 2005 reauthorization to 
include after "Secretary of Health and Human Services", "in collaboration with the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security," Subsection 203(c) should be likewise 
amended. 
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection to the 
presentation of this letter from the standpoint of the Administration's programs. 
Sincerely, 
4.2 
Brian A. Benczkows 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
cc: The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, Ranking Member, House Committee on the Judiciary 
The Honorable Torn Lantos, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
The Honorable Beam Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
The Honorable Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions 
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions 
The Honorable Joseph Biden, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
The Honorable Richard Lugar, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 
13 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012384 
TAB 12 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012385 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO DECLINE TO EXECUTE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES 
This memorandum discusses the President's constitutional authority to decline to execute 
unconstitutional statutes. 
November 2, 1994 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ABNER J. MIICVA 
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT 
I have reflected further on the difficult questions surrounding a President's decision to decline to 
execute statutory provisions that the President believes are unconstitutional, and I have a few thoughts 
to share with you. Let me start with a general proposition that I believe to be uncontroversial: there are 
circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that he views as 
unconstitutional. 
First, there is significant judicial approval of this proposition. Most notable is the Court's decision 
in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). There the Court sustained the President's view that the 
statute at issue was unconstitutional without any member of the Court suggesting that the President had 
acted improperly in refusing to abide by the statute. More recently, in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 
U.S. 868 (1991), all four of the Justices who addressed the issue agreed that the President has "the 
power to veto encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional." Id. at 
906 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing existence of President's authority to act contrary to a 
statutory command). 
Second, consistent and substantial executive practice also confirms this general proposition. 
Opinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President's authority to decline to effectuate enactments that 
the President views as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 462, 
469-70 (1860) (asserting that the President need not enforce a statute purporting to appoint an officer); 
see also annotations of attached Attorney General and Office of Legal Counsel opinions. Moreover, as 
we discuss more fully below, numerous Presidents have provided advance notice of their intention not 
to enforce specific statutory requirements that they have viewed as unconstitutional, and the Supreme 
Court has implicitly endorsed this practice. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (noting 
that Presidents often sign legislation containing constitutionally objectionable provisions and indicate 
that they will not comply with those provisions). 
While the general proposition that in some situations the President may decline to enforce 
unconstitutional statutes is unassailable, it does not offer sufficient guidance as to the appropriate 
course in specific circumstances. To continue our conversation about these complex issues, I offer the 
following propositions for your consideration. 
1. The President's office and authority are created and bounded by the Constitution; he is required to 
act within its terms. Put somewhat differently, in serving as the executive created by the Constitution, 
the President is required to act in accordance with the laws -- including the Constitution, which takes 
precedence over other forms of law. This obligation is reflected in the Take Care Clause and in the 
President's oath of office. 
2. When bills are under consideration by Congress, the executive branch should promptly identify 
unconstitutional provisions and communicate its concerns to Congress so that the provisions can be 
corrected. Although this may seem elementary, in practice there have been occasions in which the 
President has been presented with enrolled bills containing constitutional flaws that should have been 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012386 
corrected in the legislative process. 
3. The President should presume that enactments are constitutional. There will be some occasions, 
however, when a statute appears to conflict with the Constitution. In such cases, the President can and 
should exercise his independent judgment to determine whether the statute is constitutional. In 
reaching a conclusion, the President should give great deference to the fact that Congress passed the 
statute and that Congress believed it was upholding its obligation to enact constitutional legislation. 
Where possible, the President should construe provisions to avoid constitutional problems. 
4. The Supreme Court plays a special role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of 
enactments. As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a particular 
provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwithstanding his own beliefs 
about the constitutional issue. If, however, the President, exercising his independent judgment, 
determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court 
would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to execute the statute. 
5. Where the President's independent constitutional judgment and his determination of the Court's 
probable decision converge on a conclusion of unconstitutionality, the President must make a decision 
about whether or not to comply with the provision. That decision is necessarily specific to context, and 
it should be reached after careful weighing of the effect of compliance with the provision on the 
constitutional rights of affected individuals and on the executive branch's constitutional authority. Also 
relevant is the likelihood that compliance or non-compliance will permit judicial resolution of the 
issue. That is, the President may base his decision to comply (or decline to comply) in part on a desire 
to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative 
branch. 
