

REPUBLIC

327 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, | οὐ μέντοι ἦττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἢν οἱ Θραῖκες ἔπεμπον. προσευξάμενοι  
 b δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπήμην πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμείναι ἐκελεύσαι. καὶ μου ὀπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμείναι. | Καὶ

<sup>1</sup> Dion. Hal. (*Comp.* 25) in order to illustrate the care Plato took over stylistic matters even into old age, relates an anecdote that after his death a tablet was found containing this first sentence arranged in a variety of ways. For Proclus' (fifth century AD) allegorical interpretation of the "descent" of Socrates (henceforward "S."), see the introduction to vol. 2, section 3.

<sup>2</sup> The festival was of the Thracian Bendis (see 354a10–11), here possibly referring to the foundation of the Piraeus festival in 413 (all dates BC unless otherwise stated), although the cult was known earlier in Athens (see R. Parker, *OCD*<sup>3</sup>, "Bendis"). "The goddess" without qualification regularly denotes Athena (see e.g.,

SOCRATES: I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Ariston's son Glaucon<sup>1</sup> to offer my prayers to the goddess and also because I wanted to watch the festival and see how they would perform it, seeing that this was the first time they were holding it.<sup>2</sup> I must say that I thought that the procession of the local people was quite excellent, but the one put on by the Thracian contingent seemed no less impressive. When we had made our prayers<sup>3</sup> and seen the spectacle, we started back toward town.<sup>4</sup> Now, as we were heading homeward, Polemarchus the son of Cephalus caught sight of us from a distance and ordered his slave to run on and tell us to wait for him. Coming up from behind the slave caught hold of my cloak and said "Pole-

Pl. *Ti.* 21a); a dual festival may be intended, referring possibly to both the "procession of the local people" and the "Thracian contingent."

<sup>3</sup> For S. as an observer of religious rites, see e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.1, 4.3.16.

<sup>4</sup> "Town" is *to astu*, the central area surrounded by defensive walls, as opposed to the *polis*, the whole of the Athenian city-state, including its ports. S.'s journey to the Piraeus was about 9 km.—in fact still within the defensive walls joining the city to the Piraeus, which were constructed in the mid-fifth century, shortly before the Peloponnesian War (431–404).

ἐγὼ μετεστράφημ τε καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὅπισθεν προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαῦκων.

c Καὶ ὀλίγω ὕστερον ὃ τε Πολέμαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαῦκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικηράτος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς.

Ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστν ὠρμηῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες. |

Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἦ τοῖνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται,<sup>1</sup> τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρῆ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι;

Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων.

Ὅς τοῖνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε.

328 Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ἄρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἔστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ;

Ἄφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; |

<sup>1</sup> ἐλλείπεται ADF: ἐν λείπεται A in margine

<sup>5</sup> The contrast between force and persuasion in argument, here introduced jocularly at c7–e14, is a key theme in this book

marchus tells you to wait.” So I turned round and asked where he was. “There he is,” he said, “behind you, coming this way; do wait.” “All right, we will,” said Glaucon.

And shortly afterward Polemarchus came up. With him were Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others apparently from the procession.

Then Polemarchus said: “Socrates, you look as if you are moving off to go back to town.”

“Yes, that's not a bad guess,” I said.

“Do you see how many of us there are?” he asked.

“Of course.”

“Well then,” he said, “either prove yourselves stronger than these people, or remain here.”

“Yes, but don't we still have the alternative,” I said, “to see if we can persuade you to let us go?”

“Would you really have any success,” he said, “in persuading those who don't listen?”

“No, we certainly wouldn't,” said Glaucon.

“Well then, you'd better face the fact that we won't listen.”<sup>5</sup>

“Are you telling us that you don't know,” Adeimantus added, “that there's to be a torch race on horseback this evening in honor of the goddess?”

“On horseback?” I said; “that really is something new! Do you mean they pass torches on to each other as they race their horses?<sup>6</sup> Or something else?”

and later in Plato *Resp.*, e.g., 449b5 (henceforward all references to Plato will be to work alone).

<sup>6</sup> See Hdt. 8.98. See also the Platonic metaphor at *Leg.* 6.776b of generations “handing on the torch of life to one another.”

Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος. καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἦν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. καὶ συνнесόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε.

b Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, ὅμοιος, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι.

Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

Ἦμιν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίου τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, ἰ καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Καλθηδόσιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανίαν καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμον· ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος. καὶ μάλα πρῆσβυτης μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη αὐτόν. καθήστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπὶ τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρον· τεθνηκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγγανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ. ἰ

Εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Σώκратες, οὐδὲ θαμίσεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ. χρὴν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγώ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦ τοῦ ῥαδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν ἂν σὲ ἔδει δεῦρο ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ἦμεν· νῦν δὲ σε χρὴ

<sup>7</sup> For S.'s habit of conversing with the young, see e.g., *Ap.* 23c. Here the length of *Republic* makes it clear that this postprandial walkabout never happens. For a possible original shorter dialogue which this plan might better fit, see General Introduction, section 2.

“Exactly that,” said Polemarchus, “and besides, they’re going to hold an all-night festival, which will be worth watching. After dinner we’ll get up and go out and have a look at the festival; we shall meet a lot of young men there and talk to them.<sup>7</sup> Do stay, and don’t refuse us.”

“It looks as if we shall have to stay,” replied Glaucon.

“Well, if that’s what you decide,” I said, “that’s what we must do.”

So we went to Polemarchus’ house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, and besides them Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Charmantides of the deme Paiania and Clitophon, son of Aristonymus. Inside Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, was there too. Indeed he looked a very old man to me seeing I hadn’t seen him for a long time. He was sitting on some kind of cushion on a chair, and wearing a garland, as he had actually just finished offering a sacrifice in the courtyard. So we sat down beside him, for there were some seats there arranged in a circle.

As soon as he saw me Cephalus welcomed me and said: “You don’t often come down to see us in the Piraeus, Socrates.<sup>8</sup> Yet you ought to. For if I were still strong enough to make the journey up to town easily, you wouldn’t have to come here; we would come to you instead. But as it is,

<sup>8</sup> Cephalus’ language recalls almost word for word a Homeric formula (*Od.* 5.88, *Il.* 18.385). Cephalus’ situation and language here are also strikingly reminiscent of *La.* 181c1ff., where the elderly Lysimachus also matches Cephalus’ role as an older man not used to Socratic debate (see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (a))).

πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰένα. ὡς εἰ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἰ  
ἄλλαι αἰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσ-  
οῦτον αὔξονται αἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμῖαι τε καὶ  
ἡδοναί. | μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεα-  
νίσκοις σύνησθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς παρὰ  
φίλους τε καὶ πάνν οἰκείους.

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος  
e τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ'  
αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινα ὁδὸν προεληλυθόταν  
ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστίν,  
τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία καὶ εὐπορος. καὶ δὴ καὶ  
σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην ὅτι σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ  
ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας | ὃ δὴ “ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ”  
φασιν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ  
πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

329 Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷόν γέ  
μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς  
ταῦτὸν παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασφύζοντες τὴν  
παλαιὰν παροιμίαν· οἱ οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται  
συνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦντες | καὶ  
ἀναμμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε τὰ φροδίσια καὶ περὶ πότους  
τε καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἂ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ  
ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ

<sup>9</sup> *Neaniskos* = “youth,” appropriate, perhaps, from Cephalus’  
elderly perspective; but Polemarchus and Lysias would be at least  
in their late twenties at the earliest possible dramatic date of  
*Republic* (see General Introduction, section 3).

you should come here more often; for I would have you  
know that, for my part, the more the physical pleasures  
wither away, the more my passion for conversation and  
pleasure in it increase. So don’t refuse, but come and get  
together with these lads here,<sup>9</sup> and make yourself at home  
with us: regard us as your dear and very close friends.”

“Yes indeed, Cephalus,” I said, “and what’s more I do  
enjoy talking to very old men. As they have already trav-  
eled along a road, as it were, which we too perhaps will  
have to travel, I think we should find out from them what  
kind of a road it is: is it rough and difficult, or easy and  
passable?<sup>10</sup> I should very much like to ask you in particular  
what you make of it, since you are now at that point in your  
life which the poets say is ‘on the threshold of old age’: is  
it a difficult time of life? What report can you give of it?”

“By Zeus,” he said, “I’ll tell you how I feel about it, Soc-  
rates. For a number of us of about the same age often meet  
together, just as the old proverb says.<sup>11</sup> Now at these meet-  
ings most of us lament, long for the pleasures of youth,<sup>12</sup>  
and recall the sex, the drinking, the good food and other  
things of that sort. And we feel irritated, as if we have been  
deprived of something important. We imagine we had a

<sup>10</sup> On the difficult/easy path of life, see Hes. *Op.* 288–92 and  
*Xen. Mem.* 2.1.21–28.

<sup>11</sup> The proverb was obviously so well-known that Cephalus  
does not feel the need to quote it. See *Phdr.* 240c (“like age  
delights in like”) and scholiast ad loc (Greene, 189) “jackdaw sits  
next to jackdaw” (ὁ κολοῖὸς ποτὶ κολοῖὸν ἰζάνει).

<sup>12</sup> For the sentiments, see the elegiac poets passim, e.g.,  
*Mimn. fr.* 1 Gerber, *Simon. fr.* 520 Campbell (vol. 3), and *Soph.*  
*O.C.* 1235ff.

τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς  
 b τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως οὐδύρονται, καὶ  
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γήρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιον  
 αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον  
 αἰτιᾶσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα  
 ἐπεπόνθη, ἔνεκά γε γήρως, | καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι  
 ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα  
 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε  
 τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμενῳ ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος· "Πῶς,"  
 ἔφη, "ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια; ἔτι οἶός τε εἰ  
 c γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι;" καὶ ὅς, "Εὐφήμει," ἔφη, "ὦ ἄν-  
 θρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ  
 λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν." εὖ οὖν  
 μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκείνος εἰπεῖν, καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. |  
 παντάπασιν γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρῳ πολλή  
 εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία· ἐπειδὴν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι  
 παύσονται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσιν, παντάπασιν  
 d τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάντων πολλῶν  
 ἐστὶ καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων  
 πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν,  
 οὐ τὸ γήρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμοι καὶ εὐκοιοὶ ᾧσιν, καὶ τὸ γήρας  
 μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον· | εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γήρας, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ συμβαίνει.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλόμενος

<sup>13</sup> For sexual desire as a burden, see lyric poets passim, e.g.,  
 Hyc. fr. 287 Campbell (vol. 3), Anac. fr. 358 Campbell (vol. 2).

good life then, but now no life at all. Some also moan on  
 about the abuse shown to their advanced years by their  
 families, and it's especially for this reason that they harp  
 on about the great miseries old age causes them. But in  
 my opinion, Socrates, these people are not putting the  
 blame where it belongs. For if old age were the cause, I  
 too would have had just the same experience, at least as  
 far as old age is concerned, and so would all the others who  
 have reached this time of life. As it is, I have long encoun-  
 tered others who don't feel like this, and again I was once  
 present when someone asked the poet Sophocles: 'How  
 do you get on with sex, Sophocles? Can you still make love  
 to a woman?' And he replied: 'Mind what you say. Let me  
 tell you I am so glad to have escaped from it; it was like  
 getting away from a raging, savage master.' I thought his  
 answer was good then, and I still do now no less. For un-  
 doubtedly there is considerable peace and freedom in old  
 age from such things as these. Whenever our passions stop  
 torturing us, Sophocles' remark is entirely relevant: it's an  
 escape from a great many raging masters.<sup>13</sup> But for all this,  
 and our relationship with our families, there is just one  
 thing to blame: not old age, Socrates, but human charac-  
 ter. For if individuals are orderly and contented,<sup>14</sup> even  
 old age is only a moderate burden. But if not, this makes  
 both old age and youth hard to bear, Socrates."

Now I was full of admiration for what he said,<sup>15</sup> and,

<sup>14</sup> For Sophocles as "contented" (*eukolos*), see Ar. *Ran.* 82.

<sup>15</sup> Extravagantly favorable reaction by S., followed by critical  
 interrogation (331c1ff.), typical of Plato's S.: see also *Prt.* 328d,  
*Symp.* 198a.

e ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κέφαλε, οἰμαῖ σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἠγέισθαι σε ῥαδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτήσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ φασι παραμύθια εἶναι. |

330 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται· ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λαιδορομένῳ καὶ λέγοντι τι οὐ δι' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σεριφίος ὦν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικῆς πάνν τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι | οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικῆς πλουτήσας εὐκόλος ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο.

Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέκτησθαι τὰ πλείω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;

b Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι ὅσῃν ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις τοσαύτην ἐποίησεν, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατήρ ἔτι ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὔσης· | ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ ἔαν μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τούτοιςιν, ἀλλὰ βραχεὶ γέ τινι πλείω ἢ παραλάβον.

Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ

wanting him to say more, I attempted to draw him out by saying: "I fancy, Cephalus, that most people hearing you speak like this don't agree with you, but reckon that you bear old age lightly not because of your character, but because of the great wealth you have acquired: for the rich, they say, have many consolations."

"You're right," he said, "they don't agree with me. And there is something in what they say, though not actually as much as they imagine. But Themistocles' retort is particularly apt here: in reply to the man from Seriphos who became abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to his own merits but to his city, Themistocles said that he would not himself have become famous if he were a Seriphian, and nor would the other if he were an Athenian.<sup>16</sup> And indeed the same reply nicely fits those who are not rich and find old age difficult: that neither would the reasonable man bear old age at all easily if he were poor, nor would an unreasonable man ever be content with himself even if he had acquired riches."

"May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited most of your wealth, or did you make it yourself?"

"You want to know how much I made, Socrates?" he said. "As a businessman, I come somewhere between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake inherited about as much as I now have and multiplied it many times, whereas my father Lysanias reduced it to less than it is now. For myself, I'm well pleased if I pass on to these sons of mine not less, but a little more than I inherited."

"The reason I asked," I said, "is that you didn't strike

<sup>16</sup> The same anecdote in Hdt. (8.125), but with different details.

c σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα, τούτο δὲ ποιούσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσονται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν. | καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ συγγενέσθαι εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ μοι ἔτι τοσούδε εἰπέ· τί μέγιστον οἶε ἀγαθὸν ἀπολεαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτηῆσθαι;

“Ὁ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. | εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσῃ, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήει. οἱ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ

e ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν καὶ αὐτός— ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὧν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά— ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίνεταί καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη | καὶ σκοπεῖ εἴ τινα τι ἠδίκηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνων,

<sup>17</sup> For the parent/poet/moneymaker comparison, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.1.20.

<sup>18</sup> For the tradition of rewards and punishments for the insubstantial ghost of the individual in the after-

life, see Hom. *Od.* 11.576–600. This idea is prominent in the Mystery Religions, such as at Eleusis (see Pind. fr. 121 Bowra), taken up by Plato in *Grg.* 523ff., *Phd.* 107dff., and most elaborately in the “Myth of Er” (see *Resp.* 614aff).

“You’re right,” he said.

“I certainly am,” I said. “But tell me this too; what do you believe is the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the acquisition of all your wealth?”

“Something,” he said, “which perhaps would not convince many, if I told them. For let me tell you, Socrates,” he said, “that whenever someone gets close to thinking he will die, fear and worry come upon him about things which didn’t occur to him before. The stories told about what goes on in Hades, how the wrongdoer here must suffer punishment there, which he earlier laughed at, now torment his soul in case they are true.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, either through the feebleness of old age, or because he is indeed now nearer to the beyond as it were, and so perceives it somewhat more clearly, he himself becomes filled with suspicion and fear and now begins to reckon up and consider if there is anyone he has wronged in any way. What is more the one who finds he has committed many injus-

331 ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῆ  
μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον συνειδῶτι  
ἠδέϊα ἐλπίς αἰεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ  
Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ'  
ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως τὸν βίον  
διαγάγῃ,

a γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν  
ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ  
ἐλπίς ἂ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύστροφον  
γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ'  
ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πλείστου  
b ἀξίαν εἶναι, | οὐ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικέι.<sup>2</sup> τὸ  
γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἔξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ'  
αὐτὸν ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινας ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα  
ἔπειτα ἐκέισε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ  
τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. | ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλ-  
λας χρείας πολλὰς· ἀλλὰ γε ἔν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχι-  
στον ἔγωγε θέην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ  
Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

c Παγκάλως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ'  
αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ  
φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι ἂν τίς  
τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν

<sup>2</sup> ἐπιεικέι DF: ἐπιεικέι καὶ κοσμίῳ Stob.

tices in his life and, like children, is frequently woken by his dreams, is afraid and lives in fear of the worst. But if a person is conscious of having done no wrong, sweet hope is ever present to cheer him and to be the good 'nourisher of old age' as Pindar himself has it. I tell you Socrates, this is a beautiful saying of his about the man who lives his life in justice and piety,

Sweet expectation that nurtures old age,  
Fosters and accompanies the heart,  
And above all guides the complex  
Mind of mortals.<sup>19</sup>

He puts that so wonderfully well! It is indeed in this respect that I take the acquisition of wealth to be of the highest value, certainly not for everyone, but for the decent person. For when it comes to cheating anyone even unintentionally or telling lies, or again, owing anything—any sacrifices to a god, or money to a person, and so departing for the other world in fear, the acquisition of wealth goes a long way toward avoiding such a misfortune. And it has many other uses also; but taking one thing with another I would propose that, for a man of sense, Socrates, this is not the least important thing for which wealth is particularly useful.<sup>20</sup>

"Most beautifully put, Cephalus," I said.<sup>21</sup> But let's take this very thing, justice: are we to say that it is simply truthfulness without qualification, and the giving back of whatever one may have taken from someone else? Or is it

<sup>19</sup> Pind. fr. 202 Bowra. <sup>20</sup> Plato characterizes the elderly Cephalus with a prolix and discursive style which verges on parody in this final sentence. <sup>21</sup> See above, n. 15.

δικαίως, ἐνίστε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; | οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω·  
 πᾶς ἂν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς  
 σωφρονοῦντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανείς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρῆ  
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀπο-  
 διδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων  
 τᾶληθῆ λέγειν.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὄρος ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε  
 λέγειν καὶ ἂ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πο-  
 λέμαρχος, εἶπερ γέ τι χρῆ Σιμωνίδη πείθεσθαι. |

Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν  
 τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἐγώ,<sup>3</sup> ὁ Πολέμαρχος, τῶν γε σῶν  
 κληρονόμος;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς γελάσας, καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ  
 ἱερά. |

e Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος,  
 τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δι-  
 καιοσύνης;

Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστω ἀποδιδόναι  
 δίκαιόν ἐστι τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέ-  
 γειν. |

<sup>3</sup> ἔφη ἐγώ AD: ἐγὼ ἔφη F

<sup>22</sup> An example of a Socratic *elenchus*: putting up a trial defini-  
 tion (in this case an obviously inadequate one) for debate; see  
 the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (b)). S. also re-  
 hearses this argument in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.17–18.

possible to do these very same things sometimes justly and  
 sometimes unjustly? To take an example of what I mean:  
 I think everyone would agree that if one were to take  
 weapons from a friend who is a man of sound mind, and  
 if he were to go mad and demand them back, one ought  
 not to return them. The one giving them back would not  
 be ‘just’ to do so, and again one should not be willing to  
 tell the whole truth to somebody in that state.”<sup>22</sup>

“You’re right,” he replied.