6. The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon 
the constitutional powers of the Presidency. Where the President believes that an enactment 
unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to defend his office and decline to abide by it, 
unless he is convinced that the Court would disagree with his assessment. If the President does not 
challenge such provisions (i.e., by refusing to execute them), there often will be no occasion for 
judicial consideration of their constitutionality; a policy of consistent Presidential enforcement of 
statutes limiting his power thus would deny the Supreme Court the opportunity to review the 
limitations and thereby would allow for unconstitutional restrictions on the President's authority. 
Some legislative encroachments on executive authority, however, will not be justiciable or are for 
other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court. If resolution in the courts is unlikely and the President 
cannot look to a judicial determination, he must shoulder the responsibility of protecting the 
constitutional role of the presidency. This is usually true, for example, of provisions limiting the 
President's authority as Commander in Chief. Where it is not possible to construe such provisions 
constitutionally, the President has the authority to act on his understanding of the Constitution. 
One example of a Presidential challenge to a statute encroaching upon his powers that did result in 
litigation was Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In that case, President Wilson had defied a 
statute that prevented him from removing postmasters without Senate approval; the Supreme Court 
ultimately struck down the statute as an unconstitutional limitation on the President's removal power. 
Myers is particularly instructive because, at the time President Wilson acted, there was no Supreme 
Court precedent on point and the statute was not manifestly unconstitutional. In fact, the 
constitutionality of restrictions on the President's authority to remove executive branch officials had 
been debated since the passage of the Tenure of Office Act in 1867 over President Johnson's veto. The 
closeness of the question was underscored by the fact that three Justices, including Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis, dissented in Myers. Yet, despite the unsettled constitutionality of President Wilson's action, 
no member of the Court in Myers suggested that Wilson overstepped his constitutional authority -- or 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012387 
even acted improperly -- by refusing to comply with a statute he believed was unconstitutional. The 
Court in Myers can be seen to have implicitly vindicated the view that the President may refuse to 
comply with a statute that limits his constitutional powers if he believes it is unconstitutional. As 
Attorney General Civiletti stated in a 1980 opinion, 
Myers is very nearly decisive of the issue [of Presidential denial of the validity of statutes]. 
Myers holds that the President's constitutional duty does not require him to execute 
unconstitutional statutes; nor does it require him to execute them provisionally, against the 
day that they are declared unconstitutional by the courts. He cannot be required by statute 
to retain postmasters against his will unless and until a court says that he may lawfully let 
them go. If the statute is unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional from the start. 
The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A 
Op. O.L.C. 55, 59 (1980). 
7. The fact that a sitting President signed the statute in question does not change this analysis. The 
text of the Constitution offers no basis for distinguishing bills based on who signed them; there is no 
constitutional analogue to the principles of waiver and estoppel. Moreover, every President since 
Eisenhower has issued signing statements in which he stated that he would refuse to execute 
unconstitutional provisions. See annotations of attached signing statements. As we noted in our 
memorandum on Presidential signing statements, the President "may properly announce to Congress 
and to the public that he will not enforce a provision of an enactment he is signing. If so, then a signing 
statement that challenges what the President determines to be an unconstitutional encroachment on his 
power, or that announces the President's unwillingness to enforce (or willingness to litigate) such a 
provision, can be a valid and reasonable exercise of Presidential authority." Memorandum for Bernard 
N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel at 4 (Nov. 3, 1993). (Of course, the President is not obligated to announce his 
reservations in a signing statement; he can convey his views in the time, manner, and form of his 
choosing.) Finally, the Supreme Court recognized this practice in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983): 
the Court stated that "it is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which 
are objectionable on constitutional grounds" and then cited the example of President Franklin 
Roosevelt's memorandum to Attorney General Jackson, in which he indicated his intention not to 
implement an unconstitutional provision in a statute that he had just signed. Id. at 942 n.13. These 
sources suggest that the President's signing of a bill does not affect his authority to decline to enforce 
constitutionally objectionable provisions thereof. 
• In accordance with these propositions, we do not believe that a President is limited to choosing 
between vetoing, for example, the Defense Appropriations Act and executing an unconstitutional 
provision in it. In our view, the President has the authority to sign legislation containing desirable 
elements while refusing to execute a constitutionally defective provision. 
We recognize that these issues are difficult ones. When the President's obligation to act in accord 
with the Constitution appears to be in tension with his duty to execute laws enacted by Congress, 
questions are raised that go to the heart of our constitutional structure. In these circumstances, a 
President should proceed with caution and with respect for the obligation that each of the branches 
shares for the maintenance of constitutional government. 
Walter Dellinger 
Assistant Attorney General 
Brief Description of Attached Materials 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012388 
Attorney General Opinions 
1) Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Atry Gen. 462 (1860): In this opinion the Attorney General 
concluded that the President is permitted to disregard an unconstitutional statute. Specifically, Attorney 
General Black concluded that a statute purporting to appoint an officer should not be enforced: "Every 
law is to be carried out so far forth as is consistent with the Constitution, and no further. The sound part 
of it must be executed, and the vicious portion of it suffered to drop." Id. at 469. 
2) Constitutionality of Congress' Disapproval of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to  
the President, 4A Op. O.L.C. 21 (1980): In this opinion Attorney General Civiletti instructed Secretary 
of Education Hufstedler that she was authorized to implement regulations that had been disapproved by 
concurrent congressional resolutions, pursuant to a statutory legislative veto. The Attorney General• 
noted that "the Attorney General must scrutinize with caution any claim that he or any other executive 
officer may decline to defend or enforce a statute whose constitutionality is merely in doubt." Id. at 29. 
He concluded, however, that "[t]o regard these concurrent resolutions as legally binding would impair 
the Executive's constitutional role and might well foreclose effective judicial challenge to their 
constitutionality. More important, I believe that your recognition of these concurrent resolutions as 
legally binding would constitute an abdication of the responsibility of the executive branch, as an equal 
and coordinate branch of government with the legislative branch, to preserve the integrity of its 
functions against constitutional encroachment." Id. 
3) The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A 
Op. O.L.C. 55 (1980): Attorney General Civiletti, in answer to a congressional inquiry, observed that 
"Myers holds that the President's constitutional duty does not require him to execute unconstitutional 
statutes; nor does it require him to execute them provisionally, against the day that they are declared 
unconstitutional by the courts." Id. at 59. He added as a cautionary note that "[t]he President has no 
'dispensing power," meaning that the President and his subordinates "may not lawfully defy an Act of 
Congress if the Act is constitutional. . . . In those rare instances in which the Executive may lawfully 
act in contravention of a statute, it is the Constitution that dispenses with the operation of the statute. 
The Executive cannot." Id. at 59-60. 
4) Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, House  
Judiciary Committee (Feb. 22 1985): This letter discussed the legal precedent and authority for the 
President's refusal to execute a provision of the Competition in Contracting Act. The Attorney General 
noted that the decision "not to implement the disputed provisions has the beneficial byproduct of 
increasing the likelihood of a prompt judicial resolution. Thus, far from unilaterally nullifying an Act 
of Congress, the Department's actions are fully consistent with the allocation of judicial power by the 
Constitution to the courts." Id. at 8. The letter also stated that "the President's failure to veto a measure 
does not prevent him subsequently from challenging the Act in court, nor does presidential approval of 
an enactment cure constitutional defects." Id. at 3. 
Office of Legal Counsel Opinions 
1) Memorandum to the Honorable Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, from John M.  
Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Sept. 27, 1977): This opinion 
concluded that the President may lawfully disregard a statute that he interprets to be unconstitutional. 
We asserted that "cases may arise in which the unconstitutionality of the relevant statute will be 
certain, and in such a case the Executive could decline to enforce the statute for that reason alone." Id. 
at 13. We continued, stating that "[u]nless the unconstitutionality of a statute is clear, the President 
should attempt to resolve his doubts in a way that favors the statute, and he should not decline to 
enforce it unless he concludes that he is compelled to do so under the circumstances." Id. We declined 
to catalogue all the considerations that would weigh in favor of non-enforcement, but we identified 
two: first the extent of the harm to individuals or the government resulting from enforcement; and, 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012389 
second, the creation of an opportunity for a court challenge through non-enforcement (e.g., Myers). 