“Then this is not a definition of justice: to tell the truth  
 and give back whatever one has taken.”

“Oh but it is, Socrates,” said Polemarchus taking up the  
 argument, “at any rate if we’re to believe Simonides.”

“Well now,” said Cephalus, “I’ll hand the discussion  
 over to you two; for it’s time for me to see to the sacri-  
 fices.”

“So does that make me, Polemarchus, heir to what is  
 yours?” he said.

“Certainly it does,” replied Cephalus with a laugh, and  
 he promptly went off to the sacrifices.<sup>23</sup>

“So tell me,” I said, “you who are heir to the discussion,  
 what is it that Simonides says about justice which you think  
 is right?”<sup>24</sup>

“That it is just to give back to everyone what he is  
 owed,” he replied. “At least I think he is right in putting it  
 like this.”

<sup>23</sup> Cic. *Att.* 4.16.3, comments, apparently without irony, that  
 Plato did not think it appropriate to keep a man of Cephalus’ age  
 too long in conversation.

<sup>24</sup> Polemarchus is heir to the argument as well as Cephalus’  
 property; the Greek exploits the ambiguity.

Ἄλλα μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν—σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ—τοῦτο μέντοι ὅτι ποτὲ λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γινώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένον τι ὄψωϋν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι. καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστιν τοῦτο ὃ παρακατέθετο ἡ γάρ;

Ναί.

Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν τότε ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ; |

Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.

Ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί, ἔφη τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μῆδέν. |

Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὅς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῶ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὃ ἀποδιδούς—οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅτι ἂν τύχη ὀφειλόμενον; |

<sup>25</sup> S. regularly uses “inspired” (*theios* = literally “godlike”) ironically, to imply that poets, like prophets, spoke under divine influence but with obscure meaning (see *Ap.* 22a–c, *Ion* 542a, *Prt.*

“Well, it is certainly not easy to disbelieve Simonides,” I said, “for he was after all a wise and inspired man.<sup>25</sup> However as to whatever he means by this, Polemarchus, perhaps you know: I don’t. For he obviously doesn’t mean what we were saying just now, to return anything deposited with us by anyone, even if the person asking for it back is not in his right mind. And yet what he entrusted to us is surely owed to him. Isn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“But that means that if anyone demands something back when they are not in their right mind, in no circumstances should it be returned?”

“True,” he replied.

“Then it seems that Simonides means something other than this when he says that it is just to give back what is owed.”

“Definitely something else, by Zeus,” he replied; “for he thinks that friends owe it to friends to do them something good and not something harmful.”

“I see,” I said: “If two people are friends, and one gives back money deposited with him to the other when the exchange is going to cause harm, the one returning the money is not giving the other what is owed to him. Isn’t that what you claim Simonides is saying?”

“Certainly.”

“But how about this: oughtn’t enemies to be repaid whatever happens to be owed to them?”

315e, *Men.* 99c, and on poetry in general see below, Books 2 and 3 *passim*). This saying of Simonides (sixth/fifth century) is otherwise unknown.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρὰ γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

Ἦνίξαστο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἶη, διανοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον.

Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. |

Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο. “ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἢ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται;” τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;

Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἢ σώμασιν φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. |

Ἦ δὲ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται;

Ἦ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.

Εἶεν ἢ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;

Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένους, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα. |

Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εἶ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

<sup>26</sup> Doing good to friends and evil to enemies was traditional Greek morality, see e.g., *Men.* 71e.

<sup>27</sup> See above, n. 25.

“Yes absolutely, of course they should get what is owed to them,” he said; “and what is more I think that what is owed by one enemy to another should be something appropriate: something bad.”<sup>26</sup>

“So it seems that Simonides was talking in riddles as poets do,” I said, “to produce his definition of ‘just.’<sup>27</sup> For he was apparently thinking that it is just to pay back to each person what is appropriate, and this is what he meant by ‘what is owed.’”

“Well, what do you think he meant?” he said.

“By Zeus,” I said, “what if someone were to ask Simonides: ‘What is the art called medicine? What does it repay that is owed and appropriate, and to what things?’ How do you think he would reply to us?”

“Obviously,” he said, “it’s the art<sup>28</sup> which gives drugs, food and drink to the body.”

“And what art is known as cookery? What does it give which is owed and appropriate, and to what?”

“It is the one which gives food its seasoning.”

“Good. So then, the art of what we repay and to whom could be called justice?”

“If we must be at all consistent with what we said before, Socrates, it must be the art which renders benefit to our friends and harm to our enemies.”

“So he means that justice is to do good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies?”

“I think so.”

<sup>28</sup> *Technē*: = “art” or “skill” (a body of expert knowledge), a key term in the argument with Polemarchus, as later with Thrasymachus; see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (b)).

Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν  
καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν;

Ἴατρός.

e Τίς δὲ πλείοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον;  
Κυβερνήτης.

Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον  
δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; |

Ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ συμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε  
δοκεῖ.

Εἶεν μὴ κάμνουσί γε μὴν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε,  
ιατρὸς ἄχρηστος.

Ἄληθῆ.

Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης. |

Ναί.

Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρη-  
στος;

Οὐ πᾶν μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

333 Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

Χρήσιμον.

Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία ἢ οὐ;

Ναί. |

Πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτήσιν;

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;

Ναί.

Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἂν οἶμαι φαίης κτήσιν; |

Πᾶν γε.

"Now in matters of sickness and health, who is best  
able to do good to friends and harm to enemies when they  
are ill?"

"A doctor."

"And who for those who sail, as regards the dangers of  
the sea?"

"A ship's captain."

"But what of the just man? In what action and in what  
function is he most able to benefit friends and harm ene-  
mies?"

"In making war and alliances, I would think."

"Very well; but when someone is not ill, my dear Pole-  
marchus, a doctor is useless."

"True."

"And likewise, when people are not at sea, a ship's cap-  
tain is useless."

"Yes."

"So likewise for those not fighting a war the just man is  
useless?"

"Oh no, that doesn't seem to be true to me at all."

"So justice is also a useful thing in peacetime?"

"It is."

"Yes, and so is farming, isn't it?"

"Yes."

"For producing crops?"

"Yes."

"And likewise, shoemaking?"

"Yes."

"I presume you would say, for producing shoes?"

"Of course."

Τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρεῖαν ἢ κτήσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμοι εἶναι;

Πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο; |

b Κοινωνήματα δῆτα.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός;

Ὁ πεττευτικός.

Ἄλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμότερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ; |

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ,<sup>4</sup> ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;

Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. |

c Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρήσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀποδόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός. ἢ γάρ;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης; |

Ἔοικεν.

Ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμότερος τῶν ἄλλων;

Ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

<sup>4</sup> κιθαριστικοῦ AF: οἰκοδομικοῦ τε καὶ κιθαριστικοῦ D

"So what about justice, now? For what need, or for producing what would you say it was useful in peacetime?"

"It's useful in connection with business contracts, Socrates."

"By business contracts do you mean partnerships, or something else?"

"Yes, I mean partnerships."

"Now, when it comes to playing draughts, is the just man a good useful partner, or someone skilled in playing draughts?"

"The person skilled in playing draughts."

"And in laying bricks and stone is the just man a better, more useful partner than the builder?"

"Of course not."

"Well then, for what partnership is the just man a better partner than the lyre player, just as the lyre player is better at playing the lyre than the just man?"

"Where money is involved, I would say."

"Except, Polemarchus, perhaps when it comes to using money when you need to buy or sell a horse jointly; then, I presume, you need a trained horseman: isn't that so?"

"Apparently."

"And again, when it comes to a ship, the shipbuilder or ship's captain?"

"It seems so."

"So what then is the occasion for the joint use of silver or gold when the just man is a more useful partner than others?"

"When it is to be put on deposit and kept safe, Socrates."

Ὀυκοῦν λέγεις ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ  
κείσθαι; |

Πάνυ γε.

Ὅταν ἄρα ἀχρηστον ᾗ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος  
ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη;

d Κινδυνεύει.

Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη  
χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἡ ἀμ-  
πελοργική; |

Φαίνεται.

Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν  
καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην,  
ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; |  
Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστω  
ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἀχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος;  
Κινδυνεύει.

e Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἶη ἡ  
δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἀχρηστα χρήσιμον ὄν. τυγα-  
χάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἂρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότα-  
τος ἐν μάχῃ εἶτε πυκτικῇ εἶτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ  
φυλάξασθαι;

<sup>29</sup> S. polishes off the argument with a polar expression in epigrammatic form: literally: "in use useless, in uselessness useful" (ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἀχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος), a neatly balanced "chiastic" (ABBA) form of expression. The snappy, mannered epigram and paradoxical expression, reminiscent of the sophist Gorgias, is perhaps intended by Plato to indicate the sophistic tendency of S.'s whole line of argument here. Note also

"In fact, you mean, when we have no need to use it at all, but to put it by?"

"Exactly."

"So when money is useless, that's when justice is useful in relation to it?"

"It looks that way."

"And so when a pruning knife needs to be kept safe, justice is useful both in the community and in private life; but when you need to use it you turn to the art of viticulture?"

"It seems so."

"And so will you say that when you need a shield or a lyre to be kept safe without using it, justice is useful, but when they need to be used you turn to the skills of the hoplite or the musician?"

"That follows."

"So in all other cases, too, justice is useless when each thing is being used, but useful when it is not?"<sup>29</sup>

"It seems so."

"Then, my friend, justice can't be anything very important, if it turns out to be useful for things only when they are out of use. But let's consider this point: isn't the person who is most formidable in striking blows in a fight, whether boxing or any other kind, also the one who is best at defending himself against them?"<sup>30</sup>

Polemarchus' less than enthusiastic response in the following line.

<sup>30</sup> Not obviously true (one might argue that defense and attack require different skills), but the two aspects have to be subsumed under the heading of a "unitary" skill, if S.'s argument is going to work here. In Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.6, S. assumes that generalship involves skills of both defense and attack.

Πάνυ γε. |

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ  
λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμπούησας;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

334 Ἄλλα μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός,  
ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευματα  
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις;

Πάνυ γε. |

Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δει-  
νός.

Ἔοικεν.

Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ  
κλέπτειν δεινός.

Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. |

Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται,  
καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ  
γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππου  
b Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώ-  
πους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκῳ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ  
δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σέ καὶ καθ' Ὀμηρον καὶ κατὰ  
Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν  
φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. | οὐχ οὕτως ἔλε-  
γες;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι  
ἐλεγον· τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν  
τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς  
c ἐχθρούς.

"Certainly."

"And again, the person who is skilled at guarding  
against disease is the one best able to cause it unde-  
tected?"

"I think so."

"Then again, the same man is a good guard of a military  
camp who can also get hold of the plans and other activi-  
ties of the enemy?"

"Of course."

"So, whatever someone is skillful at guarding, he will  
also be a skillful at stealing?"<sup>31</sup>

"I suppose so."

"If then the just person is good at guarding money, he  
will also be good at stealing it."

"That's the way the argument seems to be pointing," he  
said.

"Then it appears that the just man is unveiled as some  
kind of thief, and you're likely to have learned that from  
Homer. For I tell you he's fond of Autolycus, Odysseus'  
maternal grandfather, and says that 'he excelled all men in  
thieving and perjury.'<sup>32</sup> So justice, according to you, Ho-  
mer and Simonides, seems to be some kind of art of steal-  
ing, with the proviso that it must be for the benefit of your  
friends and to the detriment of your enemies. Isn't that  
what you meant?"

"Zeus no!" he said, "but I no longer know what I did  
mean.<sup>33</sup> However I still think myself that justice is helping  
one's friends and harming one's enemies."

<sup>31</sup> For this paradox, see *Hp. Mi.* 375d-76b.

<sup>32</sup> See *Hom. Od.* 19.395. Clearly a joking reference.

<sup>33</sup> For S.'s capacity to bewilder his associates in the *elenchus*,  
see e.g., *Euthphr.* 11b, *La.* 194b, *Men.* 80a.

Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας  
ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι,  
καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;

Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὐδ' ἂν τις ἡγήται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν,  
οὐδ' ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο,  
ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ  
ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοῦναντίον;

Ἅμαρτάνουσιν. |

Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ  
φίλοι;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἄλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς  
ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν;

Φαίνεται.

d Ἄλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἱοὶ μὴ  
ἀδικεῖν;

Ἀληθῆ.

Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας  
δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. |

Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν  
εἶναι ὁ λόγος.

Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν,  
τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν;

Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. |

"When you say friends, do you mean those who seem  
to be true to each of us, or those who really are true, even  
if they don't seem to be so; and similarly with enemies?"