2) Appropriations Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. 0.L.C. 731 (1980): In this 
opinion we rejected the constitutionality of a proposed legislative veto, prior to the Court's decision in 
Chadha. We opined that "[t]o regard this provision as legally binding would impair the Executive's 
constitutional role and would constitute an abdication of the responsibility of the Executive Branch." 
Id. at 734. It should be noted that the legislation in question was pending in Congress, and the 
possibility that President Carter would sign the legislation did not affect our analysis of the 
constitutional issue. We simply stated that, "if enacted, the [legislative veto provision] will not have 
any legal effect." Id. 
3) Issues Raised by Section 102(c)(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 Op. O.L.C. 38 (1990) (preliminary print): This 
opinion also addressed then-pending legislation, in this case the foreign relations authorization bill for 
fiscal years 1990 and 1991. The opinion found that a provision of the bill was unconstitutional and 
severable. Regarding non-execution, the opinion stated that "at least in the context of legislation that 
infringes the separation of powers, the President has the constitutional authority to refuse to enforce 
unconstitutional laws." Id. at 53. The opinion concluded that "if the President chooses to sign H.R. 
3792, he would be constitutionally authorized to decline to enforce" the constitutionally objectionable 
section. Id. at 38. 
4) Issues Raised by Section 129 of Pub. L. No. 102-138 and Section 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16  
Op. O.L.C. 18 (1992) (preliminary print): This opinion concluded that two statutory provisions that 
limited the issuance of official and diplomatic passports were unconstitutional and were severable from 
the remainder of the two statutes. On the question of non-execution, the opinion rejected "the argument 
that the President may not treat a statute as invalid prior to a judicial determination." Id. at 40. The 
opinion concluded that the Constitution authorizes the President to refuse to enforce a law that he 
believes is unconstitutional. 
5) Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Nov. 3, 1993): This opinion discusses different categories 
of signing statements, including those construing bills to avoid constitutional problems and those in 
which the President declares "that a provision of the bill before him is flatly unconstitutional, and that 
he will refuse to enforce it." Id. at 3. The opinion concludes that such "uses of Presidential signing 
statements generally serve legitimate and defensible purposes." Id. at 7. 
Presidential Signing Statements 
1) Statement by the State Department (Announcing President Wilson's Refusal to Carry Out the  
Section of the Jones Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, directing him to terminate treaty provisions 
restricting the Government's right to impose discriminatory tonnage dues and tariff duties), 17 A  
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 8871 (Sept. 24, 1920) (Pres. Wilson): The 
State Department announced that it "has been informed by the President that he does not deem the 
direction contained in Section 34 of the so-called Merchant Marine Act an exercise of any 
constitutional power possessed by the Congress." Id. The statement also defended President Wilson's 
decision to sign the bill and noted that "the fact that one section of the law involves elements of 
illegality rendering the section inoperative need not affect the validity and operation of the Act as a 
whole." 5 Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 324 (1943). 
2) Special Message to the Congress Upon Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, Pub.  
Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower 688 (July 13, 1955): President Eisenhower, in signing a bill (H.R. 
6042) that contained a legislative veto, stated that the legislative veto "will be regarded as invalid by 
the executive branch of the Government in the administration of H.R. 6042, unless otherwise 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 689. - 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012390 
3) Memorandum on Informing Congressional Committees of Changes Involving Foreign Economic  
Assistance Funds, Pub. Papers of John F. Kennedy 6 (Jan. 9, 1963): President Kennedy stated that a 
provision in the bill he was signing contained an unconstitutional legislative veto. He announced that 
"[i]t is therefore my intention . . . to treat this provision as a request for information." Id. 
4) Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works Appropriations Act, Pub. Papers of 
Lyndon B. Johnson 104 (Dec. 31, 1963): President Johnson also found that a legislative veto provision 
was unconstitutional and stated that he would treat it as a request for information. 
5) Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, Pub. Papers of Richard Nixon 
686 (June 17, 1972): President Nixon stated that a clause conditioning the use of authority by the 
executive branch on the approval of a congressional committee was unconstitutional. He ordered the 
agency involved to comply with "the acceptable procedures" in the bill "without regard to the 
unconstitutional provisions I have previously referred to." Id. at 687. 
6) Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976, Pub. Papers of Gerald  
R. Ford 241 (Feb. 10, 1976): President Ford stated that a committee approval mechanism was 
unconstitutional and announced that he would "treat the unconstitutional provision . . . to the extent it 
requires further Congressional committee approval, as a complete nullity." Id. at 242. 
7) Statement on Signing Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. Papers of Jimmy  
Carter 2335 (Oct. 18, 1980): President Carter stated that a legislative veto provision was 
unconstitutional and that any attempt at a legislative veto would "not [be] regarded as legally binding." 
Id. 
8) Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, Pub. Papers of Ronald  
Reagan 1207 (Dec. 29, 1981): President Reagan stated that a legislative veto was unconstitutional and 
announced that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation will not . . . regard himself as legally bound by any 
such resolution." Id. 
9) Statement On Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990, Pub. Papers of George  
Bush 1613 (Nov. 16, 1990): President Bush rejected the constitutionality of provisions that required a 
Presidentially appointed board exercising executive authority to include, among its 21 members, 
"seven members nominated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives . .. [and] seven members 
nominated by the Majority Leader of the Senate." Id. at 1614. He announced that the restrictions on his 
choice of nominees to the board "are without legal force or effect." Id. 
10) 7 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 377 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Pres. Grant): 
This is one of the earliest of many instances of a President "construing" a provision (to avoid 
constitutional problems) in a way that seems to amount to a refusal to enforce a provision of it. An 
1876 statute directed that notices be sent to certain diplomatic and consular officers "to close their 
offices." President Grant, in signing the bill, stated that, "[i]n the literal sense of this direction it would 
be an invasion of the constitutional prerogatives and duty of the Executive." Id. In order to avoid this 
problem, President Grant "constru[edr this provision "only to exercise the constitutional prerogative of 
Congress over the expenditures of the Government," not to "imply[] a right in the legislative branch to 
direct the closing or discontinuing of any of the diplomatic or consular offices of the Government." Id. 
at 378. 
Other Presidential Documents 
1) A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1953): This was a legal opinion from 
President Franklin Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson. President Roosevelt stated that he was 
signing the Lend-Lease Act despite a provision providing for a legislative veto, "a provision which, in 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012391 
my opinion, is clearly unconstitutional." Id. at 1357. The President stated that, "[i]n order that I may be 
on record as indicating my opinion that the foregoing provision of the so-called Lend-Lease Act is 
unconstitutional, and in order that my approval of the bill, due to the existing exigencies of the world 
situation, may not be construed as a tacit acquiescence in any contrary view, I am requesting you to 
place this memorandum in the official files of the Department of Justice. I am desirous of having this 
done for the further reason that I should not wish my action in approving the bill which includes this 
invalid clause, to be used as a precedent for any future legislation comprising provisions of a similar 
nature." Id. at 1358. 
2) Message to the Congress on Legislative Vetoes, Pub. Papers of Jimmy Carter 1146 (Jun. 21, 1978): 
In this memorandum President Carter expressed his strong opposition to legislative vetoes and stated 
that "[t]he inclusion of [a legislative veto] in a bill will be an important factor in my decision to sign or 
to veto it." Id. at 1148. He further stated that, "[a]s for legislative vetoes over the execution of programs 
already prescribed in legislation and in bills I must sign for other reasons, the Executive Branch will 
generally treat them as 'report-and-wait' provisions. In such a case, if Congress subsequently adopts a 
resolution to veto an Executive action, we will give it serious consideration, but we will not, under our 
reading of the Constitution, consider it legally binding." Id. at 1149. 
Historical Materials 
1) Statement of James Wilson on December 1, 1787 on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,  
reprinted in 2 Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 418 (1836): Wilson argued that the 
Constitution imposed significant -- and sufficient -- restraints on the power of the legislature, and that 
the President would not be dependent upon the legislature. In this context, he stated that "the power of 
the Constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature acting under that Constitution; for it is 
possible that the legislature . . . may transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the 
usual mode notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges,--
when they consider its principles, and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the 
Constitution,-- it is their duty to pronounce it void . . . . In the same manner, the President of the United 
States could shield himself, and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution." Id. at 
445-46. 