"It makes sense," he said, "to like those one considers  
true and dislike those one thinks bad."

"But then, don't you think people make mistakes about  
this, so that they think many people are good when they  
aren't really, and many are the opposite?"

"They do."

"For these people, then, the good are their enemies  
and the bad their friends?"

"Yes, indeed."

"But is it nevertheless just in that case for them to help  
the bad and harm the good?"

"It would seem so."

"But surely good people are just and cannot do  
wrong?"

"True."

"So according to your argument it is just to do harm to  
those who do no injustice."

"No, no, Socrates," he said, "that seems to be a bad  
argument."

"Then," I said, "it must be just to harm the unjust and  
help the just?"

"That seems a better conclusion than the previous  
one."

e Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, συμβήσεται, ὅσοι  
 διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν  
 φίλους βλάπτειν—πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσιν—τοὺς δ'  
 ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν—ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν  
 αὐτὸ τούναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. |

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω συμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα·  
 κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν  
 θέσθαι.

Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε;

Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι.

Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; |

335 Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν  
 φίλον· τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ  
 μὴ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ  
 θέσις.

Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς  
 ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός.

Ναί. |

Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ  
 πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φί-  
 λον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ  
 ᾧδε λέγειν,<sup>5</sup> τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν  
 δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν;

b Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς  
 λέγεσθαι.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν  
 καὶ ὄντινον ἀνθρώπων;

<sup>5</sup> λέγειν F: λέγειν ὅτι ἔστιν δίκαιον AD

“So, for many people who have misjudged their fel-  
 lows, it will turn out to be just to harm their friends, who  
 are bad as far as they are concerned, and help their ene-  
 mies, who are good, won't it? And thus we'll be saying the  
 very opposite of what we claimed Simonides meant.”

“It certainly does work out like that,” he said. “But  
 let's change our ground: you see perhaps we didn't define  
 'friend' and 'enemy' correctly.”

“How did we define them, Polemarchus?”

“We said that the person who seems to be true is our  
 friend.”

“But how are we to change it now?” I asked.

“By stating,” he said, “that the one who seems to be  
 good and actually is good is the friend, while the one who  
 seems to be good, but in reality is not, is not our friend,  
 though he may seem so. And the same definition applies  
 to an enemy.”

“Then it seems by this definition that the good person  
 will be our friend, and the bad one our enemy.”

“Yes.”

“So you're telling us to add to our definition of the just.  
 Rather than as we first defined it, when we said that it was  
 just to do good to a friend and harm to an enemy, now we  
 are to add: that it is just to do good to a friend who is good,  
 and to harm an enemy who is bad?”

“Certainly,” he replied, “that seems a good way of put-  
 ting it.”

“But is it part of being a just man,” I asked, “to harm  
 any human being at all?”

Καὶ πάνν γε, ἔφη· τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς  
δεῖ βλάπτειν. |

Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνου-  
ται;

Χείρους.

Ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν  
ἵππων;

Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. |

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται  
εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρε-  
τήν;

Ἀνάγκη.

c Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν,  
βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους  
γίγνεσθαι;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Ἄλλ' ἢ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή; |

Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώ-  
πων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι.

Ἔοικεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύναν-  
ται ποιεῖν; |

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἄλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ἄλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ  
συλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς;

"Yes, indeed," he replied, "he ought to harm those who  
are both bad and his enemies."

"When horses are harmed, do they become better or  
worse?"

"Worse."

"Judging by the standards of excellence of dogs or of  
horses?"

"Of horses."

"And dogs, too, if harmed, become worse by the stan-  
dards of dogs and not of horses?"

"That follows."

"But as for human beings, my friend, mustn't we say  
that when harmed they become worse by human stan-  
dards?"

"Certainly."

"And is not justice a human excellence?"

"That also follows."

"So, my friend, those men who are harmed necessarily  
become more unjust."

"So it seems."

"Well, are musicians able to make people unmusical  
through their musicianship?"

"Impossible."

"Or horsemen able to make people bad riders through  
their horsemanship?"

"No."

"Well, is it by justice, then, that the just make people  
unjust, or, in short, is it by their standards of excellence as  
humans that the good make people bad?"

- d Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον.  
 Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος οἶμαι ἔργον ψύχειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. |  
 Ναί.  
 Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.  
 Πάνν γε.  
 Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.  
 Φαίνεται. |  
 Ὅ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;  
 Πάνν γε.  
 Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου.
- e Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
 Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναί φησὶν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν. | οὐδαμῶ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὄν βλάπτειν.  
 Συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 Μαχόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν

- "No, that cannot be."  
 "You see, it's not, I think, the function of heat to cool things down, but the opposite."  
 "Yes."  
 "Nor of dryness to make things wet, but the opposite."  
 "Of course."  
 "Nor indeed is it the function of the good person to do harm, but the opposite."  
 "So it appears."  
 "And the just person is good, isn't he?"  
 "Of course."  
 "Then, Polemarchus, it is not the function of the just person to harm either a friend or anyone else, but that of his opposite, the unjust person."  
 "I think you're entirely right, Socrates," he said.  
 "So if anyone claims that it is just to render to each what is owed, and by that he actually means that harm is due from the just man to his enemies and benefit to his friends, the man who said this was not wise. You see what he said is not true; it's become apparent to us that it is in no way just to harm anyone."<sup>34</sup>  
 "I concede that," he said.  
 "So you and I," I said, "will fight together against anyone who claims that this view was put forward by Simo-

<sup>34</sup> That a genuine *technē* can only benefit its recipient is a fundamental tenet of Socratic ethics, thereby refuting Simonides: the just person cannot harm his enemies. Note, however, that in the immediate context S.'s conclusion simply constitutes *aporia* (impasse); in refuting Polemarchus (Simonides) they have actually failed to discover what justice is (see 336a10 below).

εἰρηκέναι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. |

Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης.

336 Ἄλλ' οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

Τίνος; ἔφη. |

Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θεβαίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίον ἀνδρός.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι; |

b Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπανσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, | ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

<sup>35</sup> Bias and Pittacus were sixth-century statesmen and lawgivers (two of the traditional seven "wise men"). "Blessed" (*makarios*) and "wise" (*sophos*) clearly have ironical overtones here, the irony being underlined by S.'s assumption, tongue in cheek, that rather than show these wise men to be wrong, one must deny that they could be responsible for the words attributed to them. In the following line, the irony is clearly lost on Polemarchus.

nides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other of the wise and blessed."<sup>35</sup>

"Well," he said, "I'm ready enough to join in the fight."

"But do you know," I said, "whose saying I think it is: the one which says that it is just to benefit friends, and to harm enemies?"

"Whose?" he asked.

"I think it must be from Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias of Thebes, or some other rich man with a great belief in his capabilities."<sup>36</sup>

"That's very true," he said.

"Well then," I said, "since it's become apparent that neither 'justice' nor the 'just' consists in this, what else can anyone suggest it is?"

Now Thrasymachus, even while we were talking, had many times been eagerly trying to get between us and take hold of the argument. Up to this point however he had been restrained by those sitting near him who wanted to hear the argument out. When we finally brought it to an end and I had asked my question, he could no longer keep quiet, but, gathering himself up like a wild beast, he sprang

<sup>36</sup> The first three were absolute rulers (of Corinth, Macedon, and Persia, respectively), whose despotic power makes them likely candidates. Ismenias of Thebes was involved in a scandal of taking bribes from Greece's enemy, Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1). The reference to Ismenias, dated after S.'s death to 395, is clearly anachronistic in the dramatic context (see General Introduction, section 3).

διαρπασόμενος. Καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δέ-  
 σταντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος,  
 c Τίς, ἔφη, ὑμᾶς πάλοι φλυαρία ἔχει, ᾧ Σώκρατες; καὶ  
 τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλιόμενοι ὑμῖν  
 αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ  
 δίκαιον ὅτι ἔστι, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ  
 ἐλέγχων ἐπειδάν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκὼς τοῦτο,  
 ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, | ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς  
 ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπὲ τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ὅπως  
 d μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον  
 μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι  
 τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι  
 ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι ἐὰν ὕθλους του-  
 ούτους λέγῃς. |

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων  
 αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐω-  
 ράκη αὐτὸν ἢ κείνος ἐμέ, ἄφρωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ  
 ἠνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσ-  
 ἐβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγενόμην  
 e ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων· Ἦ Θρασύμαχε,  
 μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γάρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ  
 τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὄδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκουτες  
 ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶον, εἰ μὲν χρυσιόν ἐζη-  
 τοῦμεν, | οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατα-

<sup>37</sup> The imagery here has mock-heroic overtones, cf. the Homeric simile-type of Greeks fighting compared to wild animals attacking sheep, e.g., at *Il.* 16.352ff., *Od.* 18.340. Plato uses S.

on us as if he wanted to tear us to pieces.<sup>37</sup> Both Polemarchus and I were struck with fear and panic as he bawled out to the whole circle: "What rubbish is this that has got hold of you all this time, Socrates? And why do you play the fool, deferring to each other like this? If you really wish to know what justice is, Socrates, don't just ask questions, or show off by refuting anyone who answers you, while you know that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. So give an answer yourself and say what you claim justice is. And don't you go telling me that it is 'the obligatory,' or 'the beneficial,' or 'the advantageous,' or 'the profitable,' or 'the expedient,' but, whatever you say, make your definition clear and precise; for I won't take that sort of drivel from you."

When I heard this I was astounded, and looking at him I was filled with fear and I believe that if I hadn't looked at him before he looked at me, I'd have become speechless.<sup>38</sup> But at the very moment he began to be exasperated as a result of the argument, I glanced at him first, so that I was able to answer him, and trembling a little I said: "Don't be hard on us, Thrasymachus. You see if I and my friend here have missed the point in any way in our discussion of the argument, rest assured it was not deliberate error on our part. Certainly don't imagine that if we were looking for a piece of gold<sup>39</sup> we would never willingly defer

in his narrator role to begin an unflattering portrait of Thrasymachus before the latter even opens his mouth.

<sup>38</sup> S., close to playing the fool here, turns a traditional superstition into a joke: if a wolf looks at you before you catch sight of it, you are rendered dumb, cf. Verg. *Ecl.* 9.53.

<sup>39</sup> For gold as wisdom, cf. Heraclit. DK 22B22.

κλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὔρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπέκκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅτι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἴου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δύναμεθα· ἐλεείσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

337 Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάκχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, | καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προύλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐβελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σ' ἐρωτᾷ.

Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· εὐ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὅποσα ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ—“Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ μῆδ' ὅτι τρεῖς τέτταρα μῆδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μῆδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῆς”—δηλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ. | ἀλλ' εἴ σοι εἶπεν· “ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προείπες μῆδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μῆδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα;

<sup>40</sup> *Eirōneia* (irony) is habitually attributed to S. by Plato, here in its original sense of “deliberate deceit” (see *Ar. Vesp.* 169–74, *Av.* 1208–11, *Nub.* 444–51) as opposed to the modern sense of

to each other in the search and ruin our chances of finding it, yet in searching for justice, an objective more valuable than masses of gold, we would be so thoughtless as to give way to each other and not seriously do our very best to bring it to light. Believe me, we are serious, my friend; but I think it's the ability we lack. So I think it is far more reasonable for us to be pitied by clever fellows like you rather than be victims of your anger.”

When he heard this he burst into loud sarcastic laughter and said: “Heracles! Here we have that usual ironic evasion of Socrates;<sup>40</sup> I knew it and told these people before that you would not be willing to answer questions, but would sham ignorance and do anything to avoid answering any questions.”

“That’s because you’re clever, Thrasymachus,” I said. “So you knew very well that if you were to ask anyone what are the factors of twelve, and in putting the question you warned him: ‘Be sure not to tell me that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, because I will not accept that kind of nonsense from you,’ I think it was clear to you that nobody would answer a question put like that. But if he had said to you: ‘What do you mean, Thrasymachus? May I not give any of the answers you have mentioned? Even if it really is one of these, my dear fellow, must I still give something other than the real one? Or do you mean something else?’ What would your answer be?”

irony, where the point is that there is a distinction between surface and underlying meaning. However, there is also a sense in which S. might be able to justify his claim of ignorance as sincere (see e.g., *Ap.* 23a–b).

- c Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνω.  
 Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἥττόν τι αὐτὸν οἶε ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἑάντε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἄντε μή; |  
 Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις· ὦν ἐγὼ ἀπέειπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινῆ;  
 Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἴ μοι σκεψαμένω οὕτω δόξειεν. |
- d Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δεῖξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίω τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν;  
 Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότε; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιώ παθεῖν. |  
 Ἦδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπό-  
 τεισον ἀργύριον.  
 Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται, εἶπον.  
 Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· ἀλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσ-  
 οῖσομεν. |
- e Πάνν γε οἶμαι, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ.  
 Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο

"Well," he replied, "this instance is just like the previous one, to be sure!"