2) Letter from Chief Justice Chase to Gerrit Smith (Apr. 19, 1868), quoted in J. Schuckers, The Life  
and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase 577 (1874): Chase stated that President Johnson took 
the proper action in removing Secretary of War Stanton without Senate approval, in light of Johnson's 
belief that the statutory restriction on his removal authority was unconstitutional. In this regard, Chase 
commented that "the President had a perfect right, and indeed was under the highest obligation, to 
remove Mr. Stanton, if he made the removal not in wanton disregard of a constitutional law, but with a 
sincere belief that the Tenure-of-Office Act was unconstitutional and for the purpose of bringing the 
question before the Supreme Court." Id. at 578. 
Congressional Materials 
1) The President's Suspension of the Competition in Contracting Act is Unconstitutional, H.R. Rep.  
No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985): The House Committee on Government Operations concluded 
that the President lacked the authority to refuse to implement any provision of the Competition in 
Contracting Act. The Committee stated that, "fflo adopt the view that one's oath to support and defend 
the Constitution is a license to exercise any available power in furtherance of one's own constitutional 
interpretation would quickly destroy the entire constitutional scheme. Such a view, whereby the 
President pledges allegiance to the Constitution but then determines what the Constitution means, 
inexorably leads to the usurpation by the Executive of the others' roles." Id. at 11. The Committee also 
stated that "[t]he Executive's suspension of the law circumvents the constitutionally specified means 
for expressing Executive objections to law and is a constitutionally impermissible absolute veto 
HOUSE OVERSIGHT 012392 
power." Id. at 13. 
2) Memorandum from the Congressional Research Service to the Committee on Government 
Operations concerning "The Executive's Duty to Enforce the Laws" (Feb. 6, 1985), reprinted in 
Constitutionality of GAO's Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.  
on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 544 (1985): This memorandum stated that the 
President lacks the authority to decline to enforce statutes. The CRS argued that "[t]he refusal of the 
President to execute the law is indistinguishable from the power to suspend the laws. That power, as is 
true of the power to amend or to revive an expired law, is a legislative power." Id. at 554. 
Cases (not included in the submitted materials) 
1) Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926): The President refused to comply with -- that is, enforce 
-- a limitation on his power of removal that he regarded as unconstitutional, even though the question 
had not been addressed by the Supreme Court. A member of Congress, Senator Pepper, urged the 
Supreme Court to uphold the validity of the provision. The Supreme Court vindicated the President's 
interpretation without any member of the Court indicating that the President had acted unlawfully or 
inappropriately in refusing to enforce the removal restriction based on his belief that it was 
unconstitutional. 
2) United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946): The President enforced a statute that directed him to 
withhold compensation from three named employees, even though the President believed the law to be 
unconstitutional. The Justice Department argued against the constitutionality of the statute in the 
ensuing litigation. (The Court permitted an attorney to appear on behalf of Congress, amicus curiae, to 
defend the statute.) 
3) INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983): This case involved the withholding of citizenship from an 
applicant pursuant to a legislative veto of an Attorney General decision to grant citizenship. Despite a 
Carter Administration policy against complying with legislative vetoes (see Carter Presidential 
memorandum, supra), the executive branch enforced the legislative veto, and, in so doing, allowed for 
judicial review of the statute. As with Lovett, the Justice Department argued against the 
constitutionality of the statute. 
4) Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988): The President viewed the independent counsel statute as 
unconstitutional. The Attorney General enforced it, making findings and forwarding them to the 
Special Division. In litigation, however, the Justice Department attacked the constitutionality of the 
statute and left its defense to the Senate Counsel, as amicus curiae, and the independent counsel 
herself. 
5) Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991): A unanimous Court ruled that the appointment of 
special trial judges by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court did not violate the Appointments 
Clause. Five Justices concluded that the Tax Court was a "Court of Law" for Appointments Clause 
purposes, despite the fact that it was an Article I court, so that the Tax Court could constitutionally 
appoint inferior officers. Four Justices, in a concurrence by Justice Scalia, contended that the Tax Court 
was a "Department" under the Appointments Clause. The concurrence stated that "Court of Law" did 
not include Article I courts and that the Framers intended to prevent Congress from having the power