"I can't see why it shouldn't be," I said, "but even assuming the examples are not alike, yet appear so to the person questioned, do you think he is any less likely to give what he thinks is the right answer, whether we forbid him to or not?"

"So you're going to do it in some other way, is that it?" he asked: "you're going to give one of the answers I've forbidden?"

"I wouldn't be surprised," I said, "if on reflection I decided to do that."

"So what if I demonstrate that there is an answer about justice which is different from all these and better? What penalty ought you to incur?"<sup>41</sup>

"What else," I said, "than what is fitting for the man who doesn't know? I think it is fitting to learn from those who know. So that's what I propose as my penalty."

"You play the innocent!" he said, "but along with the learning you must pay some money too."

"Sure! Whenever I get some," I said.

"Oh, there is some," said Glaucon; "if money is the problem, go ahead, Thrasymachus, for we'll all chip in for Socrates."<sup>42</sup>

"Oh yes, I'm sure you will," he said, "so that Socrates can do his usual trick, not answer himself, but demand an explanation and refute someone else's attempt."

"Yes, my good fellow," I said, "for how could anyone

<sup>41</sup> A formula from Athenian court procedure: the defendant has a right to propose his own penalty, along with that of the prosecutor (e.g., *Ap.* 36b). <sup>42</sup> For his friends' willingness to subsidize S., cf. *Ap.* 38b, *Cri.* 45b.

338 πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδῶς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, | ἔπειτα,  
εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται, περὶ τούτων ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶη  
ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἠγέεται ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου;  
ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς  
εἰδέναι καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ  
ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ  
Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

Ἐπιπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα, ὅ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι  
ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. | καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος  
φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν,  
ἠγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο  
δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.  
b τελευτῶν δὲ συνεχώρησεν, κάπειτα, Αὕτη δὴ, ἔφη, ἡ  
Σωκράτους σοφία· αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν,  
παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιούνητα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων  
μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. |

“Ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων,  
ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν  
ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδῃ· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ  
ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προ-  
θύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τις μοι δοκῇ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσῃ  
αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὴν ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γάρ σε εὖ  
εἶρεν.

c “Ἄκουε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον  
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί  
οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις. |

answer if in the first place he has no knowledge and is making no claim to it; and secondly, even if he had an opinion, he has been forbidden by a man of no mean reputation to say anything of what he believed? But actually it's more reasonable for you to do the talking; you're the one who claims to know and has something to say. So don't hesitate, but gratify me by answering my questions, and don't begrudge instructing Glaucon here and the others.”

When I said this, Glaucon and the others begged him do just as I asked. It was clear that Thrasymachus was keen to speak in order to gain credit, since he believed he had a brilliant answer; but he went on pretending to be keen for me to be the one to answer the questions. Finally he gave way and then said: “there you are: this is the wisdom of Socrates; he's not willing himself to teach, but goes about learning from others and doesn't even show gratitude.”

“When you said I learn from others, Thrasymachus,” I said, “that's true. But you're mistaken when you claim that I'm not grateful in return: for I pay back as much as I can. But I can only bestow praise, as I have no money. You'll find out how readily I do this when I think someone gives a good answer, at the very moment you give your reply: for I think you will argue your case well.”

“Listen then,” he said: “for I say that justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.<sup>43</sup> Well, why don't you praise me? You just won't do it.”

<sup>43</sup> On the significance of Thrasymachus' various definitions of justice/injustice in this whole section (esp. 343b–d) and S.'s counterarguments, see the introduction to Books 1–5, section 1 (Book 1 (c)).

Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφη, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς συμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πολυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ συμφέροι τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον.

d Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτῇ ὑπολαμβάνεις ἢ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον.

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις. |

Εἴτ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννούνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; |

Πάννυ γε.

e Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννίς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. | τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ταῦτόν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον· αὕτη δὲ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. |

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"I will," I said, "provided that I first understand what you mean, because at the moment I'm not yet clear. You say that the advantage of the stronger is just. But whatever do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? For I can't imagine you're claiming something like this: if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and it's to his advantage to eat beef to keep fit, that this diet is advantageous and just for us too, who are weaker than him."

"You are appalling, Socrates," he said; "you take my statement in whatever sense is most likely to wreck it."

"Not at all, my dear fellow," I said; "just explain more clearly what you mean."

"Do you mean to say," he said, "that you don't know that some cities are governed by tyrants, some by democrats and some by aristocrats?"

"Of course."

"And so what has control in each city state is the ruling power?"

"Certainly."

"But each ruling power passes laws with a view to its own advantage: a democracy passes democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical ones, and so on with the rest. In passing them, the rulers proclaim that what is to their own advantage is just for those who are ruled by them, and if anyone deviates from this they punish them as lawbreakers and criminals. So that is what I mean, my dear fellow, when I say that justice is the same in all cities: that which is to the advantage of the established regime. This, I think, is what exercises sovereign power, so that to anyone who reasons correctly justice is the same everywhere, namely the advantage of the stronger."

Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἡ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι—καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην—πρόσεστιν δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ “τοῦ κρείττονος.”

b Σμικρά γε ἕως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.

Οὕτω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτόν εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγεις, δῆλον. | ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστιθεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτόν δῆ.

Σκόπει, ἔφη.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μοι εἶπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; |

Ἔγωγε.

c Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἰοί τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν;

Πάντως πον, ἔφη, οἰοί τι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τινὰς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; |

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ τὰ συμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀσύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Οὕτως. |

“Now,” I said, “I grasp your meaning; but I will try to find out whether you are right or not. You yourself have answered that what is just is what is advantageous, Thrasymachus; and yet this was an answer you forbade me to make; but you immediately added the qualification: advantageous ‘to the stronger.’”

“A trivial addition, perhaps!” he said.

“Well, it’s not even clear yet if it might be significant. But what is clear is that we must consider whether what you say is true. Now even I agree with your definition that what is just is some kind of advantage, but you go further and say that it is the advantage of the stronger person, and this is what I don’t know about. We really must look into it.”

“Go ahead,” he said.

“I shall,” I said. “Tell me, don’t you claim too, that it’s obeying those in authority that is just?”

“I do.”

“Are the rulers in the various cities infallible or can they sometimes make mistakes?”

“Of course,” he said; “I think they can make some mistakes.”

“Therefore in attempting to legislate, some laws they get right and some not?”

“I suppose so.”

“Getting them right implies doing it to their own advantage, and wrong, to their disadvantage, doesn’t it? Is that what you mean?”

“Precisely.